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Abstract 
This thesis examines Australia's engagement with the Asia-Pacific. It seeks to locate 
Australian foreign policy within a larger Westerri discourse of international relations (IR) 
and geopolitics which has provided the dominant understandings, meanings and boundaries 
of international political life in the modem period. In the chapters to follow, I show how this 
larger discourse has been articulated in the history of Australian foreign policy through the 
dominant elite perspectives of market liberalism and power politics realism. Rather than 
treating these perspectives as discrete, mutually exclusive theories of IR, however, I 
understand each as contending poles of this larger Western discourse. In doing so, I argue 
that liberalism and realism have traditionally framed Australia's encounter with the Asia-
Pacific region. I also show that, in continuing to draw on these dominant perspectives, 
contemporary policy-makers have pursued a diplomacy of regional engagement designed to 
integrate Australian strategic and trade interests more fully into the rapidly growing 
economies of Asia. 
This thesis provides a critique of this regional diplomacy as an inadequate and narrow policy 
agenda that has focused on engaging with, and buttressing, unaccountable and undemocratic 
elites in the region. That has been at the expense of a more wide-ranging regional 
) ~ngagement with the grassroots communities of the Asia-Pacific. In advancing such a 
critique, this work is designed to count the costs and dangers of a foreign policy so 
unequivocally aligned to repressive and anti-democratic forces in the region. Those forces 
have engendered precisely the kinds of instabilities, volatilities and insecurities that 
contemporary foreign policy has been designed to counter. 
In pointing out as much, however, this thesis is not intended as a blanket condemnation of 
contemporary foreign policy for as I acknowledge there are some commendable elements of 
our recent regional policies. Those elements provide a glimpse of where we might begin to 
creatively respond to the challenges of contemporary global life. In particular, the 
acknowledgment by the more intelligent sectors of the foreign policy community that we 
need to seriously rethink identity through a fundamental intellectual and cultural engagement 
with the region represents an important insight in the context of present foreign policy 
challenges. 
The overall purpose of this thesis, then, is to question the more narrowly-conceived policy 
perspectives of Australian diplomacy. The aim in doing so is to open up space in which to 
rethink the dominant perspectives of liberalism and realism which have underpinned foreign 
policy. In the fmal part of this work, accordingly, I discuss how it might be possible to think 
beyond the realist-liberal impasse of prevailing foreign policy discourse in order to formulate 
:Qerspectives more attuned to the everyday realities of regional life. I conclude that the 
formulation of such alternatives to traditional ways of thinking is imperative if more 
equitable, just and sustainable ways of life across the Pacific are to be achieved than those 
which are currently developing. 
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Australia in the Pacific Century 1 
Introduction 
Australian Foreign Policy in the Pacific Century1 
Amidst the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era- of the disintegration of existing 
states, the re-emergence of ethnonationalism and the increase in capital and technology 
flows across national boundaries - the rise of the Asia-Pacific has represented a story of 
alluring teleological attraction to policy-makers, journalists and scholars alike. Given this 
attraction, it is hardly surprising that the Asia-Pacific region has also become a 
contentious subject in contemporary political and economic discourse. Here one sees 
often fundamental disagreement between liberal economists and those in the strategic 
communities of the West. While the former understand the region in terms of the victory 
of free markets and democracy in the post-Cold War period, the latter argue in typically 
realist terms that the rise of Asia portends a violent realignment of global relations 
marked by the strong possibility of Great Power conflict, a regional arms race and ethnic 
and civil strife. 2 Still others, particularly the ruling elites of East Asia, claim that the 
economic success of the region can be explained in terms of the organic notions of 
community found in Asian values and Confucian culture. 3 
Whatever the merit of these debates, most observers agree that the rise of the Asia-
Pacific has represented a fundamental shift in global economic power in the last decades 
of the 20th century. According to available economic data, more than one half of the 
world's economic growth is now centred on the Asian region.4 Combined with the 
demise of the Soviet bloc, the rise of Asia's economies has signalled a radical departure 
from the bipolar world of the Cold War. The simple dichotomy of communist and 
capitalist versions of Western modernity has now been replaced with a more complex 
multipolar world of proliferating centres of power and identity. 
1 A note on the system of referencing I have adopted in this thesis: Since this work makes extensive use 
of unattributed newspaper articles and other published material I have used two different means to 
reference source material. The first, used in those cases where there is a specified author, states the 
author first, then the year and finally the details of the article or volume in question. The second, used in 
those cases where the source bas no specified author, cites the name of the article first, followed by 
details of the article including the date and page numbers. 
2 For the an example of the former see Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign Relations: In 
the World of the 1990s. Second Edition. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne. Linder, S. (1986) The 
Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism. Standford 
University Press: Stanford, CA. For the latter see Kurth, J. (1989) "The Pacific Basin versus the Atlantic 
Alliance: Two Paradigms of International Relations" The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 505: pp.34-55. 
3See Zakaria, F. (1994) "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew" Foreign Affairs 73 (2): 
pp.109-126. 
4 Mabbubani, Kishore (1995) "The Pacific Impulse" Survival37 (1): pp.105-120. 
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This decentring of global political life can also be seen in the increasing powerlessness of 
states to control accelerating flows of capital, people, goods, technology and culture 
across territorial borders. This globalisation process has not only led to the adoption of a 
global consumer culture by peoples across the world, it has simultaneously elicited a 
reassertion of local ethnic identities and religious fundamentalism. Challenged by both 
these global and local forces, many nation-states now face the threat of disintegration and 
fragmentation. Meanwhile, a shift has occurred from the geopolitics of the Cold War 
when competition over territory represented the major dynamic of international politics to 
the rise of geoeconomics in which the struggle for market share has become an 
increasingly important dimension of global politics. 
These far-reaching changes have not only led to a fundamental transformation in global 
relations but have also overturned the dominant paradigms through which IR have been 
understood. The traditional Western representation of IR as an anarchic realm of clearly-
demarcated and discrete territorial states is no longer sustainable. Gender, ecology, 
migratory flows, capital movements and ethnic expressions of identity have all emerged 
as salient global issues to disrupt existing understandings which have tended to reduce IR 
to a geopolitical struggle amongst states. This has manifested itself in the theoretical and 
conceptual upheaval that has marked the discipline of IR in the last decade. In particular, 
the dominant assumptions of power politics realism that provided Western elites with a 
sense of certitude and stability during the Cold War have began to unravel in the face of 
the flows and transferred crossings of contemporary globallife.5 
This disjunction between contemporary global flows and the static cartographies of 
Western IR discourse has manifested itself in the inability of policy-making elites to 
adequately respond to the emerging realities of post-Cold War politics. As a result, policy 
paralysis has become a commonplace experience of intellectual and governmental elites 
when confronted with economic marginalisation, environmental crisis and the violent 
reassertion of subnational ethnic identities. This sense of crisis has been exemplified in the 
failure of the second earth summit where attempts by the world's leaders to confront the 
current global ecological crisis ended in the spectacle of diplomatic discord and political 
impasse. 
In this context of conceptual and policy crisis, there is a growing need to rethink and 
reformulate the traditional assumptions through which IR has been understood in the 
West. The fundamental transformation in the Westphalian system of international 
relations presently occurring demands that the dominant assumptions of Western IR be 
subject to reappraisal. And yet for all the routine promises made by mainstream scholars 
and policy-makers to rethink dominant Cold War understandings, contemporary Western 
IR has offered instead reformulated "post-Cold War" perspectives. These perspectives 
5 I am referring more specifically to the Third Debate. See the special edition of International Studies 
Quarterly (1989 Vol. 33) devoted to this debate. 
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are based upon the same metatheoretical assumptions as those which underpinned Cold 
War thinking. 
To take just three recent examples: the Persian Gulf War, the conflict in Bosnia and the 
genocidal events in Rwanda exemplified the dangers and policy pitfalls of applying 
traditional thinking to the complex strategic environment of post-Cold War global 
politics. 6 In each of these cases, Western strategic elites invoked a variety of traditional 
realist themes of just war, territorial sovereignty, non-intervention and Machiavellian 
power politics drawn from understandings codified in the 17th century European states 
system. Framed via these anachronistic understandings, Western strategic thinking in the 
1990s has become characterised by simplistic and inconsistent policy responses which 
have seen the same Western diplomats and political leaders who celebrated the 
decimation of the Iraqi population in the Gulf War stand idly by as ethnic cleansing was 
perpetrated in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
It is against this background of the failure of policy-making elites to adequately respond 
to contemporary global challenges that I examine Australia's contemporary regional 
engagement. As this thesis makes clear, Australia's recent attempt to "engage with the 
Asia-Pacific" provides an exemplary study of the great dangers and opportunities that 
exist in IR in the 1990s: of the changed geostrategic environment that peoples and 
nations across the globe confront; of the needs to rethink traditional Western 
understandings of IR in the face of such changes; of the crisis of policy-making elites in 
addressing this challenge; and of the concrete geopolitical dangers associated with not 
doing so. 
Indeed, characterised by attempts to move away from European preoccupations to a 
focus on the Asia-Pacific region, our contemporary foreign policy has been inextricably 
bound up with the broader dilemmas and volatilities of post-Cold War politics. The need 
to formulate creative alternatives to prevailing understandings, therefore, is particularly 
urgent for Australians in the 1990s who can no longer rely upon the traditional alliance 
structures of "the West" to ensure security in an increasingly "Asianised" region. Alone in 
the Asia-Pacific, Australians, more than ever, need to understand the Asia-Pacific in all its 
complexity and diversity. That task demands innovative thinking which moves beyond the 
kinds of self-understandings of the past which reduced our identity to a Western outpost 
in an alien and unstable Asian region. 
Yet for all the strategic reassessment and repositioning that has marked the contemporary 
engagement agenda, foreign policy in the 1990s remains underpinned by the same 
assumptions and presuppositions of Western IR which have long formed the basis for our 
6 See, for instance McKinley, M. (ed.) (1994) The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives. Allen and Unwin: 
Sydney. Post, T. (1992) "How the West lost Bosnia: Four lost opportunities on the road to chaos" 
Bulletin/Newsweek 3 September: pp.58-64. 
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relations with the outside world. One of the major aims of this thesis, accordingly, is to 
illustrate that while the rapid growth experienced. by Asian economies has forced policy-
makers to readjust the geographical coordinates of foreign policy, Australia's regional 
diplomacy continues to be driven by the dominant realist and liberal perspectives of 
Western IR. I will show in this thesis how these perspectives have been converted into 
narrowly-conceived trade and strategic agendas that have dominated Australia's 
encounter with the region. Thus, while contemporary defence planning continues to be 
characterised by a traditional realist security agenda, Australia's recent policy of 
"enmeshment with the Asia-Pacific" has been based upon a (neo)liberal program of 
multilateral trade liberalisation and market integration. 7 
It is what that gets left out of these dominant agendas - their shared silences and 
exclusions - which I highlight in this thesis as the most disturbing dimension of 
contemporary foreign policy. This is clear in the ways in which the trade and security 
agendas currently driving the policy process have been pursued at the expense of giving 
attention to. a range of alternative security issues such as gender, ecological crisis, 
migration, grassroots development, and cultural/ethnic identity. It is precisely these kinds 
of alternative security issues, however, that have become salient forces in the Asia-Pacific 
region with the end of the Cold War. 
Thus, the realist and liberal perspectives currently underpinning our contemporary 
regional policies remain as narrowly framed as they ever were. As in the past, the 
dominant perspectives of Western IR remain wedded to the interests of a small privileged 
strategic elite located in Western industrialised societies whose strategic practices and 
understandings continue to reduce the complexities and diversity of global life to narrow 
market-based and geopolitical images of reality. In reproducing these narrow 
understandings as the basis for regional engagement, policy-makers have marginalised 
many of the everyday realities of regional life from policy and analytical attention. In 
pointing out as much, this thesis seeks to identify the dangers inherent in failing to reflect 
upon reductionist understandings of global life. This absence of any serious reappraisal of 
the broader assumptions which have traditionally underpinned Australia's regional 
diplomacy represents a major shortcoming of recent foreign policy. Here we shall see 
how, far from reflecting upon their own understandings, contemporary policy-makers 
7 While this thesis illustrates how these liberal and realist perspectives have dominated Australian 
thinking on foreign policy, a number of writers have argued that there is another perspective which has 
shaped Australian foreign policy: namely rationalism. See Indyk, M (1985) "The Australian Study of 
International Relations" in D. Aitkin (ed.) Surveys of Australian Political Science. George Allen and 
Unwin: Sydney. Seen in terms of a broader set of metatheoretical assumptions- e.g. the state as 
rational actor, international relations as an anarchical system, the positivist-empiricist notion of "real 
worldism" etc.- the so-called "rationalist" school, however, represents a variant of realism, rather than 
a departure from it For a critical discussion of these themes particularly in relation to Hedley Bull whose 
work is seen as an exemplar of the rationalist approach see George, J. (1992) "Some Thoughts on the 
'Givenness of Everyday Life' in Australian International Relations: Theory and Practice" Australian 
Journal of Political Science 27 (1): pp.31-54. 
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have retreated into old patterns of thinking in responding to the challenges of the post-
Cold War period. 
In advancing these arguments, however, this thesis is not intended as a blanket 
condemnation of contemporary foreign policy for as I acknowledge there are some 
commendable elements of our recent regional policies. Those elements provide a glimpse 
of where we might begin to creatively respond to the challenges of contemporary global 
life. In particular, the acknowledgment by the more intelligent sectors of the foreign 
policy community that we need to seriously rethink identity through a fundamental 
intellectual and cultural engagement with the region represents an important insight in the 
context of the foreign policy challenges that are emerging in the Pacific century. 8 
As I point out in the following chapters, however, such insights have rarely found 
sustained expression in the formulation and conduct of recent foreign policy. Rather, in 
the rush to attach Australian trade and security interests to the growing economies of 
East Asia, regional engagement has been generated less by a willingness to engage at an 
intellectual and cultural level with our regional neighbours than by what can only be 
described as a cargo cult mentality. Engagement has become reduced here to a narrow 
policy of market and strategic integration with the region's elites. This is a disturbingly 
short-sighted policy agenda that, in its focus on regional elites, runs the risk of detaching 
Australian diplomacy from a wider range of post-Cold War security issues, as indicated 
above. Indeed, by so unequivocally promoting Australia's integration into the dominant 
commercial and strategic networks of the region, policy-makers are pursuing elitist and 
narrowly-conceived policies precisely at the time when we need to open up our 
perspectives to new understandings. That includes expanding the purview of foreign 
policy in what is becoming an increasingly complex, interdependent post-Cold War 
environment 
In this context it is worth introducing an argument elaborated in the final chapters of this 
thesis: namely, that our narrow trade and security-driven policies have precluded 
Australian policy-makers and diplomats from contributing to innovative and creative 
diplomacy in resolving the region's most intractable security problems such as in 
Bougainville, East Timor, West Papua and Tibet. Instead, our diplomacy has been 
characterised by an unimaginative policy of giving support to repressive state elites in the 
Asia-Pacific in the name of regional "stability" and "security". Far from achieving these 
goals, however, our elitist regional diplomacy has actually undermined the objective of 
creating a more stable, peaceful regional order. In this sense, Australia's recent diplomacy 
can be seen as a specific articulation of the broader policy crisis which I discerned above 
in the Western response to the Gulf War, Bosnia and Rwanda. 
8 See Fitzgerald, S. (1997) Is Australia an Asian Country?: Can Australia Survive in an East Asian 
Future. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
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In examining recent engagement policies in such critical terms, this work argues that the 
desire to integrate into the region should not blind _us to many of the less salutary realities 
of the Asia-Pacific. Rather than uncritically accepting the current ideological attachment 
to strategic and economic integration, I seek to think through and draw out the specific 
politico-economic implications of our multiple engagements with the region. Far from 
rejecting the need to engage with the region, however, this work argues that our present 
policy agenda has not gone far enough in its attempts to re-align Australia's interests with 
the region. It suggests that any meaningful and far-reaching regional engagement must go 
beyond the narrow and opportunistic policies of prevailing diplomacy. That requires no 
less than a serious and sustained reassessment of orthodox foreign policy thinking which, 
as we shall see, remains constrained by the elite perspectives of power politics realism 
and market liberalism. 
Containing the Asia-Pacific: Australia's Realist Foreign Policy Tradition 
In order to understand how contemporary Australian foreign policy has arrived at this 
critical juncture, it is necessary to know where it came from in the first place. To this end, 
Chapter 1 of this thesis begins by outlining the dominant understandings through which 
Australian policy-makers have come to make sense of the world. That chapter represents 
a thematic discussion designed to identify a broader Western discourse of IR from which 
Australian foreign policy has derived its major assumptions. 
In locating Australian foreign policy as a site of this larger discourse, I illustrate how 
policy-making elites have traditionally understood the societies of Asia and the Pacific 
through the dominant perspectives of Western IR- in particular, power politics realism 
and, to a lesser extent, market liberalism. Framed via these perspectives, Australia's 
regional foreign policies have been based upon strictly geopolitical and market-based 
representations respectively. These representations have reduced the cultural richness and 
diversity of Asian and Pacific societies to rigid and narrow images of strategic and 
commercial reality. As we shall see in early chapters, these representations have served to 
frame the history of Australia's encounter with the region, which has fluctuated between 
realist representations of the region as a strategic threat and liberal images of the region 
as an object of development, trade and engagement. 
Through addressing this broader process of understanding, Chapter 1 of this thesis 
examines how the dominant perspectives of Western IR came to be articulated in an 
Antipodean context in the first place. I argue that this process was inextricably linked to 
the formation of Australia as a settler colony in the 18th and 19th centuries in which 
successive generations of European settlers sought to make sense of an alien world 
through drawing on the dominant understandings and experiences of modem European 
society from whence they had come. The settlement of Australia became a process of 
transposing the familiar forms and structures of European society to an isolated 
Australian continent. In doing so, the new settlers tapped into culturally resonant 
representations of Asia deriving from Europe which emphasised the despotic, dangerous 
Australia in the Pacific Century 7 
and unstable nature of the Asian region- thereby consigning a vast area of the earth's 
surface to a singular geopolitical identity of othern~ss. 
These representations served not only to simplify the complex realities and great cultural 
differences that the new settlers confronted in the Asia-Pacific, but also to more clearly 
demarcate a nascent sense of identity in the Australian colonies. Thus, the representation 
of Asia as a geopolitical and cultural threat amounted more to an affirmation and 
narration of Australia's own identity as an isolated Western settlement than representing 
an objective depiction of the societies of Asia and the Pacific. In other words, Australians 
came to "know" and "understand" the Asia-Pacific through a broader process of Western 
identity formation wherein the Asia-Pacific represented a marker of "otherness" against 
which the sovereign identity of Australia as a stable, Western state was defined. 
This broader process of identity formation was reproduced after World War II through 
power politics realism. That approach came to dominate the thinking of Western foreign 
policy elites during the Cold War. With the development of an Australian IR discipline in 
the 1960s, realism became entrenched as the unquestioned orthodoxy in Australia. 9 
Educated in Britain's most esteemed universities, the first generation of Australian IR 
scholars brought the dominant assumptions and understandings of Anglo-American 
realism to Australia's policy and academic sectors. 10 As Mel Gurtov has noted the realist 
approach stresses the need to: 
construct and defend a stable balance of power among rival states; to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of state actions in strictly national terms; to operate on 
the basis of what is, not what has been or might be; to disregard the 
expressions of good intentions by other leaders; to trust no-one and nothing, 
other than the justness of one's own national cause; and to rely on military 
power rather than moral suasion, diplomatic agreements, international law, or 
an open, democratic decision-making process to protect and enforce one's 
interest. 11 
For Australian policy-makers and academics, these realist understandings provided a 
conceptual language and set of shared assumptions about the nature of IR through which 
Australia's traditional sense of Western identity could be expressed in Cold War terms.12 
In particular, the dominant realist image of IR as an anarchical world of competing self-
interested states fitted neatly into Australia's own self image as representing an 
9 George, J. (1992) "Some Thoughts on the 'Givenness of Everyday life"'. Indyk, M (1985) "The 
Australian Study of International Relations". 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gurtov, M. (1994) Global Politics in the Human Interest. Third Edition. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 
Colorado. p.19. 
12 Dalby, S. (1996) "Security Discourse, the ANZUS Alliance and Australian Identity" in G. Cheeseman 
and R. Bruce (eds) Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security 
Thinking after the Cold War. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.llO. 
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endangered, isolated European society located in a hostile, unstable Asian region. 
Buttressing such discursive representations was. the development of Area Studies in 
Australia which played a central role in producing knowledge of the domestic polities of 
Southeast Asia. The knowledge produced under the aegis of Area Studies confirmed and 
reinforced realist images of Asia as dangerous, unstable and backward. 
In adopting these understandings, policy-makers during the Cold War reproduced the 
traditional regional threat scenario in which the Asia-Pacific became reduced to an 
unstable region that represented a geostrategic threat to Australia's Western settlement. 
Such representations were articulated through the pervasive fear of Asiatic communism 
which dominated the foreign policy debate in Australia during the Cold War. Policy-
makers and academics were particularly concerned with what became known a the 
"falling dominos of Southeast Asia". In responding to this sense of threat and fear 
towards the region, our strategic elite formulated a containment strategy of Forward 
Defence designed to counter regional threats through eliciting the deployment of Western 
forces in Southeast Asia. 
As I make clear in the early chapters of this thesis, however, the realist understandings 
that underpinned such policies were not the product of neutral and objective 
representations of the Asia-Pacific region. Rather they represented a narrowly-bounded 
discourse of Cold War geopolitics that reduced the complex realities of the Asia-Pacific 
to strictly geostrategic representations of reality. I argue that such representations cannot 
be disconnected from the rise of US global hegemony in the post-war period in that they 
provided the discursive underpinnings that made possible a larger Cold War project in 
which US strategic power was extended across the globe. Thus, in framing Australian 
identity as an isolated Western outpost in an anarchical Asian region, policy-makers were 
also involved in a broader set of strategic practices that integrated Australia into the US 
global strategic network. That was achieved through converting Australia's traditional 
sense of insecurity into the broader policy objective of attracting a US strategic presence 
in the region. In this way, Australia's Cold War foreign policy became hitched to the 
goals of American globalism. As we shall see, this was to have grave implications for 
Australia's encounter with the region which became characterised by a violent 
interventionist Cold War strategy that drew Australia and its Western Allies into a series 
of bloody conflicts in Southeast Asia. This strategy involved no less than Australia's 
military commitment to the Vietnam War and all the failures of Western regional strategy 
that this entailed. 
Such policies, however, were not the only option open to policy-makers at the time. 
Indeed, one of the major themes of this work is to show that, outside of the dominant 
realist discourse, other interpretations of regional reality could emerge through which a 
less violent, more cooperative regional foreign policy was possible. In fact, if they had 
decided to do so, policy-makers could have rejected the power politics view that 
emphasised Australia's endangered position and stressed instead the post-colonial 
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affinities that Australian society shared with its neighbours as small powers located in· a 
common part of the world. 
That this was not the case was due largely to the powerful attraction which realism held 
for policy-makers in offering simple representations of a complex world that claimed a 
universal, mirror-like perspective on reality. Drawing on a positivist theory of knowledge 
which dominated Anglo-American social science13, realism represented a self-enclosed, 
self-affirming discourse of reality on the basis of which Australian policy-makers could 
claim to know and understand the world. The whole problem with this, however, was 
that it discouraged any kind of critical reflection on the broader theoretical 
presuppositions and discursive meanings that underpinned the dominant images of reality 
which emerged during the Cold War. The consequences of this were that the crude 
simplistic understandings of Asia adopted by Australia's early settlers were 
unquestioningly reproduced by policy-makers throughout the Cold War. 
This was clear in the ways in which policy-makers resorted to monolithic understandings 
of the region as a substitute for the more arduous task of developing sophisticated and 
nuanced knowledge of the great complexities of Asian and Pacific societies. The dangers 
of such unreflective real worldism were no more tragically exemplified than in Australia's 
strident promotion of Western involvement in the Vietnam War. Here we shall see how 
reductionist geopolitical images of Vietnam as a Cold War battlefield came to frame 
Australia's dominant policy perspectives. Such images betrayed a profound 
misunderstanding of the deep historical and cultural processes driving Asian nationalism 
and anti-colonialism during the Cold War. 
Australia's Neoliberal Regional Engagement: Beyond the Cold War? 
With the dramatic transformations that have marked IR in the last two decades, 
particularly the West's defeat in the Vietnam War, these Cold War understandings of the 
Asia-Pacific have become unsustainable. As Chapter 4 illustrates, the recent decline of the 
Western industrial centre and the emergence of the traditional peripheries of Asia as 
centres of economic growth have challenged the image of Asia as unstable and backward 
13 The history of positivism is a complex one which I can hardly aim to do justice to here. In its most 
general sense, positivism refers to the notion of a unified theory of science in which the methodology of 
natural sciences is adopted as the major underpinning for the explanation of social reality. Rejection of 
this positivist theory of knowledge can be made on simple grounds that human reality is very different 
from that which exists in the natural world. Here we can see how social reality involves intersubjective 
meanings and interpretive understandings that do not lend themselves to the empiricist methodologies 
that underpin study into the natural world. I would go further than this, however, in rejecting positivism 
on the basis that even in the natural sciences- and, in particular, in the most sophisticated apogee of 
the natural sciences, namely physics- the notion of reality as an independent realm of facticity and 
truth has long been discredited since at least Heisenberg quantum physics and chaos theory. See, for 
instance, Jencks, C. (ed.) (1992) The Postmodern Reader. St. Martin's Press: New York. For a general 
discussion of positivism see Giddens, A. (1982). Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory. London: 
Macmillan Press. 
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which underpinned Australia's Cold War policies. In seeking to elaborate on this 
transformation, I examine recent arguments regarding the "postmodern" condition of 
contemporary political life. Here we shall see how the proliferation of identities and the 
unravelling of traditional geopolitical alignments in recent decades have served to disrupt 
many of certainties which have formed the basis for "modem" political life since the 
Renaissance. Against this background of postmodernity, I argue, the forces of global 
capitalist development have effectively overturned the traditional territorial cartographies 
of Western IR and given way to new terrains of discourse in the post-Cold War period. 
It is in response to these changes that policy-makers have shifted Australia's regional 
diplomacy from a Cold War strategy of containment to one of regional engagement and 
integration in the post-Cold War era. This shift has been dominated by a neoliberal policy 
agenda characterised by two major themes. The first relates to the introduction of major 
reforms designed to integrate Australia more fully into the rapidly growing economies of 
Asia. Those reforms have been based on the export drive of the Australian state in which 
contemporary foreign policy has become hitched to the goal of achieving increased 
market share in the Asia-Pacific. The second theme, and one complimenting this market 
approach, has been the vigorous promotion of trade liberalisation and "open regionalism", 
exemplified in Australia's recent APEC diplomacy. This has been part of a broader liberal 
institutionalist agenda directed at developing inter-state trade and security arrangements 
across the Pacific to strengthen free market economic relations. 
For policy-makers, journalists and academics alike, this neoliberal policy agenda has 
represented a fundamental "repositioning" of Australia's place in the world in which 
Australian society is understood to have fmally overcome its traditional estrangement 
from the societies of the Asia-Pacific.14 Thus, according to one leading foreign policy 
analyst, Australia's diplomatic history has seen a "diplomatic maturation" over the last 25 
years as policy-makers have begun to accept the need to engage more fully with the Asia-
Pacillc.15 
This thesis critically examines these claims, challenging the notion that regional 
engagement has marked a "new direction" in foreign policy. It argues that current 
neoliberal policies remain wedded to many of the same assumptions and narrow images 
of reality that characterised Cold War foreign policy. In pointing out as much, this thesis 
represents a strategic intervention into the current IR debate in Australia and its uncritical 
celebration of regional engagement as representing a fundamental break with Cold War 
understandings. Hence, while speaking the language of policy reform and reappraisal, 
contemporary policy-makers have in fact resorted to understandings of regional reality as 
equally reductionist and narrowly conceived as those produced in Cold War thinking. In 
14 See, for example, Evans, G. (1995) "Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking 
Glass" Australian Journal of International Affairs 49 (1): p.113. 
15 Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. Third Edition. Allen and 
Unwin: Canberra p.4. 
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reducing the region to narrow neoliberal representations of the region as a "miracle 
economy", policy-makers run the risk of merely replacing the strategic reductionism of 
the Cold War with a brand of post-Cold War economic reductionism. 
Before introducing this broader critique of neoliberal foreign policy in more detail below, 
I want to comment on contemporary defence policy as it represents an even more direct 
line of continuity with realist Cold War thinking. This is a theme I elaborate on in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. Here we shall see how the traditional realist threat scenario that 
underpinned Australia's Cold War strategy of containment has been reproduced in 
defence planning in the 1990s. This is clear in the ways in which policy-makers continue 
to look towards the United States as our major ally in defending against a possible threat 
to Australian security from the Asia-Pacific region. In reproducing this old worldview, 
defence planners have recently sought to rejuvenate the Western Alliance in the Asia-
Pacific. They have also attempted to enhance Australia's technological edge over 
potential regional adversaries by acquiring high-tech weapons systems. In pursuing these 
policies, Australia's defence establishment has reinvoked the traditional "region as threat" 
scenario through seeking to identify a myriad of unspecified threats that exist "out there 
in the region" as the major source of danger in the post-Cold War era. 
In the absence of any critical reflection, however, our defence community, which has 
never thought too seriously about the assumptions and presuppositions that have formed 
its worldview, is proving incapable of devising adequate post-Cold War defence policies. 
Indeed, while recent transformations in global politics demand a fundamental rethink of 
Australia's place in the world, current defence planners have sought a nostalgic return to 
the past when the Western Alliance provided Australia with a clear sense of identity and 
when security objectives were advanced through the projection of US geopolitical power 
into the region. As we shall see, this attempt to tum back the clock has not only 
undermined recent attempts to "engage with the region" but has also led to an explicitly 
violent politics of identity, exemplified in the militarisation of contemporary Australian 
defence planning. 
While this traditional security agenda can be readily traced to Cold War thinking, it is in 
relation to our neoliberal regional diplomacy that policy-makers have forcefully promoted 
the idea that an extensive repositioning has occurred in contemporary foreign policy. In 
Chapter 6 of this thesis I subject these claims to vigorous critique. Here we shall see how 
contemporary neoliberalism shares many of the same fundamental assumptions about 
international life as Cold War realism. Thus, whatever the stated differences in emphasis 
between Australia's traditional realist policy of containment and its contemporary 
neoliberal agenda of regional engagement, both, I argue, are concerned with a narrow set 
of questions and assumptions regarding the rational action of states in an anarchical 
world. 
' 
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This is clear in the ways that both contemporary neoliberalism and realism take the state 
as the central actor of IR. This has produced a shared image of IR as a mosaic of clearly 
demarcated sovereign jurisdictions. It is also clear in the methodological individualism 
that both realism and neoliberalism share. Thus, the former's stress on the atomised, self-
interested nature of international relations is reproduced in the neoliberal notion of a 
static, essentialised human nature. Here individuals, and states, become reduced to self-
interested utility and profit maximisers competing in an anarchical marketplace.16 In 
sharing this common view of human nature, both neoliberals and realists account for 
agency in terms of rational action based upon calculations of narrowly defmed self-
interest. Hence, while neoliberals stress the possibilities of cooperation in inter-state 
relations, a proposition rejected by realists, they do so on a utilitarian basis that departs 
little from the power politics worldview of realism. From either a realist or neoliberal 
perspective, ethical or moral considerations are ruled out as irrelevant to the atomised, 
self-interested realm of IR. 
This convergence between neoliberalism and power politics realism can be readily 
discerned in contemporary Australian foreign policy. Hence, the same Cold War realist 
insistence on "order", "stability" and "Western leadership" have also been invoked by 
contemporary policy-makers as a crucial precondition for developing and maintaining 
liberal economic relations across the Pacific. In other words, Australia's strident 
promotion of a neoliberal free trade agenda presupposes the maintenance of the same 
kind of global order as Western strategists sought to entrench during the Cold War - an 
order of stable territorial states and market economies underpinned by the strategic 
practices of power politics realism. It is through the promotion of a stable (Western-
dominated) regional order, then, that Australia's free trade diplomacy has converged with 
the goals of defence planning. 
This convergence of realism and neoliberalism, however, has meant that the prevailing 
foreign policy debate has been conducted within such narrow terms of discourse as to 
exclude a range of emerging realities from analytical and policy attention. As two of 
Britain's leading IR theorists have noted, the contemporary debate in Western IR: 
clearly does not cover many of the central features of contemporary world 
politics. By focusing on states it automatically ignores major features and by 
avoiding moral questions it locates itself in a very narrow debate. It looks very 
much like a debate restricted to the prosperous nations of the West, and takes 
for granted many of the features of this globalized world that theory should in 
16 See George, J. (1996) "Australia's Global Perspectives in the 1990s: A Case of Old Realist Wine in 
New (Neo-Liberal) Bottles?" in R. Leaver and D. Cox (eds.) Middling, Meddling and Muddling: Issues 
in Australian Foreign Policy. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p. 13. 
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fact call into question, such as identity, nationalism, economics, religion and 
gender. 17 
Framed in terms of this narrowly-conceived debate, Australia's regional engagement has 
been characterised by major silences and omissions. In Chapter 7 of this thesis, I show 
how the silences and limitations of this broader IR debate have found concrete policy 
articulation in the narrow definition that policy-makers have given regional engagement 
Here we shall see how engagement has come to denote a narrow policy of integrating 
strategically and commercially with the elites of the region. Like its Cold War 
counterpart, therefore, contemporary foreign policy has represented an elitist and 
dangerous set of geopolitical practices detached from the cultural, gendered, 
environmental, ethnic and class realities of everyday life. This has been exemplified in the 
disturbing ways in which Australian policy has been directed toward supporting 
unaccountable and undemocratic state elites in the region which appear increasingly 
distant from the daily needs and struggles of the people over which they rule. Seen from 
this perspective, the concrete politico-economic agendas currently driving regional 
diplomacy are actually detaching Australia from the Asia-Pacific region, rather than 
leading to any meaningful engagement with it. 
Rethinking Australia's Regional Engagement 
Where, then, does this critique of contemporary regional engagement lead? Is it possible, 
I ask, to think beyond the rigid policy understandings which have circumscribed regional 
engagement within such narrow parameters of discourse. The final part of this thesis 
addresses these questions through examining in more detail the silences and exclusions of 
contemporary foreign policy. My main objective is to draw upon and formulate 
alternative understandings to the realist and liberal perspectives currently underpinning 
Australia's regional diplomacy and its narrow market-based and geopolitical images of 
reality. 
In addressing this task, it is necessary to recognise that any adequate understanding of the 
Asia-Pacific must be based upon an acknowledgment of the great diversity and 
complexities of regional life. As I have already indicated, however, those complexities 
have been obscured in contemporary foreign policy, characterised as it is by rigid images 
of the region as a miracle economy and strategic threat. Beyond these reductionist 
understandings, a range of other identities and realities exist. In Chapter 8, accordingly, I 
map some of the non-territorial identities and everyday practices that have characterised 
social relations across the region- relations based upon gender, ethnic and indigenous 
identities, ecology and migratory flows. These realities are emerging as part of an 
alternative regional security agenda that is taking on growing significance with the end of 
the Cold War. 
17 Smith, S. (1997) "New Approaches to International Theory" in J. Bayliss and S. Smith (eds.) The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. p.171. 
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In addressing this alternative post-Cold War security agenda, I draw upon a growing 
critical literature on IR from scholars concerned with the growing crisis of sovereign 
authority and the incapacity of governments across the globe to formulate creative 
solutions to contemporary global problems. 18 Engaging in dissent against orthodox IR 
theory and its positivist assumptions about the "real" nature of international politics, 
critical IR has drawn upon a range of post-positivist approaches to knowledge and 
society - from postmodemism and postcolonialism to critical theory and feminism. 
Above all else, this emerging critique of Western IR seeks to open up to scrutiny many of 
the dominant assumptions about identity, knowledge and representation through which 
global political life has been understood in the West since the expansion of the European 
states system in the 17th century. 19 
By drawing upon this critique, I seek to apply the questions posed by critical IR to 
Australia's engagement with the Asia-Pacific. This involves developing more 
sophisticated tools of inquiry and policy-making able to apprehend emerging realities- a 
particularly urgent task if we are to respond adequately to the increasing volatilities and 
complexities of the post-Cold War security environment. Indeed, in a world in which 
issues such as gender, migration, ethnic identity and technology flows are becoming 
increasingly important, it is imperative that Australia's foreign policy community question 
prevailing policy directions and expand the narrow intellectual perspectives underpinning 
prevailing policies. 
Thus, through posing fundamental questions about how we represent the world around 
us, this thesis draws upon more inclusive understandings of the Asia-Pacific attuned to 
the shifting terrain of work, ecology, migration and gender of regional life. That entails 
thinking beyond the exclusionary practices of modem foreign policy discourse by 
developing policy perspectives attentive to the everyday practices and non-territorial 
identities of the societies of Asia and the Pacific. 
To this end, Chapter 9 of this thesis examines the recent emergence of a range of social 
movements across the Pacific which have articulated the marginalised perspectives of 
indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees, women and ordinary citizens. I argue that, in 
their focus on grassroots communities, social movements represent an important source 
for rethinking and reformulating contemporary understandings of the Asia-Pacific. This 
18 Ashley, R.K. and Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Introduction Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident 
Thought in International Studies" International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): pp. 259-268. Ashley, R.K. and 
Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question 
of Sovereignty in International Studies" International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): pp.367-416. 
19 For this broader post-positivist literature see Flax, J. (1990) Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, 
Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West. University of California Press: Berkeley. 
Bernstein, R.J. (1976) The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Bernstein, R.J. (1991) The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of 
Modernity!Postmodernity. Polity Press: Cambridge. 
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focus goes beyond the dominant strategic and commercial networks of the region that 
have been the main preoccupation of prevailing engagement policies. In this sense, the 
emergence of critical social movements can seen as part of a "broader process of social 
invention that carries the possibility of reconstructing the conditions for a decent life from 
the bottom up". 20 Indeed, as I argue, the real significance of social movements lies in the 
ways they have sought to reclaim the cultural richness and diversity of Asian and Pacific 
societies from the reductionist understandings of prevailing discourse. 
Having identified these movements as important agents for reimagining the Asia-Pacific 
region, I conclude this thesis by examining how opening up foreign policy to the insights 
and perspectives of social movements can promote a more wide-ranging agenda of 
regional engagement. How is it possible, I ask, to subject the formulation of foreign 
policy to the grassroots perspectives of citizens groups and other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs)? How does this serve to expand regional engagement from an 
elitist, state-centred focus to a policy agenda sensitive to ecological, gender, and other 
marginalised perspectives? In posing these questions, I argue that it is necessary to have a 
more open and transparent debate on foreign and defence policy in Australia, one that 
promotes greater community participation rather than being the preserve of a small elite 
of trade economists and strategic professionals. 
Democratising Australian foreign policy, however, not only involves a reform of formal 
political processes, but necessitates an entire reappraisal of Australia's policy of 
"regional engagement" and its narrow strategic and economic agendas. That is, if 
Australians are to fundamentally reorient their place in the world then regional 
engagement must be seen as an opportunity to engage in a broader debate about who 
"we" are as Australians in the late 20th century. Any meaningful and far-reaching 
engagement policy implies a broader intellectual and cultural engagement with the 
peoples and grassroots communities of Asia the Pacific. 
That will necessarily involve posing a much broader set of questions than has been 
possible within the prevailing foreign policy debate. How, for instance, might it be 
possible to rethink and reinvent identity in line with the fundamental changes taking place 
in global politics? To what extent will engaging with the Asia-Pacific demand a 
fundamental reorganisation of our relations with the outside world? Is it possible, 
moreover, to imagine regional engagement in terms that are consistent with Australia's 
democratic traditions? And fmally how might "regional engagement" contribute to a 
general renewal of domestic society at a time of great community anxiety and stress? 
Before turning to these questions, however, it is a necessary to relate a larger story of 
Australia's historical encounter with the Asia-Pacific. It is a story that like so many others 
20 Walker, R.B .J. (1988) One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: Boulder, Colorado. p.8. 
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about the modem world begins (but by no means ends) in post-Renaissance Western 
Europe. 
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Chapter_1 
Imagining the Asia-Pacific: Region, State and Identity 
in Australian Foreign Policy 
In this chapter I provide a thematic discussion of the broader modes of discourse through 
which Australian policy-makers have traditionally understood the Asia-Pacific. My 
argument is that foreign policy-makers have derived their underlying assumptions about 
identity, sovereignty and order from a larger Western discourse of IR. I identify this 
discourse with the dominant understandings of post-Renaissance Western thought which 
emerged in conjunction with the development of the European states system in the 16th 
and 17th centuries. 
While it is beyond the scope of the present chapter to examine this discourse in its myriad 
detail and complexity, I want to identify two dominant themes as being central to the 
theory and practice of contemporary Australian foreign policy. The first relates to the 
emergence of a distinctly modem conception of political identity and space as territorial. 
Here I examine how the strict demarcation of political space in early modem thought 
became codified in the European states system as the basis for understanding IR in the 
modem era. As we shall see throughout this thesis, such territorial understandings have 
been translated into Australian foreign policy through state-centric representations of 
reality which contemporary policy-makers have drawn upon to understand the "Asia-
Pacific". Such representations have reduced the region's great complexities and pluralism 
to the expression of its governing elites. 
The second theme of post-Renaissance thought which I discuss in this chapter involves 
the dominant modes of discourse through which modem Western societies have come to 
understand other cultures and, in turn, through which Australian policy-makers have 
understood the societies of the Asia-Pacific. Here I will show how Europe's colonisation 
of the non-Western world hinged upon defining its colonial subjects as inferior, 
dangerous and backward- that is, as "others" against which the sovereign Western self 
was imagined. This division between Western selves and non-Western others has become 
central to the ways that Western IR scholars and foreign policy practitioners have 
classified global political space in terms of a range of dichotomies between inside/outside, 
self/other, West/East and advanced/backward. In seeking to make sense of the different 
cultures and peoples of Asia and the Pacific, successive generations of Australians drew 
upon these dichotomous understandings of Western IR. That served not only to 
reproduce traditional Western representations of otherness but also to reduce the Asia-
Pacific to crude and monolithic images of the region as a geopolitical threat to Australia. 
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In charting how these themes of territoriality and otherness have been translated into 
Australian foreign policy, my aim is to demonstrate that the understandings currently 
driving foreign policy are not the product of universally valid, mirror-like representations 
of reality. Instead, policy-makers have represented the Asia-Pacific through historically 
and culturally-constructed understandings and meanings. Translated into Australian 
foreign policy, such understandings have become part of, what Jim George has identified 
as, "a discursive regime of exclusion, silence, and intolerance that reduces a complex and 
turbulent world to a patterned and rigidly ordered framework of understanding, derived 
from a particular representation of post-Renaissance European historical experience".1 
Space as territorial, the state as the only true expression of identity and a world divided 
along a binary axis of self/other, West/East, core/periphery and Australia/Asia- these 
are the dominant assumptions that policy-makers have drawn upon in reproducing 
narrow market-based and geopolitical representations of the region. Such representations 
have come to be expressed more formally through the dominant realist and liberal 
perspectives of Western IR. 
In reflecting upon this narrowly-conceived process of understanding, this thesis 
demonstrates that there are other ways of relating to different cultures beyond Western 
IR and its dominant representations of territoriality and otherness. To point that out is to 
acknowledge that modem territoriality is not the only way of organising political life. As 
anthropologists have long been aware, many "traditional" societies are structured around 
non-territorial modes of identity such as complex kinship networks. In fact, in some 
societies, notably those based on slash and bum agriculture, fixed territoriality is inimical 
to their fragile ecological systems. Far from being "natural", then, territoriality in the form 
of fixed property rights and permanent agricultural use has proven to be ecologically 
dysfunctional in those areas that require cyclical patterns of land use. Within such 
societies, "nomadic property rights" and "the sovereign importance of movement" 
displaces the fixed control over territory that characterises modem industrial life. 2 
Recognising these other models of social organisation is a particularly urgent theme in 
contemporary life, as ecological crisis, the emergence of a global economy and other 
transnational forces have recently challenged the dominant territorial organisation of 
global political space. Thus, neither by looking at the world through a state-centric prism 
nor by responding to different cultures through reducing them to representations of 
otherness have contemporary policy-makers adequately responded to the global 
challenges they now confront. Indeed, as I argue in the final chapters of this thesis, in a 
world of accelerating flows of capital, people, goods, technology and culture - what I 
will characterise later as the "postmodern" condition- it is imperative that we begin to 
1 George, J. (1994) Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. 
Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colorado. p.ix. 
2 Ruggie, J. (1993) "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations" 
International Organization47 (1): p.149. 
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rethink the static cartographies of prevailing discourse extrapolated from the 17th century 
European states system. 
Before discussing the implications of these insights in the following chapters, I begin this 
chapter by examining the emergence of a strictly territorial understanding of political 
identity in post-Renaissance Western Europe, focusing particularly on the thought of 
Thomas Hobbes. I then tum to a brief discussion of the theme of otherness in Western 
political thought. Here I show how the global expansion of the Western powers 
engendered a particular understanding of the non-Western world as a dangerous and 
backward realm that needed to be subjugated, controlled and colonised. My aim in doing 
so is to examine how the themes of territoriality and otherness have become the basis 
upon which contemporary Western policy-makers and academics have understood IR. 
and, in tum, Australian policy-makers have related to the Asia-Pacific. In the fmal part of 
this chapter, I discuss how these understandings came to be articulated in a specifically 
Antipodean context through examining the formation of Australia as a settler colony in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. Here I will argue that successive generations of European 
settlers sought to understand the alien world they confronted in the Asia-Pacific through 
drawing on the dominant understandings of Western Europe from whence they had 
come. 
Territoriality and the Proto-Foreign Policy of Hobbes 
As I have already indicated, the origins of Australian foreign policy are part of a larger 
story of how a territorial notion of identity emerged in post-Renaissance Western Europe 
and subsequently became the basis for organising modem political relations. This can be 
traced to the breakdown in medieval cosmology and the formulation of a modem, 
territorial conception of space by early modem thinkers to meet the spatial requirements 
of the emerging political and intellectual order in post-Renaissance Europe. As Michel 
Foucault has pointed out, the world of the middle ages was constituted through the 
prevailing discourse of Christianity in which: 
there was a hierarchic ensemble of places: sacred places and profane places; 
protected places and open, exposed places; urban places and rural places .. .In 
cosmological theory, there were supercelestial spaces, as opposed to the 
celestial, and the celestial was in its tum opposed to the terrestrial place. 3 
This hierarchical conception of medieval space was based upon an "episteme of 
Resemblance" where everything conformed to God's presence in the world.4 That world 
represented a divinely created text in which, as William Connolly has noted, "everything 
was bound up with everything else through chains of resemblance .. .in a divinely inspired 
world of harmonies, correspondences and resemblances".5 Space was multiple, 
3 Foucault, M. (1986) "Of Other Spaces" Trans. by J. Miscowiec. Diacritics 16: p.22 
4 Foucault, M. (1970) The Order of Things. Tavistock: London. 
5 Connolly, W. (1988) Political Theory and Modernity. Blackwell: Oxford. p.8 
' 
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heterogeneous and disparate, depending on its particular function in the divinely ordered 
cosmos. By the time of the Renaissance, however, this conception of space as 
hierarchical and divinely ordered gradually broke down, heralding a crisis in the 
ecclesiastical order in Europe. That in turn led to a fundamental transformation in the 
ways political order and identity carne to be imagined and structured. 6 This process 
neither represented a simple break with the past nor was it a natural evolutionary process 
in which Man came to be liberated from myth and religion and thus achieve full self-
consciousness. It was rather an intense struggle waged on many fronts that took place 
over several centuries. Here the medieval structures of Western Europe gradually 
dissolved as distinctly modem understandings of space, society and identity led to the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, modern science and the modem nation-state. 
A central figure in this transformation was Thomas Hobbes whose work Leviathan came 
to express an early modern reconceptualisation of society and identity bound up with the 
emergence of the modern sovereign state. As I indicated above, this retheorisation took 
place against the background of political and theological chaos as early modern thinkers 
sought to establish political order in a gradually dissolving world of divine foundations. 7 
In response to that challenge, Hobbes sought to articulate a new foundation for order and 
identity in the form of the sovereign state, encompassing a radically altered conception of 
authority, law and human subjectivity. Here the belief in a naturally ordained and 
hierarchically structured society was gradually replaced by Hobbes' notion of a humanly-
constructed social order conceived as an "artificial Man".8 
By conceiving an artificial Man, Hobbes was concerned with constructing the boundaries 
of the state as the all-powerful sovereign agency of political life.9 At the centre of this 
6 For an account of this see Toulmin, S. (1990) Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. The Free 
Press: New York. and Tamas, R. (1991) The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that 
have Shaped our World View. Ballantine Books: New York. 
7 Dillon, M and Everard, J. (1992) "Stat(e)ing Australia: Squid Jigging and the Masque of State" 
Alternatives 17: pp.281-312. 
8 Hobbes, T. (1994) Leviathan. Everyman: London. p.LIIL Collins, S.L. (1989) From Divine Cosmos to 
Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance Order. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. p.32-3. 
9 My interpretation of Hobbes can be characterised, in the words of Ashley and Walker, as 
"countermemorialising" in the sense that it rejects the monologic reading of Hobbes by contemporary 
realists who seek to appropriate "the true" Hobbes. Realists interpret Hobbes as the grand theorist of the 
abject, self-interested nature of mankind, a contention that represents the fundamental basis of realist 
thought. In reducing Hobbes' insights to a simplistic universalised theme concerning the atomised 
condition of human nature, however, realism impoverishes the complex and polysemic nature of 
Hobbes' thought. This is clear in the ways in which realist accounts exclude the more specific historical, 
linguistic and cultural circumstances in which Hobbes thought was located-namely, 17th Century 
Europe. In focussing on how Hobbes reflects the enduring nature of the "real world", realists also fail to 
acknowledge the ways in which Hobbes' thought created a discursive space in which particular modes of 
thought were made possible at the expense of others. That was particularly true in Hobbes' contribution 
to the early modem reconceptualisaion of space as both territorial and geopolitical. For a compelling 
critique of the ways Hobbes has been interpreted in the discipline of IR, see Boucher, D. (1990) "Inter-
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concern was the boundary that he established between interior and exterior realms: 
between, what Hobbes envisaged as, a disciplined, well-ordered and artificially-
constituted society and the state of nature, which consisted of war, madness and 
drunkenness. While for many contemporary scholars, Hobbes' moral philosophy is the 
central theme of Leviathan, the boundary he draws between inner and outer realms has 
an explicitly spatial or territorial dimension. This is clear in the trope of the polity as a 
body which pervades Hobbes' text10, evidenced in arguably the most cited passage of 
Leviathan: 
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, 
or STATE, (in Latin CIVITAS) which is but an artificial man; though of 
greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence 
it was intended; and in which, the sovereignty is an Artificial soul, as giving 
life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of the 
Judicature and Execution, artificial Joints; Reward and Punishment (by which 
fastened to the seat of the Sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to 
perform his duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Natural; the 
Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus 
Populi (the peoples safety) it business ... Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by 
which the parts of the Body Politique were at first made, set together, and 
united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make men, pronounced by God in 
Creation. 11 
The trope of the "Body Politique" represents a reconstitution of space and identity in 
terms of a sharply demarcated space of sovereign jurisdiction. This is clear in the textual 
strategy Hobbes deploys in Leviathan in which he seeks to carve out a domesticated and 
ordered space of the territorial state where forms of otherness such as madness are to be 
disciplined, controlled and punished.12 Thus, "through drawing boundaries between an 
inside and an outside, chaos is chased out of the gates, orders are established "within" 
and a manageable world can be created". 13 
What is instructive for the purposes of this chapter is the ways in which this demarcation 
between inside and outside made possible a broader shift from the divine cosmos to the 
community and International Relations in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes" Polity 23 (3): pp. 207-30. 
Boucher points to the highly selective and unreflective interpretation of the so-called "Hobbesian 
Tradition" in IR. See also Ashley, R.K. and Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Conclusion: Reading 
Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies" 
International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): p.386. 
10 The notion of the polity as a body has a much longer history which can be traced to antiquity. What is 
distinct about the use of this analogy by early modern thinkers, however, is the ways in which it became 
radicalised with thinkers such as Hobbes to signal a "humanly created" order. 
11 Hobbes, T. (1994) Leviathan Everyman: London. p.liii. 
12 Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 
Manchester University Press: Manchester. p.67. For a more detailed discussion of Hobbes' textual 
strategies of otherness see Connolly, W. (1988) Political Theory and Modernity. 
13 Bauman, Z. (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence. Polity Press: Cambridge. p.12. 
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sovereign state: from overlapping, loose tributary affiliations of feudal Europe to the 
territorial organisation of modem international relations. Hobbes' demarcation between 
inside and outside realms essentially delineated a territorial space in which the 
personalised basis of feudal authority gradually gave way to the consolidation of 
authority into a single public realm. 14 With this, the state gradually replaced the 
multiplicity of hierarchical bonds with a mutually exclusive and territorially fixed 
identity.15 Thereafter, the positing of an all-powerful centre of authority that monopolised 
the means of legitimate violence over a sharply demarcated territory became the primary 
means for organising European political space. The right to make war, which had hitherto 
been exercised by certain individuals, was transferred to the state which increasingly 
monopolised the legitimate use of violence in order to police its newly-formed 
boundaries. As the interior other of drunkenness, unruliness and deviance became 
increasingly subject to disciplinary state practices, the notion of "foreign-ness" thereby 
became projected to an external realm. 
Thus, by inscribing this boundary between inside and outside, Hobbes provided the 
discursive conditions of possibility for the modem practice of foreign policy. Hobbes' 
political theory can be seen, therefore, as a kind of proto-foreign policy in which, as 
Reinhart Koselleck has noted, it was: 
the delimitation of an independent inner space, a space whose moral integrity 
was shown by Hobbes to lie solely in its character as a State ... that effectuated 
the outward evolution of an inter-state, supra-individual, 
commitment...Nothing but Hobbes' strict separation of exterior and interior 
realms could make it possible to core an area of foreign policy out of the welter 
of religious jurisdictions. 16 
It is this inside-outside boundary which is central to understanding how Australian policy-
makers have traditionally understood the "Asia-Pacific". Here we shall see how, as an 
expression of modem statecraft, Australian foreign policy has been based upon the 
Hobbesian delineation of interior and exterior realms. In seeking to secure the boundaries 
of the modem Australian state, therefore, successive generations have represented the 
Asia-Pacific as a dangerous exterior realm. In this way, the Asia-Pacific became 
converted into a marker of otherness against which Australia's own sovereign identity 
has been defmed. 
There is another way that this theme of territoriality has fundamentally shaped foreign 
policy toward the Asia-Pacific. This relates to the ways in which contemporary foreign 
policy-makers have viewed the world through a state-centric prism of understanding. 
14 Ruggie, J. (1993) "Territoriality and Beyond" pp.lS-6. 
15 Agnew, J. and Corbridge, S. (1995) Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Economy. Routledge: London. p.85. 
16 Koselleck, R. (1988) Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society. 
Berg Publishers: Oxford. p.43, 41. 
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Thus, by projecting onto the Asia-Pacific the neatly-demarcated boundaries of Western 
IR, our policy-making community have understood the region through broader 
representations of IR as a mosaic of distinct territorial states. As Edward Soja has 
observed, Western conceptions of IR are based upon a "rigidly compartmentalized 
division of political space", in which "the conventional Western political map is highly 
linear, incredibly precise (at least in appearance) and partitioned into distinct parcels" of 
territory. 17 
Whatever the utility of such understandings in early modem Europe, the strict separation 
between interior and exterior realms in Hobbesian thought represents a dangerous and 
anachronistic basis upon which to devise contemporary foreign policy amidst the 
accelerating flows of contemporary political life. Such dangers have been exemplified in 
Australia's contemporary regional foreign policies. Here we shall see how our policy-
makers have reduced regional identity to a strictly territorial formulation, effectively 
reducing the societies of Asia and the Pacific to the expression of state elites. This has 
effectively circumscribed Australia's regional engagement within narrow statist 
parameters in which a range of increasingly salient issues such as migration, gender, 
ecology and indigenous communities have simply been ignored or marginalised by 
contemporary policy-makers. Those issues, however, are irreducible to territorial 
formulations. I will examine the consequences of this narrow framing of Australian 
foreign policy in the following chapters of this thesis. For now, however, I want to turn 
to a discussion of how this territorialisation of space in post-Renaissance thought became 
converted into a broader global classification of Western selves and non-Western others 
with the expansion of Europe. More directly, I ask how did the Hobbesian inscription of 
geopolitical identities on a territorial basis become converted into a hierarchical ordering 
of states and regions, selves and others, and allies and enemies in Australian foreign 
policy? 
Encountering Difference: Defining Self and Other 
We are all descendants of Columbus, it is with him that our genealogy begins.18 
In order to establish these broader discursive connections, it is instructive to return to the 
Renaissance and the expansion of Western civilisation during the so-called Age of 
Discovery. It was during this period that Europeans came to directly encounter other 
peoples and cultures on a global scale for the first time in human history, an encounter 
which has set the major patterns and modes through which modem Western society 
(including Australia) has subsequently engaged with different cultures and peoples. 19 
17 Soja. E. (1971) The Political Organization of Space. Commission on College Geography, Resource 
Paper No.8. Association of American Geographers: Washington DC. p.9. 
18 Todorov, Tzvetan (1984) The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. Trans. Richard 
Howard, Harper and Row: New York. p.5. 
19 A close analysis of this reveals that the internationalising impulses of Western modernity centred on a 
range of discursive practices whereby Europe's others became integrated, as a subordinate part, into the 
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A key moment in this dominant geopolitical trajectory was Columbus's discovery of 
America. As Tzvetan Todorov's remarkable account has shown, the Spanish conquest of 
America represented "an exemplary'' history of the ways in which Western civilisation has 
confronted and encountered societies and civilisations that are different 20 As Todorov 
observes, the Spanish encounter with America's Indians encompassed two approaches to 
understanding and coping with difference. The first approach, that adopted by the 
conquistadors, centred on defining "the Indian" as an inferior other and an object of 
conquest and domination. The second approach, exemplifled in the missionaries' 
response, was based upon the principle of equality in which the Indians were seen as 
potential Christians who could be saved from their pagan ways and integrated into the 
righteous framework of Western Christian civilisation. Both these approaches composed 
a logic of obliteration of difference - one through conquest, the other through 
conversion. The point that Todorov makes is that the humanist proclivities of 
missionaries such as Las Casas were as equally intolerant and complicit in the near-
destruction of Indian civilisation ("the greatest genocide in human history") as the brutal 
conquistadors and their notion of the Indian as an inferior, sub-human identity. The logic 
of obliteration of difference that underpinned both approaches transformed the Spanish 
"discovery" of America into a bloody, murderous encounter with Europe's other. 
What is instructive for present purposes is that, as Todorov suggests, this dual hostility 
towards difference has encompassed the discursive field of possibilities that has framed 
the West's encounter with other societies and cultures. Through both conversion and 
conquest, accordingly, Western modernity has been fuelled by an expansionist logic in 
which Europe's others have been integrated within a disciplinary framework of the West. 
This has amounted to an annihilation and obliteration of difference at the heart of the 
rationalising impulse of modernity, examined by Max Weber among others. As Todorov 
points out, excluded as a model for social relations is a third approach to difference that 
is based not upon the logic of obliteration but rather on a respect for difference. This 
approach seeks neither to destroy nor convert the other but to relate to difference on its 
own terms. 
It is on the basis of this dual approach to difference, which excludes this third orientation, 
that Australia's regional policies foreign policy have been formulated. Indeed, this dual 
orientation has been articulated in foreign policy via the dominant "realist" and "liberal" 
dominant European system of international relations. Insofar as this has been the dominant geopolitical 
trajectory of modernity, it must also be noted that there have been multiple points of resistance to such 
dominant geopolitical forces - resistance which has encompassed a range of enduring anti-colonial and 
anti-imperial struggles. In recognising this, one must be attentive to the ways in which modern discourse 
never achieves total closure over space and thus never entirely erase alternative ways of life and identity. 
Rosow, S. (1990) "The Forms of Internationalization: Representations of Western Culture on a Global 
Scale" Alternatives 15 (3): p.293. 
20 Todorov, T. (1984) The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other p.5. 
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perspectives that have underpinned Australian thinking on international affairs. The 
history of Australia's regional relations, accordingly, has been characterised by 
understandings of the Asia-Pacific which have oscillated between realist threat scenarios 
and a liberal agenda of trade and economic engagement. 21 While the former has been 
based upon representations of the region as an object of conquest/containment, the latter 
has stressed the possibilities for cooperation, development and conversion. Beyond this 
double bind of our regional policy lies Todorov's third approach to difference which has 
effectively been excluded from the formulation of foreign policy. In the final chapter of 
this thesis, I will examine how it might be possible to rethink the prevailing engagement 
with the Asia-Pacific through adopting this alternative approach to difference. 
For now, however, I want to preface the discussion of Australian foreign policy to follow 
by further examining the theme of otherness in Western post-Renaissance thought. This 
theme has been elucidated in Jacques Derrida' s discussion of logocentrism, a term which 
denotes the pervasive tendency in Western thought to divide the world up into a series of 
binary oppositions such as mind/matter, self/other, West/East, inside/outside, 
rational/irrational sane/insane etc. 22 The dominant disposition here is to impose a 
hierarchy upon each binary pair in which the former term is accorded a pure presence or 
identity that inhabits the realm of logos, while the latter term derives from the former as 
its negation, inferior form or oppositional "other". 23 This is clear in the two paradigmatic 
approaches to difference identified above where both define different cultures in terms of 
the privileged features of Western self-identity. That is, both approaches locate their own 
position, namely, Western civilisation, as the regulative ideal against which other societies 
and cultures are understood. It is through such logocentric modes of discourse that the 
West has understood the East and, in turn, that Australia has understood the Asia-Pacific 
region. Thus, in encountering difference on a global scale, European explorers, traders, 
colonialists, missionaries and soldiers deployed these dominant logocentric modes of 
Western culture in order to give meaning to their experiences. In doing so, they classified 
the world in terms of a range of binary oppositions in which a hierarchy of self/other, 
inside/outside and West/East was imposed upon the spatial relations between Europe and 
non-European societies. 24 
21 See Footnote 7 in the introduction. 
22 See Culler, J. (1982) On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. Cornell University 
Press: Ithaca.p.93. 
23 Ibid. p.107. 
24 None of this is to say, however, that this ordering was a simple, monologic process. Rather, as the 
history of colonialism has shown, Western geopolitics has been resisted at every tum requiring 
systematic violence that has often ended in genocide. The point I wish to make here is that such violence 
was made possible by the sense of superiority and mission that Europeans felt in "bringing civilisation to 
the world". For a discussion of the more specific ways in which Asia and the Pacific became imagined in 
Western thought see Dathorne, O.R. (1996) Asian Voyages: Two Thousands Years of Constructing the 
Other. Bergin and Garvey: Wesport, Connecticut. 
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In the Enlightenment, this logocentric ordering of global relations became articulated 
through a distinctly temporal dichotomy between "advanced" and "backward" societies. 
Here the advanced stage of Europe was contrasted with the backward and primitive state 
of non-European societies. As notions of temporal transition came to dominate 
Enlightenment thinking, Europe's superiority was seen as a product of a universal path of 
historical development, expressed in the evolution of modern science, capitalism and the 
nation-state. Writers such as Rousseau and Montesqueie began speculating on the factors 
and principles that might be applied in ordering the distribution of populations, cultures 
and political systems in the world.25 The "primitive" state of the non-Western world was 
explained via a whole raft of environmental and racial typologies framed as scientific 
theories that placed Western civilisation at the apex of evolution and non-European 
societies at the other end of the evolutionary scale. 
An exemplary figure of the Enlightenment project was Hegel whose totalising system of 
world history established a fundamental hierarchy between the West and its others.26 In 
The Philosophy of History, which reproduced his famous lectures of 1830-31, Hegel 
developed a typology of global development based upon the absolute sovereignty of state 
forms. While at the apex of this typology stood the absolutist states of the West (the 
"Germanic World"), the lowest stage of evolution was reserved for the despotic rulers of 
"the Orient".27 Within this typology, universal history represented a process in which "the 
Universal Spirit" achieved full realisation through a progressive movement to statehood. 
History became understood as a process in which temporally backward non-European 
societies progressively adopted the privileged features of the West. As we shall see in the 
following chapters, it is via these same modes of universal progressivist history that "the 
Asia-Pacific" has been imagined in contemporary Australian foreign policy. 
By the time that the modem system of IR had developed in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the dominant understandings of Western IR were well established. In seeking to outline 
some of these understandings, I have focused on modem thinkers such as Hobbes and 
Hegel whose work amounted to what can be seen as proto-foreign policies through 
which space became territorially defined and the globe was divided up into a hierarchical 
25 Harvey, D. (1990) The Condition ofPostmodemity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. 
Blackwell: Cambridge, MA. p.250. 
26 As with Hobbes, my reading of Hegel is not meant to discover the "real" Hegel. In fact, rather than 
seeking to capture "what Hegel actually meant" (because he said and meant a lot of things all of which 
are subject to multiple interpretations) I am concerned with the ways in which Hegel has tended to be 
read and translated into IR discourse. For an example of an interpretation of Hegel which goes beyond 
caricatured readings of "Hegelian Idealism", see Zizek, S. (1990) "Beyond Discourse-Analysis" in E. 
Laclau (ed.) New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. Verso: London. This is a brief piece that 
seeks to radicalise Hegel by reinterpreting his Lord/Bondsman dualism as a kind of postmodem 
retheorisation of identity in which the self becomes possible only through its oppositional relation with 
the other. 
27 Hegel, G.W.F. (1944) The Philosophy of History. Trans. by J. Sibree. Revised Edition: Willey Book 
Co: New York. 
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ordering of geopolitical relations. In deploying these historically-constituted 
understandings of space and identity, contemporary policy-makers have reproduced the 
prevailing division of global geopolitical space as a natural object of policy. Discursive 
strategies which were seen as contingent and historically constructed by thinkers such as 
Hobbes and Descartes have tended to become naturalised in modem foreign policy. For 
instance, when a former Australian Foreign Minister unproblematically invokes foreign 
policy as an objective response to "the world as we fmd it", he is actually normalising that 
world through the deployment of a deeply embedded understandings which constitutes 
selves and others on a global scale. 28 Those understandings have not only effectively 
shaped the interpretive possibilities of Australian foreign policy but have provided the 
logocentric lens through which policy-makers have understood the world. 
As I will show throughout this thesis, it is through this broader ordering of global 
relations in post-Renaissance thought that our policy-makers have traditionally 
understood the societies of Asia and the Pacific. Thus, when confronting the difference 
represented by Asian and Pacific societies, Australia's colonial settlers looked toward 
Europe as the main locus of identity and the regulative ideal against which to make sense 
of their experiences. No less than the Spanish conquistadors and missionaries landing on 
the shores of the Americas in 15th and 16th centuries, successive waves of European 
migrants to Australia have engaged difference in terms of the intellectual baggage of their 
own culture. In doing so, they deployed familiar binary oppositions that demarcated the 
boundaries between inside/outside, self/other, West/East and so on. In the rest of this 
chapter, I want to connect Australian foreign policy to this broader history I have charted 
above. In particular, I want to examine the historical circumstances through which the 
broader understandings of Western IR were transmitted to the new colonial settlement of 
Australia and ultimately translated into contemporary Australian foreign policy. 
The Colonial Origins of Australian Foreign Policy 
... Without songs, architecture, history: 
The emotions and superstitions of younger lands, 
Her rivers of water drown among inland sands, 
The river of her immense stupidity 
Floods her monotonous tribes from Cairns to Perth. 
In them at last the ultimate men arrive 
Whose boast is not: "we live" but "we survive", 
A type who will inhabit the dying earth. 
And her five cities, like teeming sores, 
Each drains her: a vast parasite robber-state 
28 Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the I990s. Second 
Edition. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne. p.41. · 
Where second-hand Europeans pullulate 
Timidly on the edge of alien shores ... 29 
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The evocative verse of A.D. Hope gives expression here to the experience of isolation, 
alienation and estrangement that has encompassed the formation of the modem identity 
of "Australia". It is a cultural expression bound up with the act of founding a settler state 
in the Southern land of "Terra Australis" whereby European civilisation was transplanted 
to an alien continent, isolated from the rest of the world by the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
and surrounded by unknown cultures and peoples. This experiment of turning an 
unexplored continent into a penal colony was far removed from the Enlightenment 
visions of Utopia that infused European society. On the contrary, it represented "a 
Dystopia of petty thieves and other criminals"- what Jeremy Bentham termed "a sort of 
excrementitious mass".30 As Robert Hughes has noted, "to most Englishmen [Australia] 
seemed not just a mutant society but another planet- an exiled world, summed up in its 
popular name 'Botany Bay'. It was remote and anomalous to its white creatures".31 
Difference, then - in the form of estrangement from the land and a sense of isolation 
from Europe - was the dominant experience for successive waves of European 
immigrants in first arriving in the Southern continent. The problem for the new settlers 
became one of securing a stable identity amidst a sense of isolation and estrangement. 
This identity was based upon a founding act so obviously and openly an act of pure 
invention: namely, the transplantation of a British penal colony to a continent half way 
around the world. There are no centuries of noble history here, no grand revolutionary 
struggle for independence, and certainly no sense of mission to match America's frontier 
society. On the contrary, the transportation of a surplus of convicts from Britain's 
teeming gaols to Australia is notable precisely for the lack of legend and shared history 
usually associated with the founding myths of state. 
In lacking clear historical or ethnic referents, the new settler colony in Australia was 
manifestly "inorganic"32, relying solely upon the imaginative practices of settlement and 
statecraft to secure the stable boundaries of identity. Indeed, the difficulties of forging a 
sovereign identity were if anything heightened in the colonial settlement of Australia as 
the formation of the new colony was quite literally a Hobbesian act of projecting the 
29 From the poem "Australia" in Hope, A.D. (1992) Selected Poems. Angus and Robertson: Sydney. 
30 Hughes, R. (1987) The Fatal Shore: A History oft he Transportation of Convicts to Australia. Collins-
Harvill: London. p.1 
31 Ibid. p.2. 
32 The same point is made by David Campbell in respect to the American colonies. Campbell argues that, 
as an inorganic settlement, America is peculiar in its dependence upon practices of imagination for its 
being as the "imagined community par excellence". In contrast to Campbell's reformulated "American 
exceptionalism" thesis, however, it is possible to speculate here that the salience of imaginary practices is 
in fact a common condition of colonial settler states or what Paul Carter has characterised more broadly 
as "living in a new country". Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security p.105, Carter, P. (1992) Living in a 
New Country: History, Traveling and Language. Faber and Faber: London. 
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criminal element of British society to an external realm "out there", a realm of difference, 
disorder and unruliness. The challenge for the new settlers became how to convert this 
Antipodean "state of nature" (an exotic "outside" to Europe's "inside") into a stable 
interior identity of the sovereign state. In other words, how was it possible to carve out a 
sovereign space in the absence of any foundational referents of national identity? 
The answer revolved around the referents of geography and race. A sense of nation thus 
became tied, not to an imagined tribal community or a long history as in Europe, but 
rather to the lonely figure of Anglo-Saxon Man struggling to master the harsh geography 
of the Southern continent located at the margins of empire. When launching Federation 
by declaring "a nation for continent and a continent for a nation", Alfred Deakin sought 
to invoke a shared geographical reference point for the new nation. Meanwhile, Henry 
Parkes celebrated phrase "the crimson thread of kinship" exemplified the other enduring 
referent of Australian state identity - a racial afflliation with the British Empire and its 
spread of White civilisation across the globe. These tenuous referents of identity -
geography and race, and continent and empire - gave rise to an intense anxiety on the 
part of the new settlers. Confronted with the harsh Australian environment, its strange 
other-worldly fauna and flora, European Man was estranged in this hostile, harsh 
environment. In signifying the Hobbesian state of nature, Australia's desolate bush 
landscape became central to the imaginative aesthetic representations of the new colony. 
Seeking to overcome such estrangement, the colonisers of Australia expressed a strong 
desire to settle the continent and tame it. This explains the centrality of narratives of 
exploration in Australian nationalist mythology. As Paul Carter has shown, the 
colonisation of Australia was marked by an Enlightenment narrative in which the words, 
charts, explorations, mappings and discoveries of the new settlers served to convert the 
strange territories of the continent into a sense of place and home. 33 The colonisation of 
the new continent was above all an act of domestication of social space in which the early 
settlers sought to fashion the alien continent into a territorially-fixed state. As Carter has 
noted, "located against the imaginary grid, the blankness of unexplored country was 
translated into a blueprint for colonization". 34 This was exemplified in the urban 
settlement of Australia's coastline in which "towns were laid out as geometrical 
abstractions"· evidenced most notably in the planning of Melbourne and Adelaide which 
strictly conformed to the grid rationality of Euclidean geometry.35 
Indeed, as Carter has noted, the efficacy of the grid in the formation of Australia was not 
so much that it was more rational than other forms of urban planning but that it was 
culturally familiar36, providing a recognisable space in which the new settlers could feel at 
"home". Western civilisation could thereby be constructed in an alien land and space 
33 Carter, P. (1987) The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History. Faber and Faber: London. 
34 Ibid. p.204. 
35 Ibid. p.207. 
36 Ibid. p.210. 
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rationally planned. The rationalising impulse of Western modernity was in this way 
extended to the new continent, transmitted by state-building forces seeking to "settle" the 
new continent. The objective of constructing an ordered social space became tied to what 
Keith Hancock called "Australia's great social experiment" of capital-labour relations in 
which a truly rational, egalitarian society could be constructed out of a hostile, alien 
territory. 37 
As the settlement of the continent proceeded, the sense of continental estrangement of 
the early colonies became converted into a profound anxiety about Australia's own 
geographical position in the world. As Rex Mortimer has noted, "the shell of a 
Europeanised society [was] grafted onto the rump of Asia, a society whose predominant 
reaction to its situation has been expressed in reflexes generated by irrational fears and 
racial prejudices". 38 The displacement of the early settlers from European civilisation to 
an alien continent gave rise to a sense of danger and threat emanating from the immediate 
environs. In establishing a small Anglo-Saxon settlement inhabiting a vast, empty 
continent rich in resources, successive generations of Australians felt under constant 
threat of being overrun by the poverty-stricken "hordes" of Asia and the Pacific. In the 
early part of this century, the union official R.S. Ross, put it this way: 
... the ultra-problematic Pacific is all awry. The more one reads on the problems 
the more one is alarmed, the more one thinks the outlook full of foreboding. 
Wherever one turns, a black wall stands like an inexorable Gibraltar across 
one's path, offering naught but something upon which to dash one's head in 
erring futility. As a country Australia is in the danger zone because of the 
proximity, ambitions, and requirements of Asia's multiplying millions. 39 
This fragility of identity- that feeling of being on the periphery of empire- engendered 
an extreme sense of otherness in Australia's geography. Just as the Australian continent 
had been understood in terms of its other-worldly, exotic and unfamiliar qualities, so too 
did the neighbouring societies of Asia and the Pacific represent a vast perilous unknown 
to the European settlers of Australia. In confronting this threatening unknown realm, 
early policy-makers sought to convert the societies of Asia and the Pacific into an object 
of knowledge through reproducing the "time-honoured image of Asia as difficult, 
despotic, dangerous, and above all different from Australia". 40 In doing so, they tapped 
into a range of Western constructions of the non-Western "other" which reduced the 
complex realities and great cultural differences of the Asia-Pacific to a variety of tropes 
such as the yellow peril, the multiplying millions of Asia, the falling dominos of Southeast 
37 Hancock W.K. (1930) Australia. Ernest Benn: London. 
38 Mortimer, R. (1978) "From Ball to Arndt: The Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarship" in R. 
Mortimer (ed.) Showcase State. Angus and Robertson: Sydney. p.101. 
39 Ross, R.S. (1928) "A Labour View of Pacific Problems" in P. Campbell, R. Mills and G. Portus (eds.) 
Studies in Australian Affairs. Macmillan: Melbourne. p.215. 
40 Broinowski, A. (1992) The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. p.134. 
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Asia or the unstable regional balance of power. It was through these broader Western 
images of otherness that knowledge of Asia and the Pacific came to be produced in 
Australian foreign policy. 
Indeed, what has made these images of region so enduring and powerful is the ways in 
which they have fed into a broader process of identity formation through which 
successive generations of Australian elites imagined and understood their own identity. 
Hence, representations of the Asia-Pacific region as a dangerous, unstable other 
amounted as much as anything else to an affirmation and narration of Australia's own 
identity. Thus, in locating otherness in the Asia-Pacific, policy-makers displaced a sense 
of continental estrangement and isolation that characterised the early settlement of 
Australia to a space outside the continent. This projection of threat and insecurity to an 
external, foreign realm, marked the emergence of a distinctly Australian foreign policy. 
The Hobbesian challenge of carving out a sovereign domain was thereby achieved 
through practices that defmed the region as a foreign, exotic realm. "Australia" and the 
"Asia-Pacific" - state and region - became mutually constitutive identities of this 
emerging foreign policy that inscribed the Asia-Pacific region as a marker par excellence 
of otherness. 
As we shall see in the following chapters, this framing of Australian identity has 
manifested itself in two main themes in Australia's foreign relations. The first, articulated 
in the protector theme, has been based upon the realist goal of containment whereby 
policy-makers have sought protection from the Asia-Pacific region in the form of a 
security guarantee from Western allies: Great Britain before World War II and the United 
States thereafter. This has led to a sycophantic, highly dependent foreign policy that, in 
its strident efforts to show "loyalty" to imperial patrons, has called on successive 
generations of Australian troops to fight and die in foreign adventures on faraway 
battlefields. In the first 88 years of Federation, the Australian armed forces were engaged 
in war in countries abroad for a total of 27 years, and had military forces stationed abroad 
for a further 27 years, or 62 percent of the time. 41 That surely makes Australia one of the 
most belligerent war-making states on earth, all of the time never once having been 
forced to defend itself. 
The second response has been articulated in the theme of engagement with the region, in 
which, rather than adopting a posture of containment and protection, policy-makers have 
sought to overcome Australia's geographical engagement through development, 
cooperation and assistance with the region. This posture has been based upon the desire 
by Australians to feel "at home" in our Asian and Pacific neighbourhood. Whilst this 
approach, identified with the focus of contemporary foreign policy, has been presented as 
a fundamental break with the past, a major aim of this thesis is to challenge this notion. I 
41 Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War: External Relations Since 1788. Second Edition. 
Australian National University Press: Canberra. p.6. 
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will show here that contemporary regional engagement has not only reproduced 
traditional liberal themes of Australian foreign policy but that it been driven by precisely 
the same modes of Western IR discourse as those-which have given rise to the protector 
theme. 
Indeed, rather than treating realism and liberalism as discrete, mutually exclusive theories 
of IR, I understand each as contending poles of the larger discourse I mapped above.42 
That is to say, rather than comprising opposing, mutually exclusive viewpoints, the liberal 
and realist approaches to foreign policy have drawn their enduring discursive force on the 
ways in which each establishes and delimits the other and, in tum, constructs the terms of 
discourse within which Australian foreign policy has been conducted. Richard Leaver has 
summed this up by observing how realism and liberalism: 
perpetually invoke and justify each other's separate existence ... the two are not 
alternative so much as complementary visions of the international system. They 
provide a classic example of how a relationship of total exclusion which 
appears to be highly adversarial in fact sustains a symbiotic link between the 
two 'reverse video images'. 43 
Taken together, then, and constituted within a common discursive space, the realist and 
liberal approaches to Australia's regional relations have served to reproduce the dominant 
assumptions of Western IR - in particular, a territorial understanding of global life 
articulated via the state-as-actor model and a division of global political space into 
domestic-international, inside-outside and self-other. In reproducing these shared 
metatheoretical assumptions, Australian policy-makers have naturalised a particular 
territorial image of IR in terms of a hierarchical arrangement of states and regions, at the 
expense of other definitions of global life. A major theme of the following chapters is to 
show how, characterised by the double bind of Western IR, Australian foreign policy has 
effectively come to understand the world through representations which reduce the 
complexity and difference of the Asia-Pacific to narrow market-based and geopolitical 
images of reality. 
000 
This chapter has focused on examining the themes of territoriality and otherness in 
Western thinking on IR. My analysis began with the gradual shift that occurred in early 
modern thought in which thinkers such as Hobbes classified and divided political space 
and identity into sharply-demarcated territorial jurisdictions. My main focus was on 
showing how particular understandings and interpretations of sociopolitical life became 
42 Mortimer, R. (1978) 'From Ball to Arndt". Richardson, J.L (1995) "Problematic Paradigm: Liberalism 
and the Global Order" in J.A. Camilleri, A.P. Jarvis, and A.J. Paolini (eds.) The State in Transition: 
Reimagining Political Space. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado. Vasquez, J. (1983) The 
Power of Power Politics: A Critique. Frances Pinter: London. 
43 Leaver, R. (1990) "The Gamaut Report: The Quality of Realism" Australian Outlook 44 (1): p. 23. 
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codified into a rigid discourse of foreign policy and international relations (Western IR). 
Through this Western discourse, I argued, foreign policy practitioners and IR scholars 
have classified the world in terms of a range of dichotomies between self/other, 
inside/outside and West/East. In charting the trajectory of Western IR, the main 
objective of this chapter has been to establish the broader connections between this 
discourse and the theory and practice of Australian foreign policy. Having traced the 
dominant understandings through which foreign policy-makers have understood the Asia-
Pacific, I can now turn in the following chapters to a more detailed historical survey of 
Australia's relations with the Asia-Pacific. 
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Chapter 2 
Early Australian Foreign Policy: Securing White 
Australia in the 'Far East' 
In this chapter, I examine the early period of Australian foreign policy from the late 19th 
century to the beginnings of the Cold War in the 1950s. My focus is on identifying certain 
pivotal moments which highlight how the identities of state and region were framed in 
early foreign policy. This, in turn, involves showing how relations with the Asia-Pacific 
came to be circumscribed within a broader Western discourse of identity formation. 
Within this discourse, Australia was represented as an isolated outpost of the British 
Empire located in what policy-makers viewed as a dangerous Asiatic region. 
Underpinned by such representations, early foreign policy was dominated by a profound 
sense of threat and isolation concerning Australia's place in the world. This manifested 
itself in an obsessive search for security. Thus, in seeking to respond to apparent security 
threats emanating from the region, policy-makers adopted a dual approach - that is, 
they looked toward the British to provide strategic protection from Asia at the same time 
as attempting to increase trade and development cooperation with the so-called ''Far 
East". Characterised by this dualism, regional foreign policy fluctuated between realism 
and liberalism, strategy and trade, and containment and engagement. 
Western Identity and Australia's Dual Search for Security in the 'Far East' 
In the late 19th Century, Australian policy-makers became concerned with European 
imperial competition in the Pacific. At the turn of the century these security anxieties 
shifted to the spectre of a rapidly modernising Japan with expansionist aims, a 
development which elicited a heightened sense of threat in Australia. This sense of threat 
drew upon a more generalised racial fear of "Asia" popularly dubbed the "yellow peril" 
which was initially articulated in the explosions of racial violence that accompanied the 
influx of Chinese immigrants to the Australian gold fields. With Japan's military victory 
over Russia in 1905- a victory that marked the emergence of Japan as a major global 
power - the locus of anti-Asian sentiments shifted to the menacing figure of Japanese 
imperialism. The Japanese threat was to dominate Australian thinking on international 
affairs for the next half century. 
Believing that Australia represented an isolated Western outpost in a volatile region, 
policy-makers were convinced of the need for Great Power patronage to ensure 
Australian security. In the name of showing loyalty to Great Britain and eliciting future 
protection, accordingly, a long history of Australian participation in foreign wars was 
launched with the dispatch of expeditionary Australian forces throughout the 19th 
century to the Sudan, the Maori wars, the Boer wars and the Boxer rebellion in China. In 
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all these expeditions, the initiative for Australian participation carne not from Britain but 
from the various Australian colonial governments which competed with one another over 
who would be the first to display loyalty to- empire. 1 That theme has resonated 
throughout the history of Australian foreign policy since the 19th century. 
In fact, this strident loyalty to Empire by Australian elites reflected the broader framing of 
Australian identity in terms of a sense of Anglo-Saxon kinship, or what Paul Hasluck was 
to call, Australia's "family ties" with Great Britain.2 Australian patriotism was, thus, 
imperial rather than national, exemplified in Prime Minister Alfred Deakin's definition of 
Australians as "independent Australian Britons".3 At the core of state identity was a 
civilisational and racial mythology that identified Australia with an imagined Western 
civilisation characterised by Anglo-Saxon culture, a capitalist economic system, liberal-
individual values and the Christian religion. This identification with "the West" is 
illustrated in the most enduring and profoundly-felt national myth in Australia - the 
ANZAC legend which commemorates the defeat of New Zealand and Australian Troops 
(ANZAC) by Turkish forces at Gallipoli in World War I. Here a tactical blunder by the 
British hierarchy led to the deaths of a great number of Australian troops, who, it is said, 
fought with great courage and distinction. The resonance that the ANZAC legend has 
found in nationalist mythology can be explained through the way it served to give 
defmition to national identity whereby imperial sacrifice carne to mark Australia's 
graduation to full nationhood. Gallipoli signalled Australia's indivisible unity with the 
West, a kind of sacrificial act committed in battle against Western Christianity's long-
standing Nemesis- the Islamic Turks. As Bruce Kapferer has pointed out: 
The Anzacs are vital symbolic embodiments of the Australian nationalist 
imagination because they established an identity for Australia in the context of 
the very ideological and ontological roots of Western Judea-Christian 
civilisation. It did so in a situation in which the very basis of Western 
European Christian civilisation was ideologically conceived as threatened by 
anti-Christian of forces .. .In doing so, the Anzacs symbolised their ontological 
unity and too, the unity of the nation they represented with the Western 
European world. 4 
The narration of national identity in terms of the broader distinction between East and 
West engendered an intense sense of endangerment and insecurity in Australian thinking 
on international affairs. Australian insecurity stemmed from a fundamental discord 
between the alignment of Australian identity with the West and its geographical location 
1 Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War: External Relations Since 1788. Second Edition. 
Canberra: Australian National University Press. p.18. 
2 Hasluck. P (1951) The Government and the People 1939-41: Australia in the War of 1939-45. Vol. 1. 
Australian War Memorial: Canberra. p.156. 
3 Hancock W.K. (1930) Australia. Ernest Benn: London. 
4 Kapferer, B. (1988) Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in 
Sri Lo.nka and Australia. Smithsonian Institution Press: Washington. p.127. 
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in the East. The constitution of state identity was secured under the perpetual threat of 
erasure in which "the yellow peril" lurked ominously at the boundaries of Australia's 
identity, always threatening, always "out there" and always in need of being kept out. 
This projection of danger and otherness to an outside realm was reflected in the naming 
of the region as "the Pacific and Far East". That designation conjured up an image of a 
vast oceanic expanse that cut the continent off from its roots in Europe, emphasising, in 
turn, Australia's dependence on the maritime protection of Britain. The characterisation 
of the region as "the Far East" was a clear product of a British-devised foreign policy and 
indicated the ways in which Australian representations of the outside world prior to 
World War II were mediated through the interests of the British Empire, denoting both 
Europe as centre and the location of Australia on the periphery. 
Australian representations of the "Far East", however, did not merely replicate those of 
the Colonial Office in London. On the contrary, while the idea of "the Far East" may have 
had some geographical logic for colonial policy-makers in London, for Australians it 
denoted proximity, not distance, representing a subject of intense concern rather than 
indifference. For Australia's policy elite, "the Far East" was not a transparent description 
of geographical reality but an objective of policy. The alien threats emanating from the 
region had to be kept in abeyance - the Far East had to be kept "far away". Rather than 
replicating British imperialism in seeking to incorporate the East into Empire, Australian 
policy-makers sought to insulate Australia from the region's dangers. That meant 
vigorously patrolling the boundaries between self and other in order to secure the 
boundary between a stable, sovereign Australia and a dangerous, unstable region. 
In order to ensure such insularity, containment of the region became the primary 
objective of early foreign policy. That involved eliciting British naval and military 
protection, maintaining the discriminatory White Australia immigration policy, and 
ensuring the protection of Australian industry through economic tariffs. 5 Cohering around 
rigid and fixed modes of representation of self/other, this attempt to ensure continental 
protection was based upon achieving nothing less than absolute security. This was to lead 
to a distinctive brand of colonialism in which successive generations of political leaders 
sought to deny hostile anti-British forces access to the Pacific from which they could 
launch an attack on Australia. This was achieved either through promoting British 
annexation of the islands of the South Pacific or seeking diplomatic recognition of 
Australia's own control of some areas. 6 
5 Campbell, R. (1928) "Australian Defence Policy" in P. Campbell, R.C Mills and G.V Portus (eds.) 
Studies in Australian Studies. Macmillan: Melbourne. p.179. Hancock (1930) Australia p.64. Ross, R.S. 
(1928) "A Labour View of Pacific Problems" in P. Campbell, R. Mills and G.Portus (eds.) Studies in 
Australian Affairs. Macmillan: Melbourne. 
6 See, for instance, Thompson, R.C. (1980) Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 
1820-1920. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne. 
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Prime Minister Alfred Deakin's ambitious initiative in the early 20th century to establish 
an Australian '~Monroe Doctrine" exemplified this colonial impulse. Deakin proposed that 
the American commitment to control the "Western hemisphere" be extended to the 
Pacific, involving a vague and unelaborated proposal to establish cooperation among the 
British Empire, Holland, France, China and the United States.7 Although virtually ignored 
by the Colonial Office, this initiative indicated the ambitious security objectives pursued 
by Australian policy-makers. Early foreign policy was thus characterised by a fervent 
attempt to strengthen Britain's resolve in staying militarily engaged in the Pacific and 
maintaining the colonial status quo. This "sub-imperial" reflex8 was also evident in a 
number of other diplomatic initiatives such as the invitation Deakin extended to the 
American navy's "Great White Fleet" to visit Australia, Lyon's attempts to initiate a 
Pacific pact of regional understanding and Bruce's 1936 proposal for a non-aggression 
pact These initiatives were all designed to check the expansion of Japan and to maintain 
Western dominance in the region by institutionalising the presence of American and 
British forces in the Pacific.9 What was distinctive about this imperialist role was that, far 
from being generated by the grand civilising mission that characterised American and 
British expansionism, Australian imperialism was provoked by an abject fear of invasion. 
As Keith Hancock noted: 
... the imperialism of these Australian colonies ... sprang from an intense racial 
self-consciousness combined with a continental insularity ... All they wanted 
was security, and to them this meant isolation. 10 
In espousing such imperialist designs, policy-makers adopted a reductionist 
understanding of the Pacific and Far East. This was clear in the naming of the region as 
"the Pacific and Far East", which tended to be used in an undifferentiated way by policy-
makers who represented the lifestyles and cultures of regional life through strictly 
geopolitical understandings. Here the region was reduced to a monolithic strategic threat 
and an object of Western imperialism. By reproducing these representations, Australian 
policy-makers were complicit in the broader imaginative practices that sustained Western 
imperial history through incorporating Asia and the Pacific into the circuits of Western 
strategic power. 11 
7 See Meaney, N. (1967) "A Proposition of the Highest International Importance: Alfred Deakin's Pacific 
Agreement Proposal and its Significance for Australian-Imperial Relations" Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies 3 (3): pp. 200-213 which includes a transcript of Deakin's proposal. 
8 McQueen, H. (1970) A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning the Social Origins of Australian 
Radicalism and Nationalism. Penguin Books: Hannondsworth. 
9 Beaumont, J. (1989) The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1945. Occasional Paper Number 
1. The Australian Institute of International Affairs: Melbourne. 
10 Hancock, W.K. (1930) Australia p.206. 
11 In locating Australian foreign policy within this broader history of Western imperialism, however, it is 
important to note that this history has never been a unitary, unproblematic nor uncontested process. On 
the contrary, the grand narratives of Western imperialism have always been challenged by counter-
narratives: either from alternative imperial traditions such as those of Japan and China or from anti-
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In his post-World War I diplomacy in the League of Nations, Prime Minister Billy 
Hughes exemplified this reductionist geopolitical imagination. Hughes argued 
successfully that Australian needed control over German New Guinea12, the Soloman 
Islands, the Bismark Archipelago and Nauru on the basis that these neighbouring islands 
"encompassed Australia like fortresses". 13 This argument effectively reduced the South 
Pacific to a singular geopolitical identity of otherness and an object of colonial control. 
The consequences of such strategic reductionism were exemplified in Australia's major 
colonial possession, New Guinea, where the Australian administration was characterised 
by a marked sense of indifference to the development of the colony through its policy of 
neutralising the territory through occupation. Unlike British colonialism which was based 
upon the need for a secure supply of raw material from its colonies, there was no great 
desire to develop or economically exploit Australia's mandated areas. The less that 
happened in Australia's colonies the better, lest a developing colony attract the attention 
of hostile imperialist powers. Such indifference was to have far-reaching consequences 
for the territory. Contemporary Papua New Guinea is characterised by severe problems 
of economic underdevelopment, poverty and high levels of unemployment, all of which 
can to one degree or another be traced back to the indifference of Australian 
colonialism. 14 
Producing Knowledge of the Region: Foreign Policy between the Wars. 
Against this background of indifference, Australian knowledge about the Asia-Pacific 
remained rudimentary. The study of Asian history and civilisation was not a separately 
taught subject in Australian schools and universities but rather found expression as an 
adjunct in courses on European history. 15 "Asia" appeared as part of history only insofar 
as it was an object of conquest and discovery in the expansion of Europe. Not 
surprisingly, public debates about the Far East and the Pacific were characterised by both 
ignorance and xenophobia in which sensationalist and racist depictions of the "Asian 
menace" and "the Yellow peril" were commonplace. The lack of a well-informed public 
debate on Australia foreign policy was due, in the estimation of William Macmahon Ball, 
a noted scholar on East Asia, to the fact that 85% of news reports in the Australian media 
colonial struggles and everyday practices of resistance by peoples across the Pacific and Asia See for 
instance Osborne, M. (1970) Region of Revolt: Focus on Southeast Asia. Pergamon Press: Sydney. 
12 In fact, New Guinea had been the object of Australian imperialism as early as the middle of the 19th 
century when the Queensland government unilaterally sent an expedition to the territory to claim it as 
part of the Empire. On hearing of this, the Colonial office in London revoked Queensland's declaration 
as it was determined not to be forced into extending its colonial empire any further. For a discussion of 
this see Stargardt, A.T. (1977) Australia's Asian Policies: The History of a Debate 1839-1972. Institute 
of Asian Affairs: Hamburg. pp.55-81. 
13 See the documents in Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World: A Documentary History of from the 
1870s to the 1970s. Longman Cheshire: Melbourne. 
14 For an account of this, see Amarshi, A. Good, K. and Mortimer, R. (1979) Development and 
Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea. Oxford University Press: Melbourne. 
15 Reynolds, C. (1991) "Asian History" Unpublished Paper. Research School of the Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University: Canberra. p.3. 
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"comes through London" and a further 12% "through New York".16 Relying solely on 
the British Colonial Office and its various legations abroad for knowledge about 
international politics, the Australian Government had no independent diplomatic 
representation abroad, nor any independent means to gather and assess intelligence on 
foreign relations. This was officially recognised as a major problem in 1923 when the 
official Leeper Report concluded that there were "serious deficiencies in Australia's 
knowledge of the course of world events and British policy".17 
The first signs of an official government interest in developing knowledge about Asia and 
the Pacific are discernible with the government's appointment of James Murdoch as 
Foundation Professor of Oriental Studies at Sydney University in 1917.18 Murdoch was 
appointed to teach Japanese language at Sydney University and the Duntroon Military 
College in Canberra His appointment was made at the urging of both the Department of 
Defence and the New South Wales Chamber of Manufacturers. While the former was 
concerned with the increasing activity of Japanese imperialism in the Pacific, the latter 
urged Murdoch's appointment on the basis of potential trading opportunities in large 
Asian markets.19 Two year later, the Government established the Pacific Branch in the 
Department of Prime Minister under the directorship of the former intelligence officer 
Edmund Piesse which was designed to gather both military intelligence about Japan and 
information in assisting Australian administration of its colonial territories under the 
Mandate system of the League of Nations.20 These early efforts to produce knowledge of 
the region were motivated, therefore, by Australia's interests in defence and trade -
interests which were to create a fundamental dualism at the core of Australian foreign 
policy. Thus, since at least early this century, policy-makers have oscillated between 
representing "the region" in terms of threat, at one time, and as an unparalleled trading 
opportunity, at another. 
While the fear of Japan characterised foreign policy thinking throughout the inter-war 
period, the optimism that marked IR after the dark years of W odd War I was articulated 
through a liberal, trade-based orientation. This liberal disposition emphasised the 
cooperative and non-conflictual basis of Australia's relations with the Asia-Pacific based 
upon images of the region as a trading partner and object of "development". This 
approach was energetically promoted in the 1930s by a group of liberal intellectuals, 
comprising mainly economists and politicians associated with the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, 
16 See William Macmahon Ball's preface to Duncan, W.G.K. (ed.) (1938). Australia's Foreign Policy. 
Angus and Robertson: Sydney. 
17 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1975) "Appendix" in Documents of Australian 
Foreign Policy 1937-1949. Volume 1. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. p.554. 
18 Walker, D. and Ingleson, J. (1989) "The Impact of Asia" inN. Meaney (ed.) Under New Heavens: 
Cultural Transmission and the Making of Australia. Heinemann Educational Australia: Port Melbourne. 
pp. 304-305. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1975) "Appendix" p. 554. Walker, D. and 
Ingleson, J. (1989) "The Impact of Asia" p.305. 
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the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Australian Institute of International Affairs. 21 
Foremost amongst this group were John Latham, J.G Crawford, I. Clunies Ross, 
Frederick Eggleston, William Macmahon Ball, and A.C.V. Melbourne. This group was 
preoccupied with the problem of Australia's declining trade position, particularly as the 
world-wide depression of the 1920s had highlighted Australia's vulnerability to the 
vagaries of world trade. In addressing this problem, these liberal intellectuals argued that 
Australia needed to increase its share of the rapidly growing markets of the Far East. The 
image of huge markets and an untapped consumer base, particularly for Australian raw 
materials and food stuffs, was energetically promoted in the writings of this group. 
Clunies Ross, for example, edited a well-known volume concerned with demonstrating 
that Australian capital enjoyed "comparative cost advantage" in specific Asian markets.22 
These kinds of arguments have found expression in Australia's contemporary regional 
engagement which, notwithstanding present claims about its novelty, has its antecedents 
at least as far back as the liberal regionalism of the 1930s. 
The policies prescribed by these liberal intellectuals included posting Australian trade 
representatives to Asian capitals such as Shanghai and Batavia and promoting the 
teaching of Asian languages and culture in Australian schools and universities. It was not 
until Australians understood "the East" that they could effectively trade in it. By 1933 
some of these proposals were taken up by the Government with the legislation of a trade 
commissioners act allowing for the appointment of trade representatives abroad.23 Within 
a year, the Attorney General, John Latham, undertook a major trade mission to the 
Netherlands East Indies, Hong Kong, Singapore, French Indo-China, the Philippines, 
China and Japan, concluding in his official report to the Parliament that "it is important 
we should endeavour to develop and improve our relations with our near neighbours, not 
only in economic matters but also in relation to the vital issues of peace and war". 24 
Although such policies tended to stress cooperation and engagement as the basis for 
regional diplomacy, there was no absolute divide between the arguments of the liberal 
regionalists and those policy-makers who tended to emphasise a sense of threat in 
Australia's relations with the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, these dual policy perspectives 
21 See Brown, N. (1990) "Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia: 1920-1960" Australian 
Cultural History 9: pp. 80-92. 
22 Clunies Ross, I. (ed.) (1935) Australia and the Far East: Diplomatic and Trade Relations. Angus and 
Robertson: Melbourne. See also Shepherd, J. (1939) Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East. 
New York Institute of Pacific Relations: New York. 
23 See Stewart, F.H. (1935) "Australian Commercial Representation Abroad" in H. Dinning and J.G. 
Holmes (eds.) Australia's Foreign Policy 1934, which contains a reprint of the Trade Commissioners 
Act. 
24 Magew, R. (1973) "The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934: Its Significance in the 
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy" Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 59 (4): 
pp.447-63. Gobert, W. (1992) The Origins of Australian Diplomatic Intelligence in Asia, 1933-1941. 
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.96. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School 
of Pacific Studies, Australian National University: Canberra. p.15. 
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articulated the respective defence and trading interests that generated a common search 
for security across the Pacific by policy-makers. Driven by these instrumental policy 
interests, Australian diplomacy was based upon the dual agenda of eliciting Great Power 
protection from the region, while at the same time as promoting strategies of regional 
trade and development. Constituted within a common space of Western geopolitics, 
therefore, both liberal and realist approaches presupposed that a Western regional 
presence was imperative for the maintenance of a stable geopolitical order of free trading 
states across the Pacific. 
Heightened Fears of the Yellow Peril: Australian Foreign Policy and WW II 
While trade remained an important part of Australian diplomacy, it was a sense of 
military threat that increasingly demanded the attention of policy-makers in the late 
1930s. Australia's political leaders paid primary attention to Japan whose expansionary 
foreign policy in the Pacific heightened the need for policy-making elites know more 
about the outside world. Suddenly, political leaders required knowledge and information 
about the Asia and the Pacific region. Many liberal intellectuals who had an interest in 
"Asian" societies were called upon to become functionaries of the state- this time, 
however, producing knowledge for security purposes rather than trade.25 By the mid-
1930s the Department of External Relations was established for the first time as a 
separate government department. As Millar has suggested, the new department "was 
greatly needed to provide advice on the developing relations with Asia in which Japan 
was thrusting and threatening".26 With this, Australia's official links with the outside 
world rapidly expanded as Australian diplomatic appointments were made for the first 
time outside Britain: in 1940, Casey was appointed to the United States, Latham to 
Japan, Eggleston to China and Crithcley to the Netherlands East Indies. Diplomatic 
postings were also established in New Caledonia (1940), Portuguese Timor (1941), 
Malaya (1941), the USSR (1943), India (1944) and New Zealand (1944).27 In the new 
Department, a Pacific Mfairs Division was divided up into "South-East Asia", "East 
Asia", and "South West Pacific" sections, the "Australian-New Zealand Secretariat" and 
"the Far Eastern Commission for the Allied Control of Japan".28 This division of labour 
reflected the increasing needs of Australian policy-makers "to know more about Asia" as 
inter-state tensions increased across the globe. 
Far from contributing to a deeper understanding of the region, however, such efforts to 
develop knowledge of Asia merely reinforced time-honoured stereotypes of the Yellow 
Peril and traditional notions of regional threat and danger. Foremost amongst such 
representations was the image of a Japanese "southern thrust" through "Southeast Asia" 
25 Miller, J.D.B. (1983) "The Development oflntemational Studies in Australia 1933-1983" Australian 
Outlook 37 (3): pp.138-42. 
26 Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War p.41. 
27 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1975) "Appendix" pp.552-553. 
28 Ibid. pp.553-4. 
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advancing toward the Australian continent 29 The actions of the Japanese armed forces 
were interpreted as being part of a grand design to take control of the Australian 
continent. By 1942, as one writer has noted, an "air of panic and desperation" hung over 
any discussion of Australian foreign policies. 30 
This amplified sense of threat in war-time foreign policy was, however, less the product 
of a considered appraisal of the strategic situation in the Pacific than a familiar reflex 
reaction to White Australia's enduring sense of geographical endangerment. As Henry 
Frei has observed in his exhaustive study of Australian reactions to Japan's southern 
advance, policy-makers never seriously analysed Japanese strategic writings and, if they 
had, would have found that Japan's "southward advance was never ... a direct push on to 
Australian shores so often anticipated in Australia threat-literature".31 Indeed, Japanese 
assessments concluded that an invasion of Australia would require a huge deployment of 
troops and equipment which was beyond Japan's already stretched capability. Rather than 
coveting the Australian continent, Imperial Japan sought to secure a supply of resources 
from Southeast Asia crucial for Japanese industry which had been cut off by Western 
powers prior to World War II.32 Far from being an indication of Japan's intention to 
invade Australia, therefore, the bombing of northern coastal Australia in 1942 
represented an attempt to preempt any possible counter-offensive against its take-over of 
the Netherlands East Indies, including its major target, ,the Sumatran oil field. The notion 
that the Australian continent held relatively little interest for Japanese strategists was 
difficult to accept, however, for policy-makers whose sense of superiority derived from 
the notion that Australia was a prosperous, white, Western country in a region of poverty 
and instability. 
In seeking to make sense of the events of a world at war, then, policy-makers invoked the 
decades-old fear of the "yellow peril". In doing so, they drew on a self-enclosed discourse 
of foreign policy that reduced the complex strategic situation in the Pacific to the familiar 
binary oppositions of Western IR which demarcated Australia from a threatening and 
dangerous Asian and Pacific region "out there". Their focus was as much on the cultural, 
civilisational threat that "the barbaric Asiatic Japanese" presented to Australia's 
29 This image was particularly prevalent in the period from December 1941 to July 1942 during which 
Australian fears of an invasion were at their most intense. Sifting through the documents collated in 
Documents of Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949 illustrates the profound sense of vulnerability of 
Australian policy-makers toward Japanese military actions. Coral Bell has described Australian policy 
during these months as "embarrassing" in its obsessive sense of threat and "less than realistic 
understanding of the situation overseas". Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign 
Policy. Third Edition. Allen and Unwin: Canberra. p.19. 
30 Dupont, A. (1991) Australia's Threat Perception: A Search for Security. Canberra Papers on Strategy 
and Defence No.82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University: Canberra. 
p.33. 
31 Frei, H.P. (1991) Japan's Southern Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War 
II. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne. p.2, 217. 
32 For this see McQueen, H. (1991) Japan to the Rescue. William Heinemann Australia: Melbourne. 
pp.285-294. and Dupont, A. (1991) Australia's Threat Perception pp.32-36. 
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"Western" way of life as it was on the concrete strategic danger that Japanese militarism 
posed to Australian security. As Prime Minister Curtain emotionally announced after the 
Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1941: "We-shall hold this country and keep it as a 
citadel for the British-speaking race and as a place where civilisation will persist". 33 
By invoking this sense of civilisational threat, Australian political leaders were preparing 
the discursive ground for Australia's shifting alliance from Britain to the United States in 
the post-war period. The sense of vulnerability and defencelessness promoted by 
Australian political leaders during WWII can thus be understood in tenns of the effect it 
had in creating a psychology of dependence on the United States.34 This was clear in the 
ways in which the war in the Pacific was narrated in Australia. Here, the British failure to 
defend Singapore meant that Australia became "rescued" by the United States when 
General Douglas MacArthur's forces defeated Japan both at the Battles of Midway and 
the Coral Sea.35 In reproducing this dominant narrative of the war, Australian policy-
makers viewed the United States as the emerging leader and saviour of Western 
civilisation. 
When addressing the Parliament on his arrival in Australia, MacArthur outlined his 
military strategy in tenns of a Western struggle to defend (Euroamerican) civilisation. 
MacArthur declared that the bond between the two countries is "that indescribable 
consanguinity of race which causes us to have the same aspirations, the same ideals and 
the same dreams of future destiny". 36 In declaring as much, MacArthur was skilfully 
invoking the binary image of Western Saviour/Regional Threat central to Australian 
thinking on international affairs since settlement. Such declarations not only drew on, and 
reproduced, a deeply entrenched sense geographical of otherness in Australia but also the 
long-standing martial tradition of Australians fighting and dying abroad in the name of 
upholding Western civilisation against it's enemies. 37 
Breaching Australia's Imperial Reflex?: Liberal Regionalism in the Post-War Period. 
With the end of World War II, a more open atmosphere prevailed in international 
relations. Out of the chaos of world war, peoples and governments across the world 
appeared to be more open to a whole range of possibilities for the reorganisation of 
global relations both between and within states. In long-standing European colonies such 
as in the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese occupation had opened the way for post-
war independence from European colonialism. In Australia, meanwhile, those liberal 
intellectuals who had been recruited into the state during the war were now able to give 
33 cited in Hasluck, P. (1970) The Government and the People p.558. 
34 Pilger, J. (1987) A Secret Country. Johnathan Cape: London. p.117. 
35 see McQueen, H. (1991) Japan to the Rescue. 
36 MacArthur, D. (1965) A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army, 
Douglas MacArthur. edited by E.V. Whan. Frederick. A. PraegerPublishers: New York. p.117. 
37 See the official Australian history of World War II Hasluck, P. (1970) The Government and the People 
p.235. 
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expression to their own liberal attitudes in the post-war reconstruction of Australian 
society. During this period, foreign policy was formulated by this small intelligentsia, 
whose war-time experiences of mobilisation elicited an unwavering belief in the efficacy 
of the state in promoting progress, prosperity and democracy. The central policy 
influences during this period were Prime Minister Ben Chifley, Secretary of the External 
Affairs Department John Burton and the Minister for External Affairs Herbert Evatt. 
Under the tutelage of these figures, post-War diplomacy was based upon the grand liberal 
vision of Keynesian global development and Evatt's own brand of liberal internationalism, 
in particular, his untiring efforts to develop and promote the fledgling United Nations. 
In promoting this liberal agenda, policy-makers also sought closer relations with the Asia-
Pacific. This was reflected in the sympathetic and generally positive relations which the 
Labor Government established with the emerging nationalist elites of Asia. In particular, 
Chifl.ey and Burton developed an affinity with Indonesia's anti-colonial nationalist cause. 
While Australian waterside workers banned Dutch shipping from Australian ports, 
Australian representatives in the United Nations attacked the brutality of the second 
Dutch "police action" in Indonesia and demanded that the Dutch be expelled from the 
United Nations.38 Australian support was clearly appreciated and acknowledged by the 
Indonesian nationalist Republican leadership which nominated Australia to represent it on 
the United Nations Good Offices Committee and whose foreign minister, Dr. Subandrio, 
went so far as to describe Australia as the "mid-wife" of the Indonesian Republic.39 
Based upon sympathy towards nationalist struggles for independence, Labor's foreign 
policy eschewed the traditional sense of threat toward Asia. The Labor Government 
framed Australian identity less in terms of the image of a Western outpost in an alien 
region than as a small power that had much in common with the emerging independent 
countries of Asia. Evatt stressed Australia's interest in developing international structures 
that would favour small powers and moderate the excessive influence that dominant 
states such as the United States could exercise. That represented the first time in which 
Australian foreign policy significantly departed from the broader interests of Western 
global hegemony.40 
This departure, however, was far from unequivocal. Thus, while the Labor Government 
displayed a liberal disposition toward decolonising struggles in Asia, it also reproduced 
many of the protectionist measures of past policies. Under Immigration Minister Arthur 
38 Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War pp.184-5. 
39 Ibid. p.185. Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam. Allen and Unwin: 
Sydney. p. 71. 
40 By 1949 relations between the United States and Australia were at an all time low. The Unites States 
was particularly concerned by Australian actions in the United Nations which sought to resist the 
imposition of American globalism. Indeed, relations were strained to such an extent that US policy-
makers were worried about the possibility that the Australian Labor Government could become a major 
security risk to the West. This centred on suspicions that a high-level intelligence leak existed within the 
Australian government. See Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way Chapter 1. 
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Calwell, Labor represented arguably the most strident Australian government in applying 
and promoting the racist White Australia Policy. In promoting the "peopling Australia" 
program, Calwell allowed huge numbers of migrants from Europe to enter Australia 
while deporting Asian spouses of Australian servicepeople and prohibiting the permanent 
entry of "Asians" without exception. This racist and discriminatory policy was framed via 
the widely-held belief that "prosperous", "democratic", Anglo-Saxon Australia had to be 
kept culturally pure from the "Asiatic" races of the region. 
Other aspects of Labor's foreign policy were also a product of the long-standing 
protectionism of diplomacy. The Government's obsession with a resurgent Japan was one 
such aspect, articulated most notably in Canberra's resistance to the Japanese Peace 
Treaty which was seen as too "soft". Another was the continuing efforts to obtain 
agreement for a Pacific security pact, evidenced in Evatt's appeal to the United States to 
provide the kind of security guarantee once provided by the British Navy.41 
Through· seeking the stationing of US forces close to Australia, Evatt reproduced an 
imperialist imagination that rendered the region an object of Australia's security anxieties 
and goals. The notion that the Pacific was central to Australian security was repeated ad 
nauseam. The Pacific, however, was not understood in terms of its cultural diversity but 
rather as an undifferentiated geopolitical space that had to be neutralised as a threat 
Australian security through occupation. The ANZAC pact between Australia and New 
Zealand engineered by Evatt during the war, typified this small-time imperialist 
disposition. The pact unilaterally called for the establishment of a zone of regional 
defence in the "south and southwest Pacific" after the war and asserted Australia's right 
to have a major input into post-war planning. As Evatt claimed in 1946: 
Our stake in the Pacific is paramount... The Australian Government has never 
relaxed for a moment in its determination to see this country participate as a 
party principal in all the international decisions that affect this area. 42 
Evatt was essentially making a claim here on the "southwest Pacific" as an area of 
Australian strategic interest and one that Australia had the right to intervene in, if not 
with its own forces then those of its imperial patron. In order to entice American policy-
makers into the region, Evatt offered the use of Manus Island for the establishment of US 
naval base.43 Manus was an island north of New Guinea that was not Australian territory 
but rather part of the original Australian mandate for that area under the League of 
Nations system.44 The unquestioned assumption that Manus "belonged" to the Australian 
41 Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World: A Documentary History of from the 1870s to the 1970s. 
Longman Cheshire: Melbourne. pp.480-505, 517-530,551. Dupont, A. (1991)Australia's Threat 
Perception p.36. 
42 cited in Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War p.l27. 
43 For these initiatives see Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the Worldpp.517-526. 
44 Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally p.32 
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Government as a bargaining chip in Evatt's negotiations, without even the slightest 
attempt being made to consult with the Island's people, was an indictment of Evatt's 
shallow legalistic and statist rhetoric on the "sovereign rights of people". It was also an 
indication that foreign policy was still based upon a "colonial ethos" and a "Western 
imperialist view of the world".45 
This failure to totally break with Australia's "imperial reflex" was not merely a product of 
Evatt's anglophile disposition but was related more fundamentally to the ways in which 
liberal regionalism shared common assumptions with Australia's realist tradition of 
foreign policy. Thus, both realist and liberal policy-makers framed regional identity in 
terms of the grand dichotomy of Western self/Asian other. This shared framework is 
illustrated by the work of Frederick Eggleston and William Macmahon Ball, arguably the 
two foremost intellectual figures of this liberal regionalist tradition. Like their realist 
counterparts, both writers characterised the region as politically "unstable", strategically 
"dangerous" and economically "backward". 46 According to Eggleston, the democratic 
practices, economic development and stable social order that prevailed in the "advanced 
West" represented a stark contrast to Asia where the question of order had not been 
settled. The prevalence of anarchy, poverty and ignorance in Asia made the "primitive" 
appeals of communism attractive there. Progress, Stability and Development were all 
taken as the constitutive principles of Western identity, features that were viewed as 
"absent" and "lacking" in the East. 
In framing regional identity in terms of the absence of these features, liberal intellectuals 
focused on ways in which the region's otherness could be converted into the values and 
characteristics that marked the West. The societies of Asia and the Pacific thereby 
became a kind of social laboratory in which liberal ideas of progress and development 
could be applied and tested for their validity. Eggleston, for instance, focused on the 
possibilities of spreading democracy and capitalist development to Asia in the form of 
education, capital and the gradual "grafting" of appropriate Western political institutions 
to Asian societies.47 Similarly, Macmahon Ball argued that poverty provided fertile 
ground for communist revolutions which the West could help to alleviate through 
assisting in the economic development of Asian countries. His focus was on both 
improving the social and economic welfare of the "rank and file" and addressing the 
"critical shortage" of "capital equipment...and technical and scientific training".48 
In advancing such policy prescriptions, both Macmahon Ball and Eggleston espoused a 
notion of "development" in which the Western liberal state represented the model of 
45 Lockhart, G. (1987) "Fear and Dependence: Australia's Vietnam Policy, 1965-1985" inK. Maddock 
and B. Wright (eds.) War: Australia and Vietnam. Harper and Row: Sydney. pp.12-13 
46 Eggleston, F.W. (1957) Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy. Cheshire: Melbourne. Ball, W. 
Macmahon (1952) Nationalism and Communism in East Asia. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne. 
47 Ibid. p.161. 
48 Macmahon Ball, W (1952) Nationalism and Communism in East Asia p.203. 
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progress and guarantor of a stable international order. Eggleston, for instance, argued 
that the privileged status of Western liberalism derived from the fact that it represented 
the apex of an on-going historical evolution from "chaos to order". That involved a 
process through which the Western liberal state had moderated the inherently competitive 
urge of human nature through its codification of "certain rules of order so that Man could 
carry out life with his fellows".49 According to this view, the evolution of human society 
is based upon an Hegelian movement of otherness into self (See Chapter 1) in which the 
rules of Western order are geographically extended "until they cover the whole world".50 
In seeking to extend Western order across the Pacific, liberal regionalists pursued the 
same goals as policy-makers who saw the world in more traditional realist terms. Thus, 
whether through liberal engagement or realist containment, Australian policy-makers 
defmed security in terms that presupposed the maintenance of a particular kind of socio-
political order across the Pacific - an order which was Western-dominated, capitalist 
and based upon the territorial state. 
000 
While in the late 1940s the emphasis on development and regional engagement produced 
a regional foreign policy which stressed engagement and cooperation, the Labor 
Government merely reproduced the underlying assumptions that had long characterised 
Australia's relations with the outside world. The major elements of early Australian 
foreign policy - a craving for absolute security, the framing of Australian identity in 
terms of its affmity with an imagined Western civilisation, and the deep-seated sense of 
threat and otherness towards Asia and the Pacific- continued to underpin post-War 
foreign policy. Such assumptions derived from a broader Western discourse of IR which 
successive generations of Australians drew upon to understand and make sense of the 
unfamiliar societies of Asia and the Pacific. As we saw in the last chapter, this discourse 
derived from broader territorial understandings developed in the post-Renaissance 
European states system. In continuing to espouse such understandings, post-War policy-
makers sought to secure the tenuous boundaries of Australian identity through rigidly 
demarcating self from other and Australia from the Far East, projecting onto the region 
the qualities of an exotic, undifferentiated other. Whatever the slight degree of openness 
in the Labor Government's policies, in any case, the possibilities of an alternative to 
traditional analytics glimpsed in the 1940s were closed off with the emergence of the 
Cold War in the 1950s and 60s, a period to which this thesis now turns. 
49 Eggleston, F.W. (1957) Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy p.17. 
50 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3 
Region and Foreign Policy in 
the Cold War 
By 1950, the period of liberal regionalism that had characterised the Labor Government's 
foreign policy had ended. Led by Robert Menzies, the conservative establishment in 
Australia was to exercise its electoral ascendancy for more than two decades thereafter, 
reasserting the traditional realist bases of foreign policy. That included reinvoking familiar 
threat scenarios, further integrating Australia into the Western Alliance and formulating a 
regional foreign policy based upon Cold War geopolitics. This emerging Cold War 
discourse signalled a general shift in the dual terms of reference of foreign policy from 
liberal regionalism back to the dominant tradition of Realpolitik. 
This chapter examines the emergence of this Cold War discourse in the 1950s and 1960s. 
I argue that, through this discourse, the new conservative Government articulated the 
familiar fears of Asia and the Pacific in terms of a broader Cold War conflict between the 
"Free World" and Communism. Thus, policy-makers framed the territorial and moral 
boundary between Australia and the Asia-Pacific region via a larger set of Cold War 
binary oppositions. Those oppositions rigidly demarcated good from evil, West from 
East, capitalism from communism, and modernity from tradition as a way to secure a 
stable sovereign identity of the West. As we shall see, in drawing on such representations, 
Australia's political elite participated in a broader Cold War ordering of global political 
relations in which Western geopolitical power was projected across the globe. 
Cold War Geopolitics and Australian Foreign Policy 
The polarisation of inter-state relations during the Cold War proved to be an electoral 
windfall for the Menzies Government. In seeking to align Australian security interests as 
closely as possible to its Western allies, the new Government was able to present itself as 
the guarantor of Australian security in contrast to Labor's reckless, utopian policies.1 The 
skill of Menzies and his parliamentary colleagues in advancing these arguments effectively 
shifted the foreign policy debate towards hard-lined realism. That forced Labor politicians 
to match their parliamentary counterparts in displays of anti-Communist rhetoric. 
While domestic political interests were important in this the shift to a more realist foreign 
policy, Australia's Cold War diplomacy was also shaped by the deep-seated fears that 
Australia's Anglophile establishment had toward Asia. Thus, in seeking to understand the 
1 For a fine example of the way the conservatives used foreign policy issues to marginalise Labor, see 
Menzies' rhetorical flourishes in Parliament, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 3 Aprill963. pp.344-5. 
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emergence of nationalist and communist revolutions in Asia, Australian political leaders 
drew upon the familiar binary oppositions of foreign policy. In doing so, they invoked 
traditional threat scenarios which heightened the_ sense of fear and otherness regarding 
Australia's Asian neighbours. This was, after all, a period in which the Third World began 
to challenge Western hegemony, evidenced in Nasser's take-over of the Suez canal, the 
1955 Bandung non-aligned conference and Sukarno's confrontation over Malaysia. For 
conservative policy-makers who equated the status quo of Western colonialism with the 
natural order of things, this was a dangerous and troubling period as old certainties were 
being called into question by the emergence of "the colonial other" from an earlier 
position of subjugation. 
Canberra's response to this rapidly decolonising world was to seek to militarily engage 
the United States in the Asia-Pacific. That response, and the fear of the Asia-Pacific that 
underpinned it, was not, however, the only interpretive option open to policy-makers. 
Indeed, if they had decided to do so, policy-makers could have rejected Australia's 
traditional sense of estrangement in the Asia-Pacific region, stressing instead the post-
colonial affmities that Australia shared with its Asian and Pacific neighbours as small 
powers located in a common part of the world. In doing so, policy-makers would have 
seen in the region emerging independent states which were both seeking to assert their 
cultural independence and negotiate a path between tradition and modernity in creative 
ways. In this sense, far from being a source of fear and insecurity, Australia's location in 
the Pacific was not only a fortuitous part of its geography but also provided an 
opportunity for policy-makers to explore a dialogue with the culturally rich and diverse 
Asia-Pacific region. That possibility was glimpsed, if only fleetingly, in some of the policy 
initiatives of the Labor government in the 1940s. 
That this was precluded as a serious policy option in the 1950s was due to the narrowly-
conceived interpretive framework of Cold War geopolitics through which Australia's 
anglophile establishment sought to make sense of the world. Thus, in 1954, Foreign 
Minister Casey observed that: 
The world is very disturbed. Anything could happen at any time, and this is a 
time when we have to stick to our friends and to our convictions. The United 
States of America is on our side. It is on the side of democracy, decency and 
right, and the forces of darkness opposed to it are very apparent and very 
powerful. The world may have a show-down at any time between our form of 
life and the forces of darkness. 2 
By articulating this pessimistic vision, Casey reproduced the dichotomous categories of 
Western IR in terms of the Cold War principle of bipolarity. Through this principle, 
policy-makers divided the world into opposing camps between the capitalist West and the 
2 cited in Sexton, M. (1981) War for the Asking: Australia's Vietnam Secrets. Penguin Books: 
Melbourne. p.37 
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communist East. As the Cold War progressed, this understanding became codified into a 
Cold War discourse of geopolitics. Foreign Minister Percy Spender's 1950 ministerial 
statement represents an exemplary text of Australian Cold War discourse. According to 
Spender, the world was in a "trance of uncertainty, doubt and fear" where the "conflict 
between Democracy and Communism" that had pervaded Europe was "now developing 
throughout Asia and the Pacific" through the "spread of Communism". Against this 
background, the main objective of Australian policy was "the maintenance of our security 
and our way of life, through maintaining the closest and best possible relations with the 
United States" with which we share a "common tradition, heritage and way oflife".3 
Through such dichotomous understandings, the Government reproduced the identity-
making practices that had traditionally served to demarcate Australia's "Western" identity 
from the regional Asiatic other. Hence, according to Menzies, Australian security was 
dependent on "the unshakeable unity of thought and action of the United States and the 
British Commonwealth, and of those other great and free nations who hold their liberty in 
common".4 In framing identity in such terms, Menzies not only stressed Australia's 
Western affiliations but also the deep-seated fears of Asia that had long pervaded 
Australia's national consciousness. Thus, while the emergence of Soviet communist 
expansionism constituted the major security concern for US policy-makers5, the sense of 
threat that prevailed in Australia drew on a much older, historically entrenched fear of 
Asia and the region. 
The fear of Communism and the Yellow Peril coalesced in the figure of Communist 
China and its imperialist designs on Southeast Asia. As in the past, this fear centred as 
much on the civilisational sense of threat from Asia's teeming millions as it did on the 
concrete geostrategic danger posed by Communist China. For the conservative anglophile 
establishment in Australia, the Peoples Republic of China stood as the very antithesis of 
the West, articulated in Menzies vision of an Australian nation based upon the suburban 
contentments of private property, consumerism, liberal democracy and the Christian 
religion. 6 In other words, policy-makers understood China through a broader discourse of 
identity formation that othered the Orient as a threat in opposition to the regulative ideal 
of Australian identity. Thus, while Australians were represented as a democratic, liberal, 
Christian people living in an empty, underpopulated continent, the teeming millions of 
China were a "herd-like", submissive people ruled by a despotic, atheistic communist 
ideology.7 Outside of this oppositional framework, of course, other views of China and 
3 Spender, P. "Statement on Foreign Policy" 9 March 1950. Reprinted in Spender, P. (1972) Politics and 
a Man. Collins: Sydney. p.309. 
4 Menzies, R. (1952) "The Pacific Settlement seen from Australia" Foreign Affairs 30 (2) p.195. 
5 See Nathanson, C. (1988) "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of 
Representation" Alternatives 13: 443-483. 
6 Strahan, L. (1995) Australia's China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge p.136. 
7 Ibid. p.142. 
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the Asian region could, and did, emerge such as in the writings of the dissident scholar 
C.P. Fitzgerald or the Labor politician Les Haylen whose views departed from prevailing 
images of China as the Cold War bogeyman. 8 
Representations that portrayed China in anything but menacing terms, however, were 
anathema to most policy-makers whose pervasive fears of China came to be articulated 
through the notion of "the falling dominos of Southeast Asia". Deriving from American 
strategic thinking, the domino theory was articulated as early as Spender's 1950 
ministerial statement which declared that: "should the forces of communism prevail and 
Vietnam come under the heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being 
outflanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma and Indonesia will become the next 
object of further Communist activities".9 Spender's successor, R.G. Casey, even more 
explicitly and urgently stated the geopolitical logic that generated Australian fears of 
China in Southeast Asia, when he declared in Parliament: 
If the whole of Indo-China fell to the Communists, Thailand would be gravely 
exposed. If Thailand were to fall, the road would be open to Malaya and 
Singapore. From the Malay Peninsular the communists could dominate the 
northern approaches to Australia, and even cut our life-lines with Europe. 
These grave eventualities may seem long-range- but it is not impossible that 
they could happen within a reasonably short period of time.10 
The scenario foreshadowed by Casey and other adherents of the domino theory, 
however, relied upon the validation of a range of assumptions for Communist China to 
be taken seriously as a threat to Australian security. For example, it assumed both that 
China was determined to pursue expansionist aims and that Southeast Asian nationalism 
was merely a surrogate for Chinese Communism. That these assumptions were never 
seriously examined demonstrated that Australian fears of Asia were so deeply embedded 
in a sense of national identity that it was enough for policy-makers to simply invoke a 
rearticulated version of the "yellow peril". Far from merely reflecting geopolitical 
realities, therefore, the threat of Asiatic communism was discursively constructed, 
drawing its veracity on images that objectified Asia as a dangerous other. These 
objectifying, othering strategies operated on a number of different levels and through a 
variety of tropes which reduced Southeast Asia to a mere object of Chinese expansionist 
aims. One of the more typical ways that this representation was secured was through 
commonplace sexual metaphors of a virulent, masculine China and a feminised Southeast 
Asia. In Spender's 1950 statement, for example, a virile China "penetrates" and "thrusts" 
into the passive "Southeast Asian region", representations which journalist Denis Warner 
reproduced in his characterisation of Australia as living "under the shadow of the Chinese 
8 See Murphy, J. (1993) Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War. Allen and Unwin: 
Sydney. p.46-51. 
9 Spender, P. (1972) "Statement on Foreign Policy" p.313. 
1° Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 Oct. 1954, Vol.S, p.2383. 
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Phallus".11 Similarly, in a meeting of the Cabinet of the Menzies Government in the early 
1950s, it was decided to "restrain" the United States in "interfering" in the region and to 
"stimulate the British".12 
Other metaphors that were deployed in foreign policy, centred on the almost inevitable 
"flow" of Chinese communism into Southeast Asia.13 Labor leader Calwell, for instance, 
described how "the red lava flow of communism is creeping ever onward and ever 
southward".14 At another time he spoke of "the red tide of Chinese imperialism". 
Functioning as naturalising rhetorical strategies, such representations were often 
expressed through scientific metaphors. Hence, references were made to the "spread of 
the communist infection" or to "the shift in the centre of the gravity of world affairs" in 
which it appeared that by the force of gravity itself the regional other would merely fall 
down upon the Australian continent.15 By using such metaphors, policy-makers tapped 
into the familiar fear of a "population explosion" in Asia and monolithic images of a 
human wave of Asian refugees "lapping" at Australian shores. 
The continual reproduction of such images actually precluded and overshadowed any 
serious analysis of the struggles taking place in Asian societies. The content and specific 
details of local spaces became suppressed by the grand abstractions of Cold War 
discourse and its neat bifurcation of global political space into competing Communist and 
Capitalist visions of modernity and political economy. This crude reductionist discourse 
simply ignored the complex historical causes of Asian nationalism and anti-colonialism 
(such as centuries of European imperialism) in favour of simplistic images of a monolithic 
global communist conspiracy. For Australian policy-makers, such crude images neatly 
fitted into existing understandings of Australia's perilous location in the Asia-Pacific. 
Such understandings led to policies which, as one writer has noted, were "locked into a 
conceptual framework that drew a haze over historical reflection [and] acted as a closed 
circle with a pattern of loaded language, establishing a public climate of fear which 
limited rational policy-making and stifled views on Asia". 16 As we shall see below, not 
only were such policies based upon a profound misunderstanding of the nature of Asian 
and Pacific societies during the Cold War but they gave rise to a violent interventionist 
Cold War strategy that drew Australia and its Western Allies into a series of bloody 
military conflicts in Southeast Asia. 
11 Warner, D. (1961) Hurricane From China. Macmillan: New York. pp.179-180. Strahan, L. (1995) 
Australia's China p.150. 
12 Murphy, J. (1993) Harvest of Fear p.70. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. p. 71, 73. Spender, P. (1972) "Statement on Foreign Policy" p.309. 
16 Murphy, J. (1993) Harvest of Fear p.49, 53. 
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Western Strategy and the Production of Cold War Knowledge 
Unless grasping is accompanied by a full acknowledgment of the other as subject, it risks being 
used for the purposes of exploitation, of "taking": knowledg_e will be subordinated to power. 17 
The fall of Singapore to Japanese forces during World War II effectively undermined the 
credibility of imperial defence as the traditional basis for Australian security. During the 
1950s, the Menzies Government formulated a new doctrine of "Forward Defence" to 
replace the strategy of imperial defence. In doing so, it sought increasing Australian 
involvement in the region alongside Australia's Western Allies. If isolation from the 
region was no longer feasible, then it was necessary to contain regional threats through a 
direct presence of Western troops in Southeast Asia In seeking US strategic engagement 
in the region, the Menzies Government aligned foreign policy irrevocably to American 
globalism and its strategy of containment 
The expansion of US geopolitical power in the post-War period demanded increased 
knowledge of the societies of Asia and the Pacific. The US Government heavily 
promoted the development of Asian language training and graduate research. Those 
efforts became codified in the "area studies" programs established in American 
universities in the 1950s and 1960s. The knowledge produced in these programs was not, 
however, an objective, neutral fonn of fact-gathering but rather represented a specific 
kind of instrumental knowledge organised within Cold War discourse. As Ben Anderson 
has argued, ''what was needed was a framework which could reduce the intractable 
pluralism [of Southeast Asian societies] to an orderly, structured universal pattern, on the 
basis of which 'systematic' analysis and policy-formulation could go forward". 18 Area 
Studies filled this requirement, replacing the highly specialised study of language, 
literature and philosophy found in traditional European scholarship with the universalistic 
premises of functionalism. Here Asian political systems became studied and compared via 
a singular universal measure. That measure, at least implicitly, was represented by the 
ideal of American capitalist democracy. 19 Notwithstanding its universalistic pretensions, 
then, Area Studies was inherently Ethnocentric and was based upon knowledge of Asian 
societies which maintained a "conservative, pro-capitalist ideological framework" that 
coincided with the global expansion of US economic, political and military power.20 
17 Todorov, T. (1984) The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. Trans. Richard Howard, 
Harper and Row: New York. p.132. 
18 Anderson, B. (1982) "Perspective and Method in American Research on Indonesia" in B. Anderson 
and A. Kahin (eds.) Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate. Interim 
Reports Series No.62, Southeast Program, Cornell University: Ithaca. p.74. 
19 See, for instance, Pye, L. (1967) Southeast Asia's Political Systems. Prentice Hall: New Jersey. 
20 Brohman, J. (1995) "Universalism, Eurocentrism and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From 
Modernisation to Neoliberalism" Third World Quarterly 16 (1): p.133. 
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Developing out of area studies was the theory of "modernisation" which dominated Cold 
War thinking during the 1960s.21 Modernisation theorists took the historical experience 
of the "advanced", "modem" states of the West as the basis for constructing universally 
valid models by which the "traditional" societies of the Third World could "develop" and 
pursue economic "growth". Through a process of extrapolation, they sought to specify 
the exemplary functions and features of "modem", "industrial" society that were seen as 
"lacking" in traditional societies. Based upon this unilinear model of development, 
modernisation theory became a blueprint for the transition from tradition to modernity in 
the Third World which, applied on an international scale, was converted into the 
ambitious project of US globalism centring on the construction of an international 
multilateral 'capitalist order across the Pacific. As Rex Mortimer has observed, 
modernisation theory was peculiarly suitable for servicing American expansionism in that 
it emphasised the necessity for Western intervention in Southeast Asia in the shape of aid 
and investment while at the same time denying the historical claims of new states to an 
autonomous culture and development process. 22 As Gabriel Kolko23 has added, 
The hallmark of American foreign policy after 1945 was the universality 
of its intense commitment to create an integrated, essentially capitalist world 
framework out of the chaos of World War Two and the remnants of the 
colonial systems. The United States was the major inheritor of the mantle of 
[Western] imperialism in modem history, acting not out of a desire to defend 
the nation against some tangible threat but because it sought to create a 
controllable, responsive order elsewhere, one that would permit the political 
destinies of distant places to evolve in a manner beneficial to American goals 
and interests. The regulation of the world and its inevitable costs were 
justified ... as a fulfilment of an international responsibility and mission. 
In launching this project, US strategic planners adopted an Enlightenment rhetoric of 
universalism and progress to justify their expansionist aims. The ambitious goals of US 
globalism in fact resonated with the Enlightenment belief that the application of science 
and technology to postcolonial societies promised a future of cumulative and unilinear 
progress across the globe. Based upon such ambitious objectives, however, US foreign 
policy was not only driven by lofty ideals but also by the strategic practices of traditional 
power politics. The coexistence of an enlightenment liberal rhetoric alongside Cold War 
realism illustrated the "Janus-faced" nature of American globalism.24 Thus, by seeking to 
create strong political institutions in the Third World to undergird expansionary economic 
21 Rostow, W.W. (1977) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Second Edition. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
22 Mortimer, R. (1978) 'From Ball to Arndt: The Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholaxship' in R. 
Mortimer (ed.) Showcase State. Angus and Robertson: Sydney. p.106. Anderson, B. (1982) "Perspective 
and Method in American Reseaxch on Indonesia" p.74. 
23 Kolko, G. (1986) Vietnam: Anatomy of War 1940-1975. Allen and Unwin: London. p.72-73. Italics 
added. 
24 Klein, B. (1994) Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. p.90. 
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liberalism, Western policy-makers lent support to many authoritarian anti-communist 
regimes. As Samuel Huntington pointed out, the transition from traditional communities 
to modem industrial society presupposed a strong institutionalised order. In its early 
stages, at least, this took the form of strong military regimes in the Third World which 
provided the requisite stability, national loyalty and strong political institutions for the 
development of capitalist structures. 25 
The same liberal rhetoric, underpinned by the strategic practices of Cold War realism, 
was also expressed in Cold War Australian foreign policy through the Colombo aid plan, 
which I will comment on below. For now, however, I want to focus on the ways in which 
the Cold War construction of knowledge through Area Studies was replicated in 
Australia through efforts by the government to promote greater knowledge of Asia. 
Thus, in 1955, the Federal Government established Departments of Indonesian and 
Malaysian Studies at Melbourne and Sydney universities which represented the first 
specialised centres for the study of Southeast Asia in Australia.26 By 1964, Paul Hasluck, 
could claim that with the development of Asian studies "reciprocal trade, closer cultural 
relations and a clearer understanding of Asia and its people are in the forefront of 
Australian policy". 27 That claim would have been inconceivable two decades earlier. 
As in the US, however, the production of knowledge in Australia was not simply an 
objective fact-gathering process but rather grew out of Cold War strategic considerations 
and the perceived need to understand a seemingly dangerous Asian region experiencing 
communist and anti-colonial insurrection. As the Cold War progressed, Australian 
scholars and policy-makers began to use the language of American social science to 
explain events in the region. As John Legge has recounted, the development of a modem 
social scientific understanding of Asia that applied the tools of economics, sociology, 
political science and anthropology overshadowed the traditional study of Asian 
civilisations and cultures in Australia during the Cold War. 28 In this way, notions of 
patrimonial states, bureaucratic elites and patron/client relationships became popular 
models for explaining Southeast Asian societies in Australia. 29 
Representing a new mode of Cold War knowledge, the emergence of "Southeast Asian" 
studies was driven by the need to convert the region into an object of policy and 
knowledge. Thus, while earlier notions like "the Far East" had captured both a sense of 
25 Huntington, S. (1968) Political Order and Changing Societies. Yale University Press: New Haven. For 
more general discussions of the intersection of Enlightenment liberalism and power politics realism in 
Cold War discourse see George, J. (1994) Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)lntroduction to 
International Relations. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colorado. pp.91-107. Klein, B. (1994) Strategic 
Studies and World Orderpp.81-105. 
26 Mortimer, R. (1978) 'From Ball to Arndt The Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarship' pp.103-104. 
27 Hasluck, P. (1964) "Australia and Southeast Asia" Foreign Affairs 43 (1): p.58 
28 Legge, J. (1990) "Asian Studies: From Reconstruction to Deconstruction" Australian Cultural History 
9: pp.93-1 02. 
29 Ibid.p.96. 
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exotic, distant European colonies and overlapping tributary states, "Southeast Asia" was 
imagined in terms of the piercing territorial gaze of American globalism. Here the region 
was understood as a grouping of modem independent states with neatly-divided borders 
over which an intense Cold War struggle was taking place.30 Underpinning this Cold War 
image of the region was a strictly geostrategic worldview. As Gregory Pemberton has 
observed, "US officials neatly divided the world up into regions", categorising each in 
terms of its "varying importance" to American global strategy.31 The sheer spatiality of 
this imagination (exemplified in the "field" of "Area" Studies) was combined with the 
methodological individualism of Anglo-American realism. Here IR was understood as 
consisting of competing individual nation-states that "acted" and "behaved" rationally 
through calculations of maximising power and self-interest32 Exemplified in the domino 
theory, this combination of spatiality and methodological individualism sustained the 
broader goals of US global strategy. Southeast Asia became part of the US State 
Department's plans to construct an American-dominated "Great Crescent" from India 
around to Japan with Indonesia as its "southern anchor".33 The "centrepiece" of such 
plans was an economically reconstructed Japan which was seen as a potential 
counterweight to China. Japan's reconstruction was to be achieved through a strategy of 
export-oriented industrialisation based upon "Southeast Asian" economies both as a 
supply of natural resources and as future markets for Japanese and American goods. 34 
Such plans were enthusiastically supported by Australian policy-makers who took great 
comfort in US policies to. build a defensive perimeter around mainland Asia to contain 
China. Those plans dovetailed nicely with Australia's own containment policy of Forward 
Defence which was also based upon strictly geopolitical understandings of "Southeast 
Asia" as a mere object of either communist expansionism or Western containment. By 
reproducing such understandings, Australian policy-makers reduced "Southeast Asia" to 
an undifferentiated space of "instability" that, in the popular idiom of the day, was viewed 
as a geopolitical "vacuum" that had to be filled. 35 Such representations provided the 
discursive underpinnings for the subsequent intervention of Western forces in Southeast 
Asia. There were two interrelated interventionist measures that became central to the 
30 As early as 1949, America's National Security Council was declaring that: "Southeast Asia is the 
target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin .. .If southeast Asia is also swept up by 
communism we [the West] shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be 
felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed 
Australia". Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
p.12. 
31 Ibid. p. 11. 
32 Morgenthau, H. (1948) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Alfred A. Knopf: 
New York. 
33 McQueen, H. (1991) Japan to the Rescue: Australian Security around the Indonesian Archipelago 
during the American Century. William Heinemann Australia: Melbourne p.52-3. 
34 Pemberton, G. All the Way Ch. 1 and 2. Ibid. 
35 "The reality that has to be faced is that at present no balance to the power of China can be found in 
southern Asia. The balance has to be provided from outside Asia". Hasluck, P. (1964) "Australia and 
Southeast Asia" p.61. 
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Forward Defence: the Colombo Plan which was based upon providing aid to non-
communist Asian countries and the strategy of Great Power protection through a series 
of alliances and other regional security instruments. While the former derived from liberal 
ideas of modernisation, the latter was based upon a realist insistence on institutionalising 
a Western military role in the Asia-Pacific region.36 
Devised largely by Percy Spender, the Colombo Plan was premised on the view that the 
spread of Communism in Southeast Asia could be prevented through addressing the 
socio-economic problems of poverty that made communism attractive to Asia's 
postcolonial societies. Designed as part of Western containment strategy, the Colombo 
plan was established in 1950 to provide regional bilateral aid in the form of technical 
assistance and educational programs. In promoting development assistance, policy-
makers also sought to enhance Australia's trading relations with the capitalist economies 
of Asia Throughout the 1950s, Deputy Prime Minister McEwan completed a number of 
trade missions to Asia- obtaining trade agreements with Malaya, Indonesia and most 
notably Japan which had become Australia's closest trading partner.37 
While these initiatives were aimed at improving economic development they also had an 
intrinsic security dimension, in which, as Spender urged, "we must increase international 
efforts to stabilise governments and create conditions of economic life and living 
standards under which the false ideological attraction which communism exerts will lose 
its force". 38 That argument echoed the kinds of views about "regional cooperation" which 
liberal regionalists Macmahon Ball, Eggleston and members of the Chifley Government 
had been propagating a decade earlier. Indeed, the Colombo plan was anticipated by 
earlier proposals by the Chifley Government for an aid and development package for Asia 
and the Pacific analogous to the Marshall-Plan in Europe.39 
In this sense, Cold War discourse incorporated the liberal vision of the region as an 
object of social engineering to be developed and modernised with realist images of the 
falling dominos of Southeast Asia. As indicated above, this convergence was exemplified 
in the modernisation theories of American scholars Walt Rostow and Samuel Huntington 
which also explains why long-standing Australian liberals like J.G. Crawford and 
Frederick Eggleston were amongst the most strident of Cold War warriors. In this sense, 
Cold War discourse incorporated the temporal dimension of liberalism and its whole 
discourse on "economic development" within the spatial logic of realist power politics. 
36 Both these liberal and realist measures were considered by successive External Affairs Ministers to be 
the major pillars of Australian foreign policy. Spender, S. (1969) Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS 
Treaty and the Colombo Plan. Sydney University Press: Sydney. and Hasluck, P. (1964) "Australia and 
Southeast Asia" p.55. 
37 For the latter, see Rix, A. (1986) Coming to Terms: The Politics of Australia's Trade with Japan 1945-
1957. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
38 Spender, P. (1972) "Statement on Foreign Policy" p.315 
39 Lee, D. (1994) Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and 
Defence Policy. Allen and Unwin: Canberra. 
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Otherness was not merely represented in terms of territorial danger and threat but also 
focused on "backwardness" and "underdevelopment". Containment strategy synthesised 
both realist and liberal perspectives through a distinctly Western spatio-temporal ordering 
of global relations. Thus, Western policy aimed not only to bring "the other" (in the form 
of instability, disorder, chaos, communism, Asia etc.) under control across space but to 
obliterate its difference in time through modernisation and development 
While liberalism was expressed in the Colombo plan, Australia's Cold War strategy 
hinged on the realist approach of building up alliance relationships to achieve state 
security. Constituting a web of bilateral and multilateral relationships that institutionalised 
Western strategic engagement, these alliances included SEATO, ANZUS, ANZAM, and 
the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. The establishment of SEATO, for instance, 
augmented ANZUS as the basis for strengthening the Western alliance in Asia and the 
Pacific. Although established ostensibly as an Asian organisation for collective security, 
SEATO was designed to legitimise Western intervention in the Southeast Asian region in 
the event of communist expansion and insurgency. Western members of SEATO (France, 
Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand) heavily outweighed SEATO's 
regional members (the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan) and was conceived by 
American strategic planners as an attempt to build a maritime "Great Wall of China" to 
contain the threat of Sino-communism in Asia.40 
Although SEATO was an outgrowth of containment strategy, its multilateral constitution 
was an exception to US policy. Based upon what John Ruggie has identified as a "hubs 
and spokes" arrangement, US policy tended instead to be organised on a bilateral basis in 
which American strategic planners sought to deal with their Pacific allies on a more 
flexible one-to-one basis. 41 Underpinned by concerns of imperial overstretch, the US 
preference for bilateralism, however, was not entirely welcomed by Australian policy-
makers who sought to lock the allies into multilateral regional arrangements. This tension 
between Australia's security anxieties in the Asia-Pacific and the pragmatic bilateralism of 
US globalism produced not only a deep psychology of dependence on the United States 
in Australia but a foreign policy designed to push for the extension of US strategic power 
at any opportunity possible. As we shall see below, driven by these dynamics, Australian 
policy-makers were by far the most strident advocates out of all of the countries of the 
Western Alliance for military intervention in Southeast Asia, effectively acting to 
strengthen the resolve of US strategic planners at a time when, as Noam Chomsky has 
suggested, the West was "at war with Asia".42 
40 Grant, B. (1972) Crisis of Loyalty p.18. Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way p.48. 
41 Leaver, R. (1995) "Tbe Evolution of an Asia-Pacific Policy Community in Australia" The Pacific 
Review 8 (1): p.176. 
42 Chomsky, N. (1971) At War with Asia. Fontana: London. 
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The Western Presence in Southeast Asia and the Violence of Cold War Discourse 
We made speeches at the UN arui we made diplomatic representation in various capitals, at American 
behests, arui at times in the very phrases concocted in Washington. Our assiduity and docility have been 
paralleled only by Russia's tamest, or most cowed, satelliteS.43 
i. The Korean War. 
Australian participation in the Korean War was the first of a series of Australian military 
deployments. In supporting Western intervention in Korea, the Menzies Government 
sought to obtain a security pact with the United States in which, as Casey noted, Korea 
was just too good an opportunity "to impress them [American policy-makers] with our 
bona fides". 44 This attitude merely reproduced the time-honoured tradition in Australia of 
seeking Great Power protection through sending Australians to fight and die in other 
people's wars.45 As one government minister insisted, Australia had to do "everything 
possible ... to attract American interests" into the region.46 
In many ways, the Korean War was to exempli.fY the subsequent history of Australian 
foreign policy during the Cold War. The reductionist understanding which characterised 
officia1 representations of Asia during the 1950s and 1960s found initial expression in the 
security fears of communist expansionism in Korea. Hence, Menzies couched the need 
for Australia's commitment to Korea in terms of the generalised threat of global 
communism. In doing so, he all but ignored the complex historical factors involved in the 
conflict in favour of simplistic invocations of the Red Menace of China. As Menzies 
declared "Korea is not an isolated affair ... aggressive communism moves to a set plan".47 
On the basis of this understanding, Australian policy became hitched to a crusading 
American anti-communism which effectively foreclosed the possibility, so fleetingly 
discerned in the late 1940s, of an independent and neutral Australian foreign policy. 48 In 
tying Australian security interests to US expansionism, policy-makers became complicit 
in the violence of the Korean War, which cost three-to four million lives and gave us the 
idea of bombing the enemy "back into the stone age".49 This amounted to a broader Cold 
War geopolitics of violence that would ultimately lead Australian troops into an even 
more protracted conflict- the Vietnam War. 
43 Crocker, W. (1971) "Foreign Policy for Australia" Institute of Public Affairs Review 25 (4). p.92. 
44 cited in Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
p.55. 
45 Grant B. (1973) A Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy. Angus and Robertson: 
Sydney. 
46 cited in Lockhart. G. (1987) "Fear and Dependence: Australia's Vietnam Policy, 1965-1985" inK. 
Maddock and B. Wright (eds.) War: Australia arui Vietnam. Harper and Row: Sydney. p.15. 
47 McCormack, G. (1983) Cold War Hot War: An Australian Perspective of the Korean War. Hale and 
lremonger: Sydney. p.107. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. p.104. 
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ii. Relations with Indonesia 
While Viemam became the focus of foreign policy during the mid-1960s, it was the newly 
independent Republic of Indonesia that preoccupied diplomats immediately after the 
Korean War. As a newly independent country of over 100 million people located on 
Australia's "doorstep", Indonesia represented for the conservative establishment in 
Australia all that was troubling and unsettling about a region emerging out of centuries of 
European colonialism. Given these anxieties, much was made in Australia of Sukarno's 
"expansionist" policies, his courting of both the Russians and Chinese and the fact that 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which represented a major element in the 
Indonesian cabinet, was the largest communist party outside Russia and China. 
In vigorously expressing these fears, Australian policy-makers became concerned with 
what they saw as an emerging "Peking-Djakarta axis" through which Sukarno was 
seeking to impose his "supremacy over the region".50 Such fears were exacerbated by 
Sukarno's fiery anti-colonial rhetoric and his attempt to claim the Dutch-controlled 
territory of West New Guinea as a natural part of the Indonesian state. Located adjacent 
to Australian-controlled Papua New Guinea, West New Guinea represented what 
Spender called "an absolutely essential link in the chain of our defence" .51 This implied 
that, unlike the prevailing Dutch occupation of the territory, an Indonesian presence so 
close to Australian administered territories would constitute a fundamental threat to 
national security. 
Australian diplomats were at the forefront of opposing Indonesia's claims to West New 
Guinea. In fact, according to both US and Indonesian officials, the Australian 
Government constituted an even more intransigent opponent to Indonesia's claims than 
the Netherlands' own government.52 It was only when the Indonesians stepped up their 
military infiltration into West New Guinea and both Britain and the United States made it 
clear that they supported Indonesian claims that Australia finally supported Indonesian 
control over West New Guinea in 1963. In its initial opposition to Indonesia, the Menzies 
Government reversed the polices of its predecessor that did so much to develop relations 
between Australia and the fledgling Republic. As one American correspondent put it, 
within the short period it had taken power, the Menzies Government "had drained the 
store of goodwill that Australia had accumulated during the whole of the Indonesian 
Revolution". 53 
5° Cairns, J. (1966) Living with Asia. 2nd Edition. Landsdowne Press: Melbourne. p.86. 
51 Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War p.187. 
52 A document by the US "National Security Council" concluded that the Australians are if anything 
more determined than the Dutch that West New Guinea should not come under Indonesia control, while 
American official Robert Johnson claimed that Australia was even more intransigent than the Dutch. 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio made similar comments to journalists Bruce Grant and Dennis 
Warner, saying that "Australia may be more of a problem in regard to the future status of West New 
Guinea than the Dutch". See Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way pp.78,88. 
53 cited in Cairns, J. (1966) Living with Asia p.88. 
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If West Papua represented a serious setback in Australia-Indonesia relations, then 
Sukarno's subsequent policy of "Confrontation" over British plans to decolonise Malaya 
became a source of overt conflict between the two countries. As Sukarno escalated his 
policy of "confrontation" by sending Indonesian soldiers into Borneo, the Australian 
Government fmally made the decision to commit its own troops to the conflict in 1965 by 
deploying forces stationed on the Malayan mainland to a larger Commonwealth 
contingent. In their support for Britain, Australian policy-makers were motivated by the 
objective of keeping their allies engaged in Southeast Asia. According to Garfield 
Barwick, Australia's new External Mfairs Minister, the formation of Malaysia was a way 
of creating a "bastion against China" and represented "a major act of orderly 
decolonisation" in which Western interests were maintained. 54 
For Sukarno and Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, in contrast, Malaysia was 
nothing more than a "neo-colonial construction" of the British who were attempting "to 
save the rubber, tin and oil of the area for the imperialists".55 While such arguments had 
some force, Sukarno's policy of "Confrontation" with Malaysia was fuelled as much as 
anything else by the needs of identifying an evil external Enemy against which a common 
national identity could be fashioned out of the deeply divided elements of the Indonesian 
archipelago. In this sense, Sukarno's policy of Confrontation was a manifestation of the 
familiar identity-making practices of modem statecraft which sought to demarcate an 
inside sovereign realm of identity from an outside, foreign space of otherness. Articulated 
via an adventurist foreign policy, such practices soon proved unsustainable. Thus, 
Sukarno's attempts to unify the competing political elements within the Indonesian elite 
through mass mobilisation were undermined by his own efforts to play one faction off 
against another in a precarious balancing act that would end in the massacres of 1965. 
For all its fierce rhetoric, the actual military dimension of "Confrontation" amounted to 
no more than a series of minor skirmishes. At no time did Sukarno make threats against 
the Australian government nor did he violate or threaten to violate Australian-
administered territory. In fact, both Australian and Indonesian policy-makers wanted to 
minimise the fall-out from Confrontation. And so, throughout Confrontation, the curious 
scenario developed in which Australian aid contributions to Indonesia continued largely 
unaffected at the same time that both Australian and Indonesian political leaders were 
speaking the language of war. Rather than being the product of strictly strategic 
considerations, therefore, Australia's sense of regional threat was an effect of the broader 
cultural framing of Australian identity during the Cold War. Thus, by defming Australia 
as a Western outpost, the Menzies Government put its support for the crumbling 
colonial empires of Europe above relations with Australia's closest and arguably most 
important neighbour. 
54 Edwards, P. with Pemberton, G. ( 1992) Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of 
Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965. Allen & Unwin: Sydney. p.259. 
55 Pemberton, G. (1987) All the Way p.167. 
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The point that needs highlighting here is that Sukarno's actions in West New Guinea and 
Malaysia represented a threat to Australian security only within a discourse that 
constituted Australian Identity in terms of a larger Western identity imagined in 
opposition to the region. Outside of this discourse, a very different view of "Asia" and 
Indonesia could emerge. That was exemplified in Labor politician Jim Cairns' trenchant 
criticisms of foreign policy which, he noted, was based upon an "abject fear of a changing 
and emerging Asia" and the "vast oversimplification of the Communist threat" in 
Indonesia and elsewhere. 56 Cairns was one of the few political leaders who explicitly 
recognised that Indonesian foreign policy was not the product of communist-inspired 
expansionism but rather of Sukamo's own attempts to impose unity on the diverse range 
of competing forces of the Indonesian polity.57 On this basis, Cairns could reject the 
heightened sense of threat that prevailed in Australia and, in doing so, disavow the crude 
foreign policy discourse that prevailed during the Cold War. Instead, he adopted an 
understanding of the region which privileged a sense of historical dynamism through 
embracing the rapid social changes taking place in Asia. 
Almost all other Australian policy-makers, however, viewed the downfall of Sukarno and 
the ascendancy of pro-American forces in 1965-6 with a sense of relief. That 
demonstrated the extent to which Australian policy was dominated by Cold War 
considerations. The fact that Sukamo's downfall was made possible by a massacre in 
which anywhere up to one million people lost their lives hardly seemed to trouble policy-
makers. There is in fact strong evidence to suggest that leading up to the massacres the 
Australian Government was not merely a passive supporter cheering from the sidelines 
but worked covertly through its ASIS operatives in Indonesia in concert with the CIA to 
destabilise Sukarno and encourage a military revolt. 58 Such was the delight at the army's 
destruction of "destabilising forces" in Indonesia, that as a reward to the new military 
government, Western aid poured into Indonesia after 1966. Australia's contribution was 
not an inconsiderable component. In fact, by 1968-9 Indonesia had replaced India as the 
largest recipient of Australian aid. 59 
56 Cairns, J. (1966) Living with Asia p.191. 
57 Ibid. Chapter 5. 
58 There is a large body of work on this subject. For the actions of the CIA in destabilising Sukarno see 
Caldwell, M. (1975) Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia. Spokesman Books: London, and Anderson, 
B. and McVey, R.T. (1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. Interim 
Report Series. Modem Indonesia Project, Cornell University: Ithaca. For the actions of Australian ASIS 
operatives in Indonesia see Toohey, W. and Pinwill, W. (1990) Oyster: The Story of the Australian 
Secret Intelligence Service. Mandarin Australia: Melbourne. and Waterford, J. and Slater, G. (1991) 
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59 Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War p.196. According to Jamie Mackie, after the new 
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Relations with Indonesia: Principles and Policies, Part 2" Australian Outlook 28: p.175. 
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For all the attention Indonesia attracted in Australia before the coup, it received very little 
attention in the foreign policy debate immediately after the imposition of pro-W estern 
military rule. This suggests that the signifying power of "Indonesia" during the Cold War 
resided in the ways in which it came to represent a marker of threat and regional 
otherness. That partly explains how the slaughter which heralded the Soeharto regime, 
was accepted with such comfort and ease by policy-makers. Bruce Grant, for instance, an 
otherwise intelligent critic, talked callously of the "self-regulatory capacity of Indonesian 
society" while, less surprisingly, for T.B. Millar, the events of 1965-6 in Indonesia were 
significant in that they represented a return of Australia-Indonesia relations to 
"normalcy". 60 
There were people, however, who questioned this whole Cold War discourse and the 
oppositional categories through which such responses were formulated. Those who 
thought outside the prevailing Cold War orthodoxy in Australia tended to reject the 
apocalyptic sense of "threat from the North" that informed much of the foreign policy 
debate. Needless to say, such views sat uneasily beside the dominant Cold War view of 
international politics in Australia. 61 Indeed, any views that deviated from Cold War 
orthodoxy were quickly marginalised in the public debate. Representing one of the few 
instances of public criticism, a 1963 petition by a group of leading AND academics 
provoked an angry and vitriolic response from conservative politicians in Parliament. 62 
While this suggested the dosed nature of the public debate, the process of executive 
foreign policy-making was even more narrowly-based.63 By 1963, a Foreign Mfairs and 
Defence Committee was set up within Cabinet which effectively limited all decisions on 
foreign policy to a small clique of conservative anglophile ministers and bureaucrats.64 
According to Micheal Sexton, it is probable that, leading up to Australia's commitment to 
Vietnam, Menzies, Hasluck and Minister for Defence Partridge were the only ministers 
involved in making decisions on foreign policy.65 
In this Cold War climate of secrecy and fear, the effect of Australia's conflicts with 
Indonesia was to reinforce the deep sense of insecurity and isolation under which foreign 
policy was formulated. Successive generations of policy-makers drew upon a self-
enclosed discourse that constituted Australian identity under the perpetual threat of 
erasure. US support for Indonesia in the West New Guinea dispute and its refusal to be 
drawn publicly on the ANZUS security commitment during Confrontation raised serious 
60 Grant, B. (1972) Crisis of Loyalty p.87. Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War p.195. 
61 In the postscript of the second edition of Living with Asia, Cairns outlines and counters some of the 
charges leveled at his analysis. See also Girling, J.L.S. (1969) People's War: Conditions and 
Consequences in China and South East Asia. Frederick A. Praeger: New York. 
62 For the statement of inter alia Bishop Burgmman, Professors Davidson, C.P. Fitzgerald and Manning 
Clark on the war in Indo-China, Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the Worldp.606-7. 
63 Murphy (1993) Harvest of Fear p.53. 
64 Edwards, P. with Pemberton, G. (1992) Crises and Commitments p.254. 
65 Sexton, M. (1981) War for the Asking p.153. 
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doubts about the efficacy of ANZUS. Rather than questioning their dependence on the 
United States, however, policy-makers responded through a strengthened resolve to 
show loyalty to the United States, in which we had "to do everything possible" to elicit 
US protection in the future. In seeking to do just that, Prime Minister Menzies announced 
in a tense speech to the parliament on the night of the 29th of April1965 the decision to 
commit ground troops to the Vietnam conflict That decision was to disclose the 
fundamentally flawed nature of Australia's Cold War strategy and its broader geopolitics 
of violence. 
iii. The Vietnam War 
Detailed studies of the politics between Australian and US officials leading up to the 
Vietnam War clearly show that the Australian Government vigorously encouraged an 
escalation of Western intervention in the Vietnam conflict 66 Australian diplomacy was at 
its most active at the time when many US strategic planners were less than enthusiastic 
about increasing Western military involvement in Vietnam. 67 Rather than being obedient 
clients yielding to pressure from their Superpower patron, therefore, Australian policy-
makers were "more convinced hawks than the Americans" in stridently advocating the 
projection of US geopolitical power into the region. 68 
The major proponent of escalating the Vietnam War was External Mfairs Minister Paul 
Hasluck. A former writer, historian and diplomat, Hasluck represented the most articulate 
spokesman in the 1960s of the realist power politics approach that governed Cold War 
foreign policy. For Hasluck, Australia, the United States and all the other nations of the 
"free world" had to confront the Chinese communist advance in Vietnam lest the 
predictions of the domino theory be realised. As with Australian policy in Indonesia and 
Korea, Hasluck and his colleagues understood the civil conflict occurring in Vietnam in 
strictly geopolitical terms which they saw as a "linchpin" state that had to be "held" 
against communist expansion. That understanding blinded Western strategic planners to 
the local and historical nature of the conflict in Vietnam. Like Indonesia before it, 
Vietnam became an object onto which Australian fears about "the region" could be 
projected. Drawing on the rigid boundaries of Cold War discourse, policy-makers 
reduced Vietnam to a struggle between the forces of good and evil, self and other, 
capitalism and communism and West and East while all but ignoring the local, 
historically-specific nature of the Vietnam conflict Exemplary here were the public 
pronouncements of Prime Minister Menzies which were articulated in almost mythico-
religious terms. For Menzies, accordingly, Vietnam was a "moral contest [and] a battle 
for the spirit of Man" in which "those who affirm the existence of a divine authority" 
were pitted against "those others who see nothing beyond an atheistic materialism". "We 
66 Ibid. 
67 See, in particular, Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. Third 
Edition. Allen and Unwin: Canberra and Sexton, M. (1981) War for the Asking. 
68 Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally p.68. 
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must by strength", Menzies stressed, "defend the geographical frontiers of those nations 
whose self government is based upon the freedom of spirit".69 
Menzies' rhetorical flourishes were supported by an emerging academic IR community in 
Australia. Based at the Australian National University, this community contributed the 
voice of "expertise" to the chorus of Cold War warriors in supporting the Vietnam War. 
Set up by Professors Miller and Millar with the staunch anti-communist Chancellor J.G. 
Crawford, the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the ANU was 
to become a hive of pro-government activity in the 1960s. In conceding later that the 
Centre was "vaguely open to the charge of militarism", Miller provided a rare insight into 
the orientation of this small IR community during the Cold War which was mobilised to 
defend government policy when public opposition began to coalesce in the mid to late 
1960s.70 In attending public meetings to support government policy, Tom Millar was at 
the forefront of arguing that Australian involvement in Vietnam could be justified on the 
basis of "paying the club fees" to the United States.71 According to Millar, Australia was 
"living on the fringe of a forest fire" in which the "endemically unstable" Indonesia rated 
just below China as "the major source of instability" in Asia.72 In understanding the region 
in such fearful terms, Millar juxtaposed Australia and its" stable" "democratic", "Christian 
way of life" with the "unstable", "totalitarian" societies of Asia. That view was based 
upon a fundamental hierarchy between the affluence, stability and homogeneity of 
Australian society and the poverty, instability and heterogeneity of Asia.73 Through 
reproducing such rigid boundaries, Millar and his colleagues provided the discursive 
grounds on which the Government could claim justification for Australian participation in 
the war. 
In drawing on this justification, policy-makers launched a vigorous diplomatic effort to 
obtain a "request" from the Americans for an Australian troop deployment in Vietnam. 
Recognising that a negotiated settlement would undermine the objective of attracting a 
US security presence into the region, Australian diplomats steadfastly opposed any 
69 cited in Millar, T.B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War pp.216-17. 
70 The symbiotic relationship between the academic IR community and government was reflected in the 
interchange of personnel between the A.N.U and the Department ofExtemal Affairs and Defence. It was 
also manifest in the establishment of the "Third Monday Club" where ANU academics, officials from the 
Departments of External Affairs, Treasury, Trade, Defence and Immigration met to exchange views and 
develop close relationships. See Miller, J.D.B. (1992) "Strategic Studies in Australia" in D.Ball (ed.) 
Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives. Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University: Canberra. pp.45-47. 
71 Millar, T.B. (1992) "Strategic and Defence Studies in Australia" in D.Ball (ed.) Strategic Studies in a 
Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University: Canberra. p.27. 
72 Millar, T.B. (1968) Australia's Foreign Policy. Angus and Robertson: Sydney. pp.47, 80. 
73 See also Harries (1967) "Is Asian Communism a Threat to Australia" in J.Wilk.es (ed.) Communism in 
Asia: A Threat to Australia. Angus and Robertson: Sydney. pp.ll8-122. 
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suggestion of seeking to resolve the conflict through negotiation.74 Accordingly, French 
President de Gaulle's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement were automatically 
dismissed by strategic planners as "a shifty way out" of the conflict.75 Indeed, far from 
speculating about negotiations, Australia's political leaders were by late 1964 speaking 
the language of escalation. According to Hasluck, we needed to seek out and give 
support to "like-minded elements" in the Johnson Administration, by which he meant 
other hard-line realists who sought an escalation of the war.76 With an American 
presidential election in full flight, Johnson was showing signs of opting out of a military 
solution. It was precisely at this time that Australian political leaders and diplomats 
skilfully played on American fears that their policies appeared vacillating and powerless 
to the rest of the world. 77 According to Bell, "if there is any phase of this entire period in 
which one might argue that Australian policy-makers influenced American policy-makers 
to ultimately damaging effect on a serious matter, it would be in these few months 
[around December 1964], when Canberra seemed far more convinced of the virtues of 
American combat in Vietnam than Washington did". 78 
The Australian Government's efforts were fmally rewarded in March and April of 1965 
when Johnson gave in to the proponents of escalation and "requested" a deployment of 
Australian troops in Vietnam. Prior to this, the United States had escalated its air 
involvement in Vietnam by launching what became known as "Rolling Thunder". 
Involving the escalated "Stage II" bombing of North Vietnam, Rolling Thunder dropped 
three times the tonnage of bombs on North Vietnam by 1973 than was dropped by all 
sides in the entire Second World War.79 Not surprisingly, Hanoi was reduced to a shell of 
rubble as countless thousands of Vietnamese civilians were killed. The official reaction of 
the Australian Government was celebratory. Ambassador to Washington Waller 
welcomed what he termed euphemistically the "new spirit and robustness" in US policy.80 
The sheer violence and terror that escalation represented cannot be understated. Nor can 
the physical violence of a war that gave us saturation bombing and defoliation on an 
unparalleled scale be disconnected from the violence of the broader reproduction of Cold 
War boundaries. Thus, in objectifying Southeast Asia as regional other, policy-makers 
reproduced reductionist understandings of global political life which effectively closed off 
other realities except the reality of Cold War territorial competition. It was through such 
discursive processes that policy-makers stridently supported, indeed promoted, a war of 
technosavagery in Vietnam. This was after all a war that gave us defoliated jungles and 
napalm, the My Lai massacres and the counter-terror Phoenix program in which 
74 Instructions from Canberra went out to all Australian Embassies, ordering that "[w]e should not 
speculate too much about negotiations at this stage". Sexton, M. (1981) War for the Asking pp.95-6. 
75 Edwards, P. with Pemberton, G. (1992) Crises and Commitments p.334. 
76 Hasluck, P. (1964) "Australia and Southeast Asia" p. 56. Ibid. p.349. 
77 Sexton, M. (1981) War for the Asking p.93. 
78 Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally p.67. 
79 Edwards, P. with Pemberton, G. (1992) Crises and Commitments p.346. 
80 Ibid. 
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Australian, South Vietnamese and American operatives were involved in, what even the 
official history of the involvement of Australian adviser's in Vietnam called rather 
sinisterly, "the twilight zone of the battlefield, an area that the Geneva Convention or 'the 
rules of war' never envisaged".81 
LILILI 
Even in its own narrow terms, Australia's Cold War doctrine of Forward Defence, which 
culminated in Western intervention in the Vietnam War, was a terrible, tragic failure. 
Neither the introduction of sizeable ground troops nor the flattening of North Vietnam by 
American bombs proved to be able to defeat the Viet Milm, Indeed, by the early 1970s, M;.,~,... 
through Nixon's announcement of the Guam Doctrine and Wilson's East of Suez 
proclamation, the US and Britain had signalled a reversal of Western military 
commitments to the region. Based upon eliciting Great Power protection, the strategy of 
Forward Defence was undermined as a viable doctrine during the Vietnam War. By any 
defmition, the deaths of 500 Australians, 55,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese enhanced neither security nor stability in Asia and the Pacific in whose name 
young Australians were sent to fight in Southeast Asia The failure of Western strategy in 
Vietnam thus reflected the misguided nature of Australian foreign policy and the broader 
modes of discourse from which it derived. The rigid geopolitical understandings through 
which policy-makers came to make sense of the world during the Cold War were simply 
inadequate in apprehending the complexities of Asian nationalism and anti-colonialism. 
Regional diplomacy was characterised by a strategic reductionism that led to a profound 
misunderstanding of the nature of Asian and Pacific. 
81 McNeil, I. (1984) The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972. University of 
Queensland Press: Brisbane. p.378. For the Phoenix program see Andrade, D. (1990) Ashes to Ashes: 
The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War. Lexington Books: Lexington, MA. 
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Chapter 4 
The Crisis of Western Geopolitics: Foreign Policy after 
the Vietnam War 
What is before us IWW in the full imperial panorama is the deep, the profoundly 
perturbed and perturbing question of our relationship to others - other cultures, 
other states, other histories, traditions, peoples and destinies. 1 
In previous chapters, I illustrated how Australian foreign policy cohered around a larger 
set of conceptual and spatial boundaries that sustained European colonialism up until 
World War II and American global hegemony thereafter. In reproducing these 
boundaries, Australian foreign policy abetted the Western imperial project and its 
dominant ordering of global political relations. Here the world became organised in terms 
of a larger set of binary oppositions between West/East, Europe/ Asia, modem/backward, 
self/other, sovereignty/anarchy and Australia/the region. During the Cold War, this 
geopolitical ordering was exemplified in the strategy of containment in which Western 
policy-makers sought to defme, demarcate and, above all, "contain" the non-Western 
other. 
This chapter examines the breakdown in this containment strategy and indeed in the 
whole post-war global order of US expansionary liberalism. It focuses on the ways in 
which the rigid boundaries of the Cold War effectively broke down, heralding a 
fundamental weakening in the dominant discursive practices that sustained Western 
global order. In pursuing this line of argument, I seek to connect the practice of 
contemporary foreign policy and its sense of crisis to the broader theme of 
"postmodernity" articulated in recent social theory. This theme has centred on the 
apparent breakdown in the Western project of order and the unravelling of its sovereign 
identities. 2 In signalling a challenge to Western IR and geopolitics, the theme of 
postmodernity provides critical insights into the discursive context of contemporary 
foreign policy and the beginnings of the so-called Pacific Century, the subject of the 
following chapters. 
In seeking to map this larger discursive context, and resuming where the last chapter left 
off, the present chapter seeks to locate the aftermath of the Vietnam War as a critical 
point of rupture of Western geopolitics. I argue that a whole series of events coalesced 
1 Said, E. (1989) "Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors" Critical Inquiry 15 (2): 
p.216. 
2 Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity Blackwell: Cambridge, MA. Vattimo, G. (1988) 
The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture. Trans. J .R. Snyder. Polity 
Press: Oxford. 
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around the Vietnam War which signalled a challenge not only to Western hegemony but 
also to the grand antinomy between Western selves and colonial others that underpinned 
global order. What has followed in subsequent decades has been a disordering of global 
political relations in which the dominant territorial organisation of political space has 
unravelled. This has led to a shift from the bipolarity of the Cold War to a multicentric 
global order, exemplified in the economic decline of the Western industrial centre and the 
emergence of the traditional peripheries of Asia as centres of capital accumulation in their 
own right. 
This fundamental shift in IR has, however, not been accompanied by a rethinking of 
Western post-Renaissance discourse from which Cold War foreign policy derived (See 
Chapter 1). Instead we shall see in this chapter how, in responding to the dissolution of 
the ordering project of Cold War geopolitics, Australian policy-makers have attempted to 
reimpose Western order through reasserting the dominant geopolitical boundaries of the 
past. Through this response, Western political elites have sought to contain the 
proliferating sites of difference, flux and ambiguity that characterise contemporary global 
life. 
I begin this chapter with an examination of the crisis of Western IR and geopolitics 
during the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a discussion of the ways in which this crisis was 
specifically expressed in Australian foreign policy. The third and final part of this chapter 
examines the response to this crisis by the Whitlam Labor Government. That response, I 
argue, merely served to reproduce the realist-liberal terms of foreign policy discourse. 
Crisis, the Rise of East-Asia and the Postmodern Condition 
There is something in Asia for us to be intently concerned about. There is an "emerging force" 
in Asia: a force of well over a thousand million people moved by nationalism, by aspirations 
for industrial and scientific power and economic strength, and by ideological influences. 
Asians are emerging from a thousand years and more of poverty and national impotence. 
They will emerge: nothing can stop them. .. The important question is: Can we learn to live 
with them and they with us ?3 
As we saw in the last chapter, the Cold War represented a relatively stable discursive 
economy through which Western policy-makers demarcated the boundaries between 
self/other, West/East, developed/undeveloped etc. In industrial societies such as 
Australia, a relatively consensual political culture was constructed through a broader 
disciplinary regime of Cold War politics. By invoking the threat of global communism, 
Western political leaders were able to mobilise public support behind the state against a 
common enemy. The imposition of this political consensus was replicated in the 
economic compromise forged between labour and capital in the core Western 
industrialised states. Based upon a stable international system of fixed exchange rates 
regulated by the IMF and World Bank, this compromise involved an unwritten contract 
3 Cairns, J.F. (1965) Living with Asia. Lansdowne Press: Melbourne. p.2. 
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through which trade unions ensured stable labour relations in return for welfare and 
employment guarantees. 4 
The basis of this post-War global order, however, was fundamentally challenged by the 
proliferation of political, military and economic crises which occurred across the globe 
during the 1960s and 70s. Signifying a broader loss of US power, Nixon enunciated the 
Guam Doctrine in 1969 which effectively amounted to a call for US allies to take 
responsibility for their own security. This, in tum, signalled the unwillingness of the 
United States to become involved in future military conflicts in the region. If any one 
event symbolised this growing realisation of the limits of American power, it was the Viet 
Mihn's Tet offensive in the Vietnam War. According to Stanley Kamow, Tet "dazzled 
American officers" in its sheer scope and boldness and "stunned" President Lyndon 
Johnson. Only months afterwards, Johnson announced his intention not to recontest 
presidential elections while largely suspending air strikes on North Vietnam.5 Even more 
unsettling for the US and its allies was the sheer terror and technosavagery of the War. 
Emblematic here was the outrage provoked by the My Lai massacres in which American 
troops slaughtered hundreds of Vietnamese men, women and children. The massacres 
provoked such outrage not because the North Vietnamese were innocent of such acts but 
rather because here was the United States, the apogee of Western liberal reason, 
engaging in overt acts of barbarism. In this sense, Vietnam came to symbolise a larger 
crisis of moral, political and cultural authority in which the premise of superiority that 
defined Western identity was increasingly being called into question.6 
Arguably the most disruptive force to post-War global order in the wake of the Vietnam 
War was the severe economic recession that spread across the globe in the early 1970s. 
The US commitment to Vietnam was a significant factor in this crisis as it imposed 
massive costs upon the US economy which were fmanced by the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations through printing more dollars. That action effectively flooded the world 
with excess liquidity, resulting in the world-wide inflationary spiral of the early 1970s.7 
The emergence of stagflation which involved the concurrence of inflation and 
unemployment was also symptomatic of a more generalised crisis in global capital 
accumulation. This was reflected in the inherent weakness of the US dollar, the growth of 
unregulated global money markets and the shift to flexible exchange rates, all of which 
heralded the end of the Bretton Woods regulatory mechanisms of the post war liberal 
4 Cox, R. (1981) "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 12 (2): pp.269-291. 
5 Karnow, S. (1994) Vietnam: A History. Penguin Books: New York. pp.523-566. 
6 Space does not permit a full account of the series of concrete political, economic and military crises that 
erupted across the globe in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. In addition to the references supplied 
below see Kaldor, M. (1978) The Disintegrating West. Allen Lane: London. 
7 Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, New Jersey. p.348. 
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economy and the rise of what Robert Cox has called "global structural disorder".8 The 
unprecedented growth in the post-War period had finally come to an end as industrialised 
economies stagnated and protectionist policies be_came increasingly common.9 As Robert 
Gilpin has noted, "by the mid-1980s ... the liberal dream of an expanding world economy 
organised in terms of a self-regulating market had been shattered". 10 The effects of this 
economic crisis were particularly devastating for the US Government which since 
Vietnam had been unable to solve its massive budget deficit That problem had the effect 
of overvaluing the dollar which, in tum, encouraged imports over exports and led to a 
far-reaching process of deindustrialisation, particularly in America's mid-West 11 
Reflecting a broader sense of malaise in advanced, industrialised countries, these 
economic problems have been emblematic of the inability of governments to achieve 
fundamental social and economic goals. 12 With growing economic interdependence and 
the globalisation of production and finance, national governments across the globe have 
found it increasingly difficult to control events within their own boundaries. Transnational 
flows of capital, commodities, people, information and culture have undermined the 
economic sovereignty of the state. As Timothy Luke suggests, "[transnational] flows are 
decentring, despatialising, and dematerialising forces ... [they] create new transnational 
communities that are blurring the old geographies of them and us, other and I, friend and 
foe". 13 Signalling the unravelling of Western geopolitics, this collapse of territorial 
boundaries has unsettled the hitherto stable territorial basis of IR, a theme that I will 
address in more detail in following chapters. Suffice to say here the unravelling of 
territoriality in recent decades has had serious implications for the dominant 
understandings of Western IR from which Australian foreign policy has derived. 
Coinciding with these changes has been the emergence of other centres of production and 
capital accumulation outside of Europe and America Arguably, the most dramatic 
challenge to Western dominance was the economic re-emergence of Japan in the 1960s 
and 1970s followed by other East Asian economies less than a decade later. According to 
Robert Gilpin, the meteoric rise of Japan represented not only "a challenge to the liberal 
international economic order [but also] a remarkable shift in the locus of the centre of the 
world economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the closing decades of the twentieth 
8 Cox, R.W. (1980) "The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 
1980s" International Organization 35 (2): p.372. 
9 Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations p.3. 
10 Ibid. p.341. 
11 Ibid., Nonini, D (1993) "On the Outs on the Rim: An Ethnographic Grounding of the Asia-Pacific 
Imaginary" in A. Dirlik (ed.) What's in a Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea. 
Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. p.165. 
12 Ikenberry, G. John (1995) "Funk de Siecle: Impasses of Western Industrial Society at the Century's 
End" Millennium 24 (1): pp.l13-126. 
13 Luke, T.W. (1993) "Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-reading Realism in the 
New World Order" Alternatives 18 (2): p.240. 
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century" .14 The scope of this transformation can be glimpsed in the fact that Japan has 
managed to catch up with and overtake countries whose GNP per capita were almost 
seven times higher than Japan's immediately after WWII. 15 This shift in the centre of the 
world economy has been facilitated by a transnational movement of capital to Japan and 
East Asia where foreign capital has set up low wage production sites as a way of 
lowering costs in a globalising economy - a process I will examine in more detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
In addition to the economic rise of East Asia, the emergence of Third World nationalism 
also served to heighten the crisis in Western global order during the 1970s. Calling for a 
"New International Economic Order", Third World governments and intellectuals 
throughout the 1970s sought to "challenge the legitimacy of the principles of international 
economic relations underwritten by Pax Americana". 16 That not only had the effect of 
weakening hegemony but in fact signalled the emergence of a counter-hegemonic force. 17 
Hence, during the 1970s there was a general reassertion of Third World nationalism 
evidenced in, for instance, the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the fall of the 
Shah in the Iranian Islamic Revolution. 
Taken together, the economic crisis in Western industrialised societies, the industrial rise 
of Japan and East Asia, and the emergence of Third World nationalism represented a 
fundamental challenge to Western hegemony and the representational practices that 
served to frame and give meaning to the post-War global order. Indeed, these 
decolonising events have signified an historical irruption in which, as Edward Said has 
noted, "Europe and the West, were being asked to take the Other seriously". 18 Seen in 
these terms, decolonisation represented a struggle that both disrupted and resisted the 
demarcation of Europe's others to a space of inferiority and backwardness. 
In seeking to theorise this emergence of "the other" from centuries of suppression, 
Robert Young has argued that the present epoch is characterised by what he identifies as 
the postmodern condition. 19 For both Young and Said, in forcing Europeans to confront 
"the other", the colonial project generated the West's own cultural awareness and sense 
of relativity. Through this self awareness, it was no longer possible to view "the West" as 
the unquestioned and dominant centre of the world. Invoking historian Arnold Toynbee , 
Young traces this process of cultural relativisation to the expansion of Europe in which 
14 Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations p.xiv. 
15 Arrighi, G. Ikeda, S. and Irwan, A. (1993) "The Rise of East Asia: One Miracle or Many" in R. Palat 
(ed.) Pacific Asia and the Future of the World-System. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut. p.44. 
16 Cox, R (1980) "The Crisis of World Order" p.383. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Said, E. (1989) "Representing the Colonized" p.223. 
19 Young, R. (1990) White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. Routledge: London. p.19. 
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the global spread of Western power also led, paradoxically, to there-empowerment of 
non-Western states.20 As Young concludes, postmodernism could be said to mark: 
not just the cultural effects of a new stage of late capitalism, but the sense of 
the loss of European History and Culture as History and Culture, the loss of 
their unquestioned place at the centre of the world?1 
This has meant that the univocal and unilinear story of Western modernity can no longer 
continue to go uncontested. The fixed boundaries between self/other, West/East, 
inside/outside which have sustained Western geopolitical thought have been seriously 
challenged recently with the multiplication of centres of history and identity. As Said has 
observed, alterity has erupted into vision: the decolonisation of women, natives, sexual 
eccentrics etc. has both challenged and resisted metropolitan History, and the single 
narrative of Western Enlightenment upon which it has been based.22 This decolonisation 
of Western thought has involved not only the displacement of the West as Centre but a 
serious rupture in Western civilisation itself. That is, to the extent that "the West" has 
depended for its veracity on claims to superiority and universality, the growing awareness 
of Europe's relativity (i.e. the consciousness of other cultures and histories) has served to 
make problematic Western identity. As Young has suggested, "as History gives way to 
the Postmodern we are witnessing the dissolution of 'the West"'. 23 As we have already 
seen, this "dissolution" of the West as centre has been fuelled by concrete historical 
conditions in which "the other" has erupted out of, and spilled over, the boundaries of 
Western geopolitical discourse that ascribed the non-Western, the deviant, the mad, the 
feminine etc. to a realm of otherness and inferiority. 
Jacques Derrida has invoked the Greek term aporia to denote this condition in which the 
originating principle of identity is revealed as nothing more than the effect of differential 
relations - that is, the product of Western logocentrism.24 In other words, in 
demarcating a space of otherness to secure a sovereign self, modern identity is always 
confronted with and challenged by this space of otherness (its aporia) that endlessly 
threatens to spill over and disrupt the neat categories upon which identity depends. The 
conditions producing the crisis of Western geopolitics after the Vietnam War, therefore, 
were not unique to this period but can be seen as always present in, and intrinsic to, the 
constitution of modern identity. 
Australia's sense of endangerment in the Asia-Pacific region has exemplified this aporia 
of modern identity as images of the Yellow Peril have always been intrinsic to Australian 
20 Ibid. p.19. 
21 Ibid. p.20. 
22 Vattimo, G. (1988) The End of Modernity pp.9-10. Said, E. (1989) "Representing the Colonized" 
pp.222-223. 
23 Young, R. (1990) White Mythologies p.20. 
24 Culler, J. (1982) On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. Cornell University 
Press: Ithaca For a discussion of logocentrism refer to Chapter 1. 
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self-understandings. In eliciting Great Power protection throughout this century, policy-
makers have been able to defer the aporia of Australian identity. With the withdrawal of 
a Western security guarantee after Vietnam, however, policy-makers have found it 
increasingly difficult to sustain the traditional definition of Australia as an outpost of 
White Civilisation. The shift in global power that has occurred in recent decades has 
meant that Western academics and strategic elites can no longer unproblematically 
confine the societies of Asia and the Pacific to a space of otherness and inferiority. 
The post-Vietnam war period can be characterised, therefore, less as a fundamental break 
with the past than a manifestation of this ever threatening condition of aporia. As I have 
indicated above, that condition has brought about a generalised breakdown in Western 
foreign policy discourse and the categories that have ordered, defmed and divided the 
world into objects of knowledge and geopolitical disciplinary practice. In this sense, by 
disclosing the traces of otherness which identity relies on, crisis can be seen as a general 
condition in which the boundaries between identity/other blur and the strategies that 
patrol this boundary break down. 25 
The point here is that the economic, political and military crises that coalesced around the 
US defeat in Vietnam were framed by a larger discursive crisis of Western geopolitics. 
That crisis involved the declining capacity of dominant discursive formations (such as 
Australian foreign policy) to represent the world in the dichotomised terms of Western 
logocentrism. In particular, the economic success of the Japanese and East Asian 
economies, roughly coinciding with the decline of Western industrialised society, has 
disrupted claims of a Western cultural monopoly on modernity. New narratives and 
mythologies have emerged containing a counter-vision of modernity from Western 
civilisation based upon "Asian values" and "Confucian" or "Communitarian capitalism".26 
All of this has served to disrupt the Cold War mapping of global politics in terms of 
bipolarity, framed via the broader themes of otherness and territoriality of Western IR. 27 
The Crisis of Representation in Australian Foreign Policy 
The world becomes chaos and synthesis salvation. 28 
Signalled by the failure of containment and the blurring of conventional geopolitical 
boundaries, the breakdown in Cold War discourse has had profound effects on Australian 
foreign policy. Symbolised in the Guam doctrine, the contraction of Western geopolitical 
25 Ashley, R. and Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the 
Question of Sovereignty in International Studies" International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): p.378. 
26 For a sample of this burgeoning literature see Zakaria, F. (1994) "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation 
with Lee Kuan Yew" Foreign Affairs 73 (2): pp.109-126. Peter Berger and Hsin-Huang Micheal Hsioa 
(eds.) (1988) In Search of an East Asian Development Model. Transaction Books: New Brunswick, NJ. 
27 Klein, B. (1994) Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. p.132. 
28 Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. (1993) Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. by J.Cumming, Continuum 
Publishing Company: New York. p.5. 
The Crisis of Western Geopolitics 75 
power removed the central objective of Australia's own containment doctrine of Forward 
Defence: namely, the deployment of Australian troops alongside Western forces in the 
region.29 The consequences of this breakdown, however, went far beyond ending Cold 
War strategic doctrine. In fact, it signalled a broader crisis of representation of foreign 
policy in which the whole spatial imaginary of Western geopolitics carne to lose its 
signifying power. With this, the traditional modes of foreign policy could no longer be 
deployed in the unproblematic way they once were. The framing of "the region" as a 
space of backwardness and instability was no longer undertaken with the same 
confidence, vigour and certitude that representations of a Cold War threat had permitted. 
This breakdown in traditional thinking can be glimpsed in the anxiety of the new 
Australian Minister for External Mfairs in 1969, Gordon Freeth, who observed that: 
there is a wide-spread feeling that in Asia and the Pacific old patterns are 
breaking up and new ones emerging; and that Australia's own relationship with 
the region may be entering a period of change and readjustment 30 
This sense of rapid change and uncertainty became a pervasive theme in the foreign 
policy debate during the late 1960s and early 1970s.31 Writing in the official series of the 
Australian Institute for International Mfairs some five years after Freeth's statement, 
Professor Gordon Greenwood described a world in "disarray" in which "Western unity, 
strength and cohesion had eroded [and] ominous signs of difficulties lay ahead".32 For 
Greenwood, the "decay of old alignments and of bipolarity" presented a bleak landscape 
dotted with a range of "disturbing tendencies such as the rebellion of youth, mass 
demonstrations, the quagmire of Vietnam and the prevalence of guerrilla and terrorist 
activities".33 Greenwood noted that "the seemingly intractable problems of race, rapid 
decolonisation, the political instability of many new states and the use of political violence 
as a deliberate political weapon" all represented a challenge to global order. Taken 
together these so-called disturbances signified a more general malaise in which, according 
to Greenwood, "men were feeling their way in a swamp of uncertainty".34 
It is the response by Australian policy-makers to this sense of crisis in the 1970s - a 
sense of being in the swamp of uncertainty- which I examine in the rest of this chapter. 
During this period, policy-makers sought to fill the void left by the failure of containment 
29 Cheeseman, G. (1993) The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam. Longman 
Cheshire: Melbourne. p.xv. 
30 cited in Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World: A Documentary History from 1870 to the 1970s. 
Longman Cheshire: Melbourne. p. 708. 
31 See, for example, Greenwood, G. (1974) "The International Background" in G. Greenwood and N. 
Harper (eds.) Australia in World Affairs 1966-70. Cheshire: Melbourne. Darby, P. (1976) "Changing 
Western Values and Perspectives" DyasonHouse Papers 2 (5): pp.4-7. Bull, H. (1976) "The West and 
the Third World", Dyason House Papers 2 (5): pp.l-4. 
32 Greenwood, G. (1974) "The International Background" pp.22,26. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. p.3. 
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with a myriad of fragmented strategies, reassertions, narratives and practices. As 
Greenwood suggested, Australian policy-makers "were groping for new directions".35 
Revolving around the traditional longing for order, this groping for new directions 
represented a response to losing the kind of certitude and predicability which Western 
strategic elites enjoyed during the Cold War. It is a response that Richard Ashley and 
Rob Walker have characterised as one of "desire" in which crisis: 
elicits a kind of homesickness for an institutional order that reimposes order 
and stable boundaries - and brings an ambiguous and uncertain reality under 
control. 1his is the response of desire ... the desire to fill the void, to compensate 
for the lack, to impose a centre of universal judgement capable of effecting 
limitations and fixing a space, a time and identity beyond question. 36 
In adopting this response of desire, Australian policy-makers attempted to reassert the 
boundaries of Cold War geopolitics. This has taken the form of attempts to reassert both 
the territorial boundaries of the Australian state and Western identity amidst the 
proliferating challenges to sovereign identity in contemporary political life. As we shall 
see, in reproducing traditional understandings, policy-makers drew upon the traditional 
realist and liberal modes of foreign policy discourse. Hence, the foreign policy of the 
Whitlam Labor Government, which I examine below, signalled a shift from the Cold War 
language of threat and anarchy to a more liberal rhetoric of cooperation and "engagement 
with the region" while the subsequent Fraser and Hawke Governments, the subject of 
next chapter, represented a return to a more realist foreign policy. 
The Foreign Policy of the Whitlam Government: Reinvoking Liberal Regionalism in an 
Uncertain Era 
Coinciding with the electoral victory of the new Whitlam Labor Government in the early 
1970s, the crisis of Western geopolitics engendered a more open atmosphere in Australia 
in which the rigid boundaries of Cold War discourse were increasingly open to challenge. 
This openness produced the conditions in which a more liberal rhetoric prevailed in 
Australian foreign policy. In this sense, the emergence of the new Government had many 
parallels with that of its Labor predecessors of the 1940s as both were a product of a 
time when prevailing global social relations were coming under challenge and the 
dominant geopolitical alignments of international politics remained relatively fluid. 
Against this background, a less oppositional regional foreign policy emerged in the early 
1970s in which the traditional emphasis on threat was replaced with a stress on 
cooperation with Australia's regional neighbours. This reformist foreign policy agenda 
was spelt out by Whitlam during a visit to Malaysia: 
35 Ibid. p.29. See also Teichmann, M. (ed.) (1967) New Directions in Australian Foreign Policy: Ally, 
Satellite or Neutral?. Penguin Books: Harmondsworth. 
36 Ashley, R. and Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Reading Dissidence" p.381. 
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We have shifted the emphasis of our continuing involvement in South-East 
Asia from one primarily based on ... military alliances to one based increasingly 
on developing trade with the countries of the region, on promoting progress 
through constructive aid programs, on encouraging security through regional 
cooperation-operation, on a positive response to recent proposals that we 
should consider financial assistance to agreed ASEAN projects, and on the 
development of cultural contacts through the negotiation of cultural agreements 
with the countries of Southeast Asia. 37 
In pursuing these kinds of policies, the Whitlam Government tended to eschew Cold War 
understandings that reduced the Asia-Pacific to a geopolitical buffer or threat, preferring 
instead to stress the common affmities that the countries of Asia shared with Australia. 
This was articulated in the development of closer links with the governments of the 
region including: the completed withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, official recognition 
of the People's Republic of China, the condemnation of America's continued bombing of 
North Vietnam, the abolition of National Service, the provision of aid to ASEAN, and 
the introduction of decolonisation plans for Papua New Guinea.38 
Despite claims of "new directions", however, the whole foreign policy outlook of the 
Whitlam Government resonated with the voices of an earlier era of liberal regionalists 
such as William Macmahon Ball and Frederick Eggleston. In reverting to traditional 
liberal foreign policies, Labor sought to a restore a sense of order and certainty amidst 
the clamour of difference and multipolarity that increasingly characterised global 
relations. As the Australian Prime Minister told The New York Times in July 1974, the 
regional reorientation of foreign policy was "essential for Australia in a new era of Pacific 
diplomacy, [an era marked by] the drift away from international order and international 
cooperation". Through promoting greater cooperation in the Pacific and Asian region, 
Whitlam declared that "Australia was seeking a better international order [against the 
backdrop] of a sense of drift, a sense of events out of control".39 
In its regional reorientation of foreign policy, therefore, the Whitlam Government was 
attempting to find new bases of Australian identity against the background of a 
breakdown in the major categories and boundaries of Cold War geopolitics. In promoting 
a "self-reliant", "independent" and "regionally-oriented" foreign policy, Whitlam sought 
to articulate a broader modernist vision of Australia's place in the world. That vision was 
one in which the certainties of the past were restored through a liberal, social democratic 
ethos of centralised social management. Standing at the centre of this vision was the 
heroic figure of Whitlam, the urbane lawyer educated in classics. He fulfilled the desire 
for a traditional rationalist order of social progress in Australia through declarations of a 
37 cited in Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World p.758. 
38 Cheeseman, G. (1993) The Search for Self Reliance pp.S-6. 
39 Whitlam 's Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations published in Australian Foreign 
Affairs RecordVol.45 (September 1974) pp.576-83. 
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self-confident and tolerant Australian nationalism, aboriginal reconciliation and the 
Keynesian objective of a just, growth-oriented economy. 
Driven by this social reform agenda, the Whitlam Government sought to refashion 
Australian identity in response to a broader cultural crisis in the West. That crisis 
manifested itself in Australia in the serious challenges to the dominant identity of White 
Australia which emanated from the feminist movement, the Aboriginal community and 
the growing number of refugees and migrants coming to Australia from Asia. In 
responding to the breakdown in the grand mythology of Western civilisation and its 
univocal definition of Australian identity, the Whitlam Government promoted a new 
discourse of multiculturalism. Meanwhile, in foreign policy, Whitlam's cosmopolitan 
vision resonated with the need to find a place in the region, expressing a broader desire to 
be "at home" in Asia which had long generated liberal thinking. In articulating this theme 
of "Australia in Asia", the Labor Government in the early 1970s anticipated much of the 
contemporary discourse of foreign policy and its so-called "tum to Asia". The major 
themes of cooperation and integration with Asia that dominate present-day foreign policy 
in fact resound with the Whitlam reformist agenda of the 1970s in which Australia came 
to be viewed as a multicultural nation on the edge of the Asian Region. 
While there was much that was appealing about this vision, Whitlam's liberal policies 
hardly represented a novel approach to Australian foreign policy. The emphasis on 
cooperating with the region was based upon the same instrumental interests of trade and 
security that had long characterised Australian regional diplomacy. Those interests hardly 
lent themselves to any kind of expansive and meaningful intercultural engagement 
between Australia and the societies of Asia and the Pacific. Indeed, far from representing 
a break with Australia's imperial past, the Whitlam Government's foreign policies were 
based upon the enduring assumptions of Western foreign policy discourse and the 
objective of maintaining Western "order" and "stability". Such interests and objectives 
had determined the nature of Australia's relations with the region since settlement. 
This continuity in policy was reflected in the Labor Government's continuing support for 
the American Alliance which was viewed as the "keystone of Australian security". 40 This 
view placed Australia firmly within the orbit of the Western security alliance led by the 
United States. As Whitlam remarked during his visit to America: "the United States 
remains the true leader of the world and as much as she used to be 'the last and best hope 
of the world'". "It is to the United States", Whitlam continued, "that the West chiefly 
looks for meaningful leadership in that direction". 41 
40 Dupont, A. (1991) Australia's Threat Perception: A Search for Security. Canberra Papers on Strategy 
and Defence No.82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University: Canberra. 
p.69. 
41 cited in Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World. p.772 
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By aligning Australia to the interests of the US, the Whitlam Government espoused a 
liberal vision of regional cooperation and progress which presupposed the same kind of 
global order as Western strategists sought to entrench in the Cold War. Privileging the 
interests and value systems of Western industrialised society, the Whitlam Government 
took Western liberal capitalism as the exemplar of development and progress and the 
basis for global order. Hence, while it is true that the foreign policy of the Whitlam 
Government signalled a definite shift toward a regionalist agenda, it could hardly be said 
to have marked a major departure from traditional realist assumptions. Never far from the 
surface were many of the assumptions that had undergirded Cold War thinking such as 
the need for a White Protector, the view of international politics in terms of the global 
balance of power and the primacy of instrumental national interests as the basis for 
Australian diplomacy. Indeed, as we have seen throughout this thesis, liberal good 
intentions of cooperation and engagement have always gone hand-in-hand with realist 
power politics. This convergence has been articulated in the common desire of both 
liberals and realists to create a stable manageable order in Asia and the Pacific as a way of 
guaranteeing Australian security. 
This "will to order" was exemplified in Whitlam's attempts to establish a regional forum 
to facilitate regional cooperation and consultation, a proposal that reproduced the long 
history of Australian diplomatic attempts to establish a Pacillc Pact as the basis for 
institutionalising a role for its Western allies in the Asia-Pacific. Resonating with a 
colonial-style mentality, Whitlam's proposal was greeted with silence by regional leaders 
who were highly suspicious of Australia's role as a proxy of US interests. Put forward 
without any serious prior consultation, Whitlam's unilateral proposal represented a 
particularly clumsy attempt by a small peripheral country to upstage the newly-formed 
ASEAN grouping, which Whitlam envisaged would be subsumed into his broader 
regional forum as a "sub-regional organisation".42 
Understood in these terms, such policies were designed to restore the status quo of 
Western global order and can be viewed as a readjustment of Australian policy in line 
with the changes in US strategic thinking after the Guam doctrine. As in the Cold War, 
the attempt to maintain Western global hegemony by the Whitlam Government involved 
massive costs and enormous geopolitical violence. That was evidenced no more tragically 
than in the complicity of the Whitlam Government in Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. 
Involving the on-going genocide of the East Timorese people, the Indonesian takeover of 
East Timor has shown in unequivocal terms the limitations of the liberal reformist agenda 
of Australian foreign policy. 
42 Girling J.L.S (1977) "Australia and Southeast Asia in the Global Balance: A Critique of the 'Fraser 
Doctrine"' Australian Outlook 31 (1): p.8. See also Camilleri, J.A. (1973) An Introduction to Australian 
Foreign Policy. Jacaranda Press: Brisbane. Leifer, M. (1983) Indonesia's Foreign Policy. George Allen 
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Generated by a preoccupation with "order" and "stability", Australia's policy on Timor 
was determined by the broader objective that has dominated foreign policy since the mid-
1960s: namely, developing and maintaining friendly relations with Indonesia's military 
rulers. For Whitlam, Indonesia represented the "gateway" to Asia and was thus crucial to 
the Labor Prime Minister's grand vision of Australia as a developed nation with budding 
relations with its Asian neighbours. Apart from such liberal ambitions, Australian efforts 
to develop close relations with Indonesia were determined by realist security 
considerations in which Australian support for the Soeharto regime was conceived on the 
basis of Soeharto's consolidation of a pro-Western, capitalist order in Indonesia. In 
protecting wider Western security and economic interests, the Soeharto regime was 
viewed by policy-makers as a major strategic asset to Australia. In privileging such 
strategic calculations above any ethical or moral consideration, Australian policy-makers 
jettisoned the interests of East Timorese independence in favour of the wishes of 
Indonesia's generals and the imperative of keeping Indonesia "stable" and "benign". 
This policy position was framed via the broader understandings of Western IR which 
reduced the complexities of global life to a rigid territorial mosaic in which global 
political space became partitioned into distinct parcels of sovereign states. As Stephen 
Toulmin has observed, this territorial worldview can be traced to the Newtonian theory 
of central forces. 43 Hobbes extended this theory to the social world in his conception of 
sovereignty in which he insisted that the atomised, individual nature of social life requires 
overwhelming force concentrated at the centre in the form of the sovereign state (See 
Chapter 1). As we have seen throughout this thesis, such understandings have been 
central to the practices of modem statecraft which subordinate the dynamics of plural 
local communities to a sovereign centralised authority exercising control over a fixed 
territorial space. Forming the basis for organising IR, these dominant territorial 
understandings have effectively detached policy perspectives from the specificities of 
local space in favour of ritualised invocations of "stability" and "order" based upon 17th 
century theories of centralised force. 
In framing its foreign policy at least implicitly via these broader understandings, the 
Whitlam Government supported Indonesian sovereignty over the former Portuguese 
colony. The basis for this position was stated clearly by Whitlam when he declared that 
an independent East Timor "would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the 
area".44 Former adviser to Whitlam, Nancy Viviani has noted that Australia's Timor 
policy was determined largely by Whitlam's fears of the "balkanization of Southeast 
Asia". That fear was based upon the Hobbesian assumption that viable political units 
could be constructed only through the development of large-scale communities with 
power concentrated in a central, sovereign authority. On this basis, a small independent 
43 Toulmin, S. (1990) Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. The Free Press: New York. 
pp.194, 209. 
44 Official Department of Foreign Affairs briefing paper, reproduced in Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and 
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East Timor was viewed by Australian policy-makers as unviable and vulnerable to the 
military ambitions of larger (non Western) powers. According to this view, an 
independent East Timor would be a potentially disruptive element to the Western 
orchestration of a stable geopolitical order of sovereign states and capitalist economies in 
the Asia-Pacific. Exemplifying this strictly geopolitical worldview was Whitlam's 
contemptuous attitude toward "mini-states". According to James Dunn, the former 
Australian Consul General to Portuguese Timor, Whitlam often treated the idea of an 
independent state of East Timor "as a joke", while former diplomat Gregory Clark 
commented on Whitlam 's "obsession about the stupidity of creating small nation-states". 45 
From this viewpoint, calls for East Timorese independence came to be seen as an 
unwelcome disruption to the sovereign act of developing "relations with Indonesia" 
which represented a central part of the Whitlam Government's grand visions of 
engagement with Asia. 
The fundamental objectives that undergirded the Whitlam Government's Timor policy, 
therefore, can be summarised as: maintaining Western "order and stability" across the 
Pacific, strengthening the status quo of regional state elites and above all else developing 
close relations with Indonesia. These objectives have formed the basis for Australia's 
subsequent security policies which I examine in more detail in the next chapter. 
While the Whitlam Government stressed the need to restore order in international 
relations, however, support for the Soeharto Government and other repressive state 
regimes in Southeast Asia has had exactly the opposite consequences. By most 
socioeconomic measures, the policies pursued by regional elites over the last three 
decades of high-speed export-oriented industrialisation have contributed to, rather than 
curbed, rising social tensions and "instabilities". Far from contributing to any enduring 
sense of "regional stability", therefore, Australian policy, as exemplified in our support 
for Indonesia's takeover of East Timor, has been designed to buttress the repressive state 
rule of the Soeharto Government and other authoritarian regimes in keeping a lid on 
simmering social tensions and discontent that their own policies have created. I will 
address this theme in more detail in chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis. 
DOD 
The attempt by Whitlam to promote a new modernist vision of Australian identity and 
nationhood ultimately proved unsustainable. Rather than heralding a new beginning, the 
Whitlam Government signalled a heightening of crisis which exacerbated the general 
sense of social, political and economic malaise. In particular, Whitlam's modernist ethos 
of enlightened social management was difficult to sustain in a society that remained, for 
the most part, an inward looking Anglo-American outpost. Furthermore, while Whitlam 
45 Dunn, J. (1983) Timor: A People Betrayed. Jacaranda Press: Melbourne. p.150. Viviani, N. (1976) 
"Australians and the Timor Issue" Australian Outlook 30 (2): p.199. 
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sought to promote a new vision of Australia's place "in the region", Australia continued 
to be viewed by many as a proxy of Western colonialism. Ending as late as the 1960s, the 
White Australia Policy continued to cast a long_-shadow over Australia's image in the 
region while the emerging discourse of multiculturalism was resisted by many Australians 
who still clung to a deeply-entrenched mythology of Western civilisation and identity. 
Perhaps most significantly, Whitlam's vision of a just social democracy faltered as the 
hyper-Keynesian economic strategy pursued by the Government served only to deepen 
the economic recession. It is the response to these ultimately unsustainable policies by 
contemporary Australian defence planners to which this thesis now turns. 
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Chapter 5 
Contemporary Foreign Policy 1: Security, Realism and 
the Regional Threat 
In the previous chapter, I examined the breakdown of Cold War geopolitics and its 
bifurcated organisation of global politics in terms of the principle of bipolarity. With this 
breakdown, the containment strategy of Cold War foreign policy was replaced by "a 
groping for new directions" in Australia's external relations. Forming the basis of the 
Whitlam Government's foreign policy, the search for new directions was articulated 
through attempts to promote a renewed modernist vision of identity in response to a 
postmodern decentring of identity. The Whitlam Government sought a (qualified) return 
to a liberal regionalist view of Australia and its place in the world. Despite Whitlam's 
claims of new directions, however, his liberal regionalist vision was based upon the same 
assumptions and objectives that underpinned Cold War thinking. Whatever the nature of 
this vision, it soon proved unsustainable. Indeed, far from heralding a new beginning, the 
Whitlam Government's policies heightened the general sense of social, political and 
economic malaise. 
With this failure, the "groping" for a sustainable basis of state identity has continued. The 
downfall of the Labor Government ushered in a series of conservative governments and a 
shift from the liberal directions of Whitlamism back to a language of Realpolitik in 
foreign policy. This chapter examines the reassertion of realist policies by recent 
Australian governments - policies designed to counter apparent threats emanating from 
the Asia-Pacific region. I argue that through these policies, Australia's defence 
community has sought to reinvoke a sense of order and certainty in international relations 
through the reinscription of Cold War boundaries between self/other, inside/outside, 
West/East etc. 
In examining contemporary defence/security policy, I begin with a brief discussion of the 
Fraser and Hawke Governments and the renewal of Cold War geopolitics. The second 
part of this chapter discusses contemporary realist narratives of the Asia-Pacific and the 
rearticulation of the traditional "region as threat" scenario. As this discussion makes 
clear, this renewed "region-as-threat" scenario has centred less on identifiable military 
threats as in the past than on a more generalised notion of "regional uncertainty and 
instability" which has dominated post-Cold War threat assessments. The third part of this 
chapter examines how this updated, yet all-too-familiar, threat scenario has been 
expressed through contemporary security policies. That has been clear in the continuing 
alignment of our regional diplomacy with the Western Alliance and burgeoning defence 
cooperation between Australia's defence forces and those of the region. Finally, I 
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conclude this chapter with a discussion of the contemporary discourse promoted by a 
number of regional leaders on "Asian Values". I relate this discourse to the theme of 
postmodernity examined in the last chapter. This discussion illustrates how recent 
attempts by policy-makers to forestall and defer the aporia of Australian sovereign 
identity have ultimately proved unsustainable. 
From Fraser to Hawke: The Renewal of Cold War Discourse 
The failure of the liberal policies of not only the Whitlam Government in Australia but 
also the Carter Administration in the United States provoked a neo-conservative backlash 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For the conservative elites of Western industrial 
society, the sense of breakdown in domestic society and loss of control in international 
affairs in the 1970s was due to a deeper moral crisis in Western society. Evidenced most 
dramatically in the US defeat in Vietnam, the loss of Western will and fortitude was 
viewed by American conservatives as an inevitable consequence of the decline in 
morality.1 For this generation of leaders, the contraction of Western geopolitical power 
and the loss of US credibility had to be reversed through reasserting US leadership in the 
world. That view reflected a nostalgia for the certitude and stability that had prevailed 
during the height of the Cold War underwritten by US power projection. 
Roughly coinciding with the beginning of the so-called second Cold War, the new Fraser 
Government sought to reassert the dominant boundaries of Cold War discourse. The 
epitome of the traditional conservative establishment, Fraser became arguably the most 
strident advocate of the renewal of Cold War politics in Australia. Like his Labor 
predecessor, Fraser exercised a dominant influence on the formulation of foreign policy, 
for whom the liberal principles of Whitlam's diplomacy were characterised by a lack of 
"realism" in truly appreciating the persistent dangers that communism posed to 
international order. In his first major foreign policy statement, Fraser argued that 
Australia could not survive in "a deeply disturbing world environment" through a foreign 
policy that was based on ideology and values as in the past. Instead, he stressed the need 
to focus on concrete interests as the basis for a realistic foreign policy which involved the 
realisation that "power in the broader sense remains the major factor in international 
politics". 2 
In seeking to reinvoke the traditional boundaries of the Cold War, however, Fraser faced 
the problem of identifying a credible strategic threat to Australian security. The 
traditional threat scenario of the yellow peril could no longer be sustained with the force 
that it had during the height of the Cold War. Earlier strategic analyses in the wake of 
Vietnam had noted the lack of an identifiable threat to Australia in the short to medium 
term. The old communist danger of China had subsided while the repressive state rule of 
1 See, for instance, Knopelmacher, F. (1971) "America-the Bad Society" The Australian May 3-5: 
p.8. 
2 Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World: A Documentary History from 1870 to the 1970s. Longman 
Cheshire: Melbourne. p.782-3. 
Contemporary Realist Foreign Policy 85 
the Soeharto regime made Indonesia the "model of stability and rationality" that policy-
makers had always yearned for.3 In the absence of traditional threats, the regional threat 
scenario that circulated during the height of the Cold War was replaced by 
representations of the global threat that the Soviet Union posed to Australian security. 
Indeed, by the time, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Fraser had whipped both himself 
and, if polling is accurate, the Australian public into something of a frenzy.4 In arguing 
that the Soviets were seeking to achieve global "primacy", Fraser advanced the view that 
"the world is facing probably its most dangerous crisis since World War II". Not to be 
outdone by his party leader, Defence Minister Killen claimed that the Soviets represented 
"a direct threat" to Australian security, although he failed to elaborate on why this was 
so.5 
As we have seen in this thesis, there was nothing new about this translation of distant 
conflicts into "direct threats" to Australia security. In the case of the Fraser Government, 
this was achieved via realist understandings of IR, and, in particular, "balance of power" 
arguments. As Fraser declared, "Australia lives in a world where predominant power is 
controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union and international diplomacy has to 
be understood principally as an effort by the [major] powers to create a balance in the 
world favourable to their interests" .6 In adopting a balance of power worldview, the 
Fraser Government drew up foreign policy assessments which, in their global scope, 
meant that just about any action by the Soviet Union could be portrayed as detrimental to 
the global balance. Tied into this narrow framework, the notion of the Soviet Union 
representing a "direct threat" to Australian security became both credible and real. 
Through this great powers perspective on the world, the Fraser Government sought to 
bolster US credibility as its primary foreign policy goal. 7 Here, policy-makers were 
concerned with the US capacity to project geopolitical power across the globe in resisting 
at all costs "Soviet expansionism". As Graeme Cheeseman has argued, such objectives 
signalled a return to Forward Defence as "Australian military forces were once again 
deployed into the region to help the Americans contain communist expansionism".8 That 
was evident in the increased air and naval deployments in the Indian ocean, increased air 
surveillance of Australian ocean approaches, the offer to the United States of the use of 
Australian defence facilities, the commitment of troops to the US-sponsored peace 
keeping mission in the Sinai desert and aid provision to shore up the South Pacific 
3 Dupont, A. (1991) Australia's Threat Perception: A Search for Security. Canberra Papers on Strategy 
and Defence No.82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University: Canberra 
p.67. 
4 Ibid. p.82. 
5 Cited in Cheeseman, G. (1993) The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam. 
Longman Cheshire: Melbourne p.10. 
6 Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World p.782. 
7 Girling, J.L.S. (1977) "Australia and Southeast Asia in the Global Balance: A Critique of the Fraser 
Doctrine" Australian Outlook 31 (1): pp.9-10. 
8 Cheeseman, G. (1993) The Search for Self-Reliance p.11. 
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nations against Soviet aggression.9 In its return to Forward Defence, the Fraser 
Government reproduced the objectifying, othering strategies of Cold War geopolitics. 
Once again "the region" became reduced to an object of the imperialist desires of either 
communist expansionism or Western containment. Thus, policy-makers became 
preoccupied with attempting to "prevent the movement of the Soviet Union into this area 
as superpower competition in Southeast Asia would lead to instability" .10 
Such representations, and the concrete practices of Realpolitik they engendered, were 
reproduced in the foreign policies of the subsequent Hawke Government.11 If anything, 
the new Labor Government was even more staunchly anti-communist and pro-American 
than its predecessor. In its preoccupation with growing Soviet links with some Pacific 
island states, the Hawke Government expressed alarmist statements bordering on 
hysteria 12 The peak of the Government's reaction came with news of Libyan interest in 
expanding its links with Pacific states. That news was greeted by the Hawke Government 
and the mass media in Australia with statements that evoked a sense of danger and threat 
recalling early Cold War discourse. 
While during the peak of the Cold War, this sense of a threat "out there" was associated 
with the so-called falling dominos of "Southeast Asia", the focus of both the Fraser and 
Hawke Governments was concern over "instability in the South Pacific". The coups in 
Fiji, anti-colonial strife in New Caledonia, the secessionist struggle in Bougainville and 
the crisis of the ANZUS alliance were all viewed in Canberra as evidence of the growing 
"instability" in the Pacific. This instability was seen by policy-makers as creating "a 
window of opportunity" for the Soviets in the region.13 
In projecting a discourse of regional otherness onto the "South Pacific", policy-makers 
converted the Islands states of the Pacific into an object of strategic concern. During the 
Fraser and Hawke Governments, Australia's Pacific policy centred on the doctrine of 
"strategic denial" which involved both the maintenance of Western dominance and the 
denial of access to countries regarded as potentially hostile (i.e. the Soviet Union).14 By 
adopting this approach, the Fraser and Hawke Governments reproduced the reductionist 
9 Ibid. 
10 Meaney, N. (1985) Australia and the World. p.788. 
11 Indeed, as Coral Bell has pointed out, "[s]o considerable was the sense of continuity with the Fraser 
years that it seemed reasonable to argue that there was bipartisanship on Australian foreign policy". Bell, 
C. (1994) Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. Third Edition. Allen and Unwin: 
Canberra. p.155. 
12 For instance, news that fishing access agreements were being negotiated between the Soviets and both 
Kiribati and Vanuatu provoked a strident public warning from the Australian Government. It also led to 
much behind-the-scenes diplomacy by Australian policy-makers at the South Pacific Forum designed to 
censure those states. Fry, G. (1991) "Australia's Regional Security Doctrine: Old Assumptions, New 
Challenges" in G. Fry (ed) Australia's Regional Security. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.7. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Herr, R.A (1986) "Regionalism, Strategic Denial and South Pacific Security" The Journal of Pacific 
History 21 (4): p.174. 
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strategic imagination through which the South Pacific had been understood by policy-
makers since settlement. Here the South Pacific became represented as a strategic 
vacuum that needed to be "filled". This policy of strategic denial represented a renewal of 
the Cold War doctrine of "containment" in which policy-makers sought to prevent Soviet 
expansion into the region. Thus, throughout the 1980s, Canberra pursued the familiar 
dual strategy of "stabilising" the region through supporting "economic development"15, 
while at the same time promoting political alliance "to the West".16 
In pursuing these diplomatic initiatives, Australian policy-makers continued to locate 
Australian identity fmnly within the Western Alliance. Arguably, Australia's most overt 
declaration of alliance to the West was the maintenance of US defence and intelligence 
installations in Australia. Long a thorny issue for successive Australian governments, the 
bases were justified by Hawke and other ministers on the grounds they contributed to 
global bipolar stability. The unequivocal support given by the Labor Government 
resonated with a long history of Australian sycophancy and dependence, which Hawke 
did his best to reproduce, telling the Australian-American association that the two nations 
would be "together forever". 17 Aside from the geopolitical arguments for or against the 
American installations, their existence has served a fundamental symbolic function in 
securing the boundaries of "the West" as a meaningful geopolitical and cultural category 
at a time when Western identity has come under serious challenge. Richard Leaver makes 
the argument eloquently: 
... [Australian] Governments owed much of their post-war success to their 
ability to act out the domestic role of loyal ally to the United States. The 
symbolism of loyalty was domestically more important than the content of 
support. Australia's decision to host the bases was not judged domestically by 
any reckoning of what the bases did or did not contribute to the nuclear 
balance, but simply by the appearance of cooperation they conveyed. 18 
15 This was articulated in the increase in Australian aid to the South Pacific which quadrupled in the 
1970s, further doubling after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, see Ibid. 
16 This was achieved through a pro-American diplomacy whereby Australia sought to assert its 
leadership in the South Pacific Forum to exclude Soviet influence in the region. This elicited a view 
amongst Pacific states at the Forum that Australia was seeking to play the role of "regional policemen". 
Other measures that the Hawke Government adopted as part of its regional diplomacy included 
upgrading the maritime surveillance system of island states, providing technical and training support for 
Pacific defence and security forces, increasing Australia's naval movements in the region and supervising 
more effective coordination of regional defence activities. Camilleri, J (1989) "The Emerging Human 
Rights Agenda: Australia's Response" Interdisciplinary Peace Research. 1 (1): p.112. Fry, G. (1991) 
"Australia's Regional Security Doctrine" p.4. Hegarty, D. and Polomka, P. (1989) The Security of 
Oceania in the 1990s, Vol. I: Views from the Region. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University: 
Canberra. p.6, 9. 
17 cited in Millar, T. B. (1991) Australia in Peace and War: External Relations Since 1788. Second 
Edition. Australian National University Press: Canberra. p.361. 
18 Leaver, R. (1987) "Australia's Peace Movements, Politics and Strategists: Comments on Professor 
Gelber's Critique" Australian Outlook 41 (2): p.l31. (italics added) 
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This symbolic "presencing" of the West provided the discursive underpinning for 
Australia's continued support for US globalism in_ the 1980s and 1990s. This was clear in 
the Hawke Government's automatic support for US actions in the Gulf War in which, 
with neither Cabinet nor public consultation, Hawke pledged Australian forces to the 
Gulf. This recalled a long expeditionary pattern of showing loyalty to the protector. As 
Henry Reynolds has noted: "the man who shed tears over bodies in Tiananmen square 
expressed pride in a campaign which may have well decimated a generation of Iraqi 
youth".19 Exemplifying the predominant policy orientation, journalist Greg Sheridan 
sought to justify complicity in such carnage by advancing the time-honoured argument 
that "the unique aloneness of Australia's position" meant that it is "overwhelmingly in our 
interests to maintain the one truly significant alliance we have".20 Once again, facing a 
complex, volatile reality that required a sophisticated, thoughtful response, our foreign 
policy elite reverted to a ritualised invocation of the need to show unquestioned loyalty to 
distant allies. Instead of pursuing a serious debate, policy-makers privileged a narrow, 
unreflective provincialism through which Australia was understood as an isolated outpost 
of Western civilisation rather than an independent member of its own region. That self-
understanding was exemplified in the failure of Australian political leaders to notify, let 
alone consult with, regional governments about Australia's decision to commit forces to 
the Gulf.21 
Realist Narratives in the Post-Cold War Period: The Asia-Pacific as a Marker of Uncertainty 
While policy-makers were preoccupied with the "Soviet threat" in the early 1980s, by the 
end of the decade reformist elements within the Soviet Union had emerged, culminating 
in Gorbachev's strategy of Perestroika and Glasnost. In signalling the end of the Cold 
War, these developments meant that attempts to reinscribe communism and the Soviet 
Union as the grand Cold War enemy soon became unsustainable. Within a year of the 
Hawke Government's hysterical response to Libyan and Soviet activity in the Pacific, the 
foreign minister was claiming that the presence of hostile powers in South Pacific had 
disappeared without a trace.22 Amidst this decline in the threat posed by Cold War 
enemies, Australian defence planners cast around for alternative sources of danger which 
posed a potential threat to Australian security. This search for potential threats can be 
related to the identity requirements of the modem state and the representational practices 
of statecraft that demarcate a sovereign inside space of identity from an outside space of 
otherness. As we have seen in this thesis, through fixing the boundaries between 
19 Reynolds, H. (1991) "Catching up with Geography" Australian Society April: p.28. For critical essays 
of the Gulf War see McKinley, M. (ed.) (1994) The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives. Allen and Unwin: 
Sydney. 
20 Reynolds, H. (1991) "Catching up with Geography" p.30. 
21 Richardson, J.L. (1994) "The Gulf War and Australian Political Culture" in McKinley, M. (ed.) The 
GulfWar. p.89. 
22 Camilleri, J (1989) "The Emerging Human Rights Agenda: Australia's Response" Interdisciplinary 
Peace Research 1 (1): p.lll. 
Contemporary Realist Foreign Policy 89 
domestic-foreign, self-other and inside-outside, modern foreign policy functions to fulfil 
these requirements of modern state identity. 
In the absence of a grand Cold War enemy, however, policy-makers have had to draw on 
an emerging post-Cold war discourse of otherness to secure traditional geopolitical 
boundaries. This discourse has centred on a myriad of possible threats. Arabs (as in the 
Gulf War), immigrants, global terrorism, aids, and economic marginalisation have all at 
various times assumed the figure of otherness in post-Cold War foreign policy. Such 
othering strategies have departed from the Cold War proclivity to identify specific states 
as enemies such as in the 1950s and 60s when Indonesia, China and North Vietnam all 
became markers of the regional threat to Australia. Since the 1986 Dibb Report, defence 
planners have concluded that there is "no readily identifiable threat of major direct attack" 
and the most likely threats to Australian security would come from "low level and 
escalated low level contingencies". 23 While still concerned over China and other 
traditional military threats, our defence planners have focused on emerging non-military 
dangers which have become a more common source of insecurity in the post-Cold War 
period. As the 1994 Defence White Paper, Defending Australia, noted: 
... ethnic and national tensions, economic rivalry, disappointed aspirations for 
prosperity, religious and racial conflict, or other problems could produce an 
unstable and potentially dangerous strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific 
over the next 15 years.24 
The locus of otherness has shifted from the grand enemies of the Cold War to the 
"spectacle of uncertainty"25 and the general condition of disorder in the post-Cold War 
period. In place of an identifiable military threat, a more generalised sense of threat 
prevails - of boundaries blurred, territories unravelling, and old patterns of geopolitical 
organisation breaking up. Whilst lacking the parsimony and discursive force of the Cold 
War fear of an expansionist Soviet Union or China, post-Cold War threat assessments 
have continued to identify "the Asia-Pacific region" as a marker of otherness and danger. 
For contemporary policy-makers, therefore, myriad threats "out there in the region" 
continue to lurk ominously at the edges of Australian territory. The function of this 
renewed "region as threat" scenario has been to secure the territorial boundaries of the 
state, through distinguishing "us" from "them" and projecting "our" insecurities onto an 
external realm of otherness. As a marker of uncertainty and complexity in the post-Cold 
War period, "the region" has become characterised as a geopolitical "cauldron" from 
23 Dibb, P. (1986) Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. Australian Government Publishing 
Service: Canberra. p.2, 7. 
24 Australia. Department of Defence (1994) Defending Australia: 1994 Defence White Paper. Australian 
Government Publishing Service: Canberra. p.8. 
25 Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. p.250. 
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which a major conflict could soon erupt.26 Policy-makers have become concerned by 
Chinese military modernisation, growing nationalism and militarism in Japan, rapid 
economic change across the Pacific, rising protectionism in East Asia, growing 
"instability" in the South China Sea and the growing "arms race" in Asia 27 The question, 
however, as to why such discrete and apparently unrelated developments have been 
categorised within, as it were, a common inventory of regional instabilities is never 
explained by contemporary defence planners. By tying these troubling developments into 
a broader Western discourse of otherness, policy-makers have simply assumed that these 
events are related; that taken together they indicate the threatened and endangered 
condition of Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. 28 
By questioning this assumption, my intention is not to suggest that these developments 
are untroubling- for they surely are. Rather I want to point out that such developments 
have come to be understood within a narrow discourse in which the spectre of "regional 
uncertainty" has reinforced Australia's sense of estrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. 
This sense of estrangement and the defensive response it has given rise to, however, is 
not the only interpretive option open to policy-makers. In fact, rather than resorting to 
traditional existential anxieties, policy-makers could develop a less apocalyptic response 
to so-called "regional instability". That response would recognise that the rapid historical 
changes experienced recently in Asian and Pacific societies are in fact shared by all 
societies in an expanding global economy. Such changes represent new opportunities for 
creative diplomacy, rather than provoking a ritualised turn to old anxieties. In contrast to 
such open possibilities, Australian defence and security thinking has been characterised by 
a conditioned policy response which has projected contemporary global problems to a 
realm outside the state defined as "the region out there". 
In reproducing this conditioned Hobbesian response, contemporary policy-makers have 
drawn upon neorealist narratives of economic decline and the loss of Western global 
hegemony. I want to briefly discuss the major themes of neorealism and its structuralist 
bent, particularly concern over the regionalisation of the world economy and the renewal 
of mercantilist policies which have increased the possibility of future global conflict. 29 
26 A useful survey of such arguments is provided in Richardson, J.L. (1994) The Asia-Pacific: 
Geopolitical Cauldron or Regional Community. 
27 For a sample of this burgeoning literature see Shambaugh, D. (1994) "Pacific Security in the Pacific 
Century" Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 93 (587): pp.423-429. "The New 
Nationalism" Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 November 1995: pp.20-26. For an article that debunks 
the notion of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific See Nagara, N. (1995) "The Notion of an Arms Race in the 
Asia-Pacific" Contemporary Southeast Asia 17 (2): pp.186-206. 
28 Exemplary here is the work of Ball and Kerr who provide a neat table listing a range of diffuse 
unrelated conflicts and tensions in Asia and the Pacific. How, for instance, competing Russian and 
Japanese claims to Southern Kuril Islands are related to continued fighting between government and 
rebel forces in Laos is never explained by the authors. Ball, D. and Kerr, P. (1996) Presumptive 
Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.42. 
29 See Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, New Jersey. p.394. Higgott, R. Leaver, R. and Ravenhill, J. (eds.) (1993) Pacific Economic 
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Advancing the neorealist notion of hegemonic stability, Charles Kindleberger has argued 
that a single, hegemonic power (i.e. the United States) is necessary for international 
economic stability, a precondition presently lacking in international politics with the 
recent emergence of new centres of power (i.e. Japan and East Asia). 30 That has not only 
demanded painful adjustments among states but also generated the possibility of major 
conflict including recent tensions between the United States and China. 
In advancing this thesis, Kindle berger has argued that during the Cold War the US 
supplied "public goods" of order and international stability which provided East Asia with 
the necessary preconditions for development. These costs were borne disproportionately 
by the hegemon. As the US has declined economically, however, it has become unwilling 
to bear such costs by tolerating the protectionist industrial policies of East Asian 
economies. This has signalled a period of rising trade tensions and even potential 
conflict. 31 Implicit in this neorealist perspective is the desire to re-project US power 
across the globe and to return to an earlier era of American globalism. Not surprisingly, 
many neorealists have bemoaned the passing of the Cold War in which the United States 
was able to impose its will and provide so-called "leadership" in an anarchical world. 
Those concerns have been central to contemporary Australian debates on defence, 
although such debates have been characterised by traditional realism rather than its 
neorealist variant. This has been exemplified in the work of Paul Dibb, government 
adviser and Australia's leading defence analyst, who has expressed fears of regional 
instability in terms of the need to develop "balance of power" mechanisms in Asia. 32 For 
Dibb, the spectre of "unbridled competition between Asia's Great Powers [could well 
become] the dominant theme of the 21st Century [in which] there is a danger that the 
Pacific Age could end in a major Asian war two or three decades hence".33 In arguing 
that governments have become "too complacent about security", Dibb's target of 
criticism is the dominant liberal, multilateral approach of contemporary Australian foreign 
policy which I discuss in detail in the next chapter. 34 "Neither the market nor the 
information revolution", Dibb writes, "will resolve ancient enmities, racial hatreds, 
Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict. Allen & Unwin: Sydney. Frankel, J.A. and Kahler, M. 
(eds.) (1993) Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the US in Pacific Asia. University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago. Kurth, J. (1989) "The Pacific Basin versus the Atlantic Alliance: Two Paradigms of 
International Relations" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 505: p.45. 
3° Kindleberger, C. (19 81) "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy" International 
Studies Quarterly 25 (3): pp.242-254. See also Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International 
Relations. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. pp.72- 80. 
31 For an explicit account framed in these terms see J. Kurth (1989) "The Pacific Basin versus the 
Atlantic Alliance". 
32 Dibb, P. (1995) Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia. Adelphi Paper No.295. Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. See also Bell, C. (1990) "The ANZUS Alliance: The Case For" in D. Ball and C. Downes 
(eds.) Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
33 Dibb, P. (1993) "Asia's Simmering Cauldron Could Soon Boil Over" The Australian 19 November: 
p.l3. 
34 Dibb, P. (1994) "Power Shifts rule out Defence Complacency" The Australian October4: p.l5. 
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religious bigotry or territorial ambitions". It is only through the "use of the balance of 
power that we can maintain international order [and prevent Asia] from lapsing into 
chaos".35 · 
Far from being international in nature, however, the kind of "order" that Dibb has in mind 
is an American-centric one. That preference is reflected in the crux of his argument that 
should a destabilising struggle for power between India, Japan and China take place "only 
the US can hold the balance of power". As Dibb concludes, "we need a rejuvenated US 
alliance system in the region".36 It is at this point that the political project implicit within 
such realist narratives is disclosed. Order and stability equals US hegemony. The Pacific 
age is less a cause for celebration than a call to arms - order must be reasserted, 
American power renewed and Asia put back in its place as the other. 
Underpinned by these objectives, Dibb's thesis also draws on, what Edward Said 
identifies as, a broader discourse of "orientalism"37 in which Western scholars, 
colonialists and policy-makers have sought to define and make authoritative statements 
about "Asia". Through converting the region into an object of knowledge, policy-makers 
have sought to contain Asia to a space of otherness and ultimately to achieve Western 
control over it. Dibb's latest work, accordingly, is littered with sweeping generalisations 
about the character of societies "in Asia". 38 His work reproduces traditional essentialisms 
about "Asia" as a threat. Thus, invoking a brand of cultural determination, he notes that 
"the values of the States and individuals in Asia are not as resistant to the idea of war and 
conflict, and the primacy of the State, as in the democracies of the West". This opposition 
between West-East, however, is not the product of secure ontological foundations but 
rather an effect of Dibb's dogmatic attempt to redraw the orientalist boundaries of the 
past. Significantly, it was the so-called "West", not "Asia", that was "less than resistant to 
the idea of war" in its development of weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War. 
That such orientalist arguments can be reproduced by Australia's "leading" defence 
analyst indicates that the crudest possible expression of Western logocentrism is alive and 
kicking in Australia in the 1990s. 
In fact, this renewal of orientalising strategies has been a major theme of one of the most 
influential perspectives on post-Cold War politics, Samuel Huntington's "clash of 
civilisations" thesis.39 Huntington has argued that, rather than heralding the end of East-
West conflict, the post Cold War period will be characterised by an intensification of 
conflict along major civilisational "fault lines". Applying Huntington's thesis to 
Australia's regional relations, Owen Harries has claimed that Australia is located on one 
such "fault line" and thus faces a more severe threat in the future than at any other time in 
35 Dibb, P. (1995) Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia p.70, 73. 
36 Dibb, P. (1994) "Power Shifts rule out Defence Complacency" p.l5. 
37 Said, E. (1978) Orienta/ism. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. 
38 Dibb, P. (1995) Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia. 
39 Huntington, S. (1993) "The Clash of Civilisations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (3): pp.22-49. 
Contemporary Realist Foreign Policy 93 
its history.40 He argues that, "Australia's strategic isolation from the West will be greater 
than it is now because for the first time in Australia's history there will be no Western 
power projecting its power into the region".41 Harries concludes in foreboding terms that 
"if Huntington is right in identifying an emerging Confucian-Islamic challenge to the 
West, Australia is on the edge of the most dangerous 'fault-line' in the world- and it is 
the softest Western target on that line".42 
The effect of these various contemporary realist narratives of region has been to 
reinscribe traditional Hobbesian boundaries in Australian foreign policy at a time when 
transnational forces such as migratory patterns, informational and capital flows and 
changing economic trajectories are making such boundaries problematic. Contemporary 
security policy, therefore, is being formulated against a broader disordering/reordering 
dynamic of postmodernity. Thus, as conventional patterns of political relations 
increasingly unravel so too are official efforts to sustain and rearticulate these patterns 
correspondingly increased. Running through contemporary realist narratives, accordingly, 
is an acute sense of loss of certainty in international relations in which the Cold War is 
seen in terms of the stability and predicability it once afforded (Western) policy-makers.43 
This chapter now turns to an examination of the ways in which these understandings have 
been articulated in Australian defence policy through a violent politics of identity. 
Contemporary Policy Articulations: Regional Security and the Violent Reassertion of 
Sovereign Identity 
Framed via these larger narratives of post-Cold War uncertainty and disorder, 
contemporary Australian security policy has been characterised by a stress on self-
reliance, a rejuvenation of the Western Alliance, a major weapons acquisition program 
and burgeoning defence cooperation between Australia and the states of Southeast 
Asia. 44 I will take each of these elements in turn in order to show how they represent 
interlocking security policies designed to reterritorialise global political space and to 
secure the territorial boundaries of the Australian state amidst the rupture in the dominant 
geopolitical ordering of IR signalled by the "end of the Cold War". 
The notion that Australia needs to develop an independent, self-reliant defence capability 
was foreshadowed in the 1970s, although its adoption in official policy did not occur until 
40 Harries, 0. (1993) "The Collapse of 'The West"' Foreign Affairs 72 (4): pp.41-53. 
41 Harries, 0. (1995) "Alone in the Asia-Pacific" The Australian 8-9 April: p.26. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See for instance the latest Defence White Paper, Australia, Department of Defence (1994) Defending 
Australia: 1994 Defence White Paper. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. 
44 My reading of the contemporary defence and security policy has been made on the basis of the major 
official reports on Australian defence over the past decade. See Ibid. Australia, Department of Defence 
(1993) Strategic Review 1993. Department of Defence: Canberra. Australia, Department of Defence, The 
Defence of Australia 1987. Australia Government Publishing Service: Canberra. Evans, G. (1989) 
Australia's Regional Security: Ministerial Statement. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 
Canberra. Dibb, P. (1986) Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. 
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the 1987 Defence White Paper. Since that time, self-reliance has become a central 
element of defence policy. The prevailing definition of "self-reliance" has not, however, 
led to a more independent Australian stance from- its Western allies. On the contrary, it 
has denoted the development of defence forces with an enhanced technological capacity 
to meet external military threats within the context of Australia's continuing alliance with 
the United States. This oxymoronic policy of "self reliance within the US alliance" has 
been based on a realisation that Australia can no longer rely solely on US protection to 
meet its security needs in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, self-reliance has 
represented a minor policy modillcation to Cold War thinking in which Australian 
defence planners have brought their policies into alignment with the less ambitious 
regional commitments by the US in the post-Guam doctrine era. As Defence Minister 
Kim Beazley proudly declared in the late 1980s, "our allies are looking to us to play a 
larger role in the region as their own resources shrink" and have insisted that we accept 
"our regional responsibilities".45 Australia has taken up the slack here as the United States 
withdraws from Asia- a proud proxy of the Western Alliance. 
In continuing to support US power projection into the region, contemporary defence 
planners remain wedded to old patterns of thinking. Policy-makers have not rethought the 
fundamental assumptions of Western IR that one might expect with the monumental 
changes that have occurred with the end of the Cold War. Nor, in the face of growing 
economic interdependence across the Pacillc, have they rejected the sense of existential 
anxiety and geographical estrangement that has underpinned Australian thinking on 
international affairs since settlement. Thus, while the Keating Government asserted an 
independent diplomatic style, the content of its policies sought to maintain Australia's 
integration into the American global strategic network. The advent of the conservative 
government of John Howard has marked even closer relations between the US and 
Australia, evidenced in the planned upgrade of the joint Pine Gap intelligence station and 
increased military cooperation between Australia and the United States. Such initiatives 
have signalled a "rejuvenation" of the Western Alliance in the Asia-Pacific region.46 As in 
the past, the aim of contemporary diplomacy is to elicit a greater US commitment to the 
Asia-Pacific in the belief that the United States is a "stabilising force". 
This move to "rejuvenate" the Western Alliance, however, has not gone uncontested, nor 
is it unproblematic.47 Hence, while policy-makers defiantly declare that "the Western 
association of nations ... will remain in place", the mere enunciation of this statement 
45 Cheeseman, G. (1990) "Over-reach in Australia's Regional Military Policy" in G. Cheeseman and St. 
John Kettle (eds.) The New Australian Militarism: Undermining our Future. Pluto Press: Sydney. p.80. 
46 "Howard Boosts US Security Links" The Australian. 27-28 July 1996: p.l. Sheridan, G. (1996) "Solid 
as a rock- why the US is a good policy base" The Australian June 12: p.13. 
47 For a discussion of the challenges from various groups to Australian security policy see Dalby, S. 
(1996) "Continent Adrift?: Dissident Security Discourse and the Australian Geopolitical Imagination" 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 50 (1): pp.59-75. 
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illustrates the fragility of an identity that was once taken for granted. 48 Australia is 
located here anxiously on the Western frontier. 49 In reinscribing traditional geopolitical 
identities, contemporary defence planners have. been preoccupied with what Bradley 
Klein has called "the construction and preservation of the West" at a time when this 
identity is increasingly coming under challenge. 50 As we have already seen, the emergence 
of other centres of capital accumulation and geopolitical power in the Asia-Pacific has 
made the traditional framing of Australian identity as an isolated outpost of Western 
civilisation difficult to sustain. That has led to a fundamental tension in Australian defence 
and foreign policy between accommodating recent global power shifts through "engaging 
with the Asia-Pacific", while at the same time as maintaining traditional alliance structures 
with "the West". Once again, our regional diplomacy can be characterised in terms of its 
oscillation between realist and liberal approaches, i.e. between a narrative that positions 
Australian against the region and one that locates Australia in the region. 
A product of this (ambiguous) attempt to preserve "the West" as the sovereign locus of 
Australian identity has been the major weapons acquisition program carried out in the last 
decade by Australia's defence forces. Announcing a $7 billion ship building program and 
an upgrade of long-range forces including submarines and F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft's, 
the 1987 White Paper described the program as "the largest defence capital investment in 
Australia's peacetime history". 51 As Beazley told an American audience, the weapons 
program allowed Australia to develop "the technological edge we need to enable less 
than one percent of the earth's population to guard 12% of its surface". 52 
Based upon a desire for order and control, such claims illustrate the persistence of Cold 
War patterns of thinking in recent defence policy. Thus, drawing on a traditional military 
understanding of security conceived as the maintenance of territorial boundaries against 
external military threats, defence planners have resorted to high-tech weapons to counter 
perceived threats to Australian security that exist "out there in the region".53 Once again, 
a militaristic solution of "strategic denial" is being invoked as a way of securing the 
boundaries between a sovereign, stable Australia and a dangerous, "uncertain" region. As 
Christine Sylvester has noted, the latest offering of defence orthodoxy, the 1994 Defence 
White Paper, parades the "force capabilities" that defence planners are developing to 
48 Evans, G. (1989) Australia's Regional Security: Ministerial Statement p.4. 
49 Sylvester, C. (1996) "The White Paper Trailing" in G. Cheeseman and R. Bruce (eds.) Discourses of 
Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking after the Cold War. Allen and 
Unwin: Sydney. p.137. 
5° Klein, B. (1994) Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. p.41. 
51 Australia, Department of Defence (1987) The Defence of Australia 1987. p.vii. 
52 cited in Cheeseman, G. (1990) "Over-reach in Australia's Regional Military Policy" p. 86. 
53 Dalby, S. (1996) "Security Discourse, the ANZUS Alliance and Australian Identity" in G. Cheeseman 
and R. Bruce (eds.) Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security 
Thinking after the Cold War. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.124. 
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tame and bring under control the "new uncertainties" which have emerged recently.54 
This is where the modernism of Australian defence policy is most visible - evidenced in 
its taming of uncertainty, its fetish for technology and its celebration of progress to defeat 
the forces of disorder and recalcitrance, invoked rather ominously as "the region". 
By resorting to the technology of organised violence to stave off the uncertainty of post-
Cold War politics, defence planners have drawn on traditional realist views of security 
and IR as a time-honoured struggle for power in an anarchical world. From this realist 
perspective, the only possible response to contemporary uncertainties is to mobilise the 
means of organised violence, to acquire a "technological edge" to bring threats under 
control and to reassert the boundaries that provide the "stability" and "predicability" that 
policy-makers yearn for. This militaristic response is, however, at odds with the public 
rationales of contemporary diplomacy to build cooperative international institutions 
across the Pacific. 55 As Graeme Cheeseman has pointed out, defence planners are 
continuing to prepare to defend against a region which our diplomats are seeking to 
engage with. 56 
At a time of growing economic interdependence and the globalisation of capital, 
technology and culture, defence planners are persisting with a traditional realist security 
agenda that ignores the complexities and multi-layered nature of contemporary insecurity 
and violence. In pursuing a traditional state-centric security agenda, contemporary policy-
makers understand the societies of Asia and the Pacific through reductionist 
representations of reality. Thus, the region continues to be framed via a narrow 
geostrategic worldview in which as Kim Beazley has candidly declared: 
We do not address the complex texture of political, economic, cultural and 
social characteristics of our neighbours. On all these subjects we make no 
judgements: we address only the simple facts of geography, in light of what 
history tells us about the vulnerabilities of our territory and approaches. 57 
By reducing the region's complexities to such narrow geopolitical considerations, the 
defence establishment has continued to pursue instrumental policy interests as the basis 
for its relations with the outside world. This has been at the expense of a more expansive 
and meaningful engagement between Australia and the Asia-Pacific. That has been 
exemplified in the failure of Australian defence planners to deliberate upon the 
importance of self determination, demilitarisation, decolonisation, inter-cultural exchange, 
resource destruction and environmental degradation, to name just a few elements of what 
54 Sylvester, C. (1996) "The White Paper Trailing" p. 139. 
55 Dalby, S. (1996) "Security Discourse, the ANZUS Alliance and Australian Identity" p.123. 
56 Cheeseman, G. (1996) "Back to 'Forward Defence' and the Australian National Style" G. Cheeseman 
and R. Bruce (eds.) Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security 
Thinking after the Cold War. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.268. 
57 cited in Cheeseman, G. (1993) The Search for Self-Reliance p. 147. 
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an expanded non-traditional agenda of security policy might look like.58 To the extent 
that such issues have been considered at all, they are invoked as "regional uncertainty" 
and converted into a threat to sovereign boundaries that must be controlled through 
traditional militaristic means. 
This narrow geostrategic world view- long the basis for Australian defence planning -
has also underpinned the other major element of contemporary defence policy: namely, 
growing defence cooperation between Australia and ASEAN defence forces which since 
1989 has burgeoned. For instance, in 1993-94 Australia spent $A229 million on 
cooperative defence activities in the Asia-Pacific mostly with ASEAN nations, the 
majority of whom are now more militarily engaged with Australia than any other country 
including amongst themselves. 59 As Ball and Kerr point out, it will soon be difficult for 
Singapore and Indonesia to deploy military equipment or forces which have not been 
maintained or trained in Australia. 60 
Such cooperative initiatives may appear inconsistent with the rest of Australia's 
contemporary defence posture which, as we have seen in the foregoing discussion, has 
centred both on preserving close links with the Western alliance and developing 
technological means to defend against threats coming from the Asia-Pacific region. Yet 
for contemporary policy-makers, defence cooperation with ASEAN dovetails nicely with 
the emphasis on bilateral defence relations and military alliances found in existing security 
policy. Through providing "transparency" and "confidence-building" amongst the 
region's defence forces, defence cooperation is viewed as contributing to a web of 
bilateral defence links.61 This perceived need for defence cooperation has been reinforced 
by the concern shared among ASEAN, Australia and the United States over an 
economically emerging and militarily powerful China. 
More broadly, the policy of "strategic partnership" with ASEAN has been engendered by 
the reterritorialising impulses of the state in Australia. While defence planners have 
declared that Australia's regional security environment is "benign", they have displayed 
considerable unease and anxiety at the state of general disorder in post-Cold War politics. 
Struggles for self-determination, religious fundamentalism, growing environmental 
problems, rising social tensions and economic dislocation throughout Asia have all been 
viewed with great concern by the defence establishment. 62 In responding to these 
challenges to sovereign boundaries, policy-makers have engaged in military cooperation 
58 See the territorial definition of "security" in Evans, G. (1989) Australia's Regional Security: 
Ministerial Statement p.l. 
59 Ball, D. and Kerr, P. (1996) Presumptive Engagement p.64. 
60 ibid. p.93. 
61 See Sebastian, L. (1996) "Enhancing the Security of Southeast Asia through the Deepening Web of 
Bilateral Relations" The Indonesian Quarterly 24 (1): pp.l3-18. 
62 See, for, instance the article by the former secretary of the Department of Foreign Mfairs and Trade, 
Woolcott, R (1996) "The Perils of Freedom" The Weekend Australian 22-23 April: p.24. 
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with the sovereign authorities of ASEAN as a way of securing a stable and fixed 
interstate system across the Pacific. 
In their attempts to do so, regional defence planners have formulated the notion of 
"regional resilience" as the major objective of defence cooperation. The term is borrowed 
from Indonesian strategic doctrine (Ketahanan Nasional) in which it denotes policies 
designed to secure the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state through the 
overwhelming presence of the armed forces throughout the archipelago. Underpinned by 
this territorial notion of "regional resilience", Australian defence cooperation with 
ASEAN, like the recent weapons upgrade of contemporary defence forces, functions as a 
means of staving off the deterritorialising challenges to state identity. In mobilising 
against the common enemy of disorder and uncertainty, the region's governments have 
sought to police the rigidly compartmentalised organisation of global political space 
across the Pacific. That strategy was identified long ago by Hedley Bull as the conspiracy 
of "the compact of coexistence" between sovereign authorities.63 This is evident in the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs that has formed the basis for ASEAN 
relations. It is also evident in the secrecy that surrounded the negotiation of the Australia-
Indonesia Security agreement. Through conceding that the Treaty would have been 
unachievable had it been opened up to public debate, Prime Minister Keating confirmed 
the ways in which state elites have engaged with one another in opposition to elements of 
civil society viewed as destabilising threats to regional unity and stability. In this context, 
regional "integration" and "cooperation" does not signal the transcendence of the state; 
on the contrary, it is the product of the reterritorialising moves of the forces of 
contemporary statecraft in the Pacific. 
These tactics of (re)territorialisation are the product of the broader attempt to create a 
stable geopolitical order of sovereign states and market economies across the Pacific -
the central security objective of Australian foreign policy throughout its history. The 
pursuit of this goal has, however, been achieved at a terrible cost. In striving for absolute 
certitude, predicability and security, military strategists have sought to create a neat, 
rigidly-demarcated grid of stable territorial states. As the history of Western geopolitics 
has shown, however, there is never a point at which all challenges to modem strategy can 
be suppressed - a point at which the messy difference and heterogeneity of human 
reality can perfectly fit the rigid Hobbesian boundaries of modem foreign policy 
discourse. In seeking to project an idealised image of the inter-state system onto global 
political space, modem strategy is characterised by a never-ending quest for "security" 
which always encounters recalcitrant elements that cross established boundaries. The 
response to this has been the mobilisation of geopolitical violence on a global scale. 
This violent geopolitics has been exemplified in Australia's growing defence links with the 
Soeharto regime, a policy justified on the basis of maintaining regional "order" and 
63 Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Macmillan: London. p.90. 
Contemporary Realist Foreign Policy 99 
"stability". Indonesia now holds more military exercises with Australia than with any 
other country, filling the void left by the United States' decision to cut its military training 
IMET program to Indonesia following the Dill massacre. 64 In conducting training and 
joint exercises with Indonesia, it is clear that Australia's defence establishment does not 
share US concerns about human rights concerns, nor its reservations about engaging too 
closely with a repressive, authoritarian regime. Indeed, far from distancing Australian 
interests from the Soeharto regime, the development of Australia-Indonesia defence links 
has reached a highpoint recently with the signing of the Australian-Indonesia Security 
Agreement. 
While for the most part, the agreement serves to simply formalise existing security 
cooperation between the two countries, Article two calls on the two countries to consult 
and consider joint measures in the case of "adverse challenges" to either party. This 
phrasing represents a potentially new level of engagement between Canberra's defence 
establishment and Jakarta's military leaders. The ambiguity of the term "adverse 
challenges" has posed the question whether this could lead to the direct engagement of 
Australian troops in Indonesia to suppress internal opposition and dissent. The 
Indonesian defence forces have proved themselves more than capable of performing the 
task unassisted, due partly to military training in Australia. Of greater concern than this 
unlikely scenario, therefore, is the training of Indonesian military units in Australia which 
are later used to violently repress internal dissent and secessionist movements in 
Indonesia, including in East Timor and Irian Jaya where ongoing struggles for self-
determination have been met with brutal repression by the Indonesian military. In 
privileging a narrowly conceived notion of regional "order" and "stability, policy-makers 
have remained silent on the ethical dilemmas posed by defence cooperation. 
Characterised by this major policy silence, Australian defence planning has become 
hitched to the repressive rule of state elites throughout Asia and the Pacific. I will address 
this subject in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Taken together, then, self-reliance, the maintenance of the Western alliance, the high-tech 
upgrade of Australian defence capabilities and defence cooperation with the region have 
formed a contemporary strategic orientation designed to reinvoke a sense of order and 
certainty in Australian foreign policy. In the face of various challenges to the sovereign 
authority of both the territorial state and Western identity, defence planners have pursued 
a strategy designed to reterritorialise global political space through a violent reinscription 
of the traditional boundaries. As I show below, however, this strategy is a problematic 
one, not least in the ways it has sought to preserve Western identity as the primary 
reference point for Australia's own identity. 
64 Earl, G. (1995) "Looming Poll Spurred Signing" The Australian Financial Review 15 December: p.16. 
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Recalcitrant Encounters: Asianist Discourse and the Continuing Crisis of Representation 
Notwithstanding the attempts by contemporary policy-makers to restore the certainties of 
the past, the crisis of Western geopolitics discernible since the 1970s continues to 
unsettle and displace the traditional assumptions of Western IR. Australian-Malaysian 
relations and the periodic tensions that have arisen between the two countries over the 
last decade provides an instructive case study of the continuing crisis of representation in 
contemporary foreign policy. This represents as it were a microcosm of the broader 
contradictions in Australia's regional diplomacy. 
The tensions between the two countries have emerged over a number of issues such as 
Australian media representations of Malaysia and Paul Keating's characterisation of the 
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir as "recalcitrant". These incidents have raised the 
considerable ire and indignation of Mahathir, whose response can be related to the 
broader discourse of "Asian values" articulated by East and Southeast Asian policy-
making elites. Mahathir has become a leading advocate of this discourse, rallying against 
the individualistic and "decadent" culture of the West and its media which, according to 
Mahathir, has represented the postcolonial world in sensationalist and disrespectful ways. 
In contrast to the decadence of the West and its high crime rates, open sexuality and 
disintegrating family life, Mahathir ascribes to Asia a common cultural heritage based 
upon the ethics of hard-work, social integration and family values. Those ethics have 
been seen as central to the recent economic success of East Asia. 
The most obvious dimension of this discourse is that it reverses the identity-making 
representations of Western IR. Here sovereign identity is ascribed to Asia not Europe as 
the West becomes othered as abject, dangerous and unstable. Confucianism not 
Protestant Christianity is the source of the modem work ethic, while the economies of 
East Asia not the US and Western Europe are the growth centres of the world economy. 
This reversal of the categories of Western IR offers a counter-vision of modernity by the 
conservative modernising elites of East Asia who, while promoting high-speed capitalist 
industrialisation, have sought to ward off the detrimental effects of individualism and 
materialism that accompanied the industrialisation process in the West. This counter-
vision has been based upon an organic view of society in which the state is viewed as a 
guardian of national community in opposition to the liberal individualism of Western 
society.65 That view has been deployed with great domestic political effect by East Asian 
governments who have naturalised their authoritarian rule through laying claim to a 
venerable tradition of "authority and hierarchy" in Asian civilisation. By inverting the 
boundaries between self-other and West-East, East Asian policy-makers have sought, like 
their counterparts in Western industrialised countries, to reaffirm a strong sense of 
identity and security in an uncertain world where old patterns of global political relations 
65 For a discussion of this see Robison, R. (1996) "The Politics of 'Asian Values"' The Pacific Review 9 
(3): pp.309-27. 
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are rapidly unravelling. Thus, both Australian and Malaysian policy elites are attempting, 
in different ways, to insert themselves into a shifting global network of power. 
Far from challenging traditional geopolitics, therefore, Mahathir and others have 
promoted an identity as equally essentialising as its Western counterpart. 66 In seeking to 
secure an East Asian identity, Mahathir has come up against the fundamental predicament 
of postcolonial states - namely, that through their attempts to assert an identity in 
opposition to the West, postcolonial elites have appropriated the very categories of 
Western colonialism and foreign policy discourse against which they have sought to 
position themselves. Not surprisingly, a strident assertion of state sovereignty is the 
hallmark of Asianist discourse in which an inside space of Identity must be insulated from 
evil "outside" influences of Western decadence. Thus, while Asianist discourse has 
offered a counter-vision to Western modernity, the proponents of Asian values have not 
only reproduced the logocentrism of Western IR but have also embraced its dominant 
cartography of territorial states and capitalist economies. 
The main point that needs to be made here is that, in inverting traditional foreign policy 
categories, Asianist discourse has served to exacerbate the crisis of representation in 
Australian foreign policy. This is despite the militaristic attempt to stave off this crisis 
evidenced in contemporary defence planning discussed above. Thus, Mahathir's 
promotion of "Asian values" is explicitly designed to contest and make problematic the 
Western discourse of otherness which has relegated Asia to a space of backwardness and 
inferiority- in effect turning this discourse on its head. Mahathir' s promotion of "Asian 
identity" has skilfully played on Australian anxieties about closer engagement with the 
Asia-Pacific as a way of asserting Malaysia's growing awareness of its enhanced 
economic and political power. This has represented an example of "the colonial other" 
talking back to, and turning the tables on, the West in its own language. Through 
challenging traditional representations of Asia as an inferior other, Asianist discourse has 
problematised the sovereign identity of the West. That was clear in Paul Keating's attack 
on his Malaysian counterpart for being "recalcitrant" over Mahathir' s refusal to attend the 
Seattle APEC summit. That exemplified the deep-seated anxieties that Western policy-
making elites have experienced towards recent shifts in global power relations. 
This anxiety can be related to the postmodern condition of contemporary foreign policy. 
Here we have seen how a sense of crisis and boundaries blurred has prevailed in 
Australia's foreign relations in which hitherto discrete social spaces have collapsed into 
one another and the strong sense of "the other" has been replaced with a weak sense of 
merely others.67 The effect of such transgressions has not only been "to put institutional 
66 Dirlik, A. (1991) "The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional 
Structure" Journal of World History 3 (1): p.74. 
67 Harvey, D. (1990) The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. 
Blackwell: Cambridge, MA. p.301. 
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boundaries in doubt but also to deprive an institutional order of stable oppositions". 68 The 
statement by former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that Australia was fast 
becoming the "white trash of Asia" hit a raw nerve in Australian public discourse because 
it exacerbated this sense of crisis. 69 What was so disturbing about Lee's statement was 
that it overturned the dominant imaginative cartography through which Australians had 
understood their place in the world as a wealthy, developed nation in an undeveloped 
poverty-stricken region. Lee's statement disrupted the privileged sense of Western 
identity and racial superiority that Australian foreign policy has long been based upon. 
These themes are further illuminated in the dispute that arose between the Australia and 
Malaysia in 1991 over the broadcasting of an Australian drama series Embassy. A banal 
and seemingly innocuous drama series, Embassy was set in "an imaginary state 
somewhere in Southeast Asia called Ragaan" which had many striking similarities with 
Malaysia Whilst Mahathir was incensed at the unsympathetic depiction of Ragaan which 
he saw as a thinly veiled criticism of Malaysian society, Ragaan was as much a composite 
picture of the Southeast Asian region as it was a specific representation of Malaysia 
Indeed, as a country depicted with a military government and large US strategic 
presence, Ragaan could be said to be more like Thailand than Malaysia In seeking to 
capture the region's underlying realities in a pure, distilled form through the depiction of 
Ragaan, the makers of Embassy were in fact invoking the monolithic portrayals of "the 
region" based upon the dichotomy between Australia/Asia central to Australian thinking 
on IR. Not surprisingly, the program's depiction of Ragaan was based upon images of an 
unstable, crisis-ridden and illiberal society in opposition to the stability and democratic 
nature of Australian society. Such representations amounted to an exemplary form of 
foreign policy in which the unstable and crisis-ridden Ragaan was represented in 
opposition to the rational, heroic and stable "Australian self', personified by the portrayal 
of Australian diplomats and represented spatially in terms of the sovereign territory of the 
Australian Embassy. 
In the ensuing furore over the drama series, however, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir's reaction and challenge to these crude discursive practices demonstrated that 
traditional geopolitical boundaries could no longer be accepted in the unproblematic way 
that they were during the Cold War. In registering a diplomatic protest over the 
broadcasting of Embassy, the Malaysian Government challenged and contested the 
representational strategies deployed by the makers of Embassy who fixed the identity of 
"Southeast Asia" in terms of otherness and danger. In this sense, the Embassy dispute 
signalled the postmodern moment of contemporary Australian foreign policy in which, as 
Der Derian and Shapiro have noted: 
68 Ashley, R.K. and Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: 
Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies" International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): 
p.386. 
69 See article by Ball, W. Macmahon (1979) "Act, or be the Poor Whites of Asia" The Age December 10: 
p.9. "Asia's Trash can Wait: Warning" The Age 23 May 1979: p.S. 
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foundational unities (the autonomous subject, the sovereign state, grand theory) 
and synthetic oppositions (subject-object, self-other, inside-outside) are 
undergoing serious and sustained challenges. We are witnessing changes in our 
international, inter-textual, inter-human relations in which objective reality is 
displaced by textuality (Dan Quayle cites Tom Clancy to defend anti-satellite 
weapons); modes of production are supplanted by modes of information (the 
assembly line workplace shrinks, a computer and media-generated cyberspace 
expands) representation blurs into simulation (Hollywood and Mr. Smith go to 
Washington) ... With these tectonic shifts new epistemological fault lines 
develop: the legitimacy of tradition is undermined, the underlying belief in 
progress fragments, and conventional wisdom is reduced to one of many 
competing rituals of power used to shore up a shaky society. 1his is the 
postmodern moment. 70 
As a postmodern moment, the Embassy dispute defied the traditional territorial view of 
international politics. The high politics of IR - of war, security and international 
diplomacy - were displaced in this dispute by the clash of cultural difference, the 
dynamics of representational practices, the transnational flow of information and, above 
all, the power of television. Mahathir's trenchant criticism over Embassy, and the whole 
Asianist discourse he has articulated, betrayed a deep sense of anxiety on the part of 
sovereign authorities toward the uncontrollable flows of contemporary life that have 
increasingly challenged territorial boundaries. Generated by the flows of contemporary 
electronic communications, the Embassy dispute signalled the ways in which new 
electronic spaces and "mediascapes" have increasingly come to shape contemporary inter-
state politics. New sources of diplomatic cont1ict centring on cultural representation have 
emerged recently outside of the conventional spaces of inter-governmental diplomacy. 
While these deterritorialising flows call into question old boundaries and demand the 
formulation of more imaginative and critical perspectives on global political life, the 
Australian response to the Embassy dispute drew on conventional territorial categories. 
Accordingly, the debate over the dispute in Australia was dominated by nationalist 
sentiment in which Foreign Minister Gareth Evans was condemned for his statement of 
"regret" at the incident. 71 That reaction disclosed the continuing dominance of the realist, 
state-based framework of Australian thinking on international politics. The major 
question to emerge within this framework was: "in the context of the power politics of IR 
was it in the national interest for the Government to have apologised to Malaysia?". 
Within this highly masculine, gendered and orientalist discourse, the Foreign Minister was 
accused of "grovelling" to the Malaysians. The hyperbole of this charge (Evans' "regret" 
70 DerDerian, J. and Shapiro, M. (1989) InternationaV!ntertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of 
World Politics. Lexington Books: Lexington, Massachusetts. p.x. 
71 See, for instance, Barker, G. (1991) "Evans Turns Values to Vices in the Attempt to Appease 
Mahathir" The Age July 25. Parkinson, T. (1991) "Gareth's Malaise" The Weekend Australian. 3-4 
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becomes grovelling) and the incredulous question that accompanied it (How could 
Australia possibly apologise to the Malaysians?) - at the same time that Australia's 
sycophantic behaviour towards its Great and Powerful friends went unnoted - was 
infused with Cold War themes of the past. For his part, Foreign Minister Evans' 
contribution to the debate was limited to a strident denial that he had grovelled and used 
the "language of apology". 
While the realist terms of this debate privileged geopolitical space as the terrain on which 
the Embassy dispute took place (hence, the focus on the territorial state and national 
interest), the conflict spilled out of conventional geopolitical boundaries. This has 
highlighted the paralysis of contemporary policy-makers in comprehending the textual 
and cultural dimension of global politics. In this sense, the dispute over Embassy became 
a destabilising event - a moment of aporia - in which the conventional categories of 
foreign policy lost their explanatory power. 
ODD 
This chapter has examined recent attempts to reassert traditional geopolitical boundaries. 
It has shown how those attempts faltered with the crisis of Western geopolitics after the 
Vietnam War in which the dominant binary oppositions of the Cold War began to lose 
their signifying power. In an emerging decentred and postmodern world, contemporary 
policy-makers have experienced a general sense of drift and events out of control. In 
response, they have deployed a combination of fragmented strategies and practices 
designed to stave off crisis by reimposing a sense of order and identity onto the space of 
"international politics". As we have seen in this chapter, this attempt to reimpose 
traditional boundaries has taken the form of a militaristic security posture. While this 
realist orientation has been the major dimension of Australia's contemporary defence and 
security policies, in the areas of diplomacy and foreign policy, policy-makers have 
pursued a liberal institutionalist agenda designed to economically engage with the region, 
the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Contemporary Foreign Policy II: Globalisation, 
Liberalism and the Pacific Century. 
The Asia-Pacific is our future. We are at a great moment in our history. 1 
Our future lies, inevitably, in Australia becoming more and more closely integrated into the 
region of which we are geographically so inescapably a part.2 
In previous chapters, I mapped the larger discursive context of foreign policy after the 
Vietnam War. I argued that, with the breakdown of Cold War understandings, 
contemporary Australian foreign policy has been characterised by a crisis of 
representation. Thus, we saw in Chapter 4 how the capitalist transformation of East and 
Southeast Asia has overturned existing conceptions of global political space consisting of 
a Euro-American Centre and a non-Western periphery. That effectively displaced the 
traditional framing of "the West" as the sovereign locus of Australian identity. 
In response to these transformations, policy-makers have sought to reterritorialise global 
political space and to reassert the territorial cartographies of foreign policy discourse. 
Hence, in espousing conventional military conceptions of security, contemporary defence 
planners have attempted to reassert rigid Cold War boundaries between us and them, self 
and other, West and East and Australia and the region. As we have seen, however, these 
representations can no longer be secured in the same uncontested and unproblematic way 
that was once possible. The emergence of Japan and the Asian NICs to economic power, 
the decolonisation of Asia and the general regional challenge to Western dominance in 
recent years have disrupted traditional foreign policy understandings which consigned the 
Asia-Pacific region to a space of otherness. I have characterised this as the postmodem 
condition of Australian foreign policy. 
While Australian defence planners have pursued a violent and inadequate attempt to 
renew the realist practices of statecraft, recent policy initiatives of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade have centred on a liberal agenda of free trade. This has centred 
on an activist economic diplomacy designed to integrate Australia more fully into the 
growing economies of the region. The main focus of this chapter is on these liberal 
policies of regional economic engagement. I argue that, by pursuing a liberal free trade 
agenda, contemporary foreign policy-makers have attempted to fashion a new 
1 Gerry Hand, Former Minister in the Labor Government cited in Guardian Weekly 7 March 1993. p.16. 
2 Evans, G. (1988) "Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region" Australia Foreign Affairs Record 59 (10): 
p.407. 
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mythological basis for state identity in Australia in response to the various challenges to 
Cold War thinking. That has involved a shifting definition of region in which the moral, 
cultural and cartographic boundaries of the region have expanded. The region is no 
longer represented as an unstable and dangerous "Southeast Asian" other, but rather a 
dynamic grouping of economies located on the "Pacific Rim". Contemporary policy-
makers have effectively reversed Australia's positioning vis-a-vis the region- in the late 
20th century imagination of Australian foreign policy, "the region" no longer inhabits the 
space of an alien dangerous "outside" but rather is identified in terms of Australia's own 
identity. 
This identification of Australia with the Asia-Pacific has been understood as a 
fundamental break with the past in that it has heralded an "extensive repositioning [and] 
fundamental rethinking about our place in the world".3 Such claims, however, implying 
as they do that Australians have only recently "discovered" Asia, appear disingenuous 
and partisan against the background of a more nuanced historical understanding. As I 
have shown throughout this thesis, White Australia has grappled with its "Asian" location 
since settlement, while cultural exchanges between the people of Asian societies and 
Australia have taken place for hundreds of years. Furthermore, to imply that prevailing 
policies of regional engagement are a novel development is to deny one of the most 
obvious realities of post-War Australian society: namely, that post-war economic growth 
was sustained by trade with Asian countries, particularly the insatiable demand for 
Australian primary products in Japan. 
This chapter rejects such inflated claims about Australia's contemporary regional 
engagement. It argues that while the emergence of the Asian NICs to the status of 
economic miracles has effectively overturned existing cartographies, policy-makers 
continue to imagine "the region" through the conventional liberal and realist lenses of the 
Western IR. Thus, while a realist view of the region persists in Australian defence 
planning, contemporary foreign policy has been characterised by a liberal discourse 
preoccupied with the "rise of Asia-Pacific economies" and the possibilities for regional 
engagement that flow from this. Coupled with contemporary realist defence policies, 
therefore, regional engagement represents a reproduction of the traditional analytics of 
foreign policy. Such continuities have been exemplified in the narrow strategic and trade 
interests that continue to drive regional policy. 
In fleshing out these arguments, I turn to a discussion below of the ways in which 
contemporary regional diplomacy has been framed via a larger narrative on the rise of the 
3 Evans, G. (1995) "Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass" Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 49 (1): p.ll3. Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign 
Relations: In the World of the 1990s. Second Edition. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne. p.30. For 
similar claims see also Tweedie, S. (1994) Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993. University 
of New South Wales Press: Sydney and Bell, C. (1994) Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign 
Policy Third Edition. Allen and Unwin: Canberra. 
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Pacific Century. As in the earlier parts of this work, my aim is to relate Australia's 
contemporary policy framework to the broader stories and discourses that sustain and 
lend coherence to modern political life. In doing so, I examine how recent governments 
have sought to refashion Australian identity in terms of this narrative. Here we shall how 
the forces of postmodernism and global capitalist development have given rise to new 
regional and global cartographies and new kinds of discourse. Far from pursuing new 
policy directions, however, contemporary diplomats and policy-makers have adopted a 
free trade agenda as narrowly-based as Cold War policies. In reducing regional 
engagement to this narrow geoeconomic agenda, I argue that recent Australian 
governments have passed up the opportunity to pursue a more far-reaching engagement 
with the diverse cultures and peoples of Asia and the Pacific. The final part of this 
chapter discusses the concrete implications of this through an examination of the 
multilateral activist diplomacy that policy-makers have deployed in recent years as a 
strategy of securing increased market share in a globalising economy. 
Celebrating the Pacific Century 
The Asia-Pacific region has become a central category in recent academic and popular 
discourse. Debates in geography, economics, IR and development studies have all 
heralded the economic miracle of the region and the so-called dawning of the "Pacific 
Century".4 Signalling a post-Cold War teleology, recent claims about the ''Pacific 
Century" have effectively come to replace the notion of an American Century central to 
Cold War thinking. Here political leaders and policy-academics have latched onto the so-
called regional economic miracle to reassert faith in what Jurgen Habermas has called 
"the incomplete project of modernity". 5 In response to the challenges of postmodernity 
(see Chapter 4 ), contemporary policy-makers have sought to restore the modernising 
project. With the demise of "the West" as the centre of History and identity, the grand 
narratives of progress that characterised Enlightenment thought have been renewed in 
post-Cold War discourse in the form of celebrating "the Pacific Century". This 
celebration has heralded the end of Western global primacy and the emergence of Pacific 
countries to the ranks of advanced capitalist states. In fact, the imagery of Asia-Pacific 
regionalism is replete with this kind of Atlantic-to-Pacific, Europe-to-Asia, West-to-East 
metaphor. According to an article in The Economist, for instance, "about fifty-odd 
4 Exemplary here is Linder, S.B. (1986) The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of 
Asian-Pacific Dynamism. Stanford University Press: Stanford. Bergsten, C.F. and Noland M. (eds.) 
(1993) Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System. Institute for International Economics: 
Washington D.C. Drysdale, P. (1988) International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia 
and the Pacific. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. Garnaut, R. and Drysdale, P. (eds.) (1994) Asia-Pacific 
Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations. Harper Educational Publishers: Pymble, 
NSW. Kirby, K. (1983) Towards the Pacific Century: Economic Development in the Pacific Basin. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit: London. Palmer, N. (1991) The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific. 
Lexington Books: Lexington, Mass. Abegglen, J.C. (1994) Sea Change: Pacific Asia as the New World 
Industrial Center. Free Press: New York. 
5 Habermas, J. (1985) "Modernity: An Incomplete Project" in H. Foster (ed.) Postmodern Culture. Plut~ 
Press: London. 
Liberal Foreign Policy in the 1990s 108 
countries now grouped around the Pacific Ocean ... [have taken] the torch of leadership 
from those hitherto grouped around the Atlantic". 6 Drawing on a similar trope, the 
authors of a best-selling book entitled Megatrends 2000 have claimed that, "the Pacific 
Rim is emerging like a dynamic young America but on a much grander scale".7 
Such representations have neither gone uncontested, nor are they undifferentiated. In 
fact, rather than representing a stable and unproblematic identity, the "Asia-Pacific" has 
become a site of contestation and appropriation. In promoting varying accounts of the 
region's rapid economic growth, modernising elites have sought to claim the region in 
line with their own political and commercial agendas. This is clear in the differences 
between an emerging Asianist discourse (discussed in the previous chapter) and a free-
market explanation of the rise of the Asian NICs. While the former relates the growth of 
East Asian economies to the apparent communitarian values of Asian culture, the latter 
understands the economic development of the region in terms of the well worn path of 
capitalist industrialisation. 8 These explanations reflect a broader struggle over meaning 
among policy and commercial elites across the Pacific who have sought to insert the 
region into contending discourses in order to advance their own interests. 
For Australian policy-makers, the region's economic growth has represented an 
affirmation of the free market model. This has been exemplified in Ross Garnaut's official 
report Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy which explained the economic 
success of Northeast Asia in terms of liberalised free trade and the "major role of the 
market in the allocation of goods, services and productive resources".9 As a model of free 
market progress, Gamaut invoked the rise of Northeast Asia as an example of the 
efficacy of modem technology and science. Not surprisingly, futurologists such as Alvin 
Toffler and John Naisbitt have been at the forefront of promoting a similar image of Asia-
6 The Economist 18 July 1987: p.22. 
7 Naisbitt, J. and Aberdene, P. (1990) Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s. Morrow: 
New York. p.178. 
8 For discussions of this see Zak:aria, Fareed (1994) "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan 
Yew" Foreign Affairs 73 (2): 109-126. Berger, P. and Hsin-Huang Micheal Hsioa (eds) (1988) In Search 
of an East Asian Development Model. Transaction Books: New Brunswick, NJ. For an account that 
attempts to represent the apparently culture based success of East Asian economies specifically in terms 
of Confucianism see Macfaquhar, R. (1980) "The post-Confucian Challenge" The Economist 9 February: 
p.67. For critical discussions of neo-Asianist discourse See Ang, I. and Stratton, J. (1995) "The 
Singaporean Way of Multiculturalism: Western Concepts/Asian Cultures" Sojourn 10 (1): pp.65-89 and 
Wright-Neville, D. (1995) "The Politics of Pan Asianism: Culture, Capitalism and Diplomacy in East 
Asia" Pacifica Review 7 (1): pp.1-26. For "the free market" explanation of East Asian growth see 
Garnaut, R. (1990) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy: Report to the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. For a 
similar "free market" account, but one that takes the role of the state more seriously, see World Bank 
(1992) East Asian Miracles: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford University Press: Oxford. For 
accounts that explain East Asian growth largely in terms of the state see Haggard, S. (1990) Pathways 
from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries. Cornell University 
Press: Cornell. Johnson, C. (1982) MIT! and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford University Press: Stanford. 
9 Garnaut, R. ( 1990) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy p.4. 
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Pacific development as reinvigorating our faith in the promise of modernity and its 
teleologies of human reason and progress. Toffler has taken on cult status in places like 
Malaysia and China where in 1983 as a personal guest of the Chinese Premier, lectured to 
the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in which, according to one 
participant, "he was listened to as if he were an oracle".10 
In promoting this neoliberal discourse of free market economics, contemporary policy-
makers have framed the Asia-Pacific via a broader post-Cold War remapping following 
the unravelling of traditional Western geopolitics. The most salient feature of this 
emerging cartography has been the global expansion of capitalism. Thus, by defining the 
region in terms of the expansive boundaries of the "Asia-Pacific" - a definition that 
covers nearly 50% of the world's surface- contemporary policy-makers have promoted 
a more fluid imaginary of flows and capital movements than Cold War discourse. Based 
upon the "deterritorialising power" of the Pacific Ocean whose "circumference is 
everywhere and centre nowhere", the "Asia-Pacific" implies a despatialised imagination of 
open markets and global capital. 11 
In remapping the region in these terms, policy-makers have responded to an emerging 
regional economy in which multiple centres of capital accumulation and economic control 
are based in the region's major metropoles, from Tokyo to Los Angeles, Singapore to 
Hong Kong, and Sydney to Bangkok. No longer cohering around the simple 
centre/periphery axis of Cold War geopolitics, the decentred nature of this regional 
political economy has been characterised by a series of complex, overlapping sub-
contracting networks that run throughout the region in a chain-like fashion. 12 Emanating 
from Tokyo rather than Europe or North America, the expansion of these transnational 
networks was initially fuelled by the intemationalisation of the Japanese economy from 
the 1970s. That process involved Japanese firms relocating production sites to South 
Korea and Taiwan in an attempt to escape rising domestic costs by exploiting favourable 
wage differentials in East Asian countries. 13 This move was soon replicated by Taiwanese 
and South Korean corporations which relocated production off-shore to further cut costs. 
That precipitated a massive extension of multilateral subcontracting networks throughout 
10 Woodside, A. (1993) "The Asia-Pacific Idea as a Mobilization Myth" in Dirlik, A. (ed.) What's in a 
Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. Tsuruoka, 
D. (1994) "Future Tense: Alvin Toffler Peruses a Fast-Changing Asia" Far Eastern Economic Review 
May 12: p.60. 
11 Dirlik, A. and Wilson, R. (1994) "Introduction: Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production" 
Boundary 2 (21) (1): p.2. 
12 See, Palat, R.A. (1993) "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of the Pacific-Asia" in R.A. Palat 
(ed.) Pacific Asia and the Future of the World-System. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut. Geriffi, 
G. (1993) "International Subcontracting and Global Capitalism: Reshaping the Pacific Rim" in R.A. 
Palat (ed.) Pacific Asia and the Future of the World-System. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut 
Doner, R. (1993) "Japanese Foreign Investment and the Creation of a Pacific Asian Region" in J.A. 
Frankel and M.Kahler (eds.) Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia. The 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
13 Palat, R.A. (1993) "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of the Pacific-Asia" p.12-13. 
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East and Southeast Asia, particularly into the special economic zones set up along coastal 
China.14 
This movement of capital has represented a transnational regionalising strategy in which 
East Asian and, to a lesser extent, American multinational corporations have used East 
and Southeast Asian countries as an export platform to maintain global competitiveness. 
In promoting rapid economic growth through export-oriented development strategies, 
East Asian states have competed with one another to attract foreign investment by 
providing the low-wage, high-profit conditions conducive to the relocation of 
transnational production. 15 This new international division of labour has facilitated a shift 
in global production from Western industrialised countries to East and Southeast Asia. It 
has also led an emerging transformation in the structure of production itself to a post-
Fordist system of industrial organisation.16 
Viewed in these wide-ranging terms, current policy debates on the Pacific century 
represent less a neutral, objective explanation of regional economic growth than they are 
a product of the broader imaginative cartography that sustains contemporary globalising 
forces. The sheer scope and extent of such globalising forces, identified by Susan Strange 
with an emerging "business civilisation" 17, has represented a pervasive penetration of 
capital into all comers of the globe and the Unconscious. As Steven Gill has noted, 
"capitalism is once again spreading as the predominant form of socio-economic 
organisation, not only across states, but also within states as marketisation and 
commoditisation deepens its social and geographical reach" .18 The production of space 
known as the "Asia-Pacific" is symptomatic of the global expansion of capitalism as "the 
region" has become reduced to an homogenised zone of transnational capital flows and 
economic exchange.19 Thus, characterised by the World Bank as a "miracle economy" 20, 
the Asia-Pacific region has become reified by modernising elites who seek to fashion the 
region in their own image and universalise their own interests. 
In reducing the region to such narrow geoeconomic images, recent policy debates have 
been characterised by a shift from the geopolitics of the Cold War to the geoeconomics 
14 Ibid. p.13. 
15 See Caporaso, J.A. (ed.) (1987) A Changing International Division of Labour. Lynne Rienner: 
Boulder. 
16 Bernard, M. (1994) "Post-Fordism, Transnational Production and the Changing Global Political 
Economy" in R. Stubbs and D. Underhill (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. 
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Hampshire. Itoh, M. (1992) "Japan in the New World Order" The Socialist 
Register 1992: pp.197-211. 
17 Strange, S. (1990) "The Name of the Game" in N.Rizopoulos (ed.) Sea-Changes: American Foreign 
Policy in a World Transformed. Council on Foreign Relations: New York. p.260. 
18 Gill, S. (1993) "Gramsci and Global Politics: Towards a Post-Hegemonic Research Agenda" inS. Gill 
(ed.) Historical Materialism, Gramsci and International Relations. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. p.6 
19 Dirlik, A. and Wilson, R. (1994) "Introduction: Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production" pp.1-14. 
20 World Bank (1993) East Asian Miracles: Economic Growth and Public Policy. 
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of transnational capitalism and industrial competitiveness. As we have seen in the 
foregoing chapters, during the period of European colonialism, the region became 
conceptualised as the "Far East", a strictly geopolitical labelling that denoted the 
positioning of the region on the periphery and the primacy of Europe as Centre. During 
the Cold War, Western policy-makers divided the region into "Southeast Asia", "East 
Asia", "South Asia" and the "Southwest Pacific". Southeast Asia became reduced here to 
a Cold War battlefield in which Asia's falling dominos were seen as vulnerable to 
communist expansionism. 
With the shift from Cold War geopolitics to contemporary geoeconomics, policy-makers 
have reversed the representations of the region produced by their Cold War predecessors. 
Far from representing a dangerous unstable other, the region now connotes a 
transnational space linking both sides of the Pacific. Connecting the growing economies 
of East Asia and the US, "the Asia-Pacific" exemplifies the incorporating logic of global 
capitalism and its imaginative geography of inclusivity and oneness. The aim of this liberal 
discourse and its dominant geography is domestication. At stake in the celebration of the 
Pacific century, accordingly, is the projection of the constitutive features of identity onto 
a space labelled "the region". The Asia-Pacific acts as a mirror as modernity reinvents 
itself in the form of an economic miracle, holding out the promise that everything will be 
all right against the background of flux, crisis and transformation. "Development" not 
underdevelopment, "modernisation" not "backwardness", are the dominant processes that 
characterise "the region" today. In representing the region through such geoeconomic 
images, contemporary policy-makers have adopted equally reductionist and narrowly-
conceived understandings as those espoused in Cold War thinking. In so doing, they 
merely replaced the strategic reductionism of the Cold War with a brand of post-Cold 
War economic reductionism. 
From the geopolitics of high modernity to the geoeconomics of postmodernity, from 
regional other to regional self and from Cold War bipolarity to the deterritorialised 
imagination of transnational liberalism - these shifts have all amounted to a post-Cold 
War reframing of foreign policy. This has represented a response to the challenges that 
have destabilised and disrupted the dominant regional and global cartographies of 
Western geopolitics. State identity is no longer secured through the rigidly demarcated 
boundaries of national economies but rather revolves around multiple niche markets. 21 
The erosion of state's boundaries is part of a more pervasive condition of contemporary 
political life that has entailed the decentring of political authority. Giving rise to new 
topographies, the forces of globalisation and postmodernism are reconstructing the world 
order as we experience it. 22 Against this background, new stories and mythologies have 
been invented and old narratives reworked and renewed in order to continue to do 
business, to mobilise capital, to elicit loyalty to the state - in short, to sustain the 
21 Berry, C. (1994) A Bit on the Side: East-West Topographies of Desire. emPress: Sydney. p.11. 
22 Ibid. 
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dominant identities of global capitalism and statecraft that resonate in contemporary life. 
It is within this broader context that the Pacific century has been celebrated and, in turn, 
that the erasures and reconstructions of contemporary foreign policy can be situated. 
Australia in the Pacific Century: Neoliberalism and the Ambiguous Reframing of Identity 
The end of the Cold War and the crisis of Western geopolitics has unhinged the dominant 
moorings of Australian identity in Anglo-Saxon culture. In the words of one scholar, 
Australia has become a "continent adrift".23 This unhinging of Australian identity has not 
only signalled the end of certitude of Cold War thinking but has also led to a fundamental 
ambiguity at the heart of contemporary foreign policy - an ambiguity relating to the 
postmodem condition of contemporary social life. Thus, while policy-makers have 
continued to cling to the Western Alliance, they have also sought refocus Australia's 
foreign policy toward the region. Thus, while ritual incantations continue to reverberate 
about "the Western community", powerful forces are pulling the state away from these 
traditional moorings. As one writer pointed out in the late 1980s, a shift from West to 
East has taken place in which: 
of the 25 largest banks in the world 17 are now Japanese, the first US bank is 
ranked 28th. The Tokyo stock exchange- once one-fifth the size of its New 
York counterpart is now the equal of New York, London, Frankfurt, Paris and 
the Toronto Stock Exchange put together.24 
This shift has amplified the anxiety about place that has long animated Australian thinking 
about international affairs. The sense of being at "home" in the region has become an 
urgent theme of contemporary foreign policy, as diplomats and policy-makers seek to 
come to terms with the shifting locus of power in global politics. Thus, driven by a deep-
seated sense of isolation, contemporary policy-makers have insisted that Australia must 
become a part of the region amidst fears of being left out of an emerging power bloc with 
the regionalisation of the global economy. These anxieties are not unconnected to the 
contradictory nature of the times. The globalising forces which have dominated 
contemporary life have unleashed forces of both universalisation and fragmentation.25 
While centrifugal processes are experienced as a loss of centre and a fragmentation of 
identity, globalisation entails the universalisation of a capitalist consumer culture. 
How, then, against this backdrop of great flux and transformation, have the boundaries of 
the modem Australian state been reproduced and secured? How, that is, have policy-
makers reconstituted Australian identity in terms of the prevailing geopolitical, 
23 Dalby, S. (1996) "Continent Adrift?: Dissident Security Discourse and the Australian Geopolitical 
Imagination" Australian Journal of International Affairs 50 (1): pp.59-75. 
24 McCormack, G. (1989) "Pacific Dreamtime and Japan's New Millenarianism" Australian Outlook 43 
(2): p.65. 
25 Luke, T.W. (1993) "Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-reading Realism in the 
New World Order" Alternatives 18 (2): pp.229-258. Rosenau, J. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics: A 
Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
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geoeconomic and geocultural realignments of global politics in the late 20th Century? 
And, what are the new totalising narratives and discourses that serve to sustain such 
fundamental realignments? 
As I have indicated above, the dominant response by Australian policy-makers to these 
challenges has been to seek to engage more fully with the Asia-Pacific region.26 
Signalling a reformulation of the spatial imaginary of Australian diplomacy, policy-makers 
now appropriate the region as "self', by increasingly defining Australia's place in the 
world as being an Asia-Pacific nation?7 This "repositioning" of Australia in the world 
seeks to attach Australian trade prospects to the rapidly growing economies of East Asia 
and, to a lesser extent, the ASEAN countries. 
In seeking to achieve this objective, contemporary governments have vigorously pursued 
a reformist agenda of domestic economic restructuring in Australia. That has centred on 
"micro-economic reform" aimed at "opening" the economy to international capital and 
trade through floating the dollar, deregulation, the lifting of restrictions on foreign capital 
and the lowering of protection.28 This has represented a general shift in policy away from 
the protectionist practices of the past to a neoliberal agenda of "internationalising" society 
and state in Australia in an effort to integrate more fully into an emerging global 
economy.29 
This was exemplified in the early 1990s with the "Garnaut Report"30 which explicitly 
linked, what Garnaut referred to as, "the economic dynamism of Northeast Asia" with the 
need for "domestic reform" of the Australian economy. In particular, Garnaut drew on 
the stark imagery of economic decline in which, to use Paul Keating's evocative turn of 
phrase, Australia was in danger of becoming a "Banana Republic".31 Juxtaposed against 
such dire forecasts, the Asian NICs were looked upon as a possible economic saviour as 
26 For an explicit statement of this see Evans, G. (1989) "Australia and the Pacific Century" The Monthly 
Record October: pp.564-568. 
27 Evans, G. (1995) "Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific" p.l12. 
28 See Leaver, R. (1995) "The Evolution of an Asia-Pacific Policy Community in Australia" The Pacific 
Review 8 (1): p.183 and Viviani, N. (1990) "Foreign Economic Policy" in C. Jennett and R. G. Stewart 
(eds.) Hawke and Australian Public Policy: Consensus and Restructuring. Macmillan, South Melbourne. 
29 Viviani, N. (1990) "Foreign Economic Policy" in C. Jennett and R. G. Stewart (eds.) Hawke and 
Australian Public Policy: Consensus and Restructuring. Macmillan: South Melbourne. 
30 Garnaut, R. (1990) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy. There is a plethora of government 
publications now coming out linking the economic rise of the region with the need for 
internationalisation and domestic reform in Australia. One recent report within this emerging genre is 
Karpin, D. (1995) Enterprising Nation: Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the 
Asia-Pacific Century. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. See also Inside Asia: 
Australian Companies Becoming Local Players. Australian Government Publishing Service. (Canberra, 
1995) 
31 Leaver, R. (1995) "The Evolution of an Asia-Pacific Policy Community in Australia" The Pacific 
Review 8 (1): p.182. 
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a recession-hit Australia found itself in the midst of "a regional sea of hyper-growth".32 
The need to integrate with the booming economies of the region became related to 
Australia's tenuous survival in the modem world economy. That linkage led to the 
emergence of a new threat scenario in foreign policy centring on the theme of economic 
marginalisation which has been invoked by Gamaut and others to push through a 
neoliberal agenda of unilateral trade liberalisation. Drawing on this theme of economic 
marginalisation, the Garnaut Report argued that in line with the: 
shift in the world's economic centre of gravity towards East Asia ... Australia 
needs to press ahead with trade liberalisation, towards the abolition of all 
official restrictions in trade imposed at Australia's borders by the end of the 
century". 33 
In proposing as much, Gamaut was essentially issuing a challenge to the Government to 
commit itself to a "drastic" program of micro-economic reform and a radical neoliberal 
course of unilateral tariff reductions. 34 In continuing to argue this case throughout the 
1990s, Garnaut has promoted an almost evangelistic view of the benefits of "the market" 
while all but ignoring the potential costs of unilaterally reducing tariffs, particularly the 
potential loss in both domestic employment and diplomatic leverage in trade 
negotiations. 35 I relying upon an orthodox free market account, Garnaut explained East 
Asia's economic success in terms of high saving rates, high levels of investment and 
significant productivity growth. That explanation, however, has fundamentally 
misrepresented the nature of recent development in the Asia-Pacific where the state has 
played a crucial role in high-speed export-oriented industrialisation (EOI).36 As indicated 
above, the pursuit of such rapid-growth EOI polices has been undergirded by a particular 
geopolitical order based upon the repressive rule of regional state elites which has 
provided the conditions conducive to the transnational relocation of capital. I address the 
implications of this in more detail in the following chapter. Suffice to say here, in 
adopting a narrow free market model, Australian policy-makers have ignored the 
different developmental experiences of countries like Indonesia where "organic" notions 
of community and statehood have prevailed. 37 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gamaut, R. (1990) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy p.S. 
34 See Matthews, T. and Ravenhill, J. (1991) "Australia's Economic Malaise: A Northeast Asian 
Solution?" The Pacific Review 4 (1): p. 47. 
35 For a critique of the Gamaut Report on these grounds see Matthews, T. and Ravenhill, J. (1991) "The 
Economic Challenge: Is Unilateral Free Trade the Correct Response?" in J.L. Richardson (ed.) Northeast 
Asian Challenge: Debating the Garnaut Report. Department of International Relations Research School 
of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University: Canberra. 
36 Johnson, C. (1982) MIT! and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford University Press: Stanford. Amsden, A. 
(1990) Asia's Next Giant: Late Industrialization in Korea. Oxford University Press: New York. Wade, R. 
(1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
37 See, for example, Reeve, D. (1985) Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System Oxford 
University Press: Singapore. 
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The neoliberal agenda advanced by Garnaut has not only shaped domestic economic 
policy but has also dominated contemporary foreign policy. That is clear in the main 
objective of contemporary diplomacy which has centred on securing export markets for 
Australian goods in an increasingly competitive global economy. The primacy of trade 
goals in contemporary foreign policy was facilitated by the amalgamation of the 
Departments of Trade and Foreign Affairs in 1987. Austrade was also relocated into the 
new amalgamated department and its activities were integrated into Australian diplomatic 
missions abroad. According to Grant and Evans, this restructuring has enhanced "[o]ur 
capacity to target and penetrate export markets" as one of the main objectives of 
Austrade has been to develop an export culture among Australian business. 38 According 
to prevailing orthodoxy, this will make Australian business more competitive and 
integrate Australia economically into the region. This has been part of the broader 
restructuring of the Australian state in which the traditional welfare structures of the 
social democratic state have been dismantled in the last decade. In the view of many 
scholars, that has made Australia the quintessential neoliberal state. 39 Indeed, the recent 
restructuring of Australia's diplomatic machinery can be seen as representing a broader 
corporatisation of contemporary foreign policy. 
Preoccupied with this search for export markets in Asia, foreign policy has become 
rationalised in terms of the utilitarian principle of neoliberal doctrine, in which, as Clive 
Hamilton has suggested, "a thing is right if the net economic benefits are positive, and 
wrong if they are not". 40 Neoliberalism presupposes a static essentialised human nature in 
which people become reduced to utility and profit maximisers who respond rationally and 
efficiently to correct market signals.41 This assumption leads to the belief that unfettered 
markets will produce rational behaviour which reflect market signals based on principles 
of scarcity and choice.42 In their preoccupation with this narrow idealised conception of 
the market, contemporary policy-makers have adopted understandings of the region 
abstracted from the everyday social relations of peoples across the Pacific. This has 
meant that objectives other than market integration such as humanitarianism have been 
subordinated to trade-based interests or what Gareth Evans has explained as "the 
38 Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign Relations p.40. 
39 Viviani, N. (1990) "Foreign Economic Policy". Kaptein, E. (1993) "Neo-Liberalism and the 
Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia" in H. Overbeek (ed.) Restructuring Hegemony in the Global 
Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Liberalism in the 1980s. Routledge: London. For a well-
researched account of such changes within the state see Pusey, M. (1991) Economic Rationalism in 
Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes its Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
40 Hamilton, C. (1995) "Virus Hits the Ethics of Foreign Relations" The Canberra Times 9 January: p.9. 
41 Brohman, J. (1995) "Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From 
Modernisation to Neoliberalism" Third World Quarterly 16 (1): p.126. 
42 Ibid. 
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economic imperative driving Australian policy".43 This has been clear in Australia's 
regional human rights diplomacy in which successive governments have pursued a softly-
softly approach to gross human rights throughout the region in order to protect 
commercial interests. 44 
These broader restructuring processes have not been unique to Australia. In fact. they 
have had a major impact on the very nature of international relations. Thus. the traditional 
struggle over territory waged during the Cold War has been transformed into a focus on 
competition over market share in the global economy.45 With the emergence of this 
global economy, promoting export competitiveness has become a crucial function of the 
modem state as governments have sought to maintain legitimacy by staving off crisis and 
keeping national incomes rising. Industrial policy has in this way become a primary 
component of foreign policy.46 Robert Cox has made the argument well: 
Since the mid-70s demise of Bretton Woods, a new doctrine has achieved 
preeminence: states must become the instruments for adjusting national 
economic activities to the exigencies of the global economy - states are 
becoming transmission belts from the global into the national economic 
spheres. Adjustment to global competitiveness is the new categorical 
imperative. 47 
These changes have engendered what Cox has termed the "internationalisation" of the 
state in which certain "outward-looking" state agencies have become pre-eminent.48 More 
traditional ministries of national capitalism built up in the context of national corporatism 
have been subordinated to these new internationalised departments which have developed 
to adjust domestic economic interests and political structures to the global economy . 
While Cox is concerned with the general neoliberal trend which has occurred across the 
globe recently, his argument fits the specific restructuring of the Australian state in the 
1980s and 1990s. In particular, the merging of the Departments of Trade and Foreign 
Affairs exemplifies Cox's notion of the "intemationalisation" of the state in which the 
formulation of foreign policy has become tied to trading interests and securing global 
market share. 49 
43 Hamilton, C. (1995) "Virus His the Ethics of Foreign Relations" p.9. Camilleri, J. (1989) "The 
Emerging Human Rights Agenda: Australia's Response" Interdisciplinary Peace Research. 1 (1): p.97, 
113. Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign Relations p.128. 
44 Camilleri, J. (1989) "The Emerging Human Rights Agenda" p.97. For an explicit statement of this 
from one of Australia's leading former diplomats see Woolcott, R. (1995) "The Perils of Freedom" The 
weekend Australian April 22-23: p.24. 
45 Strange, S. (1990) "The Name of the Game" p.238. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Cox, R. (1993) "Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe" in S. Gill (ed.) 
Historical Materialism, Gramsci and International Relations. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
p.260 italics added. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Pusey, M. (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra. 
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Against this background of global restructuring, contemporary state elites have sought to 
redefme their role amidst the unravelling of territoriality as the primary organising 
principle of IR in the modem period. This has been exemplified in the rise of regionalism 
recently. Thus, driven by the process of intemationalisation, states have cooperated 
within broader regional free trade organisations to create integrated economic spaces 
within which global capitalism can flourish, particularly, in facilitating flows of capital and 
technology across national boundaries. While that has represented a breakdown in the 
traditional territorial boundaries of the state, however, regionalism does not signal the 
end of state sovereignty. Rather, what we are witnessing today is the de-coupling of 
sovereignty from territoriality50 in which state elites have engaged in transnational 
cooperation through regional arrangements as a way of renewing, rather than 
relinquishing, sovereign authority. That has placed state interests at the centre of current 
transformations. As G. John Ikenberry has noted, the building of supranational regional 
bodies amounts to a pooling of sovereignty which may actually create more (not less) 
state control over trade and other flows. 51 
This form of state-directed regionalism has been particularly prevalent in the Asia-Pacific 
where attempts to institutionalise a binding regime of regional trading arrangements such 
as in Europe have been resisted and where states have been central to developing 
regionalist structures. In this sense, the growth of regionalism can been understood in 
terms of a larger institutionalist agenda. This has involved growing networks of state 
elites, international institutions and transnational capital which have developed emerging 
institutional mechanisms designed to regulate and control the deterritorialising world 
economy. 52 Representing a response to the powerful deterritorialising forces unleashed by 
globalisation, this liberal institutionalist agenda has engendered the formulation of new 
spatial practices that both police and regulate global capitalism and subject populations 
to the discipline of market forces. 53 Underpinned by this (re)ordering impulse, 
"Australia's engagement with the Asia-Pacific" has combined a neoliberal free trade 
agenda with an activist multilateral regional diplomacy. By pursuing this multilateral 
diplomacy, policy-makers have sought to institutionalise free trade structures across the 
Pacific in order to facilitate and regulate state sanctioned flows of capital and technology. 
In the remaining part of this chapter, I discuss in more detail this activist multilateral 
regional diplomacy and its broader reordering agenda. I argue that this diplomacy 
continues to promote dominant trade and strategic relations while marginalising large 
50 Agnew, J. and Corbridge, S. (1995) Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Economy. Routledge: London. p.195. 
51 Ikenberry, G. John (1995) "Funk de Siecle: Impasses of Western Industrial Society at the Century's 
End" Millennium 24 (1): p.124. 
52 Agnew, J. and Corbridge, S. (1995) Mastering Space p.195. 
53 Ibid. p.207. Gill, S. (1992) "The Emerging World Order and European Change: The Political 
Economy of European Union" The Socialist Register 1992: pp.157-196. 
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sections of people and groups who remain outside of the dominant circuits of power 
across the Pacific. 
Liberal Institutionalism and Australia's Regionalist Diplomacy 
The central theme of Australian foreign policy recently has been an activist 
"middlepower'' regionalist diplomacy. Former foreign minister Gareth Evans has been the 
most articulate advocate of this approach. He has argued that Australia is best served by 
a strategy of niche diplomacy aimed at strengthening multilateral trade and cooperative 
inter-state relations through coalitions with like-minded governments. For Evans, such a 
strategy is apposite for small and middle ranking countries like Australia which possess 
limited military capabilities and which require international adherence to "the rules of the 
game". By showing "intellectual leadership", middle powers such as Australia can 
buttress liberal international institutions against the forces of disorder and power politics 
and thus exercise a level of influence far beyond their capabilities. 
Through pursuing this diplomatic strategy, contemporary policy-makers have sought to 
develop a multilateral trading regime across the Pacific as a counter to the possibility of a 
resurgence of protectionist trade blocs. According to Evans, the development of trade 
blocs would be catastrophic for a heavily dependent trading country like Australia. In 
initiating multilateral trade reform, policy-makers have sought to free up international 
markets which, they argue, will increase the opportunities to develop export markets for 
Australian goods in the burgeoning economies of the Asia-Pacific. Hence, the regionalist 
strategy promoted by recent governments has been based upon the notion of "open 
regionalism" 54 - a non-discriminatory trading area consistent with the globalist 
guidelines of the newly-formed World Trade Organisation and designed explicitly as a 
mechanism to pre-empt any move toward regional trading blocs. Open regionalism has 
formed the basis for Australia's promotion of APEC which has been characterised by a 
broader neoliberal agenda of unilateral trade liberalisation, tariff reductions and trade 
facilitation. 
In adopting this free trade multilateral diplomacy, contemporary policy-makers have 
introduced an increasingly managerial and technocratic approach into Australian foreign 
policy recently. As a response to the "turbulence" and "disorder'' of post-Cold War 
politics, this technocratic foreign policy has been underpinned by the theme of 
geopolitical order and control. As Richard Leaver has pointed out, the desire expressed in 
Australia's (hyper)activist diplomacy to "shape the environment" and exercise 
"leadership" in order to "manage change" tends to map out in advance an agenda of 
mastery, control and regional hegemony.55 This (re)ordering impulse has been articulated 
54 The main proponent of "open regionalism" has been ANU economist Peter Drydale. See his (1991) 
Open Regionalism: A Key to East Asia's Economic Future? Pacific Economic Papers. No. 197, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University: Canberra. 
55 Leaver, R. (1991) '"The Shock of the New' and the Habits of the Past" in G. Fry (ed.) Australia's 
Regional Security. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.39. 
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in what Nancy Viviani has characterised as the "Grand Design" of Australia's multilateral 
diplomacy. 56 
In promoting this broader agenda of control, policy-makers have contributed to the 
prevailing image in the region of Australia as an anxious and overbearing proxy of the 
Western alliance. Thus, many policy-makers in the region have viewed Australia's recent 
promotion of a free trade agenda as a policy designed to benefit the richer economies of 
the region at the expense of developing countries. These elites have been less enthused 
about lowering industrial protection and other trade barriers central to the region's 
economic growth. As one Philippine scholar has bitterly noted, the idea of an Asia-Pacific 
community is "a baby whose putative parents are Japanese and American and whose mid-
wife is Australian".57 In pushing stridently for strict deadlines for liberalisation within 
APEC - in contrast to the preference for non-binding agreements by many Asian 
governments- Australian diplomacy has been seen as a surrogate for the United States 
and Japan and their attempts to integrate East Asian economies into a free trade regional 
economy dominated by American and Japanese interests. 58 
Australia's engagement policies have become characterised, accordingly, by a liberal 
instrumentalist view of ''cooperation" in which Australia's regional engagement has been 
constituted by a technical interest in trade and securing export markets. The Gamaut 
Report, for instance, called for Australians to "achieve mastery in Northeast Asian 
languages, economics, politics and other subjects".59 That appeal was framed within a 
broader argument about the need to develop a knowledge-base "to allow Australian 
enterprises to make the most of commercial opportunities" flowing from the economic 
growth of the region. 60 In this sense, regional engagement implies market access not 
cultural exchange, while restructuring denotes market integration, not a fundamental 
questioning of the assumptions that have generated Australian policy. This narrow 
agenda of regional engagement resonates with the traditional liberal image of the Asia-
Pacific as a huge untapped market for Australian exports. By adopting this cargo cult 
mentality, contemporary policy-makers have sought to "cash in" on the region's recent 
economic growth through integrating Australian economic interests East Asia That has 
involved an instrumentalist definition of cooperation in which policy objectives have 
become subordinated to an interest in control and economic gain. 
56 Viviani, N. (1990) "Foreign Economic Policy" p.391. 
57 Leviste, J.P. (ed.) (1986) The Pacific Lake: Philippines Perspectives on a Pacific Community. 
Philippine Council for Foreign Relations: Manila. p.88. 
58 See, for instance, Bello, W. (1995) Against the Mainstream: APEC and the Asia-Pacific. Arena: Hong 
Kong. 
59 Garnaut, R. (1990) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy p.7. The way this theme of "the 
need to know the region" has been tied into narrowly-based trading and strategic interests can also be 
discerned in a range of emerging Government publications urging Australians to get to know Asia. See 
for instance, Asia in Australia Council (1995) The Way to Go: Culture, Language and Australian 
Business in Asia. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. 
60 Garnaut, R. (1990) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy p.7. 
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These themes of control and economic self-interest are central to the "architectonic" 
objectives that have dominated Australia's APEC diplomacy. Through a form of 
institutionalised multilateralism, contemporary diplomats and policy-makers have sought 
to "fashion" a new "architecture" for the Asia-Pacific region in order to maintain a stable 
geopolitical order of market economies and territorial states across the Pacific. 61 
Preoccupied with this architectonic project, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) has recently engaged in a mapping exercise of "the East Asian Hemisphere" in 
which Australia was placed at the centre of "the region" around which East Asian and 
Southeast Asian countries revolved. 62 By producing such cartographic representations, 
DFAT has sought to imaginatively realign Australia's strategic and economic interests to 
the rising centres of power in the Asia-Pacific. That has amounted to an attempt by 
policy-makers to reterritorialise Australian identity within a broader regional order- i.e. 
to reanchor a "continent adrift" in terms of what Evans has called the "geometrical" or 
"geographical" reference point of the East Asian Hemisphere. 63 
It is via this multilateral regionalist diplomacy that the dominant security and trade 
agendas of foreign policy have converged. Hence, in their promotion of APEC, 
Australian policy-makers have sought not only to advance greater regional trade 
liberalisation but also to enhance Australian security interests through keeping the US 
engaged in the region. As Paul Keating has suggested, "APEC helps to lock the US 
economic and commercial interests in the region, which in turn helps to ensure US 
strategic engagement. It provides a framework to help contain or manage competition 
between China, Japan, and the US".64 By advancing this view of APEC, policy-makers 
have attempted to fashion APEC into a regulatory instrument for "managing" the 
realignment of regional relations in the post-Cold War era. For Australia, this has entailed 
reconciling the political and cultural disjunction between its major East Asian trading 
partners and its major strategic ally, the United States. Hence, policy-makers have 
recently promoted the view of APEC's role as "a bridge across the Pacific, counteracting 
the continuing tendency toward economic division between the US and Japan, and the 
US and China".65 Defined in these far-reaching terms, Australia's APEC diplomacy has 
61 Lawler, P. (1992) "The Good Citizen Australia" Asian Studies Review 16 (2): p.243. The use of the 
concept of "architecture" as the main defining metaphor of Asia-Pacific regionalism is common. See, for 
instance Harris, S. (1990) "Architecture for a New Era in Asia/Pacific" Pacific Research 3 (2): pp.8-9. 
Baker, J. A. (1991) "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community" Foreign Affairs 
70 (5): pp.1-18. Soloman, R.H. (1994) "Asian Architecture: The United States in the Asia-Pacific 
Community" Harvard International Review 16 (2): pp.26-38.Aggarwal, V.K. (1993) "Building 
International Institutions in Asia-Pacific" Asian Survey 33 (11): pp.1029-1042. 
62 Hiebert, M. (1995) "Wizard of Oz: Australia's Evans redraws the map of Asia" Far Eastern Economic 
Review 17 August: p.26 
63 Evans, G. (1995) "Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific" p.112. 
64 Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers. Community Aid Abroad Background Report No.7. 
Melbourne. p.24. 
65 Evans, G. (1995) "Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific" p.102. 
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amounted to an attempt to apply a "spatial fix" to the accelerations and transformations 
that characterise contemporary diplomacy. It is here that Australia's neoliberal trade 
diplomacy has converged with the broader security goals of contemporary defence 
planing. In other words, realist power politics is central to the neoliberal agenda of free 
trade and globalisation and its attempt to construct a regional order on the basis of the 
values and norms of "market civilisation". 
The preoccupation of policy-makers with this multilateral agenda has signalled a 
depoliticisation of contemporary foreign policy. Technical questions of international trade 
have come to dominate the foreign affairs agenda. This has given rise to a network of 
trade advisers and experts on "Pacific cooperation" who have exerted considerable 
influence over the decision-making process. In a recent survey, Richard Higgott has 
noted that the process of Pacific cooperation has been the preserve of a small network of 
practitioners, policy analysts and professionals who share a positivist problem-solving 
world view based upon the normative framework of neo-classical economics. 66 What 
binds this transnational elite together is a shared commitment to the promotion of 
economic growth through the development of global liberal institutions directed at the 
minimisation of trade reducing or trade distorting measures. 67 An example of one such 
network is the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), which has laid much of 
the groundwork for APEC and which constitutes a Trans-Pacific council organised in a 
tripartite structure of academics, government officials and business representatives. 68 
As part of an entire stratum of trade and foreign policy professionals, PECC can be seen 
in terms of a broader range of multilateral networks which have emerged across the globe 
recently, including the G3, G7, WTO, the IMF, the World Bank and APEC. These 
networks have, in their various ways, become key coordinating institutions of the global 
economy. What binds the functionaries of such institutions together is a shared 
commitment to market ideology and a growing recognition that territoriality alone will 
not secure the basis for geopolitical order. 69 
Driven by this elite community of experts, contemporary Asia-Pacific regionalism has 
been characterised by its lack of democratic accountability to the peoples of Asian and 
Pacific societies. Constituting a series of meetings of officials who work behind the 
scenes, the APEC process represents, according to one scholar, "the most anti-
66 Higgott, R. (1992) "Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia: Some Questions about the Role of 
Knowledge and Learning" Australian Journal of International Affairs 46 (2): p.182, 186. 
67 Ibid. p.189. 
68 For the long and arduous attempts to institutionalise economic cooperation in the Pacific see Kahler, 
M. (1990) "Organizing the Pacific" in R. Scalapino, S. Sato, J. Wanadi and Sung-Joo Han (eds.) 
Regional Dynamics: Security, Political and Economics Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region. Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies: Jakarta. Woods L.T. (1993) Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: 
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations. UBC Press: Vancouver. 
69 Agnew, J. and Corbridge, S. (1995) Mastering Space p.207 
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democratic, secretive, invisible and inaccessible of these (emerging regionalist) entities".70 
Representing a microcosm of the APEC process, Australia's regionalist diplomacy has 
been based upon a trade-driven foreign policy far removed from popular demands and 
democratic accountability. Thus, as Richard Leaver has observed in respect to the 
Garnaut Report: 
Democracy is approached with the utmost caution and short-circuited wherever 
possible by channelling economic diplomacy through elite circles. It is, 
therefore, no coincidence that the Garnaut Report concerns the ways and 
means to confine the conduct of economic diplomacy to a small circle of 
"professionals.71 
Characterised by this absence of democratic forms of decision-making, Australia's 
multilateral diplomacy can be understood in terms of a broader rationalisation of 
contemporary political life. That has involved the universalisation of Western 
instrumental forms of knowledge, exemplified in the promotion of market forces and 
market ideology by the policy-networks of Pacific Cooperation. These rationalising 
processes can be discerned in Australian foreign policy through the reductionist 
conception of the Asia-Pacific that our policy-makers and diplomats continue to 
espouse. Hence, for the architect of Australia's recent diplomacy, Gareth Evans, the Asia-
Pacific represents: 
A region ... which is probably the most committed of all regions to trade 
liberalisation. The economies of the region have also become increasingly 
linked. As a process of "shifting complementarities" works its way through the 
region, the pattern of regional trade and investment, the direction of 
technological flows and inter-linkages in sectors such as tourism, have all 
combined to produce a regional economic map criss-crossed with the ties of 
interdependence. 72 
Through conceiving of the region as a series of "shifting complementarities" of trade and 
technological flows, Evans has reduced the cultural richness and diversity of Asian and 
Pacific societies to narrow geoeconomic images. Underpinning these images is the notion 
of convergence advanced by Evans who claims that "the most obvious force working to 
bring the Asia-Pacific together is economic self-interest".73 "Countries of very different 
backgrounds", he claims, "are developing - under the particular impact of modem 
communications technology - information bases, practices, institutions, tastes and 
outlooks that are ever more similar". 74 For Evans, then, the convergence of different 
cultures and societies across the Asia-Pacific means that "as the battlefields of yesterday 
70 "Statement from the 1995 NGO Forum on APEC: Excerpts from the Conferences". Ampo: Japan-Asia 
Quarterly Review 1995 26 (4): p.29. 
71 Leaver, R. (1990) "The Garnaut Report: The Quality of Realism" Australian Outlook 44 (1): p.24. 
72 Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign Relations p.129. 
73 Evans, G. (1995) "Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific" p.105. 
74 Ibid. 
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tum into the marketplaces of today and tomorrow questions of cultural and social identity 
become less dominant".75 
In reducing "the region" to merely a marketplace, Evans has promoted a vision· of a 
future Asia-Pacific community in which corporate capitalism represents the basis of 
global civilisation and in which questions of language, culture, history and gender become 
irrelevant in the march toward homogenisation. In this vision, social and economic life 
becomes refracted through the prism of the market, a move that excludes the broader 
ethical, cultural and human dimensions of the Asia-Pacific from analytical attention. Far 
from representing a benign process of "development" and "modernisation", therefore, 
"convergence" signals a growing confluence among socialised regional elites in 
promoting the dominant forces of statecraft and global capitalism hegemonic in 
contemporary political life. Left out of the visions of policy-makers such as Evans are 
regional identities and realities that exist outside of the dominant circuits of economic and 
strategic power. Imagined via the neoliberal modes of post-Cold War foreign policy, 
then, the "Asia-Pacific" represents a space inhabited by state, capitalist and professional 
elites tied together within a web of transnational networks of strategic and economic 
power. Within this space, Canberra is closer to Tokyo than it is to the slums of Sydney's 
Kings Cross or the rural hinterland of outback New South Wales. Representing a kind of 
new Asian-Pacific co-prosperity sphere, "the region" here encompasses the educated, 
professional classes of Asian and Pacific societies while excluding its underclasses. 
DOD 
In the last few chapters I have outlined Australia's contemporary policy of engagement 
with the Asia-Pacific. I argued that, in response to the postmodern challenges of 
contemporary life, policy-makers have sought to reassert the dominant understandings of 
Western IR. Thus, recent governments have continued to support the US alliance, 
pursued a realist security agenda of defence cooperation with ASEAN and vigorously 
promoted a multilateral free trade diplomacy based upon the precepts of liberal 
institutionalism. Driven by these dominant interlocking trade and security agendas, 
contemporary foreign policy has been based heavily on engaging with regional state 
elites. This has often been at the expense of undertaking a more expansive regional 
engagement with the diverse and competing forces of Asian and Pacific societies. In its 
narrow and elitist focus, Australia's regional engagement has contained a number of 
dangers and silences. In particular, in seeking to integrate Australia's security interests 
into the region's dominant commercial and strategic networks, policy-makers have been 
complicit in engendering a regional order characterised less by trans-Pacific prosperity 
than economic marginalisation and cultural dislocation. It is to these silences and dangers 
that this thesis now turns. 
75 Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1995) Australia's Foreign Relations p.349. Italics added. 
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Chapter 7 
Dangerous Liaisons/Shifting Perils in Australia's 
Regional Engagement 
In the preceding chapters of this thesis we saw how, in promoting an instrumental 
strategic and trade agenda, policy-makers have aligned Australian diplomacy to the 
dominant military and economic forces of the region. As a result of this alignment, 
Australia's regional engagement has become hitched to the objective of maintaining and 
buttressing a broader geopolitical order of market economies and territorial states across 
the Asia-Pacific at great social costs. This chapter is designed to count these costs and to 
examine the dangers of a foreign policy so unequivocally tied to the interests of the 
dominant state and capitalist elites of the region. In particular, I argue that Australia's 
regional diplomacy has represented a narrow and dangerous set of geopolitical practices 
detached from the cultural, gendered, environmental, ethnic and class realities of 
everyday life. 
In advancing these arguments, I seek to question prevailing policy directions and, in turn, 
to open up space in which to rethink the images of order, identity and region which have 
traditionally underpinned Australian foreign policy. To this end, I begin this chapter by 
outlining the major features of the dominant geopolitical order of the Asia-Pacific region. 
My focus here is on the essentially inequitable and unsustainable nature of this regional 
order. I then go on to discuss how, in its stress on strategic and trade integration in the 
Asia-Pacific, recent Australian diplomacy has supported the repressive developmentalist 
states of the region and their economic strategy of exported oriented industrialisation. In 
focusing here on the twin aspects of Australia's regional engagement - namely, free 
trade liberalisation and strategic integration - I seek to offer a sustained critique of 
contemporary foreign policy and its inadequate response to the postmodern challenges of 
contemporary political life. 
Globalising Strategies and Developmentalist States in the Asia-Pacific: The Darks ide of the 
Pacific Century 
The so-called economic miracle is in fact just like a fierce economic civil war with the 
workers as casualties ... The amount of wealth we workers share is far too little. You call it an 
economic achievement? In fact, the gap between the rich and the poor is far greater now than 
40 years ago. The capitalists have taken the bulk of our earnings. What workers get is 
precious little. 1 
1 Taiwanese Union Official Jeng Tsuen Chyi appearing on the "Dateline" program on SBS Television, 
18th December 1995. 
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We saw in the last chapter that Australian policy-makers have accounted for the rise of 
regional economies in terms of the efficacy of free markets and the growth of intra-
regional trade. Deploying data that suggests growing economic integration amongst East 
Asian and Pacific countries, contemporary policy-makers have vigorously promoted the 
objectives of multilateral trade liberalisation through grand visions of a world free from 
trade barriers. While, the promotion of such visions has served distinct diplomatic and 
political goals, policy-makers have effectively left out of the picture the profound social 
costs that have accompanied the economic rise of the Asia-Pacific. As we shall see, while 
the "economic miracle" of the Asia-Pacific has signalled high levels of economic growth 
and industrialisation, the export-oriented industrial strategies pursued by East and 
Southeast Asian states have also had some less salutary consequences. That has included 
ecological crisis, a reduced capacity in the democratic capability of governing institutions 
and a growing gap between rich and poor throughout the region. 
In refusing to adequately acknowledge these dimensions of recent regional development, 
policy-makers have failed to understand the dangers and disturbing implications of 
regional engagement. I argue that while engagement has been justified in terms of 
preserving regional "security" and "stability", the prevailing policy of supporting brittle, 
authoritarian regimes while stridently promoting the expansion of free market capitalism 
has in fact contributed to a regional order of great instability, disorder and insecurity. 
Indeed, far from "engaging with the region", Australia's support for undemocratic 
regimes and its promotion of a globalisation free trade agenda has in fact detached 
regional diplomacy from the everyday lives of people across Asia and the Pacific. Thus, in 
aligning policy to the interests of this regional status quo, contemporary policy-makers 
have actually threatened Australia's long-term security interests. In doing so, they have 
passed up the opportunity to give regional engagement a more creative and expansive 
definition. I argue in the following chapters that this is a crucial precondition for 
developing an adequate policy response to the increasing volatilities and complexities of 
global life in the post-Cold War era. 
To argue as much is to question the sanguine picture that accompanies prevailing 
analyses of regional economic growth in which, as geographer Dean Forbes has 
observed, "the pattern of socio-economic change [in the Asia-Pacific] illustrates a 
different, somewhat darker and more complex side of the picture" than prevailing 
analyses. 2 Here great spatial disparities in present development is heightening the existing 
gap between urban and rural, inner and outer and interior and coastal areas. "If we delve 
deeper into the experience of selected countries", Forbes continues, "we fmd that, despite 
the modern facade of much of modern Asia, there remains grinding poverty in both rural 
and urban areas".3 Forbes' conclusions are supported by research on transnational 
2 Forbes, D. (1993) "What's in it for Us? Images of Pacific Asian Development" in C. Dixon and D. 
Drakakis Smith (eds.) Economic and Social Development in Pacific Asia. Routledge: London. p.Sl. 
3 Ibid. p.54. 
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production which illustrates that regional economic integration has not been accompanied 
by a corresponding redistribution of income but has instead facilitated an increasing 
concentration of capital and wealth across the Pacific.4 This dark side of the Pacific 
Century has been summed up well by Walden Bello who notes that: 
whether in Korea, Thailand, or the Philippines, the growth of GNP that came 
with export-oriented industrialisation was accompanied by worsening 
distribution of income; and political repression, as governments seeking 
American and foreign investors imposed labour policies banning unionism and 
assuring a supply of cheap labour. Moreover, from Seoul to Bangkok. export-
oriented, high-speed growth in the American model has created a profound 
ecological crisis as forests are leveled by the buzzsaw and the bulldozer, rivers 
are rendered biologically dead by industrial wastes and cities cloaked with 
smog worse than Los Angeles. 5 
Australian policy-makers have tended to obfuscate these less salutary realities. Thus, by 
adopting a neoliberal triumphalist discourse, they have celebrated the globalising EOI 
strategies of Asia-Pacific development as a benign and positive development of the free 
market. That has fundamentally misrepresented the state-oriented developmental 
experiences of the Asian NICs. Those countries have not only been characterised by high 
economic growth and a deepening of capitalist social relations but also by strong 
authoritarian governments and rampant human rights abuses involving the murder, 
incarceration and harassment of labour activists and other dissidents by, what Herb Feith 
has termed, the "repressive developmentalist states" of the Asia-Pacific.6 Such practices 
have been central to the "transnational style of development"7 that has characterised the 
region's developmental experience in which high-growth, export-oriented strategies have 
depended on the effective deployment of cheap and disciplined labor in order to attract 
foreign productive capital. It is worth teasing out the dynamics of this transnational form 
of development in order to more fully appreciate the Janus-faced nature of the Pacific 
Century and its "economic miracle". 
As I indicated in the previous chapter, a massive restructuring of economies across the 
globe has taken place over the last several decades. Brought about by repeated recessions 
in the 1970s and 1980s, this restructuring precipitated the emergence of a global 
economy transcending the borders of the nation-state. That involved the development of 
4 Palat, R. (1993) "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of Pacific-Asia" in R.A. Palat (ed.) Pacific 
Asia and the Future of the World-System. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut. p.16. 
5 Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities: The Pacific in the Post-Cold War Order Era. A Study by the 
Institute for Food and Development Policy and the Transnational Institute. San Francisco: Calif. p.5. 
6 Feith, H. (1980) "Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities" 
Prisma 19: pp.39-55. See also Woo-Cumings. M. (1994) "The 'New Authoritarianism' in East Asia" 
Current History 93 (587): pp.413-416. Islam, S. (1995) "Worker Woes: Pro-Union Group Slams Asian 
Governments" Far Eastern Economic Review. 6 July: p.28. 
7 Gurtov, M (1991) Global Politics in the Human Interest. Second Edition. Lynne Rienner Publishers: 
Boulder, Colorado. p.85. 
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increasingly innovative technologies by firms across the globe who were forced to cut 
costs and gain a competitive advantage in the market place. Geopolitical struggles over 
territory that characterised the Cold War henceforth became supplanted by "the struggle 
for the world product"8 as a major dynamic of inter-state relations. Against the 
background of an increasingly competitive world market, national capital has been unable 
to survive by only supplying the local market and producing in a single location: hence, 
the emergence of transnationally mobile capital producing in sites across the globe for a 
world-wide market.9 
This "globalisation of production" has represented a complex process in which 
innovations in factory automation and informational technologies have made possible the 
disaggregation of production by large firms. That has allowed for the relocation of 
productive processes to sites in the Third World where the costs of unskilled and semi-
skilled non-established labour are relatively low.10 The growth of transnational capital and 
its increasing global mobility has reflected a relative decline in the bargaining power of 
labour as the global restructuring of production has enabled capital to "shop around" for 
sites of production offering the best conditions and lowest costs. This process has been 
facilitated by the governments of low wage countries which have discarded their 
traditional import substitution strategies of development in favour of World Bank-
sponsored export oriented industrialisation based upon attracting foreign investment 
through tax incentives, the maintenance of a disciplined labour force and generous 
conditions for profit repatriation. 
It is this global expansion of capital which has given rise to the rapid economic growth 
rates of the Asian NICs. Indeed, the major restructuring of production recently has 
resulted in large inflows of productive capital into Southeast and East Asian countries 
which spurred the region's so-called economic miracle. Symptomatic of this shift was the 
far-reaching de-industrialisation of the mid-Western and Northeastern parts of America in 
the 1970s as American productive capital shifted to the Pacific seaboard of America, 
Europe and Southeast Asia. 11 
8 Cox, R. W. (1981) "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10 (2): p.37. 
9 Strange, S. (1990) "The Name of the Game" in N.Rizopoulos (ed.) Sea-Changes: American Foreign 
Policy in a World Transformed. Council on Foreign Relations: New York. p.241. 
10 Leaver, R. (1985) "Reformist Capitalist Development and the New International Division of Labour" 
in R. Robison and R. Higgott (eds.) Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural 
Change. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. 
11 Palat, R. (1993) "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of Pacific-Asia" p.3. Nonini, D. (1993) 
"On the Outs on the Rim: An Ethnographic Grounding of the Asia-Pacific Imaginary" in Dirlik, A. (ed.) 
What's in a Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. 
p.165. According to Nonini, an estimated 15 million industrial jobs were lost in the United States due to 
plant closures from 1968 to 1976 as a result of de-industrialisation. 
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Japanese capital also moved into East and Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s in 
search of lower production costs to avert economic recession and avoid a loss in the 
competitive advantage it had acquired over competitors. Precipitated by continual rises in 
the value of the Yen and Japanese wages, the expansion of Japanese capital involved a 
three-fold process: a transfer of labour intensive industries from Japan to Southeast Asia; 
direct Japanese investment in resource extraction in Southeast Asia; and the sub-
contracting by Japanese firms of the production of more sophisticated components to the 
East Asian NICs, particularly to Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong.12 
More recently, a comparable process has taken place with the appreciation of other East 
Asian currencies. This has led to the extension of Taiwanese and South Korean 
production operations into ASEAN economies and the special economic zones set up 
along coastal China, particularly in low-value added, labour-intensive manufacturing.13 
Hence, just as Japanese capital has moved into East and Southeast Asia in its quest to 
stay globally competitive, so too have Taiwanese and South Korean corporations 
transferred many of their production sites to Southeast Asia and China in order to exploit 
wage differentials in these countries. 14 
Generated by these globalising impulses, the EOI policies pursued by Asian governments 
have hinged on the establishment of effective exclusionary labor regimes throughout the 
region. Designed to politically de-mobilise labour and to guarantee the supply of a low-
wage workforce, these labour regimes represented a necessary precondition for the re-
location of transnational capital. 15 As I argued above, this has been part of a broader 
structural dynamic of the global economy in which competition amongst states to attract 
capital has resulted in an increasingly disciplined workforce and downward pressure on 
wages. Seeking to integrate their economies into the emerging transnational division of 
labour, particularly in light manufacturing industries, the repressive developmentalist 
states of East and Southeast Asia have exerted tight control on labour to maintain a low-
wage environment for transnational capital. 
12 Stubbs, R. (1994) "The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region" in R. Stubbs and G. Underhill 
(eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. Macmillan: Basingstoke, Hampshire. Steven, 
R. (1988) "Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asia: From ASEAN to JASEAN" Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars 20 (4): pp.34-54. See also "The Great Escape" Far Eastern Economic Review 
30 March 1995: pp.54-56. Sender, H. (1996) "Japan Inc.: The Sun Never Sets" Far Eastern Economic 
Review 1 February: pp.46-50. 
13 Palat, R. (1993) "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of Pacific-Asia" p.4. 
14 Stubbs, R. (1994) "The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region" p.372. See also "Driving for 
Exports" Far Eastern Economic Review 22 June 1995: pp.54-55. Shim Jae Hoon (1995) "Going Global" 
Far Eastern Economic Review 2 November: pp.46-50. For the recent move of Singaporean companies 
off-shore see Hiebert, M. (1996) "It's a Jungle Out There" Far Eastern Economic Review 25 April: 
pp.58-61. 
15 Deyo, F. (1987) "State and Labour: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development" in F. 
Deyo (ed.) The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism. Cornell University: Ithaca. 
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These exclusionary labour regimes have involved a varying range of strategies to regulate 
labour and ensure its docility ranging from all-out state coercion to the establishment of 
government-controlled unionism in order to coopt and neutralise independent labour 
activism. The range of anti-labour measures put in place by Asian states are historically 
specific and have, therefore, varied from country to country. For instance, in Indonesia, 
one of the region's most repressive states, the military has played a direct role in 
disciplining industriallabour.16 For those who courageously defy the coercive tactics of 
the military, terrible consequences can result, as in the recent Marsinah case. Here a 
young Indonesian labour activist was found dead three days after protesting the sacking 
of employees from a local East Javanese factory. Her body bared the marks of torture, 
b . d 17 eatmgs an rape. 
South Korea has had an equally brutal, albeit more sophisticated, system of labour 
repression in place in order to promote the conditions for export-oriented production. 
Violent clashes between the military and workers in South Korea have long been a visible 
consequence of South Korea's repressive form of development. The South Korean 
military-technocrat alliance has regularly had to resort to large-scale imprisonment, 
torture, and assassination in order to secure the supply of cheap disciplined workers in 
the face of a highly radicalised student and labour movement. 18 The internal security 
apparatus in South Korea which has regularly infiltrated factories has played a central 
role in the surveillance and repression of labour. These activities have been an integral 
part of the broader economic strategy pursued by the South Korean state and its 
corporate backers. 19 
There have also been less coercive, more ideological forms of control and exclusion in 
South Korea. While the state has continually intervened to limit union activities, 
instituting laws which virtually outlaw strikes and independent union activity, efforts have 
also been expended to formulate and institutionalise mechanisms for the ideological 
containment of workers.20 In promoting a fierce anti-communist identity amongst 
workers, the Factory Saemaul (New Community) exploited deeply entrenched collectivist 
and patriotic values in South Korea in order to mobilise workers to achieve economic 
targets set by the state and management. 21 
16 For the central role that the military has played in government-controlled unions in Indonesia see 
Lambert, R. (1993) Authoritarian State Unionism in New Order Indonesia. Working Paper No.25, Asia 
Research Centre, Murdoch University: Perth. 
17 See Weisseman, R. (1993) "Repression to Co-optation: Challenges for Women Workers in Southeast 
Asia" Multinational Monitor November: p.20 and Perry, M. (1995) "Amnesty Says Indonesian Women 
Raped, Tortured" Reuters News Service 15 December. 
18 See, for instance, Martin, B. (1994) "Rewriting History: Kwangju Revisited" Far Eastern Economic 
Review 26 May: pp.44-47. Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities p.39. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Gurtov, M (1991) Global Politics in the Human Interest p.113. Bello, W. (1992) Perils and 
Possibilities p.38. 
21 Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities p.39. 
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One way that Australian policy-makers have rationalised the repressive aspect of regional 
capitalist development has been to point to economic data suggesting the relatively even 
distribution of recent development in East and Southeast Asia. This implies that political 
repression represents a legitimate cost of equitable economic growth. Recent analyses 
have questioned the use of this data, however, arguing that the orthodox focus on narrow 
quantitative economic indicators masks a less salutary reality. In conducting detailed 
socioeconomic research, Arrighi, Ikeda and Irwan have recently concluded that the "East 
Asian miracle has been a phenomenon limited to jurisdictions that account for no more 
than 10% of the total population of East Asia and Southeast Asia". 22 
In Thailand, for instance, a recent study by Japanese economist Yukio Ik:emoto has 
shown that while in 1981 the share of national income of the richest 10 per cent was 17 
times that of the poorest 10 per cent, by 1992, the figure had blown out to 38.23 
Similarly, in one of the region's fastest growing economies, Indonesia, concern over the 
growing gap between rich and poor has reached such a level that the Government has 
instituted a law forcing Indonesia's wealth-owning classes to contribute a set amount of 
income to a state-based poverty fund. 24 Meanwhile, in East Asia, although there is some 
evidence suggesting that real household wage rates have increased over the last several 
decades, the increase in worker's income has been less the product of the equitable 
distribution of the fruits of economic growth than of the high levels of labor extraction 
among low-income workers and families. 25 Hence, wage increases have lagged well 
behind productivity increases while a major characteristic of East Asian development has 
been the massive entry of secondary household earners, especially women from low-
income families. 26 In other words, income equity among Asian households reflects no 
more than intensified labor outlays among poor families. 27 
Moreover, indices on real wages invoked by liberal economists to demonstrate the 
benefits of capitalist development do not address the conditions that workers must endure 
as a result of these very high levels of labor extraction. South Korean industry, for 
instance, has one of the worst safety records in the world and its workers have the 
longest working hours of any society, while Japanese is probably the only language in the 
22 Arrighi, G. Ikeda, S. and Irwan, A. (1993) "The Rise of East Asia: One Miracle or Many" in R.A. 
Palat (ed.) Pacific Asia and the Future of the World-System. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut. 
p.48. 
23 "Asia's poor fight the wealth gap" The Australian 16 April1996: p.4. 
24 Ali, Muklis (1996) "Indonesia's Suharto Creates a New Tax on Rich" Reuters New Service 22 
December. See also Kleden, I. (1996) "Poverty and Lavish Spending" The Jakarta Post 17 April: p.4. 
Leahy, J (1996) "Indonesia: Where the Rich Get Richer and the Poor stay Poorly" South China Morning 
Post 17 April: p.10. 
25 Deyo, F. (1987) "State and Labour: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development" in F. 
Deyo (ed.) The Political Economy oft he New Asian Industrialism. Cornell University: Ithaca p.197. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
Dangerous Liaisons/Shifting Perils 131 
world to have a specific word for death by overwork. 28 Fatal accidents due to fatigue and 
inadequate safety regulations are common in many factories throughout the region. 
Enduring health problems are widespread amongst many factory workers engaged in 
export production. For example, in the Philippine factory of the American transnational 
corporation, Gelrnart, the most common illness suffered by workers are urinary tract 
infections contracted because workers fear they will fall behind their production targets if 
they leave their posts to go to the bathroom. 29 Meanwhile, in the agricultural sector 
across Asia and the Pacific, the social costs have been equally disturbing. Thus, the so-
called "Green Revolution" has been accompanied not only by massive increases in crop 
production but also by tragic health costs, devastating environmental problems and the 
heightening of landlessness and the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a 
few. 30 
Borne disproportionately by the region's workers and underclasses, the great social costs 
of Asia-Pacific development suggest that the benefits of recent economic growth have 
not trickled down beyond a small privileged elite. Instead, the prevailing modes of 
export-oriented industrialisation pursued by regional states have been characterised by a 
highly uneven pattern of development both within and between states. This is having the 
effect of further widening the gap between rich and poor across the Pacific. Arguably, the 
most serious problem of prevailing development in Asian and Pacific countries is the high 
level of debt that regional governments have incurred in fmancing large-scale 
industrialisation and resource-extraction projects of "national development'' promoted by 
regional elites, international lending institutions and Western governments. As 
development specialists have pointed out, debt reservicing has become the most 
important mechanism by which rich industrial countries have extracted huge outflows of 
capital and wealth from the poorer countries of the South.31 Not only do such outflows 
far exceed the total aid contributions from the North to South, they eclipse the more 
overt forms of wealth extraction secured under colonialism. 32 The reproduction of these 
highly unequal global power relations through prevailing modes of regional development 
has served to exacerbate the divisions and cleavages that have long run throughout Asian 
28 Gurtov, M (1991) Global Politics in the Human Interest p.l12. See also Harmsen, R. (1995) "A Matter 
of Time" Far Eastern Economic Review 7 December: p.71. 
29 Weisseman, R. (1993) "Repression to Co-optation" p.22. 
30 Hawes, J. (1982) "Southeast Asian Agribusiness: The New International Division of Labour" Bulletin 
of Concerned Asian Scholars 14 (2): pp.20-29. To take one recent example, thousands of Philippine 
plantation workers recently have shown signs of sterility due to long-term exposure to dangerous 
pesticides sold by American-based multinational companies such as Shell, Dow, Standard Fruit, 
Chuiquita and Dole Fresh fruit Esplanada, J. (1995) "Banana Plantation Workers: Pesticide Causes 
Mass Sterility" Philippine Daily Inquirer 25 September: p.4. 
31 Khor, M. (1994) "South-North resource flows and their implications for sustainable development" 
Third World Resurgence 46: pp.14-25. 
32 Hunt, J. (1992) "Australia and the Economic Security of the Third World" in G. Smith and St. John 
Kettle (eds.) Threats without Enemies: Rethinking Australia's Security. Pluto Press: Sydney. p.241. 
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and Pacific societies. As we shall below, that has led to growing unrest and instability 
throughout the region. 
To the extent that such social costs are recognised at all by Australian policy-makers and 
other regional elites, however, they tend to be explained as a necessary phase in the 
industrialisation process. Here the authoritarian regimes of the region are viewed as 
providing the conditions of political stability and rapid economic growth conducive to a 
stable transition from authoritarianism to democratic industrial society. In adopting this 
understanding, contemporary policy-makers have drawn on the neoliberal theme of 
convergence whereby the societies of Asia and the Pacific have been viewed as becoming 
more like the West by progressively adopting the democratic values of Western liberal 
capitalism. 
This apriori identification of high levels of economic growth with political 
democratisation, however, has proved fallacious. As a recent analysis by leading area 
specialists has concluded, the liberal faith in the emerging middle classes of the region is 
entirely misplaced, who, far from forging liberalisation, have been "unable to construct 
democratic regimes in the place of authoritarianism and have [in fact] been overtaken by 
military dictatorships or forms of oligarchic authoritarianism".33 This points to the fact 
that the developmental experiences of Asian and Pacific states have followed different 
trajectories from the evolution of Western liberal capitalism. It also indicates that the 
linear narrative of progress adopted by Western policy-makers is simply inadequate in 
understanding the complexities of development in the Asia-Pacific. 
Indeed, far from heralding a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the export-
oriented, high-growth strategies of the Asian NICs have in fact relied upon repressive 
state practices to maintain labour discipline and integrate into the prevailing regional 
division of labour. In other words, exclusionary labour practices are intrinsic to the 
broader globalising strategies that have marked the emergence of Asian economies in 
which labour repression has become an essential instrument of social order. That has been 
demonstrated by recent figures which suggest Asian trade unionists have been the target 
of 58% of all labor violations reported to the International Labour Organisation.34 
It is the depoliticisation of such violent state practices that is the most dangerous and 
silenced part of Australian foreign policy. Contemporary policy-makers have simply 
ignored the connection between their support for globalising forces in the Asia-Pacific 
and the kinds of authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-democratic processes prevailing across 
33 Robison, R. and Goodman, D. (1996) "The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status 
and Political Consciousness" in R. Robison and D. Goodman (eds.) The New Rich in Asia: Mobile 
Phones, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution. Routledge: London. pp.2-3. 
34 McKinley, M (1995) "Globalism as Clausewitzian Strategy: Insecurity, War-Equivalence and 
Annihilation in Australia's Embrace of the New World Order", Unpublished Paper. Australian National 
University: Canberra: p.27. 
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the region. 35 As Jim George has warned, "our support for free-trade strategies and 
indigenous elite-driven institutionalism might well be accelerating divisions of power and 
increasing the risk of conflict, rather than liberalising and democratising the region".36 
This suggests that the convergence thesis at the core of Australia's recent regional 
diplomacy is in urgent need of critique. The globalising development strategies pursued 
by regional states have not led to the kind of free trade democratic order envisaged by 
liberals. That realisation undermines the whole foundation of contemporary Australian 
diplomacy, based upon the argument that free trade and globalisation will lead to a 
regional order of free market economies and democratic states across the Pacific. I 
examine the consequences of this in more detail below, arguing that judged by even a 
narrow geopolitical definition of stability and order, Australia's prevailing free trade 
diplomacy has proven to be an abject failure. 
The Perils of Australia's Free Trade Diplomacy: Enhancing or Undermining "Security"? 
Adopting an agenda of neoliberal economics, Australian policy-makers have vigorously 
promoted the benefits of free trade in organisations such as APEC and the newly created 
WTO. For them free trade represents a win-win situation in which opening up markets to 
global competition will increase the exchange of goods and services across borders -
thereby boosting demand, economic growth and employment opportunities. For the 
advocates of free trade, economic liberalisation not only produces economic gains, but 
equally importantly, enhances security among states. That argument has been advanced 
by the architect of Australia's recent multilateral trade diplomacy, Gareth Evans. For 
Evans, the increased trading activity engendered by globalisation and the breakdown in 
national economic borders leads to a convergence of cultures and understandings in 
which: 
across national borders things are being done more alike and .. .institutions, 
practices and outlooks are becoming more alike as a result of which countries, 
cultures and peoples are becoming less alien to each other...and they are 
beginning to learn that their best interests are advanced not by a culture of 
conflict but a culture of cooperation.37 
As indicated above, however, the kinds of globalising strategies adopted by state and 
capitalist elites in the Asia-Pacific belie such sanguine forecasts of a regional order of 
peace, security and economic prosperity. Indications of the effects of globalisation so far 
suggest that opening up markets to global competition will not necessarily lead to the 
kinds of benefits that neoliberals are fond of declaring. Instead, the prevailing 
transnational style of development embarked upon by regional governments has 
35 George, J. (1996) "Australia's Global Perspectives in the 1990s: A Case of Old Realist Wine in New 
(Neo-Liberal) Bottles?" in R. Leaver and D. Cox (eds.) Middling, Meddling and Muddling: Issues in 
Australian Foreign Policy. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.5. 
36 Ibid. p.5. 
37 Evans, G. (1993) Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. Allen and 
Unwin: Sydney. p.183. 
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exacerbated the divisions and inequalities that exist both within and between states in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
This is clear in the ways in which large groups of people have been marginalised from the 
workforce recently. This is especially the case in advanced industrialised countries where 
high wages put these countries at a disadvantage in competing with new production sites 
in East and Southeast Asia. In Australia, for instance, the Textiles, Clothing and 
Footwear industry lost 27000 jobs between 1989 and 1994, as companies moved off-
shore to lower-wage countries.38 Such changes have not been limited to working class 
people: over the past two decades 25% of mid-level, white collar male jobs in Australia 
have become the casualties of global restructuring and the ideology of competitiveness.39 
Far from benefiting from the prevailing neoliberal directions of Australian policy, these 
groups have been marginalised from the modem economy. For these people, the failure 
of neoliberal policy has been translated in the rise of structural unemployment which has 
become an intractable problem for governments across the globe. In OECD countries 35 
million people are now un- or under-employed, while the first ever survey of world-wide 
joblessness by the ILO estimated 2.6 billion people were unemployed globally or 30% of 
the world's total work force. 40 
For those in employment the prospects are also grim. Employment trends now show a 
massive increase in "contingent" labour either in the form of part-time, contract or casual 
work. A recent EPAC report on the Australian labour market shows that between 1984 
to 1994 casual employment has risen from 15.8% to 23.7%.41 For those left in permanent 
employment, marked increases in pressure and stress are the results of now having to 
take on the work of retrenched colleagues. A "race to the bottom" is what some analysts 
have called this downward spiral in workers' wages and conditions in which workers are 
being put in competition with one another as the threat of moving production off-shore to 
lower wage sites is enough to undermine most union claims.42 Arguably, the most 
disturbing effect of this global drive toward the hyper-exploitation of labour has been the 
continuing high levels of child labour around the world. According to a recent ILO 
report, 73 million children between the ages of 10 and 14 world-wide are forced to work: 
in Asia alone 44 million children work. 43 This labour force has played a critical role in the 
rapid economic growth rates of regional development recently. The effect of all this has 
been heightened global inequalities and the concentration of market and financial power 
in the hands of a few. It is now estimated that just 300 companies own one quarter of the 
38 Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers. Community Aid Abroad Background Report No.7: 
Melbourne. p.59. 
39 McKinley, M (1995) "Globalism as Clausewitzian Strategy" p.32. 
4° Figures cited in Ibid. p.14. 
41 Henderson, I. (1996) "Accord did little for labour market, claim professors" The Australian 2 April: 
p.2. 
42 Brecher, J. and Costello, T. (1994) Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from 
the Bottom Up. South End Press: Boston, Mass. Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers p.59. 
43 Gunawan, T. (1996) "ILO Says Child Labour Abounds" The Jakarta Post 10 June: p.l. 
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world's productive assets. 44 This growing global disparity between rich and poor is 
further illustrated by recent statistics which suggest that while in 1970, the richest one-
fifth of the world population received 30 times more than the poorest one-fifth, by 1990 
the ratio had blown out to a factor of 60.45 
It is precisely these kinds of disturbing trends that Australia's APEC strategy has had the 
effect of promoting. Indeed, in facilitating trade and investment liberalisation, our policy-
makers have enhanced the mobility of transnational capital throughout the region. This 
has had the effect of further reducing the bargaining power of labour and its ability to halt 
the erosion in conditions and wages.46 That has been exemplified in Australia's recent 
diplomacy in the WTO in joining with ASEAN countries' rejection of Western plans to 
link trading agreements with labour issues.47 This plan would give policy-makers in the 
more advanced high-cost economies such as Australia some leverage in halting the race 
to the bottom represented by the large-scale relocation of industrial production to low-
wage countries. Many officials in Asia have been rightfully wary of the sudden interest of 
Western governments in labour issues, seeing in this another form of discriminatory 
protectionism against the rising industrial centres of Asia. 
Coupled with the development of global redistributive mechanisms, however, the linking 
of labour rights and trade agreements appears to be at present the only way of halting the 
global deterioration of workers' rights and conditions. Based upon an ideological 
attachment to free trade and regional engagement, therefore, Australia's trade-driven 
policy of rejecting such an initiative has merely served to reproduce the conditions under 
which sweat shops and widespread child labour have come to characterise the region's 
"economic miracle". Through rejecting this initiative, policy-makers have missed an 
opportunity to align Australian diplomacy with the decolonising forces of the region. 
That has precluded Australian diplomacy from contributing to the formulation of creative 
redistributive solutions to the structural problems of recent globalisation. 
Seen from this perspective, prevailing patterns of globalisation and free trade represent 
less a neutral process delivering benefits for all people than one that feeds into existing 
socioeconomic cleavages and divisions. In the case of recent development in the Asia-
Pacific region, globalisation has exacerbated the highly inequitable power relations and 
broader patterns of discrimination which characterise regional societies. As a number of 
non-government organisations have pointed out, the effects of the globalisation agenda 
promoted in APEC will have massive social and economic implications for the poor of 
the region, particularly farmers, the rural landless and wage labourers.48 
44 Figures cited in McKinley, M. (1995) "Globalism as Clausewitzian Strategy" p.11. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers p.62. 
47 Spindler, S. (1996) "Free Trade in the Lives of our Children" The Age 17 December: p.l3. 
48 "APEC: Statement from the NGO Forum on APEC" Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 26 (4), 
1996. "Slow down the APEC Process, say NGOs" Third World Resurgence. 64, 1995: pp.18-19. 
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As the centrepiece of Australia's free trade diplomacy, the push for agricultural trade 
liberalisation is a good example of the dangers of free trade. While designed primarily to 
open up highly subsidised farming sectors of American and European countries, 
Australia's liberalisation agenda will, if successful, have far-reaching effects for the 
millions of small-scale, subsistence farmers throughout Asia. In a totally liberalised 
market, they would be unable to compete with the large-scale, capital intensive and highly 
mechanised farming operations of the advanced economies. Hence, while world-wide 
liberalisation of agricultural products would prove a bonanza for Australia's large 
agricultural sector it would be "cataclysmic" for the region's small farmers and rural poor. 
That would have particularly devastating effects in rural Asia where a majority of people 
still rely on agriculture for their livelihood and where opening up the economy to cheap 
foreign imports could mean "the undermining of entire rural communities and their way 
of life with greatly increased disruption and unrest".49 
The problem with the free-trade win-win scenario painted by neoliberal economists is that 
it fails to recognise the need to develop mechanisms of global redistributive justice as a 
necessary precondition for the even spread of the benefits of free economic exchange. By 
failing to acknowledge this, Australian policy-makers appear unaware that latent 
volatilities in the region could well be converted into serious unrest by current Australian 
demands for across-the-board trade liberalisation regardless of the social costs. This 
suggests that, in promoting a short-sighted agenda of economic self-interest, 
contemporary policy-makers are dangerously detaching Australian policy perspectives 
from the everyday realities of regional life. It also suggests that, defined beyond the 
prevailing terms of narrow economic self-interest, Australian "security" interests are 
better advanced by a more pragmatic, less ideologically-driven policy. That policy should 
be based upon bilateral trade negotiations that recognise the varying capacity of different 
economies to meet free trade targets. 
The threat of internal unrest which I touched on above points to a broader danger 
inherent in Australia's present promotion of globalisation-from-above strategies. That 
relates to the destabilising effects of the transnational-style of development pursued 
across the region. While Asian and Pacific societies have been integrated into the broader 
international circuits of trade and production since the colonial period, the breakdown of 
international economic boundaries has taken on unparalleled proportions in the last two 
decades. This has opened up the region to the far-reaching transformative effects of 
capitalist industrial development and its associated instabilities and volatilities. As Bradley 
Klein has suggested, the construction of modem industrial society represents a "violent 
Community Aid Abroad (1995) Asia-Pac(fic Economic Cooperation: Its Effects on the Poor. 
Polliewatch. Briefing Paper No.23 Fitzroy, Melbourne. 
49 Community Aid Abroad (1995) Asia-Pac(fic Economic Cooperation: Its Effects on the Poor p.4. 
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transgression of the land and human body".50 Here the construction of roads, port cities, 
transport networks, modem administrative techniques, large-scale infrastructural projects 
- all those requirements of modern industrial development - inevitably have far-
reaching effects "on the tenor of everyday life".51 According to the United Nations Centre 
for Human Settlement, for instance, literally millions of people are evicted from their 
homes across the globe each year to make way for modern industrial urban 
development 52 
Giving rise to such dislocative processes, the large-scale development projects pursued 
by regional governments and promoted heavily by the World Bank and IMF have 
involved the displacement of thousands of local communities from their traditional lands. 
These projects have included mining enterprises and the construction of dams, golf 
courses and tourist resorts. 53 Typically these have not only led to serious environmental 
damage but have tended to be promoted by unaccountable and undemocratic global 
policy elites detached from the everyday needs of local communities. Australian 
companies have been heavily involved in such projects throughout the region. 54 
The inequitable and dislocative effects on local communities of this kind of development 
has given rise to growing social tensions and unrest throughout the region. For instance, 
Indonesia has experienced unparalleled social and political turmoil recently. Riots 
regularly erupted throughout 1996-97, including an uprising by Jakarta's disaffected 
underclasses in the capital city that lasted for three days in the aftermath of the 
Government's blatant attempts to remove Megawati Sukarnoputri from the leadership of 
the People's Democratic Party (PDI).55 Frustrations over political and economic 
disparities in Indonesia appear to be the main motivating force behind the August unrest. 
5° Klein, B. (1994) Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge p.98. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Gunawan, T. (1996) "United Nations: Millions Evicted Yearly for Urban Developments" The Jakarta 
Post 6 June: p.2. 
53 "Scavenger Homes Demolished For Dam Project" The Jakarta Post 12 December 1996: p.14. 
Hiebert, M. (1995) "Malaysia: Just Compensation?" Far Eastern Economic Review March 9: pp.14-15. 
Fairclough, G. (1995) "Burma: That's an Order" Far Eastern Economic Review August 31: p.27. 
Tsutomu, K. (1991) "The Political Economy of Golf' Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 22 (4): pp.47-
54. "Passions Burn Low as Slum-Dwellers Resign Themselves to Fate" South China Morning Post 22 
April1996. "Displaced by Development" Inside Indonesia No.26, 1990: pp.15-16. Hirsch, P. (1988) 
"Dammed or Damned? Hydropower versus People's Power" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 20 
(1): pp.2-10. 
54 See, for instance, Van Leeuwen, Hans (1996) "Fischer sees the light on a path to Indochina" 
Australian Financial Review 27 September: p.24. Atkinson, J. (1994) Australian Mining Companies in 
the Asia-Pacific Region. Briefing PaperNo.12.Community Aid Abroad. Fitzroy, Melbourne. W AHLI 
(1995) "Australian goldmine mucks up the environment" Inside Indonesia December: pp.30-31. 
55 McBeth, J. (1996) "Indonesia: Social Dynamite" Far Eastern Economic Review 15 February: pp.20-
32. Guinness, P. (1990) "Forced into Opposition: Yogyakarta's Karnpung People" Inside Indonesia 
March: pp.13-15. 
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The prime targets of the street violence were visible "symbols of wealth" such as banks 
and luxury residential areas. 56 
In addition to having to quell unrest throughout Java, the Indonesian Government has 
had to confront continuing rebellion and resistance to its rule in Irian Jaya, East Timor, 
Aceh and West Kalimantan. In Irian Jaya recently the multinational Freeport mining 
operation has come under physical attack by the local communities disaffected by the 
mine's environmental destruction, and the dislocative effects that thousands of Javanese 
trans-migrants are having on the province. 57 Outside Indonesia, authorities throughout 
the Asia-Pacific are facing similar problems. For instance, China's recent economic boom 
has brought with it heightened inequalities between coastal and interior provinces 
-raising questions about the central Government's grip on coastal economies.58 It has 
also given rise to increasing social expectations and worker unrest throughout the 
country.59 
In fact, the problem of unmet rising social expectations has become a major source of 
discontent throughout the region. The lifestyle promised by a growing global consumer 
culture remains unachieved for the great majority of peoples in Asian and Pacific 
societies. In rejecting the dominant transnational style of development, voices of dissent 
and resistance are becoming increasingly insistent.60 They have given testament to the 
great social costs and instabilities that have accompanied prevailing regional 
development. Workers calling for labour rights, students demanding greater democracy 
and slum dwellers demanding the right of housing have all expressed their discontent with 
the conditions of daily life that prevail across the region. This reflects the growing 
disenchantment of ordinary people with elitist, undemocratic and highly inequitable 
modes of development and governance. 
Far from engendering a stable geopolitical and economic order, therefore, the support for 
globalising strategies in the Asia-Pacific has actually had the opposite effect. The 
Australian Government's promotion of an undifferentiated agenda of across-the-board 
trade liberalisation has contributed to a regional political economy of endemically 
unstable states racked by ever widening social divisions and rising political tensions. In 
responding to these destabilising forces, Asia's developmentalist regimes have used 
familiar repressive tactics to keep a lid on simmering social tensions. This has led to an 
unending spiral of geopolitical violence and instability in which social tensions brought 
56 MacKenzie, I. (1996) "Frustration helps fuel Jakarta riots" Reuters News Service 31 July. 
57 McBeth, J. (1996) "Investment: What's Yours Is Mine" Far Eastern Economic Review 28 March: 
p.60. "Special Report: Freeport Under Siege" Inside Indonesia December 1995: pp.16-27. Williams, L. 
(1996) "Jakarta Province Policy Questioned" The Age 11 June: p.8. 
58 Kaye, L. (1995) "China: Southern Cooking" The Far Eastern Economic Review 25 May: pp.22-24. 
Kaye, L. (1995) "China: The Grip Slips" Far Eastern Economic Review 11 May: pp.18-24. 
59 Kaye, L. (1996) "Labour pains: Worker unrest could challenge the party's legitimacy" Far Eastern 
Economic Review 16 June: pp.32-33. 
60 Rodan, G. (ed.) (1996) Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia. Routledge: London. 
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about by recent development have been accompanied by the repressive use of force by 
military elites seeking to guarantee stability. That has led to yet further social unrest and 
increased military repression. In this context, Australia's support for globalisation and 
free trade has converged with its policy of engaging strategically with the region's 
military elites. Here policy-makers have deduced that the only way to keep the 
instabilities of trans-Pacific capitalist development at bay is through buttressing the 
repressive state regimes of the region to keep order. That has served to align Australian 
diplomatic interests to the violent strategic practices of regional states. As we shall see in 
the fmal part of this chapter, this is where the dangerous implications of regional 
engagement are most apparent. 
Dangerous Liaisons: Australia's Regional Strategic Engagement 
There may be some truth to the claim that in many cases our soldiers have been well ahead of our 
diplomats [in engaging with the region]. The Australian military has been at the forefront of our 
diplomatic effort. They will continue to serve us well.61 
In a recent report on the region, the respected NGO, Human Rights Watch, concluded 
that the human rights records of Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia and China actually 
worsened in 1996. This conclusion explicitly undermines the argument proposed by 
Australian diplomats and policy-makers that high rates of economic growth translate into 
progressive political liberalisation. 62 As indicated above, the develop mentalist regimes of 
the Asia-Pacific have used repression in order to keep a lid on simmering social 
discontent. Thus, the disordering effects of capitalist development have been 
accompanied by a violent reordering/reterritorialising impulse in which the state has 
sought to reimpose strict territorial control through the means of organised violence. Paul 
Twomey has made the point well: 
The most pervasive influence in many Asian capitalist societies has been the 
linking of its repressive power with the economic development aims of a 
Western-educated technocratic elite. These elites promote a model of 
development, supported by most western governments and such institutions as 
the International Monetary Fund, that emphasises growth through export-
oriented manufacture and commodity production. This model requires the 
maintenance of low labour costs, political and social stability and conditions 
favourable to foreign investment so that the economy can reach a ''take off' 
phase of growth. The task of assuring that social change does not destabilise 
these conditions for growth is given to the military.63 
61 Defence Minister Ian McLachlan quoted in The Canberra Times 14 December 1996: p.4. 
62 "Repression on the Rise in Asian States" The Australian 5 December 1996: p.4. See also Islam, S. 
(1996) "Worker Woes: Pro-union group slams Asian governments" Far Eastern Economic Review 6 
July: p.28. 
63 quoted in Kettle, St. John ( 1989) Australia's Arms Exports: Keeping Them Out of Repressive Hands. 
Peace Research Centre, Australian National University. p.32. 
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Australia's strategic regional engagement has had the effect of reinforcing the major 
aspects of this regional political economy. I have already discussed in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, how this has been articulated in Australia's burgeoning defence links with 
ASEAN. These links have included extensive intelligence sharing between ASIS 
(Australian Secret Intelligence Service) and the internal security apparatus of regional 
governments. In this context, Australia's intelligence interests have become inextricably 
entwined with the repressive forces of the regional status quo. The dangerous 
implications of this have been highlighted by Brian Toohey and William Pinwill who have 
documented the extensive intelligence links that ASIS has shared with the region's most 
repressive regimes. That included the disturbing revelation that in the early 1980s ASIS 
was handing over intelligence to the corrupt Marcos regime on opposition forces in the 
Philippines.64 Similarly, Australia's policy on Bougainville, Tibet, Burma, West Papua 
and East Timor has reflected the support that Australian diplomacy has directed to 
regional states, no matter how repressive or authoritarian. 
In Bougainville, for instance, the Australian Government continues to arm the PNG 
military which has shown itself incapable of preventing its soldiers from committing 
blatant human rights abuses. This included the 1996 mortar attack by PNG forces on a 
Catholic church during morning mass, followed three days later by the massacre of 15 
innocent civilians during a village raid.65 Meanwhile in Burma, Australian policy-makers 
have steadfastly rejected calls to take action against the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC)- arguably the world's leading pariah state. Australia has opposed 
calls by pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace laureate Aung Sung Su Kyi for economic 
sanctions, favouring an approach designed ostensibly to neither encourage nor discourage 
Australian business from operating in Burma, although the fact that the Government has 
refused to close its Austrade office in Rangoon suggests a preference for a business as 
usual approach. Apart from trade interests, Australia's policy on Burma has also been 
driven by its broader goal of engaging diplomatically with ASEAN governments who, far 
from criticising the governing regime in Burma, have welcomed Burma as a permanent 
member into ASEAN. Echoing the arguments of the convergence thesis, Australian 
Trade Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer has justified the policy on Burma 
by claiming that "officially Burma is headed towards democracy".66 That claim has been 
contradicted by the actions of the SLORC which continues to repress its people through 
torture, martial law and arbitrary arrests and which has promoted the use of child and 
64 Toohey, B. and Pinwill, W. (1990) Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service. 
Mandarin Australia: Melbourne. p.256. 
65 Skehan, C. (1996) "Australia holds its fire while Bougainville bleeds" The Sydney Morning Herald 24 
December: p.13. 
66 McPhedran, I. (1996) "Pilgered on Burma: Fischer opts for pre-emptive strike" The Canberra Times 6 
June: p.2. 
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slave labour in development and infrastructural projects to aid multinational companies 
and tourist operators. 67 
Likewise in Tibet, Australia's softly-softly approach toward Chinese abuses has been 
shaped by a concern to protect markets in China. This has reflected the ways in which 
Australia's policy of trade and strategic engagement has come at the cost of a concern 
with human rights and developing creative diplomatic initiatives to resolve the region's 
intractable conflicts. 68 In fact, in so unequivocally promoting integration into the 
dominant commercial and strategic networks of the region, policy-makers have pursued a 
short-sighted diplomacy that, while providing the facade of "stability", has actually 
undermined the goal of creating a more stable, peaceful regional order. 
It is arguably in Australia's close links with the Soeharto regime in Indonesia where the 
dangerous implications of Australian strategic engagement with regional elites are most 
obvious. As I noted above, Indonesia has recently shown increasing signs of unrest 
accompanied by high levels of repression. This has represented a dialectic of violence that 
has become the most visible feature of the Indonesian political landscape recently. A 1996 
report by the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI) noted 
continuing "power abuses" by the Indonesian Government and stated its "deep concern 
about the malfunctioning of Indonesia's legal and judicial institutions".69 It also observed 
that "political violence" in Indonesia had reached "a critical point" while noting that the 
"Indonesian Government had failed to ratify the international covenant against torture". 
Meanwhile in East Timor, Amnesty has claimed that "arbitrary detention and torture 
remain a part of daily life" and that reported "disappearances and political killings have 
remained uninvestigated and unresolved". 70 
Forces resisting this ever increasing level of repression and organised violence in 
Indonesia are, however, becoming increasingly visible. This was clear in a recent petition 
by non-government organisations (NGOs) declaring their opposition to the increasing use 
of "naked power", "political violence" and "the repression of democracy" in Indonesia.71 
It was also manifest in a recent statement issued by scholars expressing concern at the 
67 "US bans Burma's 'repressive' rulers" The Weekend Australian 5-6 October 1996: p.17. See also 
Pilger, J. (1996) "Burma: A Cry for Freedom" The New Internationalist 280, June: pp.7-30.The internet 
also has extensive resources devoted to Burma, see for instance http://FreeBurma.org/ 
68 Gray, S. (1996) "Tibet, trade and the Fischer factor" The Age 16 September: p.11. For an example of 
such creative thinking see King, P. (1992) "Breaking Deadlocks: Peace-Making Opportunities for 
Australia in East Timor, West Papua and Papua New Guinea" in G. Smith and St. John Kettle (eds.) 
Threats without Enemies: Rethinking Australia's Security. Pluto Press: Sydney. 
69 "Human Rights Violations Lamented" The Jakarta Post 11 December 1996: p.2. 
70 Savill, R. (1996) "Award of Nobel Peace Prize Fails to Lift East Timor Gloom" The Daily Telegraph 
(United Kingdom) 11 December: p.14. 
71 "More NGOs Warn of Political Chaos" The Jakarta Post 6 June 1996: p.2. 
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serious dangers of social unrest due to the elitist forms of development presently taking 
place.72 
In the face of such turbulent events in Indonesia, Australian diplomacy has been 
characterised by what can only be described as policy paralysis. This was exemplified in 
the official response, or lack thereof, to the military crackdown of demonstrations in 
Jakarta in August 1996. Peter Hartcher described this response as the "the towering 
silence of Australian diplomacy".73 As people were being killed in the streets and others 
rounded up by the military for detention and interrogation, Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer refused to criticise the violent suppression of unrest, saying only that he hoped 
"the situation will settle down quickly", while adding limply that "we don't conduct our 
affairs in Australia in the same way".74 In warding off criticism of Australia's timid 
response, Downer declared that the crackdown on dissent was an "internal affair".75 By 
invoking the territorialising logic of traditional foreign policy discourse, Downer 
precluded any ethical consideration of Australia's close relations with the Soeharto 
regime. Whilst this support for the Soeharto regime has been justified on the grounds that 
Australian interests are best served by ensuring a stable, united Indonesian state, the 
policy of buttressing a repressive and undemocratic regime can hardly be seen as a 
stability-producing policy. As Peter Hartcher has noted: 
Our policy-makers are confusing a lack of change with stability. Stability in 
Indonesia is not going to be served by political repression to prop up a 
particular regime. This ultimately will lead to frustration. And frustrations can 
create explosions. 76 
Thus, Australia's diplomacy of silence on Indonesia has reflected a one-dimensional 
foreign policy and a refusal to listen to other voices outside of the military elite. Yet, the 
Indonesian Government itself has recognised that such voices will play an increasingly 
important role in Indonesia in coming years. 77 Recent unrest indicates that the dominant 
economic model of high-speed economic growth promoted by the Soeharto regime is fast 
approaching its use by date. Here the flagrant capital accumulation by rentier sections of 
the Indonesian state and multinational capital underpinned by repressive state rule is 
proving an increasingly inadequate basis on which to manage the Indonesian economy.78 
That is clear in the current economic crisis in Indonesia in which the Soeharto regime has 
been forced to call in the IMF to bail it out. 
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In so unequivocally tying our diplomacy to forces seeking to maintain the Soeharto 
model, Australian policy-makers have become detached from the voices of change. These 
forces such as those led by Indonesian democracy leader Megawati Sukarnoputri 
represent the best chance for a democratic transition in a post-Soeharto Indonesia. 
Stability and security will be achieved, therefore, less through supporting repressive state 
rule in the region than promoting aspirations for democratic development and 
accountable governance across Asia and the Pacific, including in Australia itself. 
Far from promoting such aspirations, however, the Australia's foreign policy 
establishment has put all its "diplomatic and strategic eggs into the Soeharto basket".79 
Thus, for Tim Fischer, Soeharto represents "perhaps the world's greatest figure in the 
latter half of the 20th Century". 80 The extent of such support can be measured in 
Australia's continuing recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. 
Representing the only state outside of ASEAN to do so, Australia has been "the odd man 
out" in the international community over the issue of East Timor. The European Union, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations are all beginning to take a 
more high-profile approach in opposing Indonesia's human rights abuses through seeking 
a negotiated settlement in East Timor.81 The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to 
Bishop Bello and Ramos-Horta is another sign that East Timor is becoming an increasing 
focus of international diplomacy. As is Nelson Mandela' s recent attempts to find a 
resolution to the conflict. 
The increasing detachment of Australian diplomacy from such international efforts has 
not been without costs. This was illustrated in the recent defeat of Australia on the floor 
of the United Nations in the ballot for a temporary place on the UN security council. That 
very little was learned from this defeat is evident from Ambassador Butler's account of 
the vote in terms of what he called the RLB factor, or the Rotten Lying Bastards who 
promised to vote for Australia, but evidently did not. In accounting for Australia's failed 
diplomacy in such personal terms, Butler ignored the extent to which Australia's policy 
on East Timor has rankled with states across the globe, particularly in Mrica where 
Australia lost most of its votes and where Portugal still has considerable diplomatic 
influence. 82 That our policy-makers remain impervious to, and increasingly detached 
from, such international diplomatic opinion is further illustrated by the Australia's effort 
to distance itself from US criticisms of the Indonesian Government in which, as Brian 
79 Barker, G. (1996) "Australia Needs Tougher Line on Succession" Australian Financial Review 6 
August: p.10. 
80 Lague, D. (1996) "The Looming Crisis with Jakarta" Sydney Morning Herald 3 August: p.15. 
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"Human Rights: EP Adopts Ten Resolutions" Agence Europe 18 December 1995. Stewart, C. (1996) 
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(1996) "US poised for action on East Timor" The Age 21 November: p.6. Leahy, J. (1996) "Support 
Swells for Timorese Independence" South China Morning Post 21 October: p.l. 
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Toohey has observed, Australian leaders have actively sneered at more enlightened US 
attempts to raise human rights with Soeharto.83 In fact, in formalising Australia's 
diplomatic alignment with the Soeharto regime, the recently-signed Australia-Indonesia 
Security Agreement has served to effectively distance Australian diplomacy from the 
diplomatic path pursued by governments across the world in raising concerns over East 
Timor and Indonesia's human rights record, including by Australia's traditional Western 
allies. To reiterate, Australia's support for the Soeharto Government has precluded us 
from contributing constructively to a resolution to East Timor which, if achieved, would 
provide a far more secure regional strategic and diplomatic environment in the future.84 
DOD 
This chapter has highlighted the inadequacies of prevailing regional diplomacy. It has 
argued that, in pursuing a dual agenda of free trade diplomacy and regional strategic 
engagement, policy-makers have sought to integrate Australian security interests into the 
dominant circuits of commercial and strategic power across the Pacific. In doing so, 
Australian diplomacy has become aligned to repressive state elites who have not only 
blocked democratic change but have pursued inequitable policies designed to benefit a 
small business, military and technocratic class at the expense of the great majority of 
peoples in the Asia-Pacific. 
In aligning Australian diplomacy to these dangerous forces, policy-makers have 
continued to draw upon the traditional assumptions of Western IR. This is clear in the 
continual promotion of a state-centred security policy that has privileged state-building 
forces irrespective of the repressive and corrupt nature of those forces. This conventional 
security agenda has, by definition, narrowed the ambit of Australian diplomacy to inter-
governmental relations with regional state elites, thereby precluding an expanded notion 
of security based upon questions concerning human rights, gender, ecology and 
migration. Yet, these questions are becoming increasingly important issues and themes of 
the post-Cold War period. It is to these questions that I now turn to in this thesis, before 
going on to discuss how Australian foreign policy might be reframed in the fmal chapter 
of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
On the Margins of the Asia-Pacific: Omissions, 
Exclusions, Silences 
The instabilities in global units and their interrelations are an incitement to discourse, an 
invitation to review the partialities of the voices that have nwnopolized the interpretation of 
political identity and space and to create a discursive frame that can enunciate alternatives. 
To appreciate this invitation, however, it is necessary ... to map the sites of alternative voices 
whose addresses have not appeared in the directories provided by mainstream political 
science disciplines. 1 
In the previous chapter, I examined the ways in which Australia's contemporary regional 
diplomacy has become aligned to some of the region's most authoritarian and repressive 
regimes. Based upon an agenda of integrating into the dominant strategic and 
commercial circuits of power, Australian diplomacy has become detached from the 
everyday grassroots realities of the region. This chapter examines in more detail these 
marginalised realities- in particular, gender, ethnicity, ecology and migration. In doing 
so, it focuses on a range of social relations written out of foreign policy discourse and its 
dominant territorial cartographies. Bradley Klein has identified these social relations with 
"the multiple, overlapping and interlocking networks of production, ecology, work and 
personal identity" of regional life. 2 
By highlighting these silenced realities, the aim of this chapter is to show how a variety of 
non-territorial identities and affiliations have become increasingly salient forces recently 
-representing a source of many of the volatilities and possibilities of post-Cold War 
politics. The shifting definitions of work, identity and gender that have characterised 
post-Cold War politics are having a broader deterritorialising effect on global political life 
in which the territorial boundaries of states are coming under serious challenge. 
In the face of this challenge, however, contemporary regional elites have resorted to the 
familiar territorialising moves of modern statecraft. Here we shall see how policy-makers 
have sought to contain contemporary flows within the conventional geopolitical grids of 
self/other, inside/outside and domestic/foreign. This territorialising response is proving to 
be increasingly dangerous and inadequate in a postmodern world of accelerating 
velocities and collapsing boundaries. Indeed, by continuing to pursue an elitist, state-
centred regional diplomacy, Australian policy-makers, in particular, have failed to 
1 Shapiro, M.J. (1996) "Introduction" in M.J. Shapiro and H.R. Alker (eds.) Challenging Boundaries: 
Global Flows, Territorial Identities. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. p.xvi. 
2 Klein, B. (1994) Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. p.l40. 
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understand the rapid changes presently taking place in the region. Through recent 
diplomacy, they have reproduced a discourse bereft of the kinds of insights into 
contemporary political life required to formulate an adequate post-Cold War policy 
response. As I point out throughout this chapter, an adequate understanding of the region 
requires the formulation of analytical schemas more nuanced and sophisticated than those 
currently framing the narrow trade- and security-driven agendas of Australian foreign 
policy. 
In focusing on the silences of contemporary foreign policy, this chapter examines in turn 
gender, transborder flows, ecology and indigenous peoples. Although, by no means 
exhausting the list of omissions of contemporary foreign policy, the examination of these 
issues exemplifies the narrow policy perspectives of Australia's regional engagement 
Exclusion 1: The Gendered Nature of Industrial Production and Resistance in the Asia-
Pacific 
Gender has been almost universally excluded from analyses proclaiming the rise of the 
Pacific Century. For instance, the Garnaut report on the "Northeast Asian ascendancy" 
largely neglected the issue, while policy statements by successive Australian foreign 
ministers have been notable for their glaring omission of gender as an important 
dimension of regional engagement. In excluding gender from analytical attention, policy-
makers have abstracted Australia's regional engagement from the local, everyday 
dynamics of the societies with which they have sought to engage. Indeed, as we shall see, 
not only has gender been central to the region's "economic miracle" but a focus on gender 
politics serves to disrupt and destabilise the triumphalist nature of Pacific Century 
discourse. In commenting on this silence in the political analysis of the region in general, 
Maila Stivens has noted that: 
the issue of women as active members of classes has been one of the glaring 
absences of political discourse about the region. "Peasants", "farmers", 
"proletariats", all the participants in social movements have been assumed to 
be unproblematically male, with little recognition of the ways that women act 
as political agents. 3 
What is intriguing about this silence is the central role that female labour has played in the 
economic rise of regional states.4 Indeed, the most visible characteristic of export-
oriented production across the Pacific has been its gendered nature. As Gayatri Spivak 
has observed, "it is the urban sub-proletariat female who is the paradigmatic subject of 
the current international division of labour". 5 That is evident in the free trade export 
3 Stivens, M. (1991) "Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics" in M. Stivens (ed.) Why Gender 
Matters in Southeast Asian Politics. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia. No.23, Monash University: 
Clayton, Victoria. p.23. 
4 See, for instance, Kaye, L. (1995) "To Bear Any Burden" Far Eastern Economic Review 7 September: 
pp.42-43. 
5 Spivak, G. (1987) In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. Methuen: New York. p.218. 
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zones that now litter the Pacific rim where female workers predominate in low-wage, 
non-unionised and low-skilled production. In South Korea, for instance, female workers 
make up between 70 and 90% of the workforce in export industries, while in Taiwan's 
free trade export zones female labour constitutes up to 85% of the total workforce.6 
In an increasingly competitive global economy, both transnational corporations and 
smaller firms have sought to exploit substantial wage differentials between men and 
women. In doing so, these firms have been able to lower costs by hiring part-time female 
workers which has shifted the cost of the reproduction of labour to households. 7 The 
attraction of female labour for capital is heightened by the prevailing belief that because 
of their subordinate position in the societies of Asia and the Pacific? women are more 
"pliable" than men and, therefore, more suited to factory discipline. These beliefs have 
also been accompanied by the notion that the "nimble-fingered", "dexterous" nature of 
"Oriental" women make them perfect for the demands of assembly line work. These 
gendered beliefs have been central to the expansion of industrial capitalism recently as 
young unmarried women have become the pivot of globalising strategies in the Asia-
Pacific. 
A central feature of Asia-Pacific development, therefore, has been the way in which 
existing local discourses of patriarchy and paternalism have provided the precondition for 
the transnational relocation of capital to Asia . Far from conforming to an idealised model 
of the free market, the region's economic growth has been associated, according to 
Frederico Deyo, with "the continued vitality, and indeed the expansion, of employment 
relations based on patriarchal, paternalistic and patrimonial systems of labor control".8 In 
fact, the articulation of capitalist relations of production with existing discourses of 
patriarchy and cultural authoritarianism has given rise to new forms of gender 
domination. That, in turn, has led to new configurations of identity and a redefinition in 
the boundaries that mark out the domains of work and femininity in the region. 
Exemplifying this shift has been the emergence of a new class of young, unmarried female 
workers engaged in low-wage, repetitive assembly-line work. This emerging industrial 
labour force has been recruited from the increasing pool of unemployed workers in rural 
areas due to increasing landlessness and mechanisation of agricultural work.9 The 
6 Gurtov, M (1991) Global Politics in the Human Interest. Second Edition. Lynne Rienner Publishers: 
Boulder, Colo. p.l13. Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities: The Pacific in the Post-Cold War Order 
Era. A Study by the Institute for Food and Development Policy and the Transnational Institute: San 
Francisco. p.40. 
7 Palat, R. (1993) "Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of Pacific-Asia" in Palat, R.A. (ed.) Pacific 
Asia and the Future of the World-System. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut. p.16. 
8 Deyo, F. (1989) Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism. 
University of California Press: Berkeley. p.8. 
9 See, for example, Buang, Amriah (1993) "Development and Factory Women: Negative perceptions 
from a Malaysian source area" in J. Momsen and V.Kinnaird (eds.) Different Places, Different Voices: 
Gender and Development in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Routledge: London. p.197. 
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formation of this new class of female industrial workers, however, has not been a uniform 
process across the region but rather has been characterised by culturally specific regimes 
of patriarchal power. As Donald Nonini has pointed out, the task of critical scholars is to 
investigate the great variety of patriarchal controls within the region in all their cultural 
and historical specificities. 10 
In her study of women factory workers in Malaysia, for instance, Aihwa Ong has 
examined the formation of a nascent industrial force in Malaysia. 11 lllustrating how this 
involved a transition from the flexible conceptions of time and space of kampung (Malay 
Village) life to the hierarchical structuring of industrial discipline, Ong has examined the 
ways in which female rural migrants were converted into a cheap pool of industrial 
labour. Her focus is on overlapping disciplinary techniques deployed by state and capital 
to produce the biological objects, docile bodies and sexualised subjects that have fuelled 
transnational production. 
Through instituting labour laws designed to maintain the sexual imbalance in wages, the 
Malaysian state has been crucial in supplying the flow of cheap rural labour into the 
emerging industrial sector. These laws have enabled transnational corporations to lower 
production costs through employing a female-dominated labour force. 12 In fact, 
governments throughout the region have pursued policies designed to displace women 
workers from the rural sector to produce a surplus labour force for the industrial sector. 
In Taiwan, for instance, President Lee has candidly admitted that "the Government has 
intentionally held down peasants' income so as to transfer these people- who were 
formerly engaged in agriculture- into industries" .13 
While government policy has been central to securing a flow of rural female migrants into 
industrial production, corporate strategies for securing discipline at the factory floor have 
also been gender-based. As Donald Nonini has pointed out, the imposition of industrial 
discipline in Malaysian factories has involved reproducing at the factory floor the broader 
discourses of patriarchy that subordinate young females in rural Malay families. That is 
clear in the ways in which male factory supervisors have taken on the metaphorical role 
of "fathers", "uncles" or "older brothers" in relation to their young female subordinates 
who have been encouraged to display "Asian" female values such as loyalty, hard work, 
deference to elders and piety. 14 As we saw in the last chapter, the East Asian state has 
played a critical role in promoting these so-called traditional "Asian" values. This has 
10 Nonini, D. (1993) "On the Outs on the Rim: An Ethnographic Grounding of the Asia-Pacific 
Imaginary" in A. Dirlik (ed.) What's in a Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea. 
Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. p.171. See also Pettman, R. (1992) "Labor, Gender and the Balance 
of Productivity: South Korea and Singapore" Journal of Contemporary Asia. 22 (1): pp.45-57. 
11 Ong, Aihwa (1987) Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia. State 
University of New York Press: Albany.p.151, 178. 
12 lbid. p.147. 
13 cited in Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities. p.43 italics added. 
14 Ibid.p.168. 
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served not only to naturalise a particular patriarchal model of the family but to reinforce 
traditional modes of gender domination through which factory discipline has been 
secured. Paradoxically, then, the promotion of Asian "values" by regional elites has 
involved the reification of "tradition" as a way of producing the conditions for "modern" 
industrial production. 
By organising labour relations in terms of the patriarchal hierarchies of Malay society, 
transnational capital has been able to exercise a pervasive control over the lives of its 
workers. In many instances, factory management has encouraged the notion amongst the 
families of its female employees that the factory will protect the well-being and chastity of 
their daughters. That has enabled management in the industrial estates and export 
production zones to enforce a strict code of discipline on factory workers in the quest to 
achieve higher productivity levels. The control that factory management has exerted over 
female employees has in fact extended well beyond the factory floor. Housed in barracks 
or dormitories common throughout the region's industrial estates, many female workers 
are subject to curfews and other measures designed to regulate their movements. In 
controlling the mobility of workers, factory management has sought to produce a 
"captive" labour force that can be mobilised at any time in order to meet ever higher 
production rates. While such overt control has been justified as protecting the chastity of 
young factory workers, the gender-based disparity in power relations prevalent in the 
region's export factories has inevitably translated into sexual harassment and sexual 
exploitation. In these factories an unofficial policy of "get laid or get laid off' is not 
uncommon. 15 The sense of being both exploited and under constant surveillance has been 
evocatively expressed by one Taiwanese factory worker who explained: 
I've sold five years of my youth to the company. I need a rest from this 
brainnumbing work for two or three weeks. But there is no way I can leave 
without quitting or taking a big loss. There are so many regulations you feel 
you are tied up with ropes till you can't budge an inch. And I've given them five 
years of my life.16 
The modes of surveillance and discipline that have given rise to this nascent industrial 
class are illuminated by Michel Foucault's notion of "biopower" .17 This concept relates to 
what Foucault has rather obliquely termed the "disciplinary techniques" deployed upon 
the body to constitute subjectivity. Put another way, the Foucauldian notion of 
"biopower" stresses the microphysics of power and its productive role in constituting and 
15 Tadiar, N.X (1993) "Sexual Economies in the Asia-Pacific Community" in Dirlik, A. (ed.) What's in a 
Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. p.195. For a 
further discussion of these links between sexualised violence and prevailing development see Yayori, 
Matsui (1996) "Economic Development and Asian Women" Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 26 (1): 
pp.28-33. 
16 cited in Gurtov, M (1991) Global Politics in the Human Interest p.61. 
17 Foucault, M. (1983) "The Subject and Power" in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds.) Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Second Edition. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
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making possible certain identities. Here modes of socialisation and discipline act upon the 
individual body to demarcate "normal" sanctioned behaviour from acts of "madness", 
"deviance" and "criminality". 
What is instructive for the purposes of this thesis, is the intersection between these micro-
practices of biopower and the macro-practices of foreign policy which draw upon a 
complementary form of "geopower". While the former works on the surface of the 
individual body, the latter is inscribed onto the surface of the body politic, constituting 
the macro-boundaries of IR. The complementarity of these distinct forms of inscription, 
has produced a modem form of power which, as Foucault suggests, is both totalising and 
individualising. Thus, modem power not only focuses on the discipline and welfare of 
entire populations over a given territory (geopower) but also inscribes itself on the 
microspaces of individual bodies (biopower). 
This intersection of the microphysics and macro physics of power provides critical insights 
into the expansion and reproduction of contemporary capitalism in the region. As we saw 
in Chapter 6, in promoting the regional imaginary of "the Asia-Pacific", contemporary 
policy-makers have produced a transnational space in which flows of capital and 
technology have been facilitated across the region. While these macro-practices of 
foreign policy have made possible the capital flows central to regional economic growth, 
the micropractices of "biopower" have served to constitute the docile, disciplined bodies 
that make up the region's industrial work force which has generated industrial 
production. It is through such modes of power that rural societies in Asia are being 
incorporated into regional and global circuits of capital. Here the making of labouring 
subjects from a pool of unemployed rural migrants has been central to the intensified, 
geographically expanded phase of capitalism which has characterised the regional 
economic miracle. 
This transition from rural migrant to industrial worker in the region's industrial 
transformation, however, has not only involved new forms of domination but has also 
encompassed new subjectivities and new modes of resistance. In other words, the 
articulation of globalising strategies with existing patriarchal structures has not simply 
represented a process of domination over passive objects but rather has engendered 
shifting definitions of work, identity and gender. That, in turn, has given rise to new 
spaces for political action and resistance. This is illustrated in Ong's study by the changing 
distribution of power within rural Malay families with the recruitment of female workers 
into modem employment. Hence, while the making of a gendered industrial force has 
enabled the exploitation of industrial female workers by local and transnational capital, it 
has also tended to enhance the position of these women in their own rural families. In 
other words, as significant "breadwinners", many female industrial workers have been 
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able to challenge male authority in the home. 18 In this sense, sexuality has become both a 
way of reinforcing new modes of domination and exploitation in the modem economy 
and also, paradoxically, a means of resisting and subverting the customary hierarchies of 
rural Malay life. 
The centrality of such gender dynamics in regional political life has been almost entirely 
overlooked by regional foreign policy elites preoccupied with promoting dominant 
strategic and economic relations. This is particularly true of Australian policy-makers 
who have almost totally disregarded gender as a serious policy issue. This has served to 
abstract Australia's diplomacy of "engaging with the Asia-Pacific" from the micro-
practices of the region's political economy. In doing so, policy-makers have been blinded 
to potential sources of unrest and conflict in the region based upon the new 
configurations of resistance and gender domination which I have mapped above. In 
continuing to reproduce the boundaries of Western IR, policy-makers have simply 
ignored the trans-border flows and shifting definitions of identity that have characterised 
contemporary regional life. In the next section of this chapter I examine some of these 
flows in more detail. 
Exclusion II: Trans-Pacific Flows and Border Crossings 
Recent discourse on the Pacific Century has focused on the dominant economic and 
commercial flows of the regional political economy. For example, Peter Drysdale's 
influential text on international economic pluralism examines the growth of East Asian 
economies in terms of the rise of intra-regional trade and increasing regional economic 
interdependence over the last several decades. 19 In policy terms, this narrow focus on 
trade and market integration has been evidenced in the absence of a working group on 
social or environmental issues in APEC. 
So while state-sanctioned capital and trade flows have dominated the APEC agenda, 
other kinds of flows, particularly of people, have been excluded from analysis and policy-
making. Recent advances in transportation - in particular, air travel - has meant that 
mass movements of migrants, refugees, students, businesspeople, professionals and 
tourists have come to challenge existing notions of movement and space that undergird 
foreign policy discourse. In particular, the dominant notion since Galileo that the 
homogeneity of the world follows from the homogeneity of geometrical space in which 
movement is definable through one and the same universally valid measure has become 
18 Ong, A. (1987) Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline p.220. See also Buang for the changing 
lifestyles of factory women and the "backlash" this has created, Buang, A.(1993) "Development and 
Factory Women". 
19 Drysdale, P. (1988) International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific. 
Allen and Unwin: Sydney. See also Drysdale, P. and Chen, K.Y. (eds) (1995) Corporate Links and 
Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. Harper Educational: Pymble, New South Wales. 
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contested. 20 Instead, what we are seeing today is a world "where the borders and 
boundaries of modernity melt into the emergent forms of postmodernity and then fold 
back onto themselves [and where] the common thread that runs through the multiplicity 
of life activities is the increasing mobility of actors". 21 
Described by one scholar as "a kaleidoscope of moving bodies with complex 
subjectivities" / 2 this increasing mobility of peoples across existing borders has variegated 
the global map, unravelling the tightly demarcated boundaries between inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion and foreign/domestic of Western IR. The pervasive logic of 
territoriality in contemporary foreign policy simply reduces the idea of movement to 
regulated state-sanctioned flows of capital and trade while writing out the identities of 
gender, class, ecology and culture. These identities are based upon non-territorial 
affiliations and produce non-linear movements and flows. Hence, much of the rich texture 
of everyday life and movement across the Pacific is left out of foreign policy discourse 
and its sovereign model of movement and identity which confmes contemporary flows 
within rigid geopolitical/ geoeconomic grids. Contemporary flows fundamentally 
challenge traditional Hobbesian understandings from which Australian foreign policy has 
derived its major assumptions about IR. In continuing to hold to these understandings, 
contemporary policy-makers have privileged market and commercial flows over non-
territorial human movements. That has effectively idealised the region in terms of, what 
Evans and Grant call, a series of "shifting industrial complementarities and economic 
inter-linkages".23 
This valorisation of the region's political economy serves to mask less salutary flows and 
movements that have also been central to the "making" of regional identity. In other 
words, the historical constitution of the region has not merely involved commercial and 
market flows, but a range of transborder crossings silenced by prevailing modes of 
discourse. In the rest of this chapter I examine some of these deterritorialising flows, 
highlighting how the multiple and shifting identities of regional life have been obscured in 
contemporary theorising about the Pacific Century. While it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to adequately map the trajectories of these flows, I examine how such trans-
Pacific border-crossing has challenged conventional state boundaries. This challenge has, 
in turn, elicited a violent reterritorialising response by regional states seeking to contain 
contemporary flows within conventional geopolitical borders. 
2° For a discussion of Galileo' s notion of space and movement and its importance to modern science and 
philosophy see Cassirer, E. (1963) The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. Trans. by 
Mario Domandi. Basil Blackwell: Oxford. pp.182-3. 
21 Soguk, N. (1996) "Transnational!fransborder Bodies: Resistance, Accommodation and Exile in 
Refugee and Migration Movements on the US-Mexican Border" in M.J. Shapiro and H.R. Alker (eds.) 
Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis. p.291. 
22 Ibid. p.291. 
23 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of this. 
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i. Sex Workers 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the contemporary political economy is the sex 
industry and its traffic in women's bodies. Prostitutes, hostesses or sex workers have 
become a central part of the globalisation of the world economy. According to some 
accounts, international traffic in women is currently more lucrative than the global arms 
trade. 24 Current estimates indicate that between one and two million women and children 
are trafficked across the globe every year.25 One hundred thousand women are taken to 
Japan annually to work in indentured servitude in bars and brothels, the vast of majority 
from the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. 26 This regionalised sexual political economy is 
characterised by the concentration of prostitution around both military bases and 
international tourist centres. Thousands of sex-workers service US military bases and 
facilities around the region, while the figure for the tourist industry is undoubtedly far 
higher. 
In touting the exotic subservience of Asian women, tourist companies have sustained the 
rising demand for sex-workers in the region.27 One German tourist brochure on the 
attractions of Asia, begins "if you want extremely young girls something you could 
hanged for in your own country ... ", while another obscenely boasts: 
you can get the feeling that taking a girl here as easy as buying a pack of 
cigarettes ... With this little slave you can do practically everything in the field 
of sex. She gives real Thai warmth.28 
Described in a recent article in The Far Eastern Economic Review as "the underside of 
Asia's economic boom"29 , this trade in women's bodies is simply written out of 
conventional foreign policy discourse. In their preoccupation with idealised capital and 
commodity exchanges, contemporary policy-makers have simply ignored the body 
politics of the regional sex industry and its inherent sexualised violence.30 It is hardly 
surprising to find then that the appalling exploitation of women and children in 
international prostitution is ignored by regional governments who, in urgent need of 
foreign exchange, quite literally prostitute their own countries.31 
24 Pettman, J. (1996) "Border Crossings/Shifting Identities: Minorities, Gender, and the State in 
International Perspective" in M.J. Shapiro and H.R. Alker (eds.) Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, 
Territorial Identities. University Press Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. p.267. 
25 Mirkinson, J. (1994) "Red Light, Green Light: The Global Trafficking of Women" Breakthrough. 
Spring: p.2. 
26 Ibid.p.2. 
27 Ibid.p.3. 
28 Ibid.p.3-4. 
29 "For Lust or Money" Far Eastern Economic Review 14 December 1995: p.22. 
30 Pettman, J. (1996) "Border Crossings/Shifting Identities" p.276. 
31 Ibid. p.266. 
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Outside the mainstream labour market and working illegally, migrant sex workers 
become the greatest victims of violence, their invisibility leading to exploitation by a 
system that denies their existence.32 In Japan, for instance, refuges set up for migrant sex 
workers have reported large numbers of women requiring medical treatment as a result of 
their work, often from terrible sexual violence.33 There is strong evidence of the existence 
of international networks of brokers who control the supply of migrant sex workers and 
who have connections to organised crime syndicates. 34 Often attracted into sex work 
through false promises made by agents, migrant sex workers typically incur huge "debts" 
in transport and accommodation costs before even starting work. These debts can take 
years to pay off. 
The complex dynamics of this regional sexual economy are embedded in a broader set of 
colonial and imperial relationships. Such relationships operate in terms of both larger 
geopolitical structures and more specific gender and personal social relations in which the 
penetration of capital and strategic power across the globe (geopower) is replicated in the 
penetration of men into submissive oriental bodies (biopower). The intersection between 
geopower and biopower can be seen in US military bases throughout Asia whose 
colonising presence on the territory of the Philippines, Japan and South Korea has been 
replicated in the conquest and colonisation of women's bodies by American servicemen in 
the bars and brothels that surround the bases. Just as Asia has been portrayed in Western 
strategic discourse as a monolithic "other", so too in the everyday discourse of US 
soldiers have "Asian Women" become reduced, according to popularly worn T-shirt, to 
"little brown fucking machines powered by rice".35 This troping of the body as "other" 
serves to dehumanise migrant sex workers, effectively reducing them to raw materials for 
either export or processing at home in the sex trade. 36 
For some observers, the conquest of women's bodies on such a scale has signalled a total 
and complete colonisation of both the social and physical body.37 And yet, for all the 
violence and exploitation experienced by migrant sex workers, there are parts of their 
lives that remain sites of resistance, uncolonised. The everyday practices of these women 
are characterised, accordingly, by "strategies of survival"38 which resist total subjection to 
globalising processes. In their book Let the Good Times Roll, Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 
relate the stories of women across Asia who, in the face of economic tumult, sickening 
physical violence and sexual exploitation, have managed to survive with great courage 
and resilience and who, in their simple day-to-day practices, have displayed small acts of 
32 K.B. (1992) "Human Traffic into Japan: Bringing Workers from Indonesia and Malaysia" Ampo: 
Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 23 (4): p.4. 
33 Mizuho, M (1992) "Women from Thailand" Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 23 (4): p.18. 
34 Ibid. p.17, Abjorensen, N. (1996) "The Growing Trade in Female Flesh" The Canberra Times 21 
September: p.C2. 
35 Tadiar, N.X (1993) "Sexual Economies in the Asia-Pacific Community" p.201. 
36 Ibid.p.197. 
37 Ibid.p.195. 
38 Soguk, N. (1996) "Transnationalffransborder Bodies" p.308. 
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resistance.39 In working illegally, migrant workers not only transgress the dominant moral 
and territorial boundaries of society, they also evade the territorialising reach of the 
modem state. While I do not want to play down the great violences of the sex industry, it 
is imperative to avoid simply reproducing racialised and gendered stereotypes of the 
submissive oriental woman by treating Asian sex workers as only victims of the sex 
industry. Rather, in the stories of these women's everyday lives- silenced in the grand 
narrative of the Pacific Century -we begin to understand them as active political 
subjects who, with great resourcefulness and intelligence, resist, confront and negotiate, 
the dominant instruments of power and capital in contemporary politicallife.40 
ii. Migrant Labour 
The trans-Pacific border-crossings of sex workers have been reproduced in the regional 
flows of other migrant workers, refugees, tourists, students, professionals and 
businesspeople. In particular, labour migration across the region has been crucial to the 
rapid industrialisation of East Asia, a fact obscured by the focus on trade and capital 
flows in conventional foreign policy discourse. While I have examined the migration of 
rural female workers within the state, migrant flows in the Asia-Pacific have also 
occurred across national boundaries. In 1994 alone, more than one million migrants went 
abroad, "building the glistening skyscrapers and throbbing expressways, airports and 
transit systems of the region's boom towns". 41 It is now conservatively estimated that 
there are 2.6 million migrants currently working throughout Asia.42 In the construction 
industry, foreign workers are playing a particularly central role as both the proliferation 
of public works projects and serious labour shortages in Asia are fuelling the growing 
need to import foreign labour. 43 In Malaysia's construction industry 80 percent of the 
labour force consists of foreign workers. 44 
Driven by the unevenness of capitalist development in the Pacific rim, labour migration 
has been based upon substantial wage differentials between labouring nationals. Hence, 
for many foreign workers moving across national boundaries represents an opportunity to 
help their families climb out of grinding poverty. In labour-importing countries, on the 
other hand, the existence of large pools of migrant workers, who often work illegally for 
low pay and in the most dangerous and onerous jobs, serves to push down wages and 
39 Sturdevant, S.P. and Stoltzfus, B. (1992) Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the US Military in 
Asia. The New Press: New York. 
40 In addition to the references cited above, other ethnographic readings of the resistance offered by 
migrant sex workers include Chant, S. (1995) Wonun of a Lesser Cost: Female Labour, Foreign 
Exchange and Philippine Development. Pluto Press: London. and Berry, C. (1994) A Bit on the Side: 
East-West Topographies of Desire. emPress: Sydney. 
41 Hiebert, M. (1995) "Building Asia: Give and Take" The Far Eastern Economic Review 25 May: p.54. 
42 Ibid. For an account of labour migration flows throughout the region see the cover story "Workers on 
the Move: In Search of Prosperity" Far Eastern Economic Review 23 May 1996: pp.60-77. 
43 According to one journalist, Taiwan is facing nothing less than a "labour crunch". Baum, J. (1995) 
"Building Asia: Toil and Trouble?" Far Eastern Economic Review 25 May: pp.56-57. 
44 Hiebert, M. (1995) "Building Asia: Give and Take" p.55. 
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lower the costs of production for capital. Far from confirming idealised notions of the 
"free market", therefore, labour migration can be understood in terms of the creation of a 
subterranean economy that thrives on the gross exploitation of workers. 
This economy of hyper-exploitation has been based on the inferior status of migrant 
workers as illegal or "guest" labourers who, in lacking citizenship rights, are under 
constant threat of deportation and the unscrupulous behaviour of exploitative brokers and 
employers.45 As Donald Nonini has noted "the threat of deportation acts as compelling 
form of industrial discipline".46 Strong evidence suggests that the supply of migrant 
labour is often controlled by trafficking syndicates who have connections to organised 
crime such as the Yakuza in Japan.47 On arriving in their host country, many migrants 
become bonded labour - their passports confiscated by agents until costs of transport 
and accommodation are paid off. For the few who make a small fortune as migrant 
labourers there are many tragic stories of workers returning to their home countries with 
greater debts than when they left. 
At the core of this economy of hyper-exploitation is a structural disparity between the 
mobility of capital which increasingly moves around the globe in search of low-wage sites 
and the regulation of labour through visa and citizenship requirements. Hence, while 
states have worked together in dismantling trade barriers in APEC to facilitate trade and 
capital flows, they have also individually sought to regulate human flows in and out of 
the sovereign space of the state. Not surprisingly, debates over "ethnicity" and "national 
identity" have dominated public discourse throughout the region - debates which, 
shaped by these broader processes of facilitation/regulation, are deeply embedded in the 
structural dynamics of capitalist expansion across the Pacific. 
Notwithstanding such attempts to regulate labour migration, increasing labour mobility 
has created diasporic communities of migrants that have fanned out across the region. 
This has engendered a variegated map of migratory flows very different from the 
dominant territorial cartography of Western IR. In continuing to espouse a sovereign 
model of movement and identity, policy-makers are detaching regional diplomacy from 
the everyday realities of these diasporic communities. As part of a broader 
deterritorialisation of contemporary life, flows of capital, information, culture, migrants 
and other bodies are crossing national boundaries at ever increasing speed. 48 Hence, 
while thousands of Indonesian workers labour daily in Singapore, Malaysia and Japan, 
45 Lie, J. (1994) "The 'Problem' of Foreign Workers in Contemporary Japan" Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars 26 (3): p.6. See also Jayasankaran, S. (1995) "Gimme Shelter: Illegal immigrants 
allegedly mistreated" Far Eastern Economic Review 10 August: p.26. 
46 Nonini, D. (1993) "On the Outs on the Rim" p.169. 
47 K.B. (1992) "Human Traffic into Japan: Bringing Workers from Indonesia and Malaysia". Lie, J. 
(1994) "The 'Problem' of Foreign Workers in Contemporary Japan". 
48 See for example Jones, S. (1996) "Hope and Tragedy for Migrants in Malaysia" The Asia-Pacific 
Magazine April: pp.22-27 which represents a sobering account of the lives of Indonesian migrants in 
Malaysia. 
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Hong Kong has been inundated by Chinese workers.49 Meanwhile, Thai workers have 
moved into Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Japan and Brunei, many of whom come 
from Thailand's construction industry, which has itself had to import illegal labour from 
Burma.50 Similarly, the Philippines has recently had to import welders for construction 
projects after a shortage caused by the export of Filipino welders to Japan and Taiwan. 51 
The complexities of this international labour circuit are creating complex labour 
interlinkages. Diasporas of labouring migrants now criss-cross Asia and the Pacific as 
literally whole regions are being integrated into international labour circuits. From the 
Philippine village of Santa Rosa, for instance, 2000 of the 7000 residents have taken 
overseas jobs, while in 1994 an estimated 53,000 residents of the poor northeastern Thai 
province of Udon Thani went abroad, many of whom were employed on construction 
sites throughout Asia and the Middle East. 52 
These human flows have elicited a powerful reterritorialising response by the state. 
Through a variety of practices, the state has sought to control the mobility of people by 
reinscribing the inviolability of sovereign boundaries that separate domestic from 
international, inside from outside and self from other. The policing of these boundaries 
has taken many forms, most notably through immigration policy in which regional states 
have demarcated domestic selves from foreign others- the latter of whom have been 
defmed as "exiles", "migrants", "foreigners" and "aliens" whose right of residence has not 
only been severely restricted but whose otherness has been inscribed in racialised terms. 53 
In transgressing the sovereign borders of the state, therefore, migrants and refugees have 
become a signifier of an external realm of danger and threat. For instance, in Australia, 
"boat people" is a label used to describe Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees which turns 
resourceful, courageous human beings into a monolithic mob. Depicted in such 
dehumanised terms, the flow of refugees has been understood less as a human issue than 
a problem of "sovereignty". This has allowed Australian authorities to hold refugees in 
detention centres and repatriate them back to their country of origin to discourage future 
refugees from "invading" the country. 
This projection of otherness onto migrants and refugees has also been exemplified in 
Japan where foreign workers and refugees have been blamed for a whole raft of social 
problems such as bringing crime and disease with them.54 That is despite the fact migrant 
49 Hiebert, M. (1995) "Building Asia: Give and Take" p.55. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Karp, J. (1995) "Migrant Workers: A New Kind of Hero" The Far Eastern Economic Review 20 
March: p.43. 
52 Ibid. p.44. Fairclough, G. (1995) "Building Asia: Seeking Fortune" The Far Eastern Economic Review 
25 May: p.58. 
53 Pettman, J. (1996) "Border Crossings/Shifting Identities" p.267. 
54 Hiebert, M. (1995) "Building Asia: Give and Take" p.54. Lie, J. (1994) "The 'Problem' of Foreign 
Workers in Contemporary Japan" pp.8-9. 
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workers in Japan tend to take on those jobs that many Japanese are unprepared to do at 
very low wages- a service that has helped maintain high standards of living in Japan. 
This suggests that the construction of refugees and migrants as a threat derive their 
veracity less from empirical reality than from the ways such representations affirm the 
sovereign claims of the state. 
iii. The Policy Response: Policing Territorial Boundaries 
Such strident attempts to reassert the boundaries between inside and outside betrays a 
deep anxiety on the part of state elites towards the flux and speed of global flows and 
movements. Commenting on the proliferation of illegal Indonesian settlements in 
Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir commented that "no country anywhere could tolerate 
the existence of illegal settlement within its confines. If it did not do anything about the 
problem, the Government would lose the confidence of the people".55 In anxiously 
articulating this sovereign model of identity and space, Mahathir has sought to reassert 
the sovereign boundaries of the Malaysian state in response to the flows of contemporary 
regional life. Thus, Mahathir's statement coincided with a crackdown on Indonesian 
"aliens" in which workers who had long settled in Malaysia (and whose labour has been 
crucial to Malaysia's rapid economic growth) were deported and their settlements, built 
over many years, bulldozed to the ground. 56 
This violent policing of boundaries is also evident in the surveillance of Australia's 
coastline and the prosecution of Indonesian fishermen for illegally fishing in "Australian 
waters". Many of the fisherman prosecuted are from the Sarna Bajo people, also known 
as the sea nomads of Sulawesi, who have for centuries been fishing Trepang in the waters 
off north-western Australia.57 These people are constantly battling to retain their sea-
faring way of life in the face of the depletion of ocean resources by large Japanese and 
Taiwanese trawlers operating in Indonesian waters. That has forced the Sarna Bajo to 
fish, often illegally, in Australian territorial waters. By confiscating and burning their 
boats, the Australian authorities have caused great hardships for the Sarna Bajo fishermen 
which includes the loss of their means of living. While the captain of the boats are 
imprisoned, the rest of the crew are usually deported to Denpasar. With neither money 
nor experience of being in an urban environment, many of the deportees are still only 
teenagers who must find their way back to Sulawesi. Not surprisingly, one of these 
inexperienced teenagers was recently stabbed to death in the East Javanese city of 
Surabaya. 
While there is evidence to suggest that illegal boats fishing off the Australian coast cause 
environmental damage and resource depletion, the Sarna Bajo's use of non-motorised 
55 Chew, D. (1996) "Malaysia: Illegal RI Workers Face KL Fury" The Jakarta Post 27 April: p.l. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The account of the Sarna Bajo here is taken primarily from Medhurst, S. (1994) "The Sarna Bajo: Sea 
Nomads of Sulawesi" Inside Indonesia 38: pp.22-24. For a more recent report see "Australia Detains 
Muna Fisherman" The Jakarta Post 28 April1996. 
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perahu (traditional fishing boats) and their traditional methods of fishing and navigation 
can hardly be considered a threat to the environment. 58 Indeed, while many of the Sarna 
Bajo are incarcerated in Darwin for illegal fishing, Australian authorities have implicitly 
sanctioned the high-tech fishing methods used by Japanese and Taiwanese trawlers which 
cause great destruction to the sea-bed and depletion of ocean resources. Thus, while 
much more destructive forms of fishing are sanctioned since they comply to legal 
boundaries, the Sarna Bajo become a "threat" to sovereignty as their nomadic way of life 
spills over and contests the sharply demarcated boundaries of foreign policy discourse. 
That suggests Australia's prosecution of Indonesian fisherman is aimed as much at the 
"policing of sovereign boundaries" as it is at protecting the environment. In prosecuting 
the Sarna Bajo and other "foreign" fishermen, the Australian Government has sought to 
validate an arbitrary territorial border upon which state sovereignty depends. In doing so, 
it has translated the relatively benign actions of the Sarna Bajo into a dangerous security 
threat. This representation has been reproduced in the extensive media coverage of the 
"seizure" of illegal fishing boats which has converted images of poor Indonesian 
fishermen and their dilapidated boats into a signifier of the illegal and potentially 
threatening nature of trans border flows. 
In policing its sovereign boundaries, then, the Australian Government has sought to sever 
the enduring historical flows of the Sarna Bajo to the Australian continent. The bitter 
irony of this is that while Australia's contemporary diplomacy has been driven by a policy 
known as "engagement with Asia", the Sarna Bajo have been fishing in so-called 
"Australian territorial waters" and trading with the local Aboriginal peoples for over 500 
years. This latter "regional engagement", however, has become inconsistent with 
Australia's security-driven foreign policy, based upon the increasingly anachronistic 
notion of the inviolability of sovereign boundaries. 
Exclusion Ill: Environmental Crisis, Indigenous Peoples and Local Knowledges 
The plight of the Sarna Bajo is a microcosm of the larger processes of environmental 
destruction and marginalisation of indigenous peoples that has accompanied 
industrialisation in the region in recent decades. While such destructive forces have their 
origins in the expansion of European colonialism, it is only recently that environmental 
damage has become a major regional problem. Hence, while policy-makers celebrate 
regional development in terms of a neoliberal narrative of progress and prosperity, the 
region's rapid economic growth has also led to an ecological disaster of pesticide 
poisonings, air pollution, falling water tables, unregulated waste disposal, depletion of 
58 Ibid., Osborne, R. (1989) "Turtles, Trepang and Trouble: Indonesians in Australian Waters" Inside 
Indonesia December No.21: pp.19-21. This is not to say that policy-makers such as Downer, Evans or 
Alatas are engaged in an evil conspiracy against the Sarna Bajo but rather that within the prevailing 
terms of foreign policy discourse, the Sarna Bajo become a "threat" or "problem". Thus, in challenging 
the territorialising logic of geopolitics, the Sarna Bajo have become converted into an object of discipline 
and surveillance by Australian policy-makers. 
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forest and oceanic resources and land degradation. 59 Underpinned by a linear narrative of 
progress, contemporary discourse on the "Asia-Pacific" has tended to obfuscate this 
environmental crisis. 
Based upon centralised, top-down models of high-speed, export-led industrialisation, the 
dominant paradigm of "development" in the region has involved large inflows of foreign 
capital and an emphasis on large-scale projects of "national development". While this 
approach has made possible rapid rates of economic growth, it has also led to 
environmental damage and the large-scale marginalisation of indigenous peoples whose 
way of life resists the rationalising processes of capitalist industrial development. The 
plight of such displaced peoples focuses attention on the unequal distribution of wealth 
from regional development and the question as to who actually benefits from the "region's 
economic miracle" -a question obscured in prevailing foreign policy discourse. 
In expressing its concern over the environmental consequences of industrialisation, the 
Far Eastern Economic Review recently observed that "the by-product of these boom 
years (of regional development) is environmental degradation of historic proportions".60 
Far from representing an unintended by-product of economic growth, however, such 
appalling levels of environmental damage have in fact been intrinsic to the type of export-
oriented industrialisation promoted by regional states. Thus, driven by the ever increasing 
demands of "international competitiveness", capital has been forced to increase 
productivity and lower costs wherever possible. This has included relocating heavy 
polluting industries to countries where environmental regulation is not enforced. In their 
efforts to attract foreign capital, East and Southeast Asian countries have become willing 
"pollution havens" for dirty industries disinclined to pay the costs of environmental 
protection. 61 Implicit in the celebration of the economic miracle of the region and its 
industrial "competitiveness", therefore, is complicity in the environmental degradation 
that such "competitiveness" has demanded. 
In South Korea, for instance, one of the exemplars of "the region's economic miracle", 
the sulfur dioxide content in Seoul's air is the worst in the world, causing close to 70% of 
59 For general accounts of this see Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities. Gurtov, M (1991) Global 
Politics in the Human Interest. Porter, G. (1994) "The Environmental Hazards of Asia Pacific 
Development: The Southeast Asian Rainforests" Current History 93 (587): pp.430-434. The list of more 
specific examples is endless. See Leonard, A. (1992) "Plao;;tics: Trashing the Third World" 
Multinational Monitor June: pp.26-29. Weisseman,, R. (1993) "Caltex's Corporate Colony: How an Oil 
Consortium Pollutes Indonesia" Multinational Monitor November: pp.l3-16. "Environment in Asia" Far 
Eastern Economic Review 16 November 1995: pp.63-72. 
60 Arrigo, L.G. (1994) "The Environmental Nightmare of the Economic Miracle: Land Abuse and Land 
Struggles in Taiwan" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 26 (1-2): p.22. 
61 Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers p.82. For an argument that makes an explicit 
connection between regional development and environmental destruction see Tull, M. (1994) Growth 
and the Environment: the Case of Taiwan, 1945-1990. Working Paper No.44, Asia Research Centre, 
Murdoch University: Perth. 
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the rain falling on the city to be so acidic as to pose a hazard to human beings. 62 In urban 
Thailand, air pollution has reached such proportions that children in Bangkok have 
among the world's highest levels of lead in their blood.63 In China, a relatively late-comer 
to export-oriented industrialisation, the problems of rapid economic growth are becoming 
all too visible: in Shanghai, for instance, the booming construction industry remains 
environmentally unregulated, giving rise to problems such as contaminated soil and highly 
toxic fumes which pose a serious health risk for construction workers. 64 
One could in fact detail a litany of the devastating effects of high-growth, export-oriented 
strategies of industrialisation across Asia and the Pacific, including the recent forest fires 
in Indonesia and Malaysia. It is in Taiwan, however, where the worst environmental 
degradation has taken place -where both large and small firms have dumped industrial 
waste with impunity and where in 1992 leaking chlorine gas from a polluting factory 
produced dangerous malodorous vapours over the Ai (lore) River. This disaster 
hospitalised 1700 people who required "poison antidote" injections for stinging eyes and 
throats. 65 The problem of industrial pollution in Taiwan is of such magnitude that 
according to one estimate 30% of Taiwan's rice crop is tainted with heavy metals due 
largely to unregulated dumping of industrial and toxic waste which has killed rivers, 
damaged coastal systems and poisoned aquifers. 66 
While industrial waste has become a serious problem, arguably the most alarming 
environmental issue in the region has been the rapid loss of Southeast Asia's rainforests. 
The increasing destruction of Indonesia's rainforests has exemplified the threat posed to 
fragile ecologies by the dominant development paradigm. By espousing this paradigm, 
Soeharto' s modernising regime has pursued a dual economic strategy of export-oriented 
industrialisation and exploitation of its rich supply of natural resources. Estimates of the 
amount of Indonesian rainforest deforested per annum due to logging range from 
600,000 to 1.2 million hectares, levels that the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry has itself 
acknowledged are unsustainable.67 By sanctioning this rapacious exploitation of 
Indonesia's forests, the Indonesian Government has sought to respond to the dramatic 
reduction in state revenues due to falling world prices in oil, Indonesia's major export.68 
In addressing this fiscal crisis, the Indonesian Government, at the urging of the World 
Bank, has sought to increase non-oil exports, of which logging has become an important 
62 Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities p.56. 
63 Ibid. p.56. 
64 See "A Matter of Priorities" Far Eastern Economic Review 16 November 1995: pp.70-71. 
65 Arrigo, L.G. (1994) "The Environmental Nightmare of the Economic Miracle" pp.33,35. 
66 Bello, W. (1992) Perils and Possibilities p.55. 
67 Hamilton, C. (1994) "Third World Self-Defoliation" Arena Magazine August-September: p.10. 
Belcher, M. (1990) "The Environment is a Commodity: World Bank Activities in Indonesia" Inside 
Indonesia March No.22: p.23. , 
68 Robison, R. (1987) "After the Gold Rush: The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Indonesia in the 
1980s" inK. Hewison, R. Robison, R. Higgott (eds.) Southeast Asia in the 1980s: The Politics of 
Economic Crisis. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
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industry.69 Largely as a result of deforestation, Indonesia now has the longest list of 
species threatened with extinction of any country, serious soil erosion, flash-flooding, 
mudslides, and river systems that have serious siltation problems.70 
This destruction of the fragile eco-systems of Indonesia's rainforests has had a profoundly 
negative effect on many of the archipelago's indigenous peoples whose way of life 
depends on the ecological integrity of the rainforests. The plight of the Moi people in 
Irian Jaya is just one example of the onslaught of "development" that indigenous people 
face from state and capital. The Indonesian Government has recently granted a large 
Indonesian logging company, PT Intimpura, an enormous logging concession in the heart 
of Moi ancestral lands. 71 The subsequent destruction of the forest has threatened the 
survival of the Moi's way of life. In particular, the construction of roads that now criss-
cross the forest has caused serious environmental dislocation of the river system. It has 
also led to the appearance of a string of stagnant roadside pools which produce large 
concentrations of mosquitoes increasing the risks of malaria and other diseases. 
The disregard that the Indonesian Government has had for the Moi people reflects the 
broader process of marginalisation of indigenous peoples resulting from the top-down 
development strategy in Indonesia. The demand for land fuelled by large projects of 
"national development" such as dam and golf course construction, logging operations, 
and Indonesia's transmigration program has involved the extensive alienation of 
indigenous peoples from their lands. In promoting these large-scale development 
projects, the Government has used the geopolitical language of state sovereignty in 
which, according to former Minister for Forestry Hasjrul Harahap, "in Indonesia the 
Forest belongs to the State and not the people ... [The Moi people] have no right to 
compensation".72 The Indonesian Government has steadfastly refused to recognise any 
tribal rights over land. In warning against romanticising indigenous peoples, Harahap has 
argued that "the mere fact that they are indigenous does not render them immediately 
effective or efficacious under today's conditions".73 Whatever the exact meaning of 
"effective" or "efficacious", Harahap's statements indicate that the Moi people and their 
way of life are viewed by the Indonesian Government as dispensable to the imperatives of 
"development". 
Indeed, the nomadic ways of life of the Moi and other indigenous peoples are inimical to 
the modus operandi of modem capitalism and statecraft based upon fixed property 
69 Porter, G. (1994) "The Environmental Hazards of Asia Pacific Development: The Southeast Asian 
Rainforests" Current History December 93 (587): p.434. 
70 Dauvergne, P. (1993) "The Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia" p.508. Porter, G. (1994) "The 
Environmental Hazards of Asia Pacific Development" p.434. 
71 Laine, A. (1992) "Moi Resistance: Standing up to Indonesia" Multinational Monitor 12 October: 
pp.12-15. "The Last Stand of the Moi People" Inside Indonesia June 1992 No.31: pp.21-22. 
72 cited in Laine, A. (1992) "Moi Resistance: Standing up to Indonesia" pp. 12-13. 
73 cited in Rosewarne, C. (1994) "Development and Indigenous People" Inside Indonesia March No.38: 
p.25. 
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rights.74 This is clear in the ways in which the swidden agricultural methods often adopted 
by indigenous peoples contrasts sharply with the sedentary forms of modern agriculture 
and industrial production. Thus, swidden agriculture has not only proved difficult to 
legislate in modern law, but has also engendered a mobile way of life which challenges 
the fixed occupation of territory demanded by the modern nation-state. Not surprisingly, 
in denying indigenous peoples access to forest resources, central state authorities have 
invoked the threat that "nomadism" poses to development to justify their actions. 
According to the World Bank and the Indonesian Government, for instance, the swidden 
agricultural methods used by many indigenous peoples have become a major source of 
deforestation and, therefore, a reason for denying indigenous peoples access to the forest. 
These claims, however, have not gone uncontested. Peter Dauvergne has argued that the 
World Bank's use of data is "misleading" in underestimating the impact of logging and 
exaggerating the impact of swidden agriculture.75 He has pointed to detailed studies 
which indicate that "the [swidden] form of farming represents a very refined system, well-
adapted to prevailing economic and social conditions. [It is a system] which makes 
optimal use of the limited opportunities, while ensuring that little harm is done to the 
natural environment". According to Dauvergne, much of the damage of deforestation in 
Indonesia is actually caused by the government's refusal to grant land use rights to 
indigenous peoples which intensifies the exploitation of those areas available to 
indigenous communities. 76 In providing assistance to the Indonesia through Australia's 
official aid organisation AUSAID, the Australian Government, for its part, has been 
complicit in the marginalisation of indigenous peoples. Indeed, one of AUSAID's major 
projects in Indonesia is assisting the authorities there to regularise and rationalise 
Indonesia's land registration system.77 In introducing modern surveying techniques into 
Indonesia, the project will seriously undermine the needs and ways of life of indigenous 
peoples through its further codification of land registration. 78 
The marginalisation of indigenous communities which has occurred throughout the 
region, therefore, has also involved a rejection of local knowledge as "primitive" and 
"backward".79 Hence, the stigmatisation of "swidden agriculture" as a cause of 
74 Hirsch, P. (1990) "Marginal People on Marginal Land" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 22 (4): 
p.56, 59. 
75 Dauvergne, P. (1993) "The Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia" Pacific Affairs 66 (4): pp.509-510. 
76 Ibid. p.510. See also Rosewarne, C. (1994) "Development and Indigenous People" Inside Indonesia 
March No.38: pp.25-26. and Rice, D. (1994) "Shifting Cultivators" Inside Indonesia December No.41: 
pp.21-22. 
77 Anderson, I. (1996) "Australians help codify Indonesian land titles".Inside Indonesia July-September: 
p.25. 
78 Fauzi, N. (1996) "We promote community-based land mapping" Inside Indonesia. July-September: 
p.26. 
79 Hence, the Indonesian army launched "Operation Penis Gourd" which aimed at getting the local 
tribespeople of Irian Jaya to wear Western-style clothes, instead of their semi-naked style of dress. An 
American missionary present at one location where clothes were distributed reported, however, that the 
next day the men were wearing shorts on their head and women were using the dresses as shoulder bags. 
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deforestation has become the major pretext for extensive resettlement of indigenous 
peoples. By promoting a technocratic agenda of "managing the environment'', regional 
states have pursued policies designed to marginalise indigenous people and destroy their 
way of life. As part of its broader integration and assimilation policies, for instance, the 
Indonesian Government has relocated thousands of indigenous peoples from traditional 
ancestral lands into government villages based upon sedentary agriculture. One such 
program, the "Transmigration Industrial Forest Estate" project has been organised by 100 
logging companies in Irian Jaya and has sought to remove "nomadic farmers" from their 
traditional lands and resettle them in camps where each farmer has been given a plot of 
land to cultivate fixed agricultural crops. The program has obliged companies to "employ 
the head of each family" in their logging operations, forcing indigenous peoples to survive 
by cutting down their own ancestral forests. 80 
Through the imposition of the rigid boundaries of territoriality and fixed property rights, 
regional states such as Indonesia are pursuing massive "transmigration" and relocation 
programs which are having the effect of destroying the nomadic way of life of indigenous 
peoples. As in the case of the Australian Government's actions against the Sarna Bajo, the 
Indonesian Government has invoked the "environment" as a means to marginalise local 
knowledges. The imposition of a territorial logic is clear in the rigid sedentary farm model 
adopted in the Indonesian transmigration program- a model entirely inappropriate for 
the ecosystems of Indonesia's outer islands.81 In fact, far from being driven by 
"environmental" concerns, Jakarta has seen transmigration as a security policy and as 
central means of "maintaining stability" in the outer islands. 82 Thus, while the relocation 
of indigenous peoples is an important part of the transmigration program, most 
transmigrants are Javanese - Indonesia's dominant ethnic group. Many of these 
transmigrants are in fact former military personnel.83 As Carmel Budiardjo84 has argued: 
transmigration is being promoted by the military regime in Jakarta as a means 
of enforcing the government's 'top-down' development and extending its control 
over remote and troublesome areas. [T]he main motive for the program is to 
promote 'national security' and crush dissent. 
Driven by such security concerns, transmigration has centred on a policy of relocating 
thousands of loyal disciplined bodies to "the margins" of the Indonesian state. This 
massive state relocation of Javanese peasants to Eastern Indonesia, whose sedentary 
agricultural practices have formed the basis of these new settlements, has amounted to an 
imposition of the dominant way of life and development onto the margins. In other 
"Remotest Indonesia-Cover Up" The Jakarta Post 31 July 1995. See also "Tribesmen to be Civilised" 
The Jakarta Post 11 May 1996: p.l. 
80 "The Last Stand of the Moi People" Inside Indonesia June 1992 No.31: p.22. 
81 Dauvergne, P. (1993) "The Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia" p.511. 
82 Ibid. p.512. 
83 Budiardjo, C. (1986) "The Politics of Transmigration" Ecologist 16 (2-3): p. 57. 
84 Ibid. 
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words, the Indonesian Government has promoted transmigration as a way of 
territorialising marginal places and people and incorporating them more fully into the 
state. This incorporation of indigenous peoples and places within the geopolitical grids of 
modem capitalism and statecraft, not their isolation from such processes, is the primary 
feature of marginality. 85 
The Indonesian experience I have examined above is a microcosm of the broader process 
of marginalisation of indigenous peoples throughout the Asia-Pacific by the forces of 
contemporary statecraft and capitalism. 86 The on-going ethnocide of forest peoples in the 
region such as the Kanyan and Penan in Sarawak, the Karen, and Karenni in Burma, and 
the Batak, Aeta, and Agta in the Philippines remains a silenced part of the contemporary 
narrative of the Pacific Century.87 Similarly, in their focus on the booming Pacific Rim 
economies of East Asia, contemporary policy-makers have all but ignored the South 
Pacific. As one Pacific Islander has asked, "what about the area within the Rim? In 
comparison to the Rim, is the inner Pacific a vacuum?".88 
Notwithstanding Australia's declaratory policy of "constructive commitment" with the 
South Pacific, our diplomats have vigorously promoted an APEC agenda that has 
excluded the South Pacific from the broader dialogues and forums of Asia-Pacific 
regionalism. 89 And yet it is peoples of the South Pacific, along with the indigenous 
communities of Asia, who have had the most to lose from the environmentally destructive 
patterns of regional development celebrated by policy-making elites across Asia For 
many Melanesian and Polynesian peoples, then, it is the very survival of their way of life 
and environment that is presently at stake. Indeed, the use of the Pacific as a dumping 
ground for nuclear and industrial waste which has rendered some small Pacific atolls 
inhabitable.90 Moreover, the rising water levels which have occurred due to global 
warming recently threaten to submerge some Pacific microstates within the next 50 years. 
Most scientists are convinced that global warming has been caused by increased carbon 
and sulfur dioxide emissions resulting from increasing industrialisation and urbanisation. 
Viewed from the perspective of these terrible environmental consequences, the 
85 Hirsch, P. (1990) "Marginal People on Marginal Land" p.55. 
86 See Ibid. 
87 For various accounts of this on-going ethnocide across the region see Aziz-Al Ahsan, Syed (1993) 
"Burma's Iron Hands Towards Ethnic Minorities: The Rohingnya Plight" Asian Profile 21 (4): pp.311-
316.Eder, J. (1987) On the Road to Tribal Extinction: Depopulation, Deculturation and Adaptive Well-
Being anwng the Batak of the Philippines. University of California Press: Berkeley. Rajah, A. (1991) 
"Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Nation-State: The Karen in Burma and Thailand" in Gehan 
Wijeyewardne (ed.) Ethnic Groups across National Boundaries in Mainland Southeast Asia. Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore. 
88 Lopez-Reyes, R. (1995) "The Pacific Rim Betrayal" Peace Review 7 (2): p.177. 
89 See, for instance, Seneviratne, K. (1996) "Pacific off the map at Bangkok forum" Pacific Islands 
Monthly May 66 (5): pp.14-15. 
90 Lopez-Reyes, R. (1995) "The Pacific Rim Betrayal" pp.182-183. 
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unregulated industrialisation of regional countries in recent decades is less a cause for 
celebration that deep concern. 
r::Jr::Jr::J 
In this chapter I highlighted some of the silences and omissions of contemporary 
theorising on the Pacific Century. I focused on the ways in which the abstractions of 
contemporary foreign policy have served to exclude from analytical and policy attention 
many of the everyday realities of Pacific and Asian societies - of gender, border 
crossings, indigenous peoples and ecology. Here we saw how, in promoting a trade-
driven regional diplomacy, our policy-makers and diplomats have remained oblivious to 
the many of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the region in the last two 
decades. These changes, I argued, have had a broader deterritorialising effect on global 
relations. Hence, characterised by shifting defmitions of work, identity and gender, the 
emerging realities of contemporary regional life simply evade the territorial logic of 
foreign policy discourse. This highlights the urgent need to expand the narrow intellectual 
perspectives currently directing the policy process by developing more inclusive 
understandings of the Asia-Pacific attuned to the emerging postmodern realities of 
regional life, a task I address in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
Reframing Foreign Policy: Toward an Expanded 
Agenda of Regional Engagement 
In examining Australia's regional engagement, this thesis has focused on the exclusions 
and silences of contemporary regional diplomacy. It has argued that contemporary 
foreign policy has become detached from the non-territorial and everyday realities of 
Asian and Pacific societies. In this final chapter, I examine the possibility of 
acknowledging these silenced realities in the formulation of Australian foreign policy. 
How might it be possible, I ask, to rethink regional diplomacy through recognising these 
postmodem realities and their growing importance in the post-Cold War era? In other 
words, how does acknowledging the contemporary significance of gender, ecology, 
indigenous culture and trans border flows expand Australia's regional engagement beyond 
the prevailing agenda of commercial and strategic integration? 
Reframing contemporary foreign policy in these terms entails being attentive to the local 
stories and everyday practices of trans-Pacific life and the ways such local sites are 
intersected by global forces. This corresponds to Frederic Jameson's call for a new 
cognitive mapping of local/global space consonant with the deterritorialising flows of 
global postmodemity.1 It also corresponds to Micheal Shapiro's appeal for a new 
"conceptual space beyond the world map of sovereign states [and regions]" which 
embodies planetary flows without reproducing the territorial logic of prevailing foreign 
policy discourse- a remapping based upon a critical "global politics of contested spaces 
and contentious identities".2 
How, then, does undertaking this remapping serve to reconstruct foreign policy discourse 
so as to engender more adequate and less violent understandings of post-Cold War global 
relations? How, more specifically, can a new sense of Australia's place in the world be 
imagined so that regional engagement might come to signify something more than 
cooperation between strategic and commercial elites? Furthermore, through what kinds 
of imaginative processes and geopolitical practices is it possible to reclaim the diversity 
and difference of trans-Pacific life from the rationalising practices of global capitalism and 
modem statecraft? And finally, how is it possible to construct new postmodern 
knowledges able to apprehend the deterritorialised realities of contemporary global life, 
knowledges which engage the multiple and polyvocal histories of the Asia-Pacific? 
1 Jameson, F. (1988) "Cognitive Mapping" in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.) Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
2 Shapiro, M.J. (1996) "Introduction" in M.J. Shapiro and H.R. Alker (eds.) Challenging Boundaries: 
Global Flows, Territorial Identities. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. pp.xxi- xxii. 
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In posing these questions, I divide this chapter into three parts. I begin by drawing on the 
insights of critical IR scholars who offer ways to think beyond the realist-liberal impasse 
of Australian foreign policy. Here I examine how it might be possible to engender a 
respect for difference in regional diplomacy which displaces the reductionist, 
territorialising strategies of recent foreign policy. Far from representing an arcane 
academic exercise of "theory", this project draws on a broader set of concrete practices 
of resistance long engaged in by peoples across the Pacific who seek to give meaning to 
their lives beyond the abstractions of geopolitical discourse. 
The second part of this chapter, accordingly, examines the dissenting practices of various 
social movements across the Pacific - of indigenous peoples, academics, 
environmentalists, feminists and, above all, ordinary citizens. It focuses on the ways in 
which these disparate groups of people are seeking to concretely reformulate issues of 
identity and political community. In particular, I show how cross-border coalitions signal 
an emerging "transnationalisation" of identity which forms the basis for reimagining 
regional political space. Finally, I examine how the alternative understandings of the Asia-
Pacific engendered by social movements can be concretely articulated in contemporary 
foreign policy so as to expand Australia's regional engagement. 
Beyond the Realist-Liberallmpasse: Difference, Identity and the Region 
As I have shown throughout this thesis, the dominant images of the Asia-Pacific region to 
emerge within Australian foreign policy have fluctuated between realist notions of threat 
and containment and liberal representations of cooperation and engagement. These 
fluctuating images have encompassed the discursive field of possibilities that have framed 
Australia's encounter with the Asia-Pacific. In recent foreign policy, liberal notions of 
cooperation and engagement have come to dominate over traditional realist threat 
scenarios. Contemporary policy-makers have represented the region less as a realm of 
danger and threat, as in the past, than as a space of identity, progress and modernity. 
Thus, while Australian identity has traditionally been secured through representing the 
region as an "other", in recent foreign policy, identity has become constituted through the 
inscription of an idealised Asia-Pacific region that exhibits all the privileged features of 
modern industrial life. In other words, "the self' has been secured through the projection 
of the constitutive features of identity onto a space labelled "the region" in which 
"Australia" is now located. "The Asia-Pacific" acts as a mirror as modernity reinvents 
itself in the form of an economic miracle. The economic emergence of the Asia-Pacific 
has rejuvenated the modernising project as rapid industrialisation and state building -
once the preserve of "the West"- now characterise regional development. Represented 
by policy-makers via this unilinear movement of otherness into self (but not into 
difference), "the region" is emptied of any content of cultural difference. In adopting an 
homogenising narrative, policy-makers celebrate the emergence of new centres of power 
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in the Asia-Pacific as a process of "convergence" in which "they" have become more like 
"us". 
How is it possible to move beyond this dominant philosophical model of geopolitical 
relations that marginalises difference and delimits the possibilities of foreign policy? More 
specifically, through what emerging modes of discourse is it possible to reframe foreign 
policy so that the constitution and narration of Australian identity engenders respect for 
difference, rather than its obliteration? This question involves what Tzvetan Todorov has 
defmed as the "third approach to difference" beyond the realist-liberal impasse discussed 
in Chapter 1. In posing these questions, this chapter draws on a broader rethinking of the 
dominant categories and assumptions of modem political life by critical thinkers and 
activists who, as Jane Flax has suggested, have sought "to understand and constitute the 
self, gender, knowledge, social relations and cultural change without resorting to linear, 
teleological, hierarchical or binary ways of thinking and being". 3 
This attempt to critique and reconstruct dominant ways of thinking in IR has become an 
urgent task in recent decades with the emergence of new centres of power in the Asia-
Pacific. That development has signalled the postmodem condition of contemporary 
foreign policy in which the binaries of Western IR demarcating East from West, self from 
other, developed from undeveloped and Australian from the region have unravelled. In 
order to recognise this deterritorialisation and decentring of geopolitical identity, 
however, presupposes a discursive decentring of the major modes of Australian foreign 
policy through which identity and difference have been imagined. Writing over three 
decades ago, Paul Ricoeur presciently summed up the consequences of the globalised 
condition we now find ourselves in: 
When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and 
consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a certain cultural 
monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are threatened with destruction by our own 
discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we 
ourselves are an "other" among others.4 
Acknowledging this radically decentred condition promotes a self-reflective moment in 
Australian foreign policy and its constitution of identity. That is, if it is accepted that 
"we" are just "an other among others" then identity is disclosed as an effect of difference. 
Put another way, the self is made possible through its relations with others. There is no 
foundation that secures the self, no sovereign authority that posits a realm of ontological 
3 Flax, J. (1990) Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the 
Contemporary West, University of California Press: Berkeley. p.15. See also George, J. (1994) 
Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. Lynne Rienner: 
Boulder, Colorado. Ashley, R.K. and Walker, R.B.J. (1990) "Introduction Speaking the Language of 
Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies" International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): pp. 259-268. 
4 Ricoeur, P. (1965) History and Truth. Trans. by C. A. Kelbey. Northwestern University Press: Evanston. 
p.278 
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truth; rather, every identity is contingent on the existence and inscription of an other 
within a broader economy of differential relations. "Australia", therefore, is meaningful 
only in relation to a broader encounter with difference through which the boundaries of 
identity are demarcated - an encounter exemplified in Australia's enduring engagement 
with the Asia-Pacific region. 
The acknowledgment of the interdependence of self/other and Australia/the region 
underpins an alternative understanding of geopolitical identity in which the reliance of 
identity on difference engenders a respect for the other. As James DerDerian has noted: 
"we must fmd a way to live with and recognise the very necessity of difference, the need 
to accept heterogeneity before we begin to understand our lives in the roles of others".5 
This attitude promotes a reframing of foreign policy discourse in which identity is no 
longer imagined in terms of its opposition and autonomy from otherness but rather in its 
obligation and responsibility to others. 6 
That involves establishing ways of thinking and being that constitute identity and engage 
difference without the imposition of hierarchy. Tzvetan Todorov has described this as "a 
dialogue of cultures .. .in which no one has the last word and in which neither voice is 
reduced to the status of a simple object".7 In adopting what is an essentially post-
sovereign worldview, the interlocutors of this dialogue would reject the sovereign model 
of identity in favour of a sense of responsibility that one has toward others. 8 Identity 
would be secured (always contingently) through a recognition of difference rather than 
the defensive moves of the modem state in which a sovereign space is carved out of 
boundaries which must remain inviolate in order to secure the stability of identity.9 
Rethinking identity and difference in these terms serves to open up hitherto unimagined 
possibilities in foreign policy. In particular, it serves to reframe regional engagement 
beyond the narrow economic and security agendas currently driving the policy process. 
5 DerDerian, J. (1992) Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War. Blackwell: Cambridge, MA. 
p.198. These ideas resonate in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas whose work is has become the 
subject of recent critical attention. For a concise summary of some of the concerns that generate Levinas' 
philosophy seeR. Young (1990) White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. Routledge: London. 
Chapter 1. The work of David Campbell has related the work of Levinas to more specific foreign policy 
concerns see Campbell, D. (1993) Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and Narratives of the 
Gulf War. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado. 
6 George, J. (1995) "Realist 'Ethics', International Relations and Postmodernism: Thinking Beyond the 
Egoism-Anarchy Thematic" Paper presented for the Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association. Chicago, Illinois. p.31. 
7 Todorov, T. (1984) The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. Trans. by Richard Howard. 
Harper and Row: New York. pp.249-50. 
8 George, J. (1995) "Realist 'Ethics', International Relations and Postmodernism: Thinking beyond the 
Egoism-Anarchy Thematic" Millennium: Journal of International Affairs 24 (2): p.200. 
9 One could speculate, for instance, how an alternative disposition toward refugees would emerge out of 
this reframing of the identity-difference problematic. Here one could undestand refugee flows in human 
terms rather than purely as an issue of sovereignty. 
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"Australia in the region" becomes conceived here as a narrative space in which identity is 
constituted through a recognition of the interdependence of self and other. That involves 
resisting current conceptions of regional engagement in which "sovereign", "rational" 
policy-makers deploy an architectonic regional diplomacy designed to master space "out 
there" in the service of dominant strategic and economic interests. This architectonic 
project has amounted to is a refusal by contemporary policy-makers to acknowledge the 
emergent cartographies of contemporary political life. The modem image of a sovereign 
rational subject acting autonomously in an anarchic, atomised world has been challenged 
by the radically interdependent condition of globalised postmodernity. A more adequate 
post-Cold War remapping of regional space, therefore, involves displacing the centred 
territorial subject of Australian foreign policy. It also involves defining the Asia-Pacific as 
a hybridised space in which self and other coexist equally as subjects. Conceptualised in 
these terms, regional diplomacy takes the form of a dialogue "whereby the self instead of 
assimilating the other opens itself to the other through a relation with it". 10 
This broad-based reconceptualisation of identity/difference refigures regional engagement 
as an intersubjective encounter between Australian and Asian and Pacific communities -
representing a larger dialogue whose participants each represent an interdependent "other 
among others". In this sense, the Asian and Pacific parts of "the region" come to signify 
the hybridised condition of intersubjectivity, a condition which resists the impulse to 
incorporate otherness into identity. In its place a dialogic understanding of the region 
emerges that engages the diverse histories and cultural differences of Asian and Pacific 
societies. Reimagined in such terms, the "Asia-Pacific" becomes a space that radically 
decentres identity (as the hyphen in its name suggests) - both disclosing the 
interdependence of self and other, and making possible a respect for difference as the 
basis for reformulating foreign policy discourse. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter, I examine how this imaginative remapping of 
regional space can be articulated in respect to concrete policy settings. In pursuing that 
task, however, I resist the temptation of searching for quick-fix solutions, as is the wont 
of mainstream foreign policy analysts. They usually disparage any attempt to move 
beyond prevailing terms of discourse as irrelevant to "the world as we fmd it", as if an 
adequate policy response to the end of the Cold War can be formulated through a simple 
update of prevailing policies. Yet the dangers and opportunities facing societies across 
the globe in the late 20th Century do not lend themselves to such formulaic responses. 
Rather, the decentring and deterritorialisation of identity which has been a central feature 
of global politics recently belies the desire for instant answers, involving instead 
fundamentally rethinking the assumptions that have underpinned foreign policy. 
To begin to relate this rethinking to policy settings requires confronting the logic of 
territoriality that pervades foreign policy discourse since it is through this logic that the 
10 Young, R. (1990) White Mythologies: Writing History and the West p.16. 
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difference and diversity of Pacific and Asian societies have been reduced to the 
requirements of identity. This has been expressed in contemporary Australian foreign 
policy through the conflation of "the region" with its ruling state elites. That familiar 
territorialising strategy amounts to reducing regional identity to statist expressions of 
cultural difference. Thus, in adopting the logic of territoriality, contemporary policy-
makers have focused on dominant commercial and strategic relations while all but 
ignoring other non-territorial issues drawn from cultural, gender, class and ecological 
perspectives. 
It follows from this that any fundamental reframing of foreign policy must move beyond 
the discursive practices that construct identity on a strictly territorial basis. The 
deterritorialising flows that have characterised recent trans-Pacific relations serve to 
challenge and unravel the existing territorial organisation of political space and the 
dominant understandings upon which this is based. There is a need, accordingly, to think 
beyond prevailing territorial abstractions by relocating an understanding of the region 
within the dynamics of local social relations. By their very nature, these kinds of local 
relations are based on movements and flows that often transcend the borders of the 
territorial state. 
This involves a major shift from "sedentary" forms of knowledge based upon the state to 
non-territorial, "nomadic" knowledges that derive from the everyday realities of gender, 
identity, ecology and migration. 11 In other words, the decentring of global relations in 
recent decades requires that we think beyond state-centred discourses as the only source 
of knowledge and practice. Instead we need to be attentive to the kinds of marginalised 
perspectives outlined in the last chapter, which have found their most powerful 
contemporary articulation in what I identify below as "critical social movements".12 
Emerging as increasingly salient actors across the Pacific in recent decades, social 
movements are concretely engaged in a kind of "critical geopolitics" 13 which seeks to 
11 The distinction between sedentary and nomadic know ledges comes from French philosophers Deleuze, 
G. and Guattari, F. (1988) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. by Brian 
Massumi. The Athlone Press: London. 
12 I borrow this term from Walker's exemplary study Walker, R.B.J. (1988) One World, Many Worlds: 
Struggles for a Just World Peace. Lynne Rienner: Boulder Colorado. For other useful commentaries on 
social movements see Falk, R. (1992) Explorations at the Edge ofTime: The Prospects for World Order. 
Temple University Press: Philadelphia. Dorsey, E. (1993) "Expanding the Foreign Policy Discourse: 
Transnational Social Movements and the Globalization of Citizenship" in D. Skidmore and V. Hudson 
(eds.) The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation. Westview Press: 
Boulder, Colorado. Dalby, S. (1990) "Dealignment Discourse: Thinking Beyond the Blocs" Current 
Research on Peace and Violence 13 (4): pp.140-155. Klein, B. (1989) "After Strategy: The Search for a 
Post-Modem Politics of Peace" Alternatives 13 (3): pp.293-318. 
13 The term is used and explained by a group of critical geographers working at the intersection of 
geography, development, international relations and international political economy. See O'Tuathail, G. 
(1996) Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis. For use of the term in relation to social movements see, Dalby, S. (1990) "Dealignment 
Discourse". 
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ground human community and identity via a post-sovereign worldview. That has served 
to advance the kind of rethinking of geopolitical identity outlined above. Thus, by 
forming coalitions across the Pacific, social movements refuse to be confined to the 
dominant territorial organisation of political life. They offer, therefore, the possibility of a 
rearticulation of political space beyond the dominant geopolitical understandings of the 
"Asia-Pacific". That possibility can be glimpsed in the way many social movements have 
formulated non-Western, non-elite forms of human security and development drawn from 
local knowledges which resist the imposition of a singular industrial order across the 
Pacific. This offers, in tum, the prospect for more democratic, sustainable and equitable 
modes of development and regional engagement. 
Rethinking the 11 Asia-Pacific 11 : The Critical Geopolitics of Social Movements 
While social movements have played an important role in the historical experiences of 
Asian and Pacific societies, it is over the last several decades that various by non-
government organisations (NGOs) and citizens' movements have become salient agents 
of new political understandings and practices across the Pacific. The 1980s was an 
important formative period in which, according to Walden Bello, "a tremendous number 
and rich variety of NGOs and people's organisations [emerged to form] the cutting edge 
of the alternative Pacitl.c enterprise".14 As Joseph Camilleri has noted, the kinds of 
regional networks and linkages forged by social movements "may well prove to be the 
single most important contribution to a more habitable future for the peoples of Asia and 
the Pacific". 15 
The rich variety of these movements, however, makes it difficult to use conventional 
conceptual schemas to explain their significance. Ranging from a concern with human 
rights, the environment, self-determination, indigenous culture, anti-nuclearism, urban 
renewal, health and alternative development, the issues and interests represented by social 
movements are astounding in their scope. 16 Similarly, the constituency of social 
14 Bello, W. (1992) People and Power in the Pacific: The Struggle for the Post-Cold War Order. Pluto 
Press: London. p.124. Riker, J. (1995) "Contending Perspectives for Interpreting Government-NGO 
Relations in South and Southeast Asia: Constraints, Challenges and the Search for Common Ground in 
Rural Development" inN. Heyzer, J. Riker, and A. Quizon (eds.) Government-NGO Relations in Asia: 
Prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development. Macmillan Press: London. p.39, 42. Sheth, 
D.L. (1987) "Alternative Development as Political Practice" Alternatives 12 (2): pp.155-171. Heyzer, N. 
(1995) "Toward New Government-NGO Relations for Sustainable and People-Centred Development" in 
N. Heyzer, J. Riker, and A. Quizon (eds.) Govemment-NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and 
Challenges for People-Centred Development. Macmillan Press: London. pp.1,6. 
15 Camilleri, J. (1992) "New Approaches to Regional Security: The Asia-Pacific Context" in G. Smith 
and St. J. Kettle (eds.) Threats without Enemies. Pluto Press: Sydney. p.183. 
16 For literature on various Asian NGOs and other coalitions of social movements see inter alia: 
Lopa. M. (1995) Singing the Same Song: Reflections of Two Generations of NGO Workers in the 
Philippines. Asian NGO Coalition and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human 
Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA): Manila. Romero, S. and Bautista, R. (1995) "Philippine NGOs 
in the Asia Pacific Context" in Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific 
Community: Non-Government Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community. 
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movements can range from small village groups to large-scale international coalitions. A 
further complicating issue is the non-institutional form that social movements often take: 
after all, they are defmed more by movement than stasis, by the ebb and flow of their 
actions rather than their institutionalisation in fixed structures.17 To seek to classify such 
diverse movements, whose meanings and understandings remain to be fully articulated, is, 
therefore, a perilous task. 
Moreover, in identifying these movements, it is important that one avoids romanticising 
their role or overstating their power. The problems typically faced by social movements 
are by now well documented and should not be underestimated.18 Social movements 
regularly experience repression or cooptation by governments and are often weakened by 
internal rivalries and conflicts over finances, political strategies and personal relations. 
Thus, while I examine the positive contribution that certain social movements have made 
in developing alternative understandings of political identity and practice, I am aware of 
the broader problems and dilemmas that many social movements face, particularly in the 
repressive state context of many East and Southeast Asian societies where there is often 
very little political space open to forces from civil society. 
It is precisely on the basis of these difficulties, however, that it is possible to make some 
broader conceptual observations. Indeed, the contemporary significance of social 
movements can be seen to lie precisely in the ways in which they both evade conventional 
political categories and confront the closures of the prevailing political process. As Rob 
Walker has suggested, critical social movements are important not because of their overt 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan Centre for International Exchange: Tokyo. "Laporan 
Utama: LSM" Tempo 4 May 1991: pp.17-27. Ibrahim, Rustam (ed.) (1996) The IndonesianNGO 
Agenda: Toward the Year 200. CESDA-LP3ES: Jakarta. Eldridge, P. (1995) Non-Government 
Organisations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Mahasin, 
Aswab (1989) "Pola Gerakan Pinggiran" Prisma 7: pp.3-11. Hye-Kyung Lee (1995) "NGOs in Korea" in 
Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Non-Government 
Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
and Japan Centre for International Exchange: Tokyo. McGregor, J. (1995) "Survey of Major Australian 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Involved in Public Interest and Social Action in the Asia-
Pacific Region" in Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: 
Non-Government Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community. Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies and Japan Centre for International Exchange: Tokyo. Jones, S. (1993) "The 
Organic Growth: Asian NGOs have come into their own" The Far Eastern Economic Review 17 June: 
p.23. Williamson, H. and Jayasankaran, S. (1996) "Justice for All: Malaysian NGO Protests 'Unjust' 
Global System". Far Eastern Economic Review 25 January: p.24. Berfield, S. (1996) "Activist Power 
Hits Asia" Asiaweek 6 December: pp.21-24. 
17 Walker, R.B.J. (1988) One World, Many Worlds p.31. 
18 See Riker, J. (1995) "Contending Perspectives for Interpreting Government-NGO Relations" pp.40,49. 
Heyzer, N. (1995) "Toward New Government-NGO Relations for Sustainable and People-Centred 
Development" p.11. For other examples see Andriyani, N. (1996) "Myth of the Effective Little NGO" 
Inside Indonesia March: pp.22-23. Hart-Landsberg, M. (1994) "PP21: It May be Positive, But is it 
Radical?" Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 25 (1): pp.48-52. Eldridge, P. (1995) Non-Government 
Organisations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
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power in the present but because they carry the seeds of new understandings in 
reconstructing potential future orders.19 In doing so, they both acknowledge the 
transboundary flows of contemporary life and offer more just and equitable modes of 
regional engagement. The most significant feature of the recent growth of social 
movements across Asia and the Pacific, therefore, is the ways they have signalled new 
possibilities for imagining forms of identity and political space that go beyond the 
dominant territorial understandings of contemporary foreign policy discourse. 
Such emerging possibilities can be discerned in respect to what I identify as the two 
defining dimensions of critical social movements: firstly, their articulation of non-
territorial identities which engage the multiple histories and differences of Asian and 
Pacific societies; and secondly, the trans-Pacific coalitions and alliances they form and the 
broader set of trans-boundary practices they engage in as distinctly "regional" 
movements. It is these kinds of practices that distinguishes critical social movements 
from other kinds of peoples' movements and non-governmental organisations. 
In both articulating non-territorial identities and developing emerging transnational 
practices, contemporary social movements have reconstructed an understanding of the 
"Asia-Pacific" in terms of an alternative transnational community of citizens groups and 
marginalised peoples constructed across territorial boundaries. The contribution of Muto 
Ichiyo to the Asia-Pacific NGO Conference on the World Summit for Social 
Development (1994) is worth quoting at length as it outlines the alternative political 
practices pursued by NGOs and community groups across the Pacific. According to 
Ichiyo: 
In the past two decades or so, we have witnessed grassroots communities 
organized in autonomous social movements empower themselves and resolve 
problems for themselves, without waiting for the state to become "ours" and 
without depending on seizure-of-state-oriented political parties. In other words, 
communities and social movements are beginning to change things here and 
now, without postponing solutions to remote days, while fighting all obstacles 
that stand in the way. These take various forms: Village communities 
developing integrated farming, workers' cooperatives creating jobs for 
themselves, consumer cooperatives having permanent links with rural and 
urban producer groups, people's banks, alternative people-to-people trade, 
credit associations and numerous other "economic projects" fall in this 
category. 20 
19 Walker, R.B.J. (1988) One World, Many Worlds p.6. 
20 Ichiyo, Muto (1994) "Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development" in Making a Stand, Claiming 
a Future: A Sustainable People's Agenda for the 21st Century. Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific NGO 
Conference for the World Summit for Social Development. International Institute for Rural 
Reconstruction: Silang, Philippines. p.31. 
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By stressing the everyday practices of local communities, social movements reject the 
kinds of grand theorised conceptions of state and region that have dominated 
contemporary geopolitical discourses such as Australian foreign policy. The intrinsically 
local orientation adopted by critical social movements serves to enlarge political space 
beyond the institutional parameters of the state through focusing activities on the 
everyday practices of the family, the workplace and the community. This has had the 
effect of expanding the prevailing terms of discourse by redefining "the political" less in 
terms of dominant territorial conceptions of political agency than as a function of the 
structures and practices of everyday life. Again as Ichiyo points out: 
The abode of political power is not only in the realm of government and overtly 
political institutions but in the midst of everyday life relationships. [The 
recognition of this involves] a reorganization of the power relationships in 
everyday life and a new understanding of politics .... a Copernican change in the 
appraisal of on-going movements and struggles. [T]he Copernican change 
opens a very different perspective [in which] the whole endeavour [of everyday 
struggles] is highly political in a new sense, since the emergence of alternative 
relations means redistribution of power at all levels and in all aspects of life. 
The political, thus redefined, is enriched, liberated from the monopoly of 
political professionals and returned to communities. 21 
Through relocating their understandings of social life within the realm of local practice, 
social movements deploy an alternative conception of social reality based upon the non-
territorial identities of gender, class, ecology and culture which arise out of the 
experience of grassroots communities. As Walker has noted, it is the capacity of social 
movements to articulate a multiplicity of marginalised experiences and histories "that now 
makes them so important as interpreters of the challenges and transformations of the 
modem world".22 This can be discerned in the ways citizens' movements and NGOs have 
given voice to important social forces marginalised from prevailing political processes. 
These have included the rural landless and urban unemployed marginalised from the 
modem economy, indigenous peoples alienated from their lands, women subjected to the 
violences of broader patriarchal structures and refugees and migrants who, lacking 
citizenship rights, are vulnerable to the disciplinary practices of statecraft. 
In giving voice to these forces, social movements have sought to formulate participatory 
forms of democratic practice. Such formulations are far removed from prevailing 
conceptions of democracy advanced by contemporary policy-makers through the 
convergence thesis and the so-called triumph of liberal representative democracy. Far 
from joining in such Western triumphalism, social movements have highlighted the 
shortcomings of current representative democracy which, delimited within a given 
territory of the nation-state, is proving to be an increasingly anachronistic model under 
21 Ibid. p.32. 
22 Walker, R.B.J. (1988) One World, Many Worlds pp. 26,32. 
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globalising conditions. In particular, a growing number of scholars and activists has 
pointed out how the modern ."democratic" model of political representation - based 
upon the election of political leaders to represent and speak for "the people" - has lost 
much of its legitimacy recently. Thus, in so-called Western liberal democracies grassroots 
communities have become increasingly disempowered from formal political processes 
signalled by growing class disparities. 23 The limitations of this model have been displayed 
by contemporary Australian policy-makers whose promotion of liberal capitalist values in 
the region has been centred less on advancing the needs of grassroots communities than 
on institutionalising, socialising and buttressing unaccountable technocratic policy elites. 
(see Chapter 6) 
In contrast, many activists have promoted citizen participation in political life as a way of 
establishing new ways through which poor communities can organise and speak for 
themselves.24 It is in this context that notions of "empowerment", "participatory 
democracy" and "self-determination" have become central to the community practices of 
NGOs and other citizens' groups. In promoting these concepts, social movements have 
adopted a decentred local politics designed to empower marginalised peoples to 
overcome their daily problems such as environmental degradation, gender inequality and 
ethnic marginalisation. 
While engendering an enlargement of political space at the grassroots level, the local 
politics of social movements has by no means precluded them from engaging and 
challenging state power. Rather than aiming to capture the state apparatus, however, 
NGO activists and community groups have strategically negotiated repressive state 
structures in order to be able to openly promote a people-centred pattern of development 
and security. In fact, in the repressive systems of many East and Southeast Asian 
societies, negotiating state power is "a tactical necessity" for community groups seeking 
to legitimise their role in the political process. 25 In the face of the closure of political 
space, social movements can sometimes only hope to bear witness to the repressive 
practices of states - their role limited to exposing the crimes of torture, arbitrary arrests 
and extra-judicial killings by authoritarian regimes whose victims remain silenced and 
forgotten. This role has centred on the objective of making both governments and 
23 For works that not only critique of prevailing notions of democracy but also attempt to reformulate 
democratic theory and practice which have greatly influenced my own work see: Archibugi, D. and Held. 
D. (1995) Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order. Polity Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Connolly, W. (1995) The Ethos of Pluralization. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. Falk, R. 
(1995) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics. Polity Press: Cambridge. 
24 Heyzer, N. (1995) "Toward New Govemment-NGO Relations for Sustainable and People-Centred 
Development" p. 7. 
25 Falk, R. (1992) Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order. Temple University 
Press: Philadelphia. p.127. 
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powerful international organisations more accountable, through pressuring them to 
adhere to the rule of law and to punish or boycott those who fail to do so. 26 
In seeking to negotiate repressive structures, NGOs and other citizen movements have 
redefined two strategic agendas closely identified with the state- namely, security and 
development. Many have skilfully reappropriated the language of dominant policy 
agendas to reclaim human and community-centred understandings of "security" and 
"development". Thus, by promoting their own security and development agendas, social 
movements have been able to legitimise their community-related projects which the state 
often finds difficult to discredit, lest it undermine its own ruling ideology.27 
Exploiting the polysemic possibilities of state-promoted discourses, critical social 
movements have in fact articulated concrete alternatives to the dominant politico-
economic order across the Pacific. That has been clear in their challenge to the export-
based industrial strategies and militaristic security policies that regional states have 
pursued in recent decades. In contrast, NGOs and other community groups have 
promoted people-centred and ecologically sustainable modes of development and security 
designed to reconstruct self-sustaining communities from the bottom up.28 Challenging 
conventional geopolitical understandings, these alternative agendas have been framed via 
an "ethics which puts a respect for life and the intrinsic worth of all human beings above 
all else". 29 In adopting this post-sovereign, postmodern ethics, contemporary social 
movements have formulated an alternative conception of security on the basis that "we 
cannot be secure unless others are secure, including them being satisfied with their 
economic and political situation".30 As Richard Falk has suggested, this recognition of the 
interdependence of self/other offers an alternative vision of a more secure and just world 
to prevailing realities. It is vision which is diametrically opposed to current defmitions of 
26 Ibid. Examples of this abound such as in Indonesia where the 1996 crackdown by the military regime 
against widespread protests in the capital were challenged by various activists. These opponents of the 
Soeharto regime sought to resist and "bear witness" to the brutal acts of arbitrary detention, torture and 
interrogation carried out by the military in the aftermath to the unrest. See "Rights Activists Worried 
about Missing People" The Jakarta Post 1 August 1996: p.l. While this might appear futile in the face of 
brutal military power, it is only through "bearing witness" that the military is prevented from abusing 
their power totally unchallenged and with impunity. For a very different example involving the role of 
social movements in making international organisations more accountable see Yoko, K. (1993) "Judging 
the G-7" Ampo: Japan-Asia Quanerly Review 24 (4): pp.39-57. 
27 This ability of many social movements to use the polysemic possibilities of prevailing discourse for 
their own purposes is also evident in the reclaiming of "nationalist" struggles for independence by these 
movements. Thus, activists throughout the region have sought to re-work traditional discourses of 
nationalism in their repsective societies to discredit, rather than legitimise the sovereign claims of state 
elites, by pointing to the continuities between the neocolonialism of present governments and the actions 
of their former European masters. The best example of this I know of is the writings and activism of 
Javanese priest, writer, architect and activist Romo Mangunwijaya. 
28 Bello, W. (1992) People and Power in the Pacific p.61. 
29 Heyzer, N. (1995) "Toward New Government-NGO Relations for Sustainable and People-Centred 
Development" p.4. 
3° Falk, R. (1992) Explorations at the Edge of Time p.148. 
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security which, based upon the logic of deterrence, seek autonomy from others through a 
militarisation of global relations in which one's own security is achieved through making 
"others" less secure.31 
An ecologically-based and people-centred ethics promoting participatory democracy and 
the self-reliant capacities of communities - these are the core elements of the reframed 
agendas of "security" and "development" that Asian and Pacific NGOs have articulated.32 
The promotion of these alternative agendas has depended upon the ability of movements 
to draw attention to the connections between the local and global. What distinguishes 
particular social movements as critical, then, is the ways in which they are able to 
explore linkages between local conditions and a larger structural context - i.e. between 
the disempowerment of communities at a grassroots level and the broader processes of 
uneven development, indebtedness, structural poverty, militarisation and environmental 
destruction. Such structural processes are rooted in prevailing social relations both within 
and between nations. In making these connections, social movements have been at the 
forefront of resisting the deleterious effects of rapid industrial development, militarisation 
and the destruction of autonomous local communities. In their resistance, they have 
articulated a broader crisis of legitimacy in conventional political processes and 
understandings. 33 That has been exemplified in the ways that NGOs and citizens groups 
have highlighted the disparity that exists between official notions of Progress, Security 
and Development and the everyday realities of trans-Pacific life, characterised in many 
instances by ecological crisis, economic dislocation and political marginalisation. 
In making these connections, citizens groups and NGOs have increasingly discovered that 
the struggles they wage and the broader economic and geopolitical structures they 
confront are shared by other communities across space. That has given rise to emerging 
transnational solidarities across Asia and the Pacific. 34 "As the struggle is a global 
31 Ibid. See chapter 5 for the militarising strand in Australia's own foreign policies. 
32 For a good illustration of the alternative "security" and "development" agendas see Asia-Pacific 
People's Forum on Peace and Development (1989) "Document: The Manila Declaration. Statement of the 
Asia-Pacific People's Conference on Peace and Development" Alternatives 14: pp.371-375. Making a 
Stand, Claiming a Future: A Sustainable People's Agenda for the 21st Century. Proceedings of the Asia-
Pacific NGO Conference for the World Summit for Social Development. International Institute for Rural 
Reconstruction: Silang, Philippines. INGI (1990) "Democratising Development: 1990 INGI Statement" 
Inside Indonesia June: pp.32-33. 
33 According to Walker, it this capacity to make connections that is the defining feature of critical social 
movements. Walker, R.B.J. (1988) One World, Many Worlds p.3. See also Falk, R. (1992) Explorations 
at the Edge of Time pp.125-129. 
34 Mapping these regional coalitions is a difficult enterprise as they often represent temporary strategic 
alliances rather than permanent structures. Some existing coalitions include: the Asian NGO Coalition 
for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), the Asian Alliance of Appropriate Technology 
Partners (APPR01ECH Asia), the Center for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia 
(CENDHRRA), the Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD), the Southeast Asia Rural 
Reconstruction Association (SARRA), the Indonesian Forum for International Development (INFID), 
The Asia-Pacific Centre for Justice and Peace (Washington D.C.) Asia-Pacific People's Forum on Peace 
and Development, Asia Monitor Resource Centre (Hong Kong), Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
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political struggle", observes Muto Ichiyo, "it is essential that alliances are forged between 
communities and movements of the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries to 
bring about the democratization of the global power center and the redistribution of 
global power and to create sustainable and alternative transborder systems and 
relations".35 One example of this is the People's Agricultural Plan 21 (PAP 21) which has 
involved an ambitious program between the grassroots communities of Japanese 
consumer cooperatives and the farming communities of the Negros Islands in the 
Philippines. 36 This program has been designed to tum the monocultural plantation 
economy of Negros into a people-centred economy based upon self-reliant, organic and 
integrated agriculture supplying Japanese consumer cooperatives with chemical free 
produce. This has represented an alternative producer-consumer network that bypasses 
normal agricultural markets dominated by large agribusiness. 
Another example of regional coalition building has been emergence of a range of 
coalitions of NGOs recently. These have tended to coalesce around the organisation of 
"counter-conferences" to more formal intergovernmental meetings, such as the official 
APEC and social development summits hosted by regional governments. 37 Addressing 
issues such as gender, human rights, indigenous peoples, denuclearisation and regional 
cooperation, NGOs have skilfully exploited media coverage of official events to promote 
and publicise their own critical message. Hence, the organisation of counter-conferences 
consisting of critical scholars, activists and ordinary citizens alongside the formal 
meetings of officialdom has served to juxtapose far-reaching NGO proposals for change 
against the official orthodoxy of "more of the same". This has have effectively disclosed 
the policy paralysis of official responses to growing global crises. 
The international networking efforts of NGOs and other citizens' movements have been 
aided by the development of new communication technologies in which the internet, in 
particular, has become an important way of establishing new transnational relations. This 
Movement, Asia-Pacific Peoples' Environment Network. One recent source that explicitly deals with 
these coalitions is Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.) (1995) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific 
Community: Non-Government Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community. 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan Centre for International Exchange: Tokyo. 
35 Ichiyo, Muto (1994) "Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development" p.33. 
36 Ibid. p.34. See also Ampo 20 (4) 1988: pp.8-40 and 24 (2) 1993 pp.47-53 
37 For reports and summaries of these counter-conferences see: Asia-Pacific Forum for Social 
Development (1994) Making a Stand, Claiming a Future. Asia-Pacific Forum for Social Development 
(1994) A Call for a Fundamental Change of Course: Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific NGO Forum on 
Social Development. The People's Alliance for Social Development- Asia-Pacific: Manila. Asia-Pacific 
NGO Conference on Human Rights (1993) Our Voice: Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights: 
Repon of the Asia-Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights and NGOs Statements to the Asian 
Regional Meeting. Asian Cultural Forum on Development and Asian Regional intergovernmental 
Meeting: Bangkok. "Statement from the 1995 NGO Forum on APEC: Excerpts from the Conferences". 
Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 26 (4): pp.18-36. Non-Governments Organisations and Indigenous 
Peoples of the Pacific (1994) Pacific NGO Call for Action and Equal Pannership on Population and 
Sustainable Development. Nadi: Fiji. 
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phenomenon has illustrated the positive potential of grass-roots globalisation, in contrast 
to the dangerous implications of globalisation-from-above which I have outlined in earlier 
chapters. 38 These emergent forms of transnational practice are based upon the kind of 
postmodem reframing of identity which I touched upon earlier in this chapter. Hence, 
rather than constituting identity in terms of a shared attachment to one or another 
totalising ideal, social movements are typically made up of heterogeneous local 
communities representing a plurality of interests and objectives. As Anna Yeatman has 
pointed out, in contrast to conventional political strategies, social movements do not: 
totalise the differently motivated emancipatory struggles and convert them into 
the voices of the one, singular, rational subject. Theirs is an emancipatory 
politics of exploring what it means to develop the pragmatics of self-
determination when there is no [autonomous] self in question, only selves who 
are positioned in different ways ... [social movements] do not conduct 
themselves in terms of an homogeneous movement identity in relation to which 
individual adherents discipline and subject themselves. They eschew the idea of 
a shared or common culture. Instead, the identity of a movement arises out of a 
politics of affinity between subjects who continually reinterpret the movement 
and its goals in relation to the changing character of their own personal 
histories. 39 
This reframing of identity contrasts with conventional definitions of the subject as an 
autonomous, unified self that incorporates others into a common identity. In contrast, 
social movements recognise the interdependence of self/other as the basis of an 
alternative framing of identity founded upon a relational sense of self. In recognising the 
shortcomings of traditional revolutionary strategies, therefore, social movements avoid 
the modem impulse to totalise resistance into one grand struggle. They adopt instead a 
pluralist orientation by acknowledging difference and diversity within broader 
cooperative arrangements that build connections and affinities between peoples and 
cultures. 40 Engaging in emerging techniques of transnational coalition-building, social 
movements are becoming an important source of alternative understandings of identity at 
a time when territoriality has unravelled as the sole basis for organising political space. 
In articulating the multiple non-territorial identities of gender, class, ecology and ethnicity 
- identities which by their very nature transgress state boundaries - contemporary 
social movements have displayed a heightened sensitivity toward the deterritorialisation 
and transnationalisation of global life. Here we have seen how the flows of postmodernity 
increasingly interpenetrate everyday practices, collapsing the global and regional into the 
local. Responding to these flows, social movements have displayed a simultaneously local 
and transnational orientation. Thus, NGO activists have sought to articulate local 
38 An outstanding example of this is APRENET, an internet site bringing together a range of critical 
resources on the Asia-Pacific. See http://www.miutilus.org/nautilus 
39 Yeatman, A. (1994) Postmodern Revisionings of the Political. Routledge: New York. pp.5, 118-9. 
40 Ibid p.7. 
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grassroots interests at the same time as recognising the regionalised and globalised frame 
of reference they must negotiate within the world capitalist system. Working at this 
local/regional/global intersection, social movements across Asia and the Pacific have 
articulated emerging decentred cartographies based upon flows and connections rather 
than the fixed territorial maps of foreign policy discourse.41 
The recent successes of the anti-nuclear and peace movement in the region represents a 
concrete example of the ways in which social movements have constituted alternative 
regional identities. Those successes have included the New Zealand Government's 
banning of visits by American nuclear warships; the breakdown of ANZUS; the creation 
and subsequent strengthening of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; the upholding of 
the nuclear free constitution of Palau; the decision by the French Government to cease all 
nuclear testing in the Pacific; and the Philippine Government's decision to terminate the 
lease to the Subic Naval base.42 What is notable about these victories is how the Pacific 
peace movement has deployed an alternative spatial cartography to the dominant 
territorial code of representation of Western geopolitics which has objectified the Asia-
Pacific as a "security commodity" to be struggled over by external powers.43 In contrast, 
the activism of regional peace movements has been underpinned by understandings of the 
Asia-Pacific as a region victimised by war preparations within a larger history of Western 
colonialism and indigenous resistance.44 
In drawing upon this alternative regional cartography, Pacific peace NGOs have 
redefined the notion of regional security. They have not only been concerned with a 
larger set of social relations in which forms of gender, class and ethnic domination have 
been viewed as important sources of insecurity and violence. In articulating these non-
territorial security issues, regional social movements have attempted to recover the 
polyvocal histories and interests of trans-Pacific life through conceptions of space 
deriving from everyday social relations, rather than the territorial abstractions of foreign 
policy discourse. In doing so, they have redefined the "Asia-Pacific" as a hybridised space 
of cultural difference encompassing a field of multiple subjects and histories - a 
definition consonant with the decentred condition of contemporary global life and the 
breakdown in the traditional ordering of global relations into domestic selves and foreign 
others 
By adopting this form of "critical geopolitics", trans-Pacific social movements have 
formulated alternative forms of regionalism. As Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik have noted, 
the coalitions and alliances being formed by a range of Pacific and Asian peoples have 
given rise to "critical regionalism" conceived as both "a strategic coalition linking diverse 
41 Dalby, S. (1996) "Continent Adrift?: Dissident Security Discourse and the Australian Geopolitical 
Imagination" Australian Journal of International Affairs 50 (1): p.75. 
42 Bello, W. (1992) People and Power in the Pacific pp.119-120. 
43 Dalby, S. (1996) "Continent Adrift?" p.71. 
44 Ibid. 
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spaces and times [and] a strategy for doing transnational battle in de-sublimating the 
historically repressed and ethically silenced subjects of the nation-state".45 Dirlik and 
Wilson have illustrated how the complex networks and linkages that criss-cross Asia and 
the Pacific "do not belong exclusively to circulations of hegemonic power" but rather 
have also characterised the recent emergence of new postmodern subjectivities based 
upon local and transnational communities offering the possibility for a counterhegemonic 
future.46 By engaging in transnational politics, critical social movements have not only 
sought to reclaim regionalism as a basis for articulating the pluralism of Asian and Pacific 
societies but also to recapture the political import of the "Asia-Pacific" as a region with a 
long history of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles.47 
I have sought to examine above the proliferation of regional social movements over the 
past several decades and their formulation of alternative regional cartographies. In 
redefming the Asia-Pacific in terms of the non-territorial identities and everyday practices 
of regional life, social movements have expanded existing agendas of security and 
development pursued by foreign policy-makers. This has been exemplified in the key role 
that social movements played in opening up New Zealand's foreign policy process to 
public participation in the 1980s which paved the way for the successful introduction of 
nuclear free legislation in New Zealand.48 As Simon Dalby has suggested, not only did 
this open up New Zealand's foreign policy to the perspectives of ordinary citizens but 
also served, at least momentarily, to reconceptualise New Zealand's place in the world 
away from European preoccupations and towards an understanding of the country as a 
regional nation with Pacific interests, concerns and responsibilities.49 In the final part of 
this thesis, I want to explore how a similar revisioning of "Australia's place in the world" 
might be secured through opening Australian foreign policy to the voices of critical social 
movements and their alternative cartographies of region, state and identity. 
Reformulating Australian Foreign Policy 
How, then, might the alternative cartographies produced by critical social movements 
outlined above promote an expanded agenda of regional engagement in Australian 
foreign policy? More specifically, how might it be possible to subject foreign policy to the 
grassroots perspectives of citizens groups and other NGOs so as to redefine regional 
engagement? That involves, I argue, thinking beyond the prevailing focus on states elites 
in favour of a non-territorial orientation centring on ecological, gender, and other 
marginalised perspectives. It also involves opening up foreign policy to the non-statist 
45 Dirlik, A. and Wilson, R. (1994) "Introduction: Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production" 
Boundary 2 21 (1): pp.11-12. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Hook, D. (1988) "Focus on the Asia-Pacific Region" Journal of Peace Research 25 (4): pp.335-336. 
48 Camilleri, J. (1992) "New Approaches to Regional Security" p.174-175., Bello, W. (1992) People and 
Power in the Pacijicp.ll7. Dalby, S. (1995) "Continent Adrift" p.21. 
49 Dalby, S. (1990) "Dealignment Discourse: Thinking Beyond the Blocs" Current Research on Peace 
and Violence. 13 (4): p.l51. 
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knowledges and non-territorial identities articulated by critical social movements as a way 
to reclaim the diversity of the Asia-Pacific. The task before contemporary policy-makers, 
therefore, is one of deterritorialising the dominant modes of foreign policy and the trade 
and security-driven agendas of regional engagement 
This thesis has sought to make a modest contribution to this task through denaturalising 
the territorial logic of Western geopolitics from which Australian policy-makers have 
derived their major assumptions. Thus, I have shown how the dominant representations 
of Australian foreign policy have been the product of a narrow discursive regime of 
Western geopolitics that has reduced the complexities of Asian and Pacific societies to 
realist threat scenarios and liberal celebrations of the region's economic miracle. In 
denaturalising such images, this thesis has displaced the territorial representations of state 
and region as the basis for understanding regional life. In this vacated space, I have 
sought to examine the non-territorial knowledges articulated by the dissenting voices of 
marginalised peoples, indigenous communities, migrants, refugees and social movements. 
This strategy of displacement and denaturalisation can be connected to a larger 
democratising agenda directed at opening up the debate on defence and foreign policy. 
This agenda has been driven by the growing realisation that without increased community 
participation in the foreign policy process, the notoriously secretive and closed processes 
that characterised major foreign policy decisions in the past will simply be reproduced in 
the future. We have seen many examples of this undue secrecy in the preceding chapters 
- Menzies untruthful statements to the parliament about the basis of the request for 
Australian troop participation in the Vietnam War; Hawke's commitment of forces to the 
recent Gulf War which he made without public or parliamentary consultation; or the 
recent signing of the Australia-Indonesia security treaty, the negotiations over which 
were deliberately kept secret in order to circumvent public debate and exclude dissenting 
voices opposed to Australia's close relations with the Soeharto regime. Not surprisingly, 
this history has led to a policy disposition characterised by its closure and elitism not only 
in the ways through which policy has been formulated but in the voices that Australian 
policy-makers and diplomats have tended to listen to in other societies. This is a crucial 
point for those interested in a more open debate for, as Joseph Camilleri has argued, so 
long as foreign policy is regarded as the exclusive preserve of military and state elites a 
democratic politics will remain elusive. 50 
In the face of such a secretive and closed policy-making process, a range of people have 
began to call for a more open and transparent debate on foreign and defence policy. 
Exemplary here has been the Secure Australia Project (SAP) which emerged out of a 
concern on the part of a group of critical intellectuals and activists at the growing 
5° Camilleri, J. (1992) "New Approaches to Regional Security: The Asia-Pacific Context" p.175. 
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militarisation of Australian defence and foreign policy.51 Amongst SAP's proposals has 
been the call to establish community-based inquiries on Australia's foreign relations 
designed to elicit a range of contributions from community and citizens' groups. SAP has 
also called for a full-scale official inquiry into Australia's defence and security policies and 
the reassertion of parliament over the executive in policy-making in which "executive 
decisions on foreign policy would be placed under the scrutiny of parliament, which 
would in tum be provided with greatly expanded information and a capacity for 
independent analysis".52 Such proposals would go a considerable way to opening up 
debate on foreign policy and creating the conditions in which policy-makers would 
become more attentive to perspectives traditionally marginalised from foreign policy 
formulation. 
The Amnesty International Parliamentary Group is a good example of the ways that 
policy can be opened up to the voices of social movements. 53 The kinds of citizen 
diplomacy carried out by organisations such as Amnesty International are becoming an 
increasingly important dynamic of global affairs, particularly in providing a weathervane 
of popular opinion for political leaders. Australian policy-makers would do well to 
engender policy-formulation processes more open to such forces - seeing in such 
movements an opportunity to elicit grassroots support for foreign policy initiatives. For 
their part, social movements and citizens groups could reciprocate through disseminating 
information and knowledge about the benefits and logic of certain policies, thereby 
contributing to a general democratic renewal of the policy-making process. As it is at 
present, Australia's attempts to "engage with Asia" has elicited a backlash manifested in 
both the emergence of the recent "race debate" provoked by Pauline Hanson and the 
massive electoral defeat of the Keating Government which was viewed as elitist and 
detached from the everyday lives of ordinary Australians. 
In espousing a democratising agenda, however, it is not enough merely to promote 
greater public participation in formal political processes. Rather, democratising foreign 
policy must be underpinned by a more fundamental semiotic/discursive politics that 
challenges dominant territorial representations through which our policy-makers have 
reduced the "Asia-Pacific" both to a geostrategic threat and a miracle economy. Hence, 
realist threat scenarios have provided the discursive underpinnings of Australia's 
militaristic defence policy based upon the acquisition of high-tech weapons systems with 
51 Kettle, St. J. and Smith, G. (eds.) (1992) Threats without Enemies. Pluto: Sydney. G. Cheeseman, and 
St. J. Kettle (eds.) (1990) The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security. Pluto: 
Sydney. See also Cheeseman, G. and Bruce, R. (eds.) (1996) Discourses of Danger and Dread 
Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking after the Cold War. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. 
Cheeseman, G. (1993) The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence since Vietnam. Longman 
Cheshire: Melbourne. 
52 Camilleri, J. (1992) "New Approaches to Regional SecJ.Irity" p.175. 
53 Russell, I. (1992) "Australia's Human Rights Policy: From Evatt to Evans" in I. Russell, P. Van Ness 
and Beng-Huat Chua (eds.) Australia's Human Rights Diplomacy. Australian Foreign Policy Papers. 
Australian National University: Canberra. p.30. 
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long-range projection capabilities. Similarly, liberal representations of the "miracle 
economy" have led to a trade-driven diplomacy in which policy-makers have celebrated 
global capitalism as an opportunity to expand export markets while remaining silent on 
the economic dislocation engendered by expanding capitalist relations. 
Without challenging these deeply-entrenched representations, a more democratic, 
inclusive foreign policy will remain elusive. This lesson is evident in the most significant 
geopolitical event of our times, namely, the demise of the communist bloc in Eastern 
Europe signalled by the fall of the Berlin Wall. Symbolising more than simply a direct 
physical challenge to the East German state, the fall of the Berlin Wall came to constitute 
a key signifying moment in the "fall" of communism, representing a discursive challenge 
to the practices that imaginatively constituted fixed boundaries between an inside and 
outside. The destruction of the Wall by ordinary East German citizens was as much an 
imaginative spatial practice as it was a physical act of defiance - a practice that, in 
breaking down traditional geopolitical boundaries, disclosed the arbitrariness of the East 
German state and its lack of legitimacy. 
Democratising Australian foreign policy, therefore, entails not only opening up formal 
political processes to public participation but also challenging the exclusionary discursive 
practices of Australian foreign policy. To this end, this chapter has sought to open up 
foreign policy perspectives to the non-territorial identities and nomadic knowledges 
articulated by critical social movements. I argued that subjecting foreign policy to these 
marginalised voices offers the possibility of an expanded agenda of regional engagement 
consonant with the deterritorialised realities of contemporary global life. Here we saw 
how an alternative cartography encompassing a logic of flows and connections offers a 
more adequate basis for understanding IR in the 1990s. I want to conclude this chapter 
by examining how these alternative understandings might lend themselves to specific 
policy articulations in reframing Australia's contemporary regional engagement. 
i. From the American Alliance to Meaningful Regional Engagement 
To reconstruct foreign policy in any meaningful way involves fundamentally reimagining 
Australia's place in the world. The "White Australia" traditions of the past which tied 
Australian security interests into the US strategic system are no longer relevant in a 
decentred world of proliferating identities and histories. In their place we need to 
develop a self-reflective foreign policy that locates Australia within a hybridised Asian-
Pacific space where "our" identity is contingent upon the identity of regional "others". To 
engage with the region in any meaningful sense, therefore, is to affirm the diversity and 
difference of trans-Pacific life as the basis for organising Australia's relations with the 
world. Hence, just as Donald Horne has argued that the present republican debate should 
be seen as an oppmtunity to engage in a broader debate about who "we" are,54 so too 
should regional engagement be imagined in equally expansive ways. This would include 
54 Home, D. (1996) "Keatings unfinished business" The Australian 17-18 February: p.37. 
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seeing in regional engagement the possibility of rejuvenating the democratic process and 
of opening up a new discursive and imaginative space to reorganise Australia's relations 
with the world. 
That would involve delinking Australian security interests from the US strategic alliance 
in favour of formulating a regionally focused security policy. In acknowledging the 
interdependence of self/other and Australia/the region, this thesis has undermined the 
major assumption upon which the Australian-US Alliance is predicated: namely, the need 
for Australia, conceived as an outpost of Western civilisation, to be protected and made 
autonomous from the region "out there". Indeed, with the increasing interdependence of 
global political life, it is no longer credible to rely on Great and Powerful Friends - this 
is particularly true at a time when the dangers currently arising are shared across national 
boundaries and are far removed from traditional military threats of the Cold War. 
Yet, despite this changing global context, policy-makers have continued to 
unambiguously align Australian security interests with those of the US, pursuing a high 
tech weapons acquisition program tied to the US strategic system. It is worth noting that 
while the Australian Government maintains a $10 billion annual defence budget (which 
until recently exceeded the total defence spending of ASEAN put together), it is cutting 
back in almost all other sectors of government spending. This has included cuts to 
spending on diplomatic training which could provide a cheap alternative to maintaining a 
large defence budget 
The basis for an adequate post-Cold War security policy, therefore, rests upon 
developing a viable and cost-effective defence posture that recognises the growing 
interdependence of global political life. That policy would focus on non-military means to 
achieve a stable regional order through promoting a sense of strategic community 
amongst Australia and its regional neighbours. A proposal of this kind has been put 
forward by SAP member Graeme Cheeseman who has argued that we need a less 
expensive and less dependent set of security policies focused on people-centred security 
rather than an offensive posture designed to project force into the region.55 This would 
involve, in particular, eliminating the clearly offensive elements of Australia's current 
force structure at the same time as promoting diplomacy and dialogue as a means of 
resolving regional and global conflicts. This alternative security approach, for instance, 
would promote diplomatic efforts to establish a regional denuclearised and demilitarised 
zone in the belief that the best way of achieving a stable and secure regional order is 
through demilitarising regional political relations rather than encouraging increased 
defence spending. These initiatives would, in turn, build on and expand existing 
diplomatic arrangements such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, rather than 
reproducing the history of Australian diplomacy in seeking to water down such 
initiatives. 
55 G. Cheeseman (1993) The Search for Self-Reliance p.215. 
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Whilst Australian policy-makers have dismissed such alternative approaches as unrealistic 
and unattainable, one need only look to New Zealand to find an example where creative 
thinking and the influence of social movements has led to a reframing of foreign and 
defence policy. Here New Zealand policy-makers have dealigned their security planning 
from ANZUS while avoiding militaristic defmitions of security. The New Zealand Labor 
Party, for instance, has favoured a post-Cold War security posture in which its defence 
forces are organised primarily on the basis of policing fishing zones, providing disaster 
relief, assist in aid projects and furnishing peace keeping forces. 56 This kind of policy 
platform is far removed from Australia's current emphasis on developing high tech 
offensive force capabilities within the American Alliance designed to counter traditional 
military threats. 
ii. Beyond Strategic Integration: Acknowledging Difference and Change in the Region 
As indicated throughout this thesis, in attempting to integrate Australian security interests 
more fully into the region, policy-makers have developed closer relations with many of 
the region's ruling military regimes. Through buttressing these undemocratic and 
repressive forces, contemporary policy-makers have actually undermined Australian 
security interests rather than enhanced them. I have argued that the key to this problem 
has been the territorial knowledges deployed by policy-makers - knowledges which 
have reduced Asian and Pacific societies to expressions of state elites, conflating culture 
in general with the culture of elites, and confining regional engagement to an engagement 
of states. 
Proposing an alternative agenda of regional diplomacy, therefore, presupposes 
developing understandings of regional life sensitive to the differences within Asian and 
Pacific societies. That task involves disaggregating the statist cartographies of prevailing 
foreign policy through disclosing the pluralistic nature of regional life in all its complexity 
and diversity. Recognising pluralism as the basis for understanding the Asia-Pacific 
requires more complex three-dimensional depictions of political space and identity that 
encompass not only forces maintaining the status quo but also voices calling for change, 
voices which, as we saw in Chapter 8, have become increasingly insistent across the 
Pacific recently. 
Framing Australian diplomacy in terms of this acknowledgment of pluralism and 
difference makes possible a more adequate, less elitist post-Cold War foreign policy 
designed to strategically negotiate the contending forces of the region, rather than merely 
taking the status quo as permanent and given. In Australia's relations with Indonesia, for 
instance, an adequate policy would be based less upon giving unequivocal support to the 
Soeharto regime than on simultaneously encouraging the Indonesian Government to open 
up its political processes and institutions to popular participation while recognising and 
56 James, C. (1996) "Trans-Tasman defence worries" The Australian 4 October: p.15. 
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supporting broader democratising forces in Indonesia. While in the short term this 
realignment of Australian policy might cause some irritations between the two 
governments, in the long term, such a policy would serve to deepen and broaden regional 
engagement 
There is a precursor to this proposed policy shift in the foreign policies of the Chifley 
Government in the late 1940s. Here, as we have seen, the Indonesian independence 
struggle was strongly supported and promoted by Chifley and Burton out of a strong 
commitment to anti-colonialism and self-determination, in the face of strong resistance 
from European colonialists. That represented essentially the only time that Australian 
foreign policy has spilled out of the state-based discourse of Western geopolitics. In other 
words, Chifley and Burton aligned our foreign policy to regional forces of change, and in 
doing so, established close relations outside of the status quo of European colonialism. 
Such policies produced an image of Australia as an ally of what Jim Cairns has called "the 
emerging forces of Asia".57 Subsequent governments have benefited greatly from this 
image. In aligning Australia's diplomacy to the "emerging forces" of anti-colonialism and 
democratisation today, contemporary policy-makers could in similar ways build the 
foundations for an alternative regional diplomacy into the next century. That would be 
based upon meaningful grassroots engagement and wide-ranging relations with the 
communities of the Asia-Pacific. 
To date, however, Australian diplomacy has been characterised by its timidness and 
sycophancy on the issue of supporting democratisation and human rights in the region. 
This has contrasted with the more assertive diplomacy it has pursued in promoting 
democratic change in other parts of the world. Timid regional diplomacy has made 
Australia a popular scapegoat in the domestic politics of some regional countries, as our 
zealotry in engaging with regional elites has come at the cost of losing the kind of respect 
that comes to those confident enough to openly assert their own beliefs without the fear 
of differing with others. This timidness can be largely explained by the anxieties about 
place that continue to haunt contemporary foreign policy. Australia today is a very 
anxious place to live in, where public discourse is dominated by a broader cultural crisis, 
and where fears of being left out of the region abound. This has reproduced the long-
standing sense of insecurity and isolation "in Asia" that has traditionally defmed 
Australian thinking on international affairs. 
Understanding the region in terms of its heterogeneity, however, opens up a different 
disposition, allowing Australians to feel more comfortable and less anxious about their 
sense of otherness in the region. Indeed, as I have sought to highlight in this chapter, if 
the concept of the Asia-Pacific has any meaning at all it is that we are all merely others in 
the region. Hence, just as the Australia has had its differences with the Malaysia, so too 
57 Cairns, J. (1966) Living with Asia. Second Edition. Lansdowne Press: Melbourne. 
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has Malaysia with Indonesia, the Philippines with Singapore, Hong Kong with China, and 
so on. 
Approaching the region on the basis of its vast differences introduces an ethical, post-
sovereign and postmodern position into foreign policy. This particular ethical position, 
however, has been precluded within prevailing policies. This is clear in the ways in which 
contemporary policy-makers have reproduced the dominant territorial inscription of 
global political life. Here we have seen how the sharp demarcation of political space into 
territorial states has precluded the development of transborder dialogues in favour of a 
principle of "non-intervention". This has served to authorise the sovereign jurisdiction of 
the state over a fixed territory, thereby legitimising the often brutal rule of elites across 
Asia and the Pacific. 58 
Framed via these territorial understandings, Australian regional diplomacy has become 
detached from broader international efforts to formulate lasting resolutions to some of 
the region's most intractable security problems, such as in East Timor, Bougainville and 
West Papua. Peter King, for instance, has proposed that one way the Australian 
Government could contribute to international diplomacy is to promote the creative use of 
multilateral forums and "quasi-state" arrangements to solve long-standing regional 
disputes. 59 According to King, Australia's policy toward Papua New Guinea could make 
more use of political and diplomatic levers in order to combat militarisation, ecological 
destruction and disintegration. This could include using Australia's substantial aid 
package to PNG as a bargaining chip to encourage Port Moresby to seek a negotiated 
settlement on Bougainville and to crackdown on corruption endemic in government and 
business circles. 60 
iii. Countering Globalisation-from-Above 
Seeking to expand regional engagement in the terms I have outlined above also has wide 
ramifications for APEC and the trade liberalisation agenda promoted by contemporary 
policy-makers. As Jenny Wilkinson has observed, the "key problem of APEC is its 
undemocratic nature" and the "atmosphere of secrecy and unaccountability that 
surrounds" it 61 This lack of accountable and democratic decision-making is indicative of 
the entire regional free trade agenda that has come to dominate contemporary foreign 
policy. As we have seen, a narrow neoclassical brand of economic diplomacy has been 
58 Of course, Australian national and state governments have also used the principles of "sovereignty" 
and "non-intervention" to justify actions viewed with opprobrium by the international community such as 
lax environmental control, attempts to outlaw homosexuality and other human rights abuses. This has 
been particularly the case in the perilous state of many aboriginal communities. 
59 King, P. (1992) "Breaking Deadlocks: Peace-Making Opportunities for Australia in East Timor, West 
Papua and Papua New Guinea" in G. Smith and St. John Kettle (eds.) Threats without Enemies: 
Rethinking Australia's Security. Pluto Press: Sydney. p.23L 
60 Ibid. 
61 Wilkinson, J. (1995) "Dealing with a Fiction: The NGO Conference on APEC" Ampo: Japan-Asia 
Quarterly Review 26 (4): p.8. 
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pursued by a small group of professional economists as the basis for Australia's regional 
engagement. This group has risen to occupy key advisory roles against the backdrop of 
the broader rationalisation of the public sphere in Australia. Generated by these 
processes, contemporary foreign policy has become largely reduced to a technical interest 
in trade and securing export markets. 
It is in this context that a range of regional NGOs, including Community Aid Abroad 
(CAA) and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), have called for a 
democratisation of the trade liberalisation agenda. To this end, a major coalition of NGOs 
has sought to have an input into the APEC process through proposing the establishment 
of a social and environmental forum in APEC. 62 According to its proponents, this forum 
would address those critical social and environmental issues marginalised by APEC' s 
strict focus on commercial transactions, such as the potentially detrimental social effects 
of liberalisation on marginal communities, the need for social clauses within trading 
agreements, and concerns over increasing environmental degradation caused by 
unregulated production and trade. 
As a more specific part of this social and environmental forum, CAA and ACFOA have 
proposed the formation of an Australian advisory council to government made up of 
various sectors of the community, including NGOs, consumer groups, farmers, welfare 
groups and development agencies. 63 In seeking to subject the regional trade agenda to 
such voices, NGOs and other community groups have challenged the increasing 
professionalisation and corporatisation of foreign policy. For these groups, foreign policy 
issues are simply too important to be left to trade and foreign policy professionals alone. 
Instead of promoting "globalisation-from-above" and its deleterious effects, NGOs have 
advanced grassroots globalisation aimed at restoring the balance of power between 
capital and labour as the basis for sustainable global development in the future. As a frrst 
step, they have proposed introducing labour and environmental clauses in trade 
agreements, which would contribute to halting the downward spiral in wages of recent 
decades, while preventing the relocation of heavy-polluting industries into the Asia-
Pacific in search of "pollution havens". On its own, however, this proposal would be 
viewed with hostility by developing countries as an attack on the competitiveness of their 
economies and a form of backdoor protectionism by advanced industrialised economies 
unable to compete in the global marketplace. It is for this reason that any proposal linking 
trade agreements with labour rights or environmental clauses must be tied to a broader 
agenda of global redistributive justice. That agenda would be directed at growing global 
62 Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers. Community Aid Abroad Background Report No.7. 
Melbourne. p.90. Bello, W. (1992) People and Power in the Pacific p.123. Community Aid Abroad 
(1995) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Its Effects on the Poor. Polliewatch. Briefing Paper No.23: 
Fitzroy, Melbourne. "Slow down the APEC Process, say NGOs" Third World Resurgence. No.64, 1995: 
pp.18-19. 
63 Atkinson, J. (1995) APEC- Winners and Losers p.90. 
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disparities in power and wealth and would be designed to promote the kinds of human-
centred, ecologically sustainable modes of development articulated by critical social 
movements. This would not only have a large constituency of peoples in Asia alarmed at, 
and marginalised by, prevailing top-down development strategies- including students, 
activists, women, the rural poor and ordinary citizens - but would also elicit support 
from environmentalists and workers in advanced industrialised economies. 
While this proposed agenda would involve a radical reformulation of foreign policy 
objectives, its prescriptions have found expression in the recent human development 
reports of an organisation no less influential than the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). The UNDP has been at the centre of global efforts to reformulate 
more sustainable approaches to development and security. Australian policy-makers need 
to take seriously UNDP's proposals on the reduction of debt and global military spending 
as the basis for an alternative agenda of global redistributive justice. As the UNDP' s 
Human Development Report 1992 makes clear, even a small reduction in world-wide 
military spending would make considerable amounts of money available for meeting basic 
needs in developing countries. 64 A three percent drop in total world-wide military 
spending, for instance, would by the year 2000 yield a peace dividend of 1.5 trillion 
dollars to be reallocated for grassroots development in poorer communities around the 
globe.65 
Similarly, measures designed to relieve pressures on debtor countries by reducing debt 
repayments - the major mechanism through which rich industrialised economies have 
appropriated a massive transfer of wealth and resources from the Third World - would 
also go a long way to achieving more equitable global economic relations. In taking 
seriously these kinds of options and promoting them through an active diplomacy, policy-
makers could realign Australia to the decolonising forces of the region while contributing 
to the formulation of creative redistributive solutions to the structural problems of recent 
globalisation. 
CJCJCJ 
Of course, subjecting the whole APEC process to public participation requires an entirely 
different foreign policy disposition from the one presently espoused by policy-makers, a 
disposition that I have given articulation to in the foregoing discussion. In doing so, this 
chapter has attempted to think beyond the realist-liberal impasse of Australian foreign 
policy through examining alternative ways of thinking in the space beyond Western 
geopolitics. Located in this space, I argued, have been a range of critical social 
64 United Nations Development Program (1992) Human Development Report. Oxford University Press: 
New York. pp.89-90. Originally cited in Falk, R. (1995) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global 
Politics p.191. General infonnation on UNDP is contained on the World Wide Web, see 
http://www .undp.org/ 
65 United Nations Development Program (1992) Human Development Report. pp.89-90. 
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movements which have become an important source of alternative understandings in 
contemporary political life. Here we saw how social movements have pursued a form of 
critical regionalism based upon people-centred and ecologically sustainable modes of 
development and security. My aim in examining these movements has been to explore 
how the alternative understandings they have engendered might be concretely articulated 
in Australian foreign policy. That challenge, I argued, not only presupposes a broader 
democratisation of the policy-making process, but also involves an expanded definition of 
regional engagement based upon non-military security issues and marginalised identities. 
And whilst the prospects of achieving this outcome look increasingly bleak in Howard's 
Australia, it is one that is absolutely necessary for Australians in the 1990s seeking a 
more equitable, just and sustainable trans-Pacific future. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the broader modes of discourse through which the societies of 
the "Asia-Pacific" have traditionally been understood in Australian foreign policy. In 
Chapter 1 I identified a larger Western discourse of IR and geopolitics which Australian 
policy-makers have drawn upon to understand and make sense of the alien societies that 
surrounded them. I located this discourse in terms of a wider set of understandings 
associated with the emergence of a distinctly territorial worldview in post-Renaissance 
Europe. This world view, I argued, has became the basis for understanding and organising 
global relations in the modem era. 
Having established these broader modes of discourse, Chapters 2 to 6 presented an 
historical narrative of the various ways that the "Asia-Pacific" has been understood by 
policy-makers via the territorial worldview of Western IR. This narrative represented a 
broader interpretive history of Australia's regional diplomacy. Here it was shown how 
regional diplomacy has fluctuated between realist understandings of the region as a 
strategic threat and liberal images of the region as an object of development, trade and 
cooperation. Far from seeking to present a comprehensive history. in these chapters, I 
sought to identify and explore certain pivotal moments in Australia's encounter with the 
societies of the Asia-Pacific. The emphasis was on the exclusions and silences of regional 
diplomacy and the ways in which this diplomacy has been based upon narrow geopolitical 
and market-based-interpretations of regional life. 
This history led me to a broader critique of Australia's contemporary regional 
engagement in the final three chapters of this work. In examining the dangerous 
implications of contemporary regional diplomacy, Chapter 7 took up where the history of 
foreign policy left off. In particular, I sought to demonstrate how the security and trade-
driven agendas presently directing foreign policy have been designed to integrate 
Australian security interests into the dominant circuits of commercial and strategic power 
in the Asia-Pacific. This has led, I argued, to a dangerous and elitist foreign policy 
perspective that has buttressed the unaccountable and undemocratic rule of repressive 
regimes in the region. Rather than enhancing regional stability and security, these policies 
have in fact undermined the long-term security goals of Australian diplomacy. 
These arguments have been confirmed by the tumultuous events that have taken place in 
the region in recent months. Thus, the currency crisis presently sweeping through 
Southeast Asia has demonstrated the brittle foundations of, what I have termed here, "the 
repressive developmentalist regimes" of the region and their high-speed economic 
strategies. This crisis has led to revised growth predictions in coming years which serves 
to challenge not only prevailing notions of the region as an economic miracle but also the 
uncritical celebration of globalising strategies by contemporary policy-makers. 
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As I showed in Chapter 7, the dangers of aligning Australian diplomacy to such unstable 
regimes have been articulated no more clearly than in Australia's relations with Indonesia. 
Widespread unrest has been the major feature of Indonesia's political landscape in recent 
years. Thus, while struggles for self-determination continue in East Timor, West Papua 
and Aceh, the grizzly spectacle of ethnic cleansing in West Kalimantan has added to the 
increasing levels of political violence in Indonesia. In Java itself, riots have erupted over 
the last 12 months, as increasing disparities of wealth and power have become a major 
source of discontent across the island. An aging Soeharto, whose regime has the dubious 
distinction of being the region's most corrupt, is becoming increasingly detached from the 
everyday realities of the people over whom he rules. This has been clearly demonstrated 
by his tardy response to the forest fires presently raging across the archipelago, caused by 
land clearing for plantations, which the Soeharto family and many of their cronies own.1 
Yet, in the face of all this, Australian policy-makers have chosen to put "all their 
diplomatic and strategic eggs into the Soeharto basket". This has included Howard's 
sending a delegation to Washington recently to impress upon the Americans the 
importance of the Soeharto regime to Western strategic interests. Given this unwavering 
support, Australian diplomacy has been characterised by a form of paralysis when 
confronted with examples of the Soeharto regime's repressive and increasingly 
unsustainable rule, exemplified in the "towering silence" that characterised the Howard 
Government's response to the 1996 Jakarta riots. 
While Chapter 7 addressed, as it were, the dominant commercial and strategic networks 
of power in the region, Chapter 8 examined a broader set of social relations located 
outside of dominant regional networks which represent a major silence of Australia's 
regional diplomacy. Thus, the policy of engaging with the region's elites has effectively 
excluded a range of non-elite identities. These have centred on the everyday realities of 
gender, grassroots development, migration, poverty, ecological destruction, economic 
marginalisation and culturalJethnic identity. Through highlighting the alternative security 
issues engendered by such realities, I argued that policy-makers have been unable to 
adequately respond to the growing complexities and polyvocal realities of contemporary 
political life across Asia and the Pacific. Instead they have grasped onto Cold War 
understandings, while remaining oblivious to the shifting definitions of work, ecology, 
migration and gender that have characterised post-Cold War global relations. 
Chapter 9 of this thesis, accordingly, concluded with a discussion of how it might be 
possible to reframe and rethink the dominant policy perspectives of Australia's regional 
diplomacy. In particular, this chapter focused on formulating an alternative policy agenda 
capable of apprehending the grassroots realities of regional life. Such realities, I argued, 
have emerged as salient security issues in the post-Cold War period. This period is 
proving to be a particularly appropriate moment to engage in such a rethinking as 
traditional geopolitical alignments have fragmented and the old certainties have collapsed. 
1 Aditjondro, G. (1997) "Smoke signals send a warning" Sydney Morning Herald 1 October: p.l5. 
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Signalling an emerging postmodem era, such fundamental changes have left very few 
fields of modem knowledge untouched. Thus, while cartography has shifted from two-
dimensional images of the geopolitical map to depictions of a complex reality of tectonic 
plates and ocean floors, scientific discourse has replaced the notion of a singular positive 
reality of post-Cartesian epistemology with an image of a complex, polysemic and 
interrelated world of chaos theory and quantum physics. 2 Meanwhile, in political and 
social theory, a range of postmodem interrogations of identity, truth and power have 
emerged to provide a salient critique of modem political thought. 3 And yet in the face of 
these transformations, Australian policy continues to be locked into perspectives drawn 
from geopolitical understandings fashioned in the 17th Century. Incarcerated within this 
post-Renaissance framework of Western IR, our policy-makers continue to deploy 
impoverished two-dimensional and linear images of the outside world. 
In critiquing these anachronistic and narrowly-conceived understandings, the overall aim 
of this thesis has been to open up a discursive space in which those excluded voices 
located on "the margins" of the Asia-Pacific become audible. This has involved what Jim 
George has called "the unspoken, unwritten, unreflected narratives of the dispossessed 
and silenced" in the region.4 By opening up a space of critique within Australian foreign 
policy, this work has rendered that which has been naturalised and dehistoricised within 
mainstream Western IR as mobile, fragile and above all contestable. 5 This form of 
critique has involved denaturalising the dominant geopolitical and market-based images 
of reality that have traditionally framed Australia's regional diplomacy. Rather than 
offering an objective, universally-valid perspective on reality, current foreign policy 
understandings are the product of a narrow Western IR discourse which has reduced the 
complexities and diversity of Asian and Pacific societies to rigid images of regional life. 
In pointing out as much, I have sought to disclose how seemingly natural identities are 
discursively constructed. Through this denaturalising strategy, this thesis has explored 
that which is left out, silenced and marginalised in prevailing discourse, attempting in the 
process to excavate those subjugated know ledges and understandings of modem political 
life that represent latent, suppressed possibilities in the present. This, in turn, has served 
to open up a space of critique and reflection in foreign policy discourse in which on-going 
attempts at naturalisation are problematised and contested. It is within the spaces cleared 
by such denaturalising strategies that other realities and identities are able to emerge. 
2 See Whitfield, P. (1994) The Image ofthe World: 20 Centuries ofWorld Maps. The British Library: 
London. Carey, J. (ed.) (1996) The Faber Book of Science. Faber: London. 
3 See Jencks, C. (ed.) (1992) The Postmodern Reader. St. Martin's Press: New York. 
4 George, J. (1996) "Quo Vadis Australia?: The Defence and Security Debate beyond the Cold War" in G. 
Cheeseman and R. Bruce (eds.) Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and 
Security Thinking after the Cold War. Allen and Unwin: Sydney. p.38. 
5 Shapiro, M.J. and Alker, H.A. (eds.) (1996) Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial 
Identities. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. p.138. 
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In deploying these strategies, this thesis has also politicised prevailing foreign policy 
understandings by disclosing what Edward Said has termed "the highly organised political 
circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced".6 Here we saw how the reality of 
the Asia-Pacific has been framed in ways that buttress the dominant politico-economic 
interests of regional life. It is the power exercised on the part of these dominant interests 
to name, classify, organise and order that I have sought to politicise and denaturalise. 
This power/knowledge nexus is disconnected within the conventional account of foreign 
policy in which IR, conceived as a preconstituted field of states and regions, represents 
the unproblematic object of foreign policy. In contrast, this thesis has refused to take for 
granted "the world as we fmd it" but has asked instead how the Asia-Pacific as a regional 
construct came into being in the first place. It has done this through examining the history 
of Australian attempts to insert the region into broader circuits of discursive, military and 
commercial power. 
In adopting this approach, I have sought to introduce a more self-reflective attitude into 
the study of foreign policy. Such an attitude is sensitive to the ways in which foreign 
policy is constitutive of the dominant identities and boundaries of modem political life 
and attuned to the shifting terrain between inside/outside, self/other, West/East and 
Australia/the region. The need for such an attitudinal shift is particularly urgent in the 
1990s not only because Australian foreign policy has been notoriously resistant to any 
kind of self-reflection in the past but because this absence of self-reflection has produced 
a contemporary policy agenda based upon increasingly outdated and inadequate 
representations of global reality. In asking questions about representation, identity and 
knowledge, therefore, this work has sought to introduce more sophisticated and nuanced 
understandings of a volatile post-Cold War arena, more able to apprehend the 
interpretive and multi-layered nature of social life. 
In response to these demands, I have also sought to contribute in a modest way to a 
broader reconstitution and reinvention of contemporary political life by a growing 
number of critical scholars, activists and citizens across the globe. In seeking to 
contribute to this project, the ultimate aim of this thesis has been to engender more 
inclusive understandings of the Asia-Pacific and foreign policy perspectives that avoid the 
violences and omissions of prevailing discourse. 
This surely is an ambitious and arduous task, which this thesis has claimed neither to have 
fully achieved nor to have addressed with any kind of fmality. Rather, what this work has 
aspired to is the introduction of a critical interpretive perspective into the study of 
Australia's engagement with the Asia-Pacific. By aspiring to this goal, the foregoing 
pages have represented an invitation, as it were, to Australia's defence and foreign policy 
community to engage in some of the themes raised in this thesis. The question now 
remains as to whether Australian policy-makers and academics will take up the challenge 
6 Said, E. (1978) Orientalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. p.IO 
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provoked by these broader critical perspectives or merely reproduce the closure and 
intolerance that has long characterised Australia's encounter with the Asia-Pacific. My 
hope is that they will choose the former course since it is only by thinking· critically that 
the present crisis of environmental dislocation and economic marginalisation will be 
adequately addressed and that a more stable, peaceful and secure region will develop in 
the next century. 
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